Preface: Jaromil's Dilemma

The title of this book is borrowed from the title that Milan Kundera did not give to the novel, *Life is Elsewhere*. "The original title of that novel," he writes, was "'The Lyrical Age.' I changed it at the last minute under pressure from friends who found it insipid and distasteful. I was foolish to give it up to them. The novel rests on certain questions: What is the lyrical attitude? How is youth a lyrical age? What is the meaning of the triad: lyricism/revolution/youth? And what is it to be a poet?"[1] Kundera's exploration of these questions through the life and early death of the main character, Jaromil, leads to a severe criticism of the self-absorbed, historically naïve character of lyricism. Jaromil is a talented young poet who is torn between his love of modern poetry and his desire to live life poetically. Such a conflict can make a fool of Jaromil the young man, but in a certain sense it cannot touch the greatness of his poetry, which makes itself true in its youthful incaution. Jaromil himself is caught in a bind which will eventually spell the death of him. The question is whether he loves Arthur Rimbaud more as a poet or as a revolutionary. He answers this question one day in the heat of passionate jealousy towards his mentor, a surrealist painter:

> He was overcome by the desire to rebel, and turning to the painter, he said:
>
> "You're always quoting Rimbaud: 'It is necessary to be absolutely modern.' I agree completely. But the absolutely modern isn't what we've been anticipating for fifty years, but on the contrary, what shocks and surprises us . The absolutely modern isn't surrealism, which has been around for a quarter of a century, but the revolution that's taking place at the moment under our eyes. The very fact that you don't understand this is quite simply proof that it's really new.
>
> Someone interrupted him: "Modern art was a movement directed against the bourgeoisie and against its world."

[1] Kundera, Milan. *The Art of the Novel*, 32.

> "Yes," said Jaromil, "but if it had really been logical in its negation of the contemporary world, it would have had to reckon with its own disappearance. It would have had to know --- and it would have had to wish --- that the revolution would create a totally new kind of art, an art in its own image."
>
> "So, you approve," said the woman with the alto voice, "of pulping Baudelaire's poetry, prohibiting all modern literature, and shoving the cubist painting in the National Gallery into the cellar?"
>
> "A revolution is an act of violence," said Jaromil, "that's well known, and surrealism itself knew very well that old-timers have to be brutally kicked off the stage, but it didn't suspect that it was one of them."[2]

And so in a moment of jealousy Jaromil decides his artistic and intellectual destiny. He renounces Rimbaud for the sake of Rimbaud's ideas. He gives up on modern poetry for the sake of modernity. He becomes a communist first and a poet second. He holds himself to this destiny even though he is a born poet, and he keeps to his renunciation even though he desperately loves Rimbaud.

In Kundera's later writings, Rimbaud's dictum will expand beyond the world of modern poetry and become the guiding principle by which Kundera understands the history of modernity as such. The avant-garde might think itself to be different than the mass society it finds itself in, but it shares it craven trust in the future.

> [The avant-garde] was possessed by an ambition to be in harmony with the future. It is true, avant-garde artists did create works that were courageous, difficult, provocative, ridiculed, but they did so in the conviction that "the spirit of the time" was with them and would soon prove them right.
>
> Once upon a time I too thought that the future was the only competent judge of our works and actions. Later on I understood that chasing after the future is the worst conformism of all, a craven flattery of the mighty. For the future is always mightier than the present. It will pass judgment on us, of course. And without any competence.[3]

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[2] Kundera, Milan. *Life is Elsewhere*, 199f.
[3] *The Art of the Novel,* 19f.

For Kundera, to embrace the future, whether it be in the name of conforming to mass culture, promoting avant-garde art, or supporting the revolution, is to embrace one's obsolescence. "To be absolutely modern means to be the ally of one's own gravediggers."[4]

In this book, I have borrowed the title *The Lyrical Age* in order to attempt a defense of modern poetry by affirming the other side of Jaromil's dilemma. While lyrical poetry is generally taken to be the genre of the lyrical subject who lives a rich inner life first and writes about it after the fact, I have attempted to interpret lyrical poetry as the genre of multiplicity, the genre of writing itself; indeed, the genre of the law of genre. Such an interpretation, I argue, depends upon developing an account of time that sets up a critical distance between two sorts of presence: a "factual" presence and a "counter-factual" presence. In this way, I seek to dissociate lyrical poetry from its involvement in Kundera's triad "lyricism/revolution/youthfulness" and instead develop a lyricism which is more critical and philosophical. I argue that the form of presence constituted in the poem is similar to the form of presence constituted in the philosophical work. By constituting this presence, both are capable of partially resisting the flow of history towards the future.

I develop this philosophical interpretation of the significance of temporality out of a reading of Martin Heidegger, and I argue that the poetry of Paul Celan exemplifies the sort of lyricism proper to it. I contrast this lyricism with the understanding of lyricism developed in Idealism and Romanticism, traditions to which both Heidegger and Celan have a complicated relationship. I also situate my treatment within the context of contemporary deconstructive readings of Celan and Heidegger. In particular, I rely heavily on the work of Jacques Derrida and Philippe

[4] Kundera, Milan. *Immortality*, 141.

Lacoue-Labarthe. While I borrow much from both idealism and deconstruction, I also try to navigate between two dangers which each tradition face. With its insistence on the greatness of the work of art, idealism risks becoming overly classicist. And with its insistence on the projective worklessness within the work of art, deconstruction risks banking too much on the future. I argue that in a certain respect Heidegger fell prey to both these dangers simultaneously. My question is whether modernity, considered lyrically, contains any philosophical possibilities that are neither contained in the past nor glimpsed on the horizon of the future.

In order to ask this question, I have had to largely rescind from an ethical or political treatment of Heidegger and Celan. Given the predominance of practical philosophy within contemporary continental philosophy and given the central role of the ethico-political in the thought of Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, Celan and even Heidegger, I ought to end my prefatory remarks with a brief explanation of why I have chosen to do so.

Throughout my discussion below, the model which I will use to understand the structure of significance of both philosophy and poetry is s*ophia*, the sort of knowing proper to theoretical philosophy. While some version of s*ophia* has long been interpreted as the principle goal of philosophical investigation, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have seen this privilege attacked and eroded. It seems that contemporary continental philosophy's suspicion of *sophia* and theoretical philosophy can be largely traced to two criticisms. First, s*ophia* is supposed to elucidate atemporal, omnipresent foundations, *archai*. And the contemporary philosophical scene, with its radical materialism and temporality, has little need for such fictions. Secondly, since Marx, the privilege of traditional theoretical philosophy has been taken as a way of avoiding taking seriously the stance of the human being as active knower and, more importantly,

as knowing actor. But philosophy ought to be practiced for the sake of the human being. If the human being is the center of philosophical activity then the central philosophical questions are practical. Theoretical philosophy's concern with all that is beyond the ken of the human being is at best misguided, and at worst escapist.

Over the course of my book, I will attempt to articulate a sense of *sophia* which is rigorously temporal and which is compatible with materialism. By explicitly owning the fictional status of *archai*, origins or essences, I will nonetheless suggest that there is a reason for thinking about them as important ontological structures. If I am successful in doing so, I do not think that the first criticism would apply to my decision to employ the model of s*ophia* in understanding the character of philosophy and poetry.

Two things need to be said about the second criticism. First, it seems to me that academia in general, and philosophy in particular, has the capacity to contribute something interesting to practical life precisely because it is not immediately involved in practical life. I remain extremely interested in the ethical questions which Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe and others have used to open up the philosophical tradition in fascinating new ways. My reasons for investigating Heidegger and Celan in the way that I do stems from the persuasiveness with which others have shown the philosophical importance of Heidegger's ethical and political blunders. But I think that their ethical inquiry raises problems of sufficient complexity that they require a certain kind of specialized, theoretical investigation. I certainly hope that I can eventually use the structures I develop in this book to show the ethical importance of the lyrical poem and of the continued relevance of the life of the mind to political life. But lyricism is a delicate phenomenon. Like certain species of the flowers it so often invokes, it might have to be raised in

a hermetically sealed environment, such as a greenhouse, before it can be transplanted into the wider world.

With this in mind, let me emphasize that I am not insisting on the priority of theoretical philosophy over practical philosophy or of other sorts of beings over the human being. What I am insisting is that theoretical philosophy has a right to a certain form of autonomy. Perhaps this autonomy exists only for the sake of the shared communal life human beings. If so, all questions must eventually be situated in an ethico-political horizon. But I take it that we as human beings are in fact interested in much more than ourselves. Perhaps Aristotle was right to claim that it is natural for human beings to wonder about questions far beyond their ken. Perhaps Kant was right to say we are stirred as much by the starry skies above as the moral laws within. If this is the case, then perhaps the ethico-political, or the ethico-communal, must be opened up to a broader set of "ethical" questions. That is not my goal here. I will have succeeded if I can merely draw attention to the strange beauty and wonder which modern philosophy and modern poetry can evoke, often in spite of themselves.

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I. The Lyrical Age: On Genre and The Origin of the Work of Art in Modernity

Introduction

In the "Epilogue" to "The Origin of the Work of Art,"[5] Martin Heidegger voices deep reservations concerning G.W.F. Hegel's famous diagnosis of the death of art. He cites three propositions from Hegel's *Aesthetics*: "Art no longer counts for us as the highest manner in which truth obtains existence for itself;" "One may well hope that art will continue to advance and perfect itself, but its form has ceased to be the highest need of spirit;" and "In all these relationships art is and remains for us, on the side of its highest vocation, something past" (qtd. at *BW*, 204f).[6] Heidegger calls for an anti-Hegelian mobilization of the resources of thought against these theses. And he calls for this as if it were not only a project for future work in the philosophy of art, but as if it were already the animating concern of the foregoing essay as a whole. In the context of this project, the value of this essay is to prepare the way for this mobilization by "first tak[ing] into consideration the essence of art" (*BW*, 205). The immediate sense of such a suggestion is clear. Against Hegel's claim that art's manner of disclosure is no longer the form in which truth is disclosed --- that prerogative has passed over into philosophy -- Heidegger asserts that in truth art should continue to play a world-disclosive role, in fact the decisive one.[7] Moreover, art sets up a meaningful world in which truth becomes a possibility as

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[5] Heidegger, Martin. "The Origin of the Work of Art," 204-206 in *Basic Writings,* 143-212. Hereafter cited in the body of the text as *BW*.

[6] Hegel, G.W.F. *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, 103, 103, 11.

[7] Cf. particularly *BW* 187f. where Heidegger's description of the enactment of strife between world and earth echoes Hegel's emphasis on the decisive character of world historical events. "Truth establishes itself in the work. Truth essentially occurs only as the strife between clearing and concealing in the opposition of world and earth. The strife is not to be resolved in a being brought forth for that purpose, nor is it to be merely housed there; the strife, on the contrary is started by it. This being must therefore contain within itself the essential traits of the strife. In the strife the unity of world and earth is won. As a world opens itself, it submits to the decision of a historical humanity the question of victory and defeat, blessing and curse, mastery and slavery. The dawning world brings out what is as yet undecided and measureless, and thus discloses the hidden necessity of measure and decisiveness."

much in the preservation, the assertion of the continued relevance of art, as it does in its original creation.[8]

These two claims readily demonstrate the explicitly anti-Hegelian context of the entire essay. But this immediate intuition fails to adequately capture how important Hegel's pronouncement is for Heidegger's thought considered as a work in progress. The full sense of this importance can only be grasped if we take Hegel's pronouncement as a provocation. In fact, this provocation informs at least two other major projects that Heidegger undertakes in the middle 1930s, at the same time as "The Origin of the Work of Art:" 1) his appropriation of Friedrich Hölderlin and Friedrich Nietzsche and 2) his related re-appropriation of the ontological concerns of *Being and Time* and the early lectures from the 1920s. Heidegger's turn to Hölderlin and his confrontation with Nietzsche can both be read as seeking an alternative to the Hegelian metaphysical system. This system crystallizes in the lattice-work of art. Heidegger's goal is to find resources within Hölderlin and Nietzsche that resist the concomitant evaporation of poetry's truth, its transubstantiation into the spiritual matter of the speculative concept. Heidegger's attempt, from the 1938 manuscript entitled *Contributions to Philosophy* forward, to reconsider the question of the meaning of being in light of the *Ereignis* is an attempt to develop in the philosophical register an ontology adequate to this rejection of Hegelian metaphysics and, increasingly, of metaphysics as such.[9]

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[8] *BW*, 195-196.

[9] Cf. particularly, *Nietzsche*, Vol. 1, *The Will to Power as Art*, 69-91, where Heidegger shows how five of Nietzsche's statements concerning art reflect an attempt to re-orient the metaphysically determined history of aesthetics; "What are Poets For?," 91-96 in *Poetry, Language Thought* (hereafter cited in the body of the text as *PLT*), where Heidegger describes Hölderlin's use of the figures of night and dawn in terms of the overcoming of metaphysics; and *Contributions to Philosophy*, §§103-114 (hereafter cited in the body of the text as C) where Heidegger lays out his understanding of the role that Hegel, Hölderlin and Nietzsche (among others) play in the way that metaphysics unfolds.

But even to contextualize Heidegger's intuitions about Hegel within the whole of Heidegger's thought is not yet to turn it into a genuine question, much less a riddle, which is how Heidegger broaches the problem in the "Epilogue" to "The Origin of the Work of Art."[10] Heidegger's response to Hegel can indeed be read as deeply embedded in the whole of his thought, but this response cannot be read merely as a refutation, a rejoinder, or even a qualified criticism anymore than it can be read as an endorsement, appropriation or even a critical qualification. Here, more than anywhere else in Heidegger, the project of the *Wiederholung* or repetitive retrieval of the metaphysical tradition remains a genuine question. It remains a genuine question, but a genuine question that is formulated in manifold ways. These formulations are themselves interwoven with certain propositions that appear every bit as definite as the propositions of Hegel's that Heidegger cites. And indeed, almost all of these propositions are even in agreement with Hegel.

First, Heidegger provisionally grants Hegel his main point. "The truth of Hegel's judgment has not yet been decided ... until then, the judgment remains in force" (*BW*, 205). "But," Heidegger continues, "for that very reason the question is necessary as to whether the truth that the judgment declares is final and conclusive, and what follows if it is" (*Ibid*). While Heidegger is willing to grant to Hegel that art no longer seems to function in the essential way that it once did, he seems to depart with Hegel insofar as he thinks it might be philosophically desirable, perhaps even necessary, for art to function once again in this essential way, whereas Hegel sees the philosophical formalization of art's truth as an essential hallmark of the progress

[10] "The foregoing reflections are concerned with the riddle of art, the riddle that art itself is. They are far from claiming to solve the riddle. The task is to see the riddle," (*BW*, 204).

of spirit.[11] While Heidegger's evaluation of the present state of affairs is clear, he seems less sure about whether or not art is still capable of doing what it once did. Because of this questionability Heidegger denies the truism that art has an "eternal value:" "Speaking this way [about immortal works of art and the eternal value of art] means using that language which does not trouble with precision in all essential matters, for fear that, in the end to be precise would call for --- thinking" (*BW*, 204). In denying art an eternal value he affirms the underlying assumption of Hegel's *Aesthetics* that art's value must always be understood historically. This claim is implicit in Hegel's claim that art is a thing of the past, but it also underlies the historical character of the investigation of the different forms of art in Part Two of the *Aesthetics*.[12] Heidegger's question asks about the value of art in these modern times, times which he will elsewhere follow Hölderlin in calling "destitute times."[13] Claiming that art needs to be understood temporally and also that, provisionally, we need to understand art as a thing of the past leads Heidegger to provisionally grant to Hegel that art no longer functions essentially for us: art seems to be dead. [14] In this, he again agrees with Hegel. "The question remains: Is art still an essential and

[11] Cf. Hegel's discussion of the "Position of Art in Relation to the Finite World and to Religion and Philosophy," in the *Aesthetics*, 91-105.
[12] *Aesthetics*, 299-602.
[13] "What are Poets For, 91. The reference is to Hölderlin's elegy "Bread and Wine," in *Poems and Fragments,* 242-253.
[14] This has to be the sense of Heidegger's insistence that Hegel's "judgment remains in force" for us until a future decision is made (*BW*, 205). This seems in keeping with Heidegger's general assessment of the character of art in a too-metaphysical culture. The goal is for future poets to show the way out of the impasse that thought and poetry find themselves in. But this provisional concession to Hegel seems quite odd when we consider that it follows on the heels of an essay where the two principal examples of the world disclosive force of art are Vincent Van Gogh's painting of a peasant's shoes and C.F. Meyer's poem, the "Roman Fountain," both of which are created after Hegel. To be sure, Heidegger insists that "Hegel never meant to deny" the possibility of "the rise of many new artworks and art movements." (*BW*, 205). Hegel's point, Heidegger insists, is that these new artworks are not essential to the happening of truth. But isn't Heidegger's argument in the preceding essay that they are in fact already essential? Why then grant even provisionally that art might be a thing of the past? Has the situation between 1827 and 1936 changed so drastically and in such a positive way? There is an irony here, and it should not be evaded. Nor should the seriousness with which Heidegger insists that Hegel might be right. By way of anticipation, let me suggest that to the extent to which Heidegger provides these as modern examples of an age-old function of art he remains in thrall to Hegel's evaluation of the epical value of art. To the extent to which their distinctive modernity is

necessary way in which that truth happens which is decisive for our historical existence, or is art no longer of this character" (*BW*, 205)? This question emphasizes the provisional character of Heidegger's concessions to Hegel. Heidegger is willing to concede that art might be a thing of the past, that it is no longer capable of what it was once capable of, or at least to grant that this has been the case. The provisional character of Heidegger's agreement with Hegel on all points, taken together with the way in which Heidegger formulates his questioning response to Hegel, underscores what I take to be the deepest, least provisional and therefore most unquestioned point of agreement with Hegel: that art once did something essential and that this "something" still provides the measure for art. Art did something which has been covered up by the progress of the history of truth (that is, the history of how truth is most properly disclosed in the West). If it is to be essential for truth again it will be essential in a way like the way in which it used to be essential. For Hegel, this is impossible; the three propositions that Heidegger cites are the conclusions of "the most comprehensive reflection on the essence of art that the West possesses --- comprehensive because it stems from metaphysics" (*BW*, 204). With the advent of metaphysics, art is foreclosed from disclosing truth in any essential, original way. For Heidegger, the possibility that this impossibility can be overcome therefore depends on changing the essential character of both art and philosophy and in the process changing their relationship to one another. This transformation happens through a phenomenological/ontological analysis of the being of the artwork in which the artwork reveals possibilities that exceed the conception of philosophy. To an extent, it would reveal possibilities that even exceed the conception of

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emphasized he is moving towards a lyrical theory of art that will truly unsettle the relationship between poetry and philosophy. To emphasize the distinctive modernity of art does not mean to show the distinctive ways in which modern art does something like what art used to do. It means to fulfill a role that art did not fulfill before, or perhaps that we could not have imagined that art was fulfilling until now.

philosophy achieved in *Being and Time*'s interpretation of Dasein's way of knowing as an "authentic" self-understanding of philosophy.[15] If artwork is still to serve as the origin of anything true it will have to happen in this transforming encounter: art must declare what it is in order to become what it can be, but thought must ask it to do so first. This project, if effective, accomplishes the over-turning of Hegel. It quickens art, once again, allowing art once again to be what it once was. At least, that seems to be the promise contained in the epilogue to "The Origin of the Work of Art." If this promise could be realized it would reverberate throughout the diverse investigations into art, philosophy, poetry, language, politics, education and science that Heidegger organizes around the question concerning being. This is the promise that that riddle of art proffers to the question of being.

Heidegger does not pretend to solve this riddle in "The Origin of the Work of Art," but he does make a positive step beyond, for example, *Being and Time*, by attempting to "bring to view the work character of the work" (*BW*, 205) in its ontological peculiarities. Heidegger does not claim to solve the riddle of art because he views it as insoluble. It is, for him, an essential aspect of the Gordian knot of finitude. Nor is it my goal to solve this riddle here, and this is not merely out of modesty. There are essential reasons for thinking that the promise of a re-invigorated relationship between poetry and thinking[16] is wrongly stated.

The first problem is contained in the assumption shared by Hegel and Heidegger that the present and future tasks of art are to be measured against its past function. Let me characterize

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[15] It exceeds the analysis of *Being and Time* to an extent. As I will show in my discussion of *Being and Time* in Part Two, the temporal character that the being of the artwork has is already worked out in the final theory of signification. But while Heidegger indicates that this theory of signification exceeds the possibilities of the being of equipment and things he does not yet root it in the ontology of the artwork. This final theory of signification remains largely ungrounded in *Being and Time*.

[16] I am anticipating the conclusions of "The Origin of the Work of Art" and the assumption of Heidegger's later poetological investigations by shifting from the terms "art" and "philosophy" to the terms "poetry" and "thinking."

this assumption as the dream of an epic. My first goal is to sketch out the contours of this dream in Heidegger's thought: initially in the ontological analysis of "The Origin of the Work of Art" then from there as a constant, if not consistently important, feature of his understanding of the role of the poet in the *Contributions to Philosophy*, in his lifelong reflections on Hölderlin, and in his critical evaluations of Rilke and Trakl during the late 1940s and 1950s. Heidegger comes as close as he ever will to naming this theory epical in his characterization of language (*Sprache*) as saying (*Sagen*) in the essay on "The Way to Language."[17] I will justify my characterization of this tendency in Heidegger's thought as epical by showing that it proceeds from a specific interpretation of Hegel's characterization of the truth of art in epic poetry. This borrowing of Heidegger's certainly does not account for all of, or even the most important of, Heidegger's insights into the relationship between philosophy and poetry, but I will show that it does account for those features that themselves lie at the heart of some of the most significant criticisms of Heidegger's theory of poetry. I will focus primarily on Jacques Derrida's critique of Heidegger in *Of Spirit* and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's critique in *Heidegger, Art and Politics.*

Both of these texts point to the need to free other elements of Heidegger's interpretation of poetry from these epical elements. I will call the elements that need to be freed "lyrical" and will argue in favor of a lyrical interpretation of Heidegger. To do so it will be necessary to develop a Heideggerian theory of genre. This is quite important if we want to fully conceptualize the relationship that Heidegger sees between poetry (*Dichtung*) and thought on the one hand and poetry (*Poesie)* and philosophy on the other hand. Nonetheless, a treatment of genre is absent in any substantive form from Heidegger's philosophy. However, this cannot be

[17] Heidegger, Martin. "The Way to Language," in *On the Way to Language*, 111-136. Hereafter cited in the body of the text as *OWL*.

said of post-Heideggerian reflections on the philosophy of art in the work of Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe and particularly Jean-Luc Nancy. I will enlist Nancy's explanation in *The Muses* of why a multiplicity of arts is necessary to both Hegel and Heidegger. However, I will turn it more sharply into a theory of genre in order to emphasize the centrality that this multiplicity has for the most radical elements of Heidegger's understanding of the question of the meaning of being and for his concomitant understanding of language and signification. It is in this multiplicity, which I will characterize as an essential ambiguity, that I find the possibility of freeing Heidegger's theory of art and poetry from the problems that Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe have shown to plague it. This multiplicity is the heritage of the lyrical element of poetry insofar as lyrical poetry is founded on a form of language that differentiates itself from the dominant trends of prosaic language. But the full sense of this multiplicity can only be seen if we treat both poetry and philosophy in terms of the question of genre. Philosophy, as much as poetry, needs to be understood through the ontology of the work.

This final insight affords the possibility of rereading the development of the lyrical character of the work back into the development of Heidegger's thought. In Part Two, I will do this by tracing the development of Heidegger's understanding of the concept and the metaphor, where these name the kind of languages he understands to be distinctive to the "genres" of metaphysics and poetry. I will pose the question to Heidegger: how is the formation of concepts and metaphors, understood as ideal structures of meaning, to be understood ontologically? Heidegger's answer to this question, I argue, reaches a head in the essay, "The Way to Language." Ultimately I argue that this essay, which crystallized the epical character of Heidegger's understanding of poetry, also suggests how to get beyond this historically limited

understanding. Keeping with our insights into the workly character of philosophy, it will become necessary to subject Heidegger's thought to the thought of those poets whose concerns are closest to his. Here the chief predecessor with whom Heidegger grapples will no longer be Hegel, but Friedrich Hölderlin. And the chief critic of Heidegger who seeks to wrest something un-thought from Heidegger's thought will not be Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe or Nancy but Paul Celan.

In Part Three, I will take up the poetry of Celan in its own right. On the basis of the theory of poetry that I develop in Parts One and Two, I will argue that Celan's poetry provides the best account of what a Heideggerian lyrical response to the history of the twentieth century should look like. I will begin this discussion by looking at a number of literary and philosophical examples that concretize the lyrical model that I develop in Part Two. I will be most interested in developing a lyrical understanding of moments of indecision and how the identification of moments of indecision reconfigures some of Heidegger's key assumptions about the hermeneutic tradition, textual appropriation, patricide, and conflict. Opening these assumptions up to a self-defeating moment of indecision reveals the strategy that we can see Celan adopting in his own poetic and thoughtful appropriation of Heidegger. I will argue for this admittedly difficult interpretation of Celan by following through Lacoue-Labarthe's claim in *Poetry as Experience* that Celan's poetry is continually responding to Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin.[18] Celan uses this response to re-inscribe the force of various ontical histories back into the history of being. In doing so, I argue, Celan opens up Heidegger's thinking to a truly manifold understanding of being, one which remains faithful to the idea of ontological difference while questioning the

[18] Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. *Poetry as Experience*, 33. James Lyon has documented the full extent of this relationship in *Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger, An Unresolved Conversation, 1951-1970*.

temporality of essence. Such an understanding is rooted in the capacity of both the world and things to be other than they are. This is the critical, decisive sense of a lyrical theory of art.

A Brief History of the Philosophical Treatment of the Epic

In order to argue that Heidegger's explanation of the philosophical importance of poetry should be considered under the rubric of the epic, it is first necessary to sketch out some of the essential features of the philosophical treatment of the epic. Since my goal is merely to provide an entrée into this feature of Heidegger's thought, I will restrict myself to painting in broad strokes the basic contours of this treatment in a few of those thinkers whom he grapples with most directly: Aristotle, Hegel and Nietzsche.

1. Aristotle

Apart from a few asides, Aristotle's treatment of the epic is contained entirely in the *Poetics*,[19] where he is most concerned with showing the differences between epic and tragic poetry. The three passages which deal most substantively with the epic compare the definitions, parts and values of epic and tragic poetry. Aristotle identifies the salient features of epic as: (1) its serious subject matter, which it shares with tragedy; (2) its narrative form, in which it differs from tragedy; (3) the magnitude of the time it treats, in which it is larger than tragedy; and (4) the manner of its judgment or analysis, in which it is subordinated to tragedy.

> Epic poetry, then, has been seen to resemble tragedy to this extent, that of being an imitation of serious subjects in metre. It differs from it, however, in that it is in one kind of verse and in narrative form; and also by its length --- which is due to its action having no fixed limit of time, whereas tragedy endeavours to keep as far as possible within a single circuit of the sun, or something near that .... They differ also in their constituents, some being common to both and others peculiar to tragedy --- hence a judge of good and bad in tragedy is a judge of that in epic

[19] Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1449b9-19; 1459a18-1460b5; 1461b9-1462b15.

> poetry also. All the parts of an epic are included in tragedy; but those of tragedy are not all of them to be found in the epic.[20]

Epic is more or less like tragedy in terms of its plot and character, except, importantly, that it exhibits less unity of action and is therefore slightly inferior.[21] Because of this, and because its diction[22] and thought are more simple and it is entirely lacking in melody and spectacle,[23] Aristotle judges the epic to be both aesthetically and philosophically inferior to tragedy.[24] This is true even for Aristotle's reading of Homer, who in his attentiveness to unity of plot, to character and to something that resembles the manner of thought exhibited in tragedy, brings the epic closest to tragedy. For Aristotle, Homer is the greatest epic poet because he is the most tragic epic poet.

In describing how Homer achieves this closeness to tragedy, Aristotle makes a critical observation about the kind of reasoning that epic is capable of, and in doing so touches on one essential superiority that epic seems to have over tragedy. Epic, in its capacity for presenting the improbable, is able to avail itself of a way of presenting the marvelous which is lacking in tragedy. The presentment of the marvelous, *thauma*, closely linked to the origins of philosophy for both Plato and Aristotle, is linked to the experience of the monstrous, *deinon*, which, for Heidegger, grounds the greatest insight poetry, and specifically tragedy, provides us into the question of being.

> The marvelous is certainly required in tragedy. The epic, however, affords more opening for the improbable, the chief factor in the marvelous, because in it the

[20] *Poetics*, 1149b9-19.
[21] *Poetics*, 1459a18-1460a11.
[22] In his discussion of diction, Aristotle says that the kind of diction most appropriate to the epic is strange words, whereas iambic (and trochaic) verse is more suited to the metaphor, which is the most complex form of diction and the form which is most directly relevant for understanding the relationship between poetic thinking and philosophical thinking. The iambic foot, which most closely approximates the cadence of prose, is used in most lyrical and tragic meters. Cf. *Poetics*, 1459a-9-14.
[23] *Ibid*.
[24] *Poetics*, 1461b9-1462b15.

> agents are not visibly before one. The scene of the pursuit of Hector would be ridiculous on the stage --- the Greeks halting instead of pursuing him, and Achilles shaking his head to stop them; but in the poem the absurdity is overlooked. The marvelous, however, is a cause of pleasure, as is shown by the fact that we all tell a story with additions, in the belief that we are giving pleasure to our hearers.[25]

The distance of the narrative form from presentation is one of the ways in which epic is most inferior to tragedy for Aristotle. But it enables a decisive advantage because it allows the improbable to be believable. Because it is so different from our everyday experiences, this improbability introduces an element of marvel that itself is one way of suggesting the monstrousness or uncanniness that tragedy is supposed to reveal. In this way, the pleasure that we take in embellishing stories both confirms Aristotle's claim that "it is natural for all to delight in works of imitation,"[26] and also prefigures the peculiar, educative pleasure that we take in the catharsis of our emotions of pity and fear.[27] For Aristotle, this catharsis is the central experience that tragedy produces. While epic poetry cannot give rise to this pleasure in the same way that tragedy can, it shows itself to be more capable of exhibiting what lies beneath this catharsis *in a certain way*. But if this capacity is to be explained, the logic of epic's presentation of the marvelous has to be found. Aristotle finds this in Homer's use of paralogism.

> Homer more than any other has taught the others the art of framing lies in the right way. I mean the use of paralogism. Whenever, if one thing is or happens, another is or happens, men's notions is that, if the latter is, so is the former --- but that is a false conclusion. Accordingly, if the first thing is untrue, but there is something else that on the assumption of its truth follows as its consequent, the right then is to add on the latter. Just because we know the truth of the consequent, we are in our own minds led on to the erroneous inference of the truth of the antecedent. There is an instance of this in the *Bath-story* in the *Odyssey*.[28]

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[25] *Poetics*, 1460a12-18
[26] *Poetics*, 1448b8.
[27] *Poetics*, 1449b28-29.
[28] *Poetics*, 1460a19-26.

To frame this in modern terms, we could paraphrase Aristotle's claim to mean that epic poetry makes productive use of the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Just because *b* follows from *a*, we cannot assume that the presence of *b* necessarily entails the presence of *a*. But by making this easy mistake reveal hidden truths, the epic makes the improbable seem natural. When Eurycleia, Odysseus's childhood nurse, finds a scar on the strange beggar's thigh she infers the presence of her former master. "Of course, you are Odysseus, my dear child. And to think that I didn't know you till I'd handled all my master's limbs!"[29] Eurycleia's reasoning is clearly faulty, but she is in fact right. In this way, epic poetry conceals the marvelous in the familiar just as a daily routine uncovers a simple mark and reveals the unexpected, long-awaited return of the beloved child. That the example of paralogism that Aristotle chooses is a moment of decisive recognition is not accidental. It indicates the closeness of the effect the marvelous produces to the cathartic effect that recognition (and reversal) situate in the development of the tragic plot.

The peculiar logic of the epic leads to Aristotle's judgment that in epic, "a likely impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility."[30] Just as the presentation of the marvelous in epic anticipates the cathartic possibilities of tragedy, so does the presentation of the "likely impossibility" anticipate tragedy's representation of the action in a "universal" way that is paradoxically a more true representation of the philosophical meaning of history than is the presentation of history's actual happenings in the genre of historical writing. "The poet's function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a thing that might happen, i.e. what is possible as being probable or necessary ... Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas

[29] Homer, *Odyssey*, 300.
[30] *Poetics*, 1460a27.

those of history are singulars."[31] This is most true of tragedy, with its representation of universalized, serious actions undertaken by universalized, exemplary characters, but it is already true, in a certain sense, in the philosophically and aesthetically inferior genre of epic, where, through the presence of the ordinary, the improbable is presented as being present or as having been present. If we move beyond the intentions of Aristotle but towards the place where both Hegel and Nietzsche will take the epic, we might say that the epic poet's function is to make the untrue believable by domesticating the strange.

2. Hegel

For Hegel, this domestication happens in the epic poem because the epic poem articulates and asserts the truth of a mythological origin to the ethical substance of a nation or people. Hegel takes very seriously Herodotus' claim that "Homer and Hesiod gave the Greeks their gods,"[32] interpreting it to mean that it is in Homer and Hesiod that an array of heterogeneous stories, influences and customs are synthesized into an organic totality in the form of a mythology which reveals to a people, in the form of their gods, their own identity. "Epics must belong to an early period in a people's history and yet have not to describe its earliest period. Almost every people in its earliest beginning has under its eyes a more or less foreign culture, a religious worship from abroad, and it lets these impose themselves on it."[33] It is only when these foreign elements are domesticated by synthesis into an organic totality that their artistic culture comes into its own. "What is accomplished in the genuinely epical event is not a single casual deed, ... consequently it is not a purely accidental happening, which is related, but an action ramified into the whole of its age and national circumstances so that it can be brought before us

[31] *Poetics*, 1451a37-1451b6.
[32] Qtd. at *Aesthetics*, 1047.
[33] *Aesthetics*, 1048.

only within an outspread world and demands the portrayal of this world in its entirety."[34] This world is essentially the world in which the epical poet feels herself at home but projected back into a mythical past. This past is itself passionately identified with by the poet and her contemporaries. Even though it is less factually true that their actual origin in the confluence of foreign influences, it becomes true in a way that history cannot grasp. In this way, for Hegel, the epic constitutes a people's prehistory and also opens them up to the development of their actual history and cultural knowledge in its prosaic form. The heroic age is bounded by the recollection of its (fictional) beginning in the mythology of the epic poet and the formulation of this recollection in the writing of the epic poet at the end of the heroic age.

Epic poetry also makes possible the rise of prose, including philosophy, and in doing so makes itself impossible. History, or historical writing, therefore finds its moment immediately after the articulation of the epic poetry. "What is properly historical ... takes its earliest beginning at the point when the heroic period, which poetry and art had originally to claim as its own, is ending, and when, in short, the definiteness and prose of life is present in the actual state of affairs as well as in its artistic treatment and presentation."[35] In this way, epic poetry will always be seen as a foreclosed possibility within a culture. It precedes culture, makes culture possible, but makes itself impossible.[36]

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[34] *Aesthetics*, 1051.
[35] *Aesthetics*, 987.
[36] This is why Hegel values "primitive epics" over "those composed artificially in later times" (*Aesthetics*, 1073). Hegel insists that in Virgil, as opposed to Homer, "instead of [the gods] being alive themselves and generating a belief in their existence, they are evidently *mere* inventions and external means, not capable of being taken very seriously by the poet or his hearers, although they are given a show of being taken very seriously indeed" (*Ibid*). Thus, the *Aeneid* fulfills the explicitly ideological function of justifying Augustus's *imperium*. The most important philosophical precursor for the ideologically motivated epic style of the *Aeneid* will be Plato's noble lie in the *Republic*, as I discuss in Part Three.

The self-foreclosure of epic looks quite a bit like Hegel's initial claim that "art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past."[37] Comparing Hegel's description of the "Particular Characteristics of Epic Proper" to "The Determinacy of the Ideal" of art and beauty generally shows that this resemblance is in fact an identity.[38] Epic's poetical presentation of the totality of a world in a particular, objective and exteriorized form is the most complete realization of the felt identity of the particular with the individual and of nature with spirit. This realization is, for Hegel, the accomplishment of art as such.

It is in epic poetry that we find the "point of transition to religious pictorial thinking as such, as well as to the prose of scientific thought."[39] It is from this point of transition, Hegel says, that philosophy is able to construe the arts in a series that develops from poetry into philosophy. If this transition really is the moment at which art ceases to live up to its highest vocation, we might wonder why Hegel needs to go on and to continue to elaborate the spiritual content of lyric and dramatic poetry. After all, both of these genres are at home in an essentially non-artistic, even non-poetical world.

> When feeling and will become separated in the individual, then what reaches its ripest development is not epic, but in the first case dramatic poetry and, in the second lyric. This comes about completely in the later days of a people's life when the universal principles which have to guide human action are no longer part and parcel of a whole people's *heart* and attitude of *mind* but already appear objectively and independently ... as a prosaic arrangement of things.[40]

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[37] *Aesthetics*, 11.
[38] Cf. *Aesthetics* 174-243; 1050-1092. Both passages emphasize the role that prose plays in differentiating our world from a world in which art still reveals the essential form of truth. In both sections, the development of a prosaic history marks the moment when art can no longer be the possible form of truth. And, for Hegel, epic produces the mythology that enables and is ultimately debunked by this history.
[39] *Aesthetics*, 968.
[40] *Aesthetics*, 1046.

If the time of the genres of lyric and dramatic poetry is after the development of a prosaic world view, after the hardening of the mythological imagination into religious dogmatism and after the separation of the mythological imagination from critical reason, why are these genres relevant to the pedigree of spirit? Philosophy indeed views the classical, epical moment of poetry as the final moment of art (just as it also views the classical form of art as the most truly artistic form of art, rather than the later, romantic form of art).[41] Philosophy is also itself prosaic, attuned to a thing's internal, spiritual characteristics rather than its external, sensuous appearance. But Hegel agrees with Aristotle that philosophy differs from other forms of prose in that it shares with poetry a feel for the universal in the form of a totality. That totality can only be grasped in its philosophical form once philosophy learns something from the manner of thinking proper to tragic poetry, via a detour through lyric poetry.[42] This peculiarity of poetry's education of philosophy, its continued relevance beyond its natural life in the prehistory of a people, accounts for the peculiar fact that the fate of epic poetry is not itself epic, but tragic.

[41] This is seen most clearly at the moment that Hegel finds it necessary to turn to the romantic form of art. "Classical art became a conceptually adequate representation of the Ideal, the consummation of the realm of beauty. Nothing can be or become more beautiful" (*Aesthetics*, 517). Insofar as the external presentation of the Ideal is the chief hallmark of art's spiritual progress, this is as far as art, considered on its own terms, need progress. "Yet there is something higher than the beautiful appearance of spirit in its immediate sensuous shape, even if this shape be created by spirit as adequate to itself" (*Ibid*). Romantic art struggles to present negativity, death and difference, but it only fully succeeds in doing so artistically, i.e. sensuously and in external form, in dramatic poetry, which is not properly romantic at all.

[42] Which Hegel admits he is only interested in insofar as it allows him to differentiate epic and dramatic poetry. Indeed, he thinks that this restriction allows him to side-step the inherently pluralistic character of lyric poetry. "Little can be said, by way of generalization, about the lyric poem as a work of art, because here there is a fortuitous wealth of variety in the mode of treatment and the forms of the subject-matter which is just as incalculably varied itself. For although this whole sphere here too cannot propose to exempt itself from the general laws of beauty and art, its subjective character implies in the nature of the case that the scope of turns and tones of expression must remain absolutely unlimited. Therefore, for our purpose, we are concerned only with the question how the type of lyrical works of art differs from that of the epic" (*Aesthetics*, 1132). While this marks Hegel's most explicit acknowledgment that his treatment of lyric poetry is greatly restricted in its scope, he frequently focuses his attention on those features of the lyrical poem which contrast most easily with the epic.

3. Nietzsche

Nietzsche's treatment of epic poetry, like Aristotle's and Hegel's, is subordinated to a treatment of tragedy. Unlike Aristotle and Hegel, however, Nietzsche treats lyrical poetry equally alongside epic poetry. For now, however, we will remain focused on his theory of the epic as it emerges in the early sections of *The Birth of Tragedy*.

The argument of *The Birth of Tragedy* proceeds from the intuitive "insight" with which Nietzsche opens the book. Art, he insists, has a dual origin, which he designates as "the Apollinian and Dionysian duality:"

> We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics, once we perceive not merely by logical inference, but with the immediate certainty of vision, that the continuous development of art is bound up with the *Apollinian* and *Dionysian* duality --- just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes, involving perpetual strife with only periodically intervening reconciliations.... Through Apollo and Dionysus, the two art deities of the Greeks, we come to recognize that in the Greek world there existed a tremendous opposition, in origin and aims, between the Apollonian art of sculpture, and the nonimagistic, Dionysian art of music.[43]

Like Hegel, Nietzsche sees epic poetry as sculptural or figural and lyric poetry as musical. Like Hegel, Nietzsche also sees tragic poetry as somehow uniting these two opposing sensibilities. Nietzsche thinks of epic poetry as primarily Apollinian, while lyrical poetry is Dionysian. The Apollinian impulse is an expression of the "art world of dreams,"[44] and so Nietzsche takes both sculpture and Homer as his point of reference for speculating about the dream world of the Greeks.

> If we consider the incredibly precise and unerring plastic power of their eyes, together with their vivid, frank delight in colors, we can hardly refrain from assuming even for their dreams … a certain logic of line and contour, colors and groups, a certain pictorial sequence reminding us of their finest bas-reliefs, whose

[43] Friedrich Nietzsche. *The Birth of Tragedy*, 33.
[44] *Ibid*.

> perfection would certainly justify us … in designating the dreaming Greeks as Homers and Homer as a dreaming Greek --- in a deeper sense than that in which modern man, speaking of his dreams, ventures to compare himself with Shakespeare.[45]

Like Hegel, Nietzsche finds that the figuration which epic poetry effects is in a certain sense the figuration of the nation understood as the shared resource of a people, even though it is also for Nietzsche the art that signifies the birth of the individual as a distinct, bounded entity. Moreover, Nietzsche agrees with Hegel that this is a possibility which is no longer available to us moderns. This is because he thinks that the impulse which is most distinctive to us moderns is the Socratic, which emerges as the patricidal successor to the Apollinian impulse.[46] Philosophy emerges as the form of knowledge most proper to the "theoretical" person; the theoretical world, like Hegel's prosaic world, ushers in the birth of philosophy through the end of art.

In describing epic as the creation of a figural mythology at the point of the birth of culture, Nietzsche adopts Hegel's conception of the epic.[47] But by positing the Apollinian and Dionysian forms of art as equiprimordial and by going on to give credit to both Homer and Archilocus, a lyrical poet, for being the fathers of poetry,[48] Nietzsche reconfigures his description of how epic achieves these effects in an essentially non-Hegelian way. Epic poetry does not, for Nietzsche, pass into tragic poetry through an essential detour in lyric poetry. For Nietzsche, epic poetry, lyric poetry and dramatic poetry all respond in some way to the oppositional tensions inherent in the duality of art, epic in such a way that the Apollinian predominates, lyrical poetry

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[45] *The Birth of Tragedy*, 38f.
[46] Cf. *The Birth of Tragedy*, sections 13-15.
[47] While Nietzsche does not signal out this specific feature of his debt to Hegel, he does recognize in his autobiography, *Ecce Homo*, that his book remains too Hegelian: "It smells offensively Hegelian, and the cadaverous perfume of Schopenhauer sticks only to a few formulas" (cf. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Ecce Homo*, 726). In contrast, in the "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," (included in the edition of *The Birth of Tragedy* issued in 1886, two years before he wrote *Ecce* Homo) Nietzsche still does not acknowledge this Hegelianism, but rather accuses himself of being too Schopenhauerian and too Kantian in *The Birth of Tragedy*. Cf. *The Birth of Tragedy*, 24.
[48] *The Birth of Tragedy*, 48.

in such a way that the Dionysian predominates, and tragedy in the form of a perfectly conflicted equipoise, a poetical stalemate of the highest form.

These departures from Hegel's understanding of the epic express themselves in Nietzsche's understanding of the formative role that Homer plays in classical Greek culture. Again, both Hegel and Nietzsche are interested in how Homer provides the mythological building blocks of classical Greek culture by domesticating an essentially heterogonous, inherently foreign, world-view. But Nietzsche is much more interested than Hegel in the illusory status of this domestication. For Nietzsche, the epic expresses an "Apollinian" culture in a way that is intended to cover over the Dionysian world. In the sculptures of the classical world and in the poetry of Homer, the distinctively Greek world of Olympian culture opens up. "We hear nothing but the accents of an exuberant, triumphant life, in which all things, whether good or bad, are deified. And so the spectator may stand quite bewildered before this fantastic excess of life, asking himself by virtue of what magic potion these high-spirited men could have found life so enjoyable that, wherever they turned, their eyes beheld the smile of Helen, the ideal picture of their own existence."[49] Indeed, we are not the only ones for whom this seems to be a masterful achievement; it is wondrous to the Greeks themselves. This image functioned for them as a "transfiguring mirror" in which they could behold themselves as completely non-Dionysian, apparently cut off from their own past and from everything foreign. "The effects wrought by the Dionysian also seemed "titanic" [denoting, as Nietzsche makes clear in the preceding paragraph, the past of the Greek, the 'pre-Apollinian age'] and "barbaric" [denoting the foreign, the 'extra-Apollinian world'] to the Apollinian Greek."[50] But this break is only apparent. "At the

[49] *The Birth of Tragedy*, 41.
[50] *The Birth of* Tragedy, 46.

same time, he could not conceal from himself that he, too, was inwardly related to these overthrown Titans and heroes."[51] Much less than accomplishing the construction of a national mythology by the domestication of something foreign, epic accomplishes the construction of the foreign as foreign through an illusory auto-figuration of the self. The epic world conceals a profound pessimism within its optimism. This pessimism, associated with the "folk-wisdom" of the Dionysian, is constructed as "foreign" through an act of repression. "How is the world of the Olympian gods related to this folk wisdom? Even as the rapturous vision of the tortured martyr to his suffering."[52] The dream which the epic world projects conceals its identification with the Dionysian, but from the beginning this concealment amounts to a way of expressing the Dionysian.

> The Homeric "naïveté" can be understood only as the complete victory of the Apollinian illusion: this is one of those illusions which nature so frequently employs to achieve her own ends. The true goal is veiled by a phantasm: and while we stretch out our hands for the latter, nature attains the former by means of our illusion. In the Greeks, the "will" wished to contemplate itself in the transfiguration of genius and the world of art; in order to glorify themselves, its creatures had to feel themselves worthy of glory; they had to behold themselves again in a higher sphere, without this perfect world of contemplation acting as a command or a reproach. This is the sphere of beauty, in which they saw their mirrored images, the Olympians. With this mirroring of beauty the Hellenic will combated its artistically correlative talent for suffering and for the wisdom of suffering --- and, as a monument of its victory, we have Homer, the naïve artist.[53]

For Hegel, we moderns need to recognize that the mythology of the epic was fictional, but we also have to take it as being real for the ancients. It is important to assume that through their passionate identification with this mythology the ancients took this as being supremely real. On this point at least, Nietzsche agrees with everything that Hegel says. But by taking that

[51] *The Birth of Tragedy*, 44.
[52] *The Birth of Tragedy*, 42..
[53] *Ibid*.

passionate identification of the ancients to underscore an unconscious mechanism of repression, Nietzsche shows that this supreme reality is already for the ancients also a supreme illusion. As we will see later, this means that in his history of the epic Nietzsche has already accomplished the overturning of Platonism which Heidegger and others took to be Nietzsche's accomplishment only in his mature work.[54]

For now, we are already able to see how this qualification of the epic changes what it means to claim that an epic is in a privileged way world-disclosive. This claim is not abandoned in Nietzsche's reworking of the philosophy of the epic, but it now stands over and against another world. This duality of the phenomenon of the world can in no way be interpreted as parallel to the duality of the worlds of nature and spirit. Both worlds are, for Nietzsche, both spiritual and natural. In addition to seeing how Nietzsche's theory of the epic changes the meaning of the "world", we can also see how it changes the relationship between philosophy and poetry. Because Socrates actually has two artistic fathers, Apollo and Dionysus, we have to see a double patricide at work in the birth of philosophy out of poetry: Apollo is mimetically suppressed; that is to say, he is rendered obsolete in Socrates' repetition of his gestures. This mimetic suppression parallels Hegel's understanding of the passage of the truth of the poetic word into its proper form in the philosophical concept. But there is no parallel in Hegel's theory of the lyric for the repression that Nietzsche identifies as operating in the relationship between Socrates and Dionysus. This repression, which itself mimics the gesture of Apollinian art, is another heritage of epic poetry. But it cannot be understood without understanding lyrical poetry. This is because for Nietzsche, more than designating the difference between epic poetry

[54] Cf. Heidegger. *Nietzsche*, 1: 200-210. The most important text for Heidegger's understanding of how Nietzsche accomplishes the overturning of Platonism is *Twilight of the Idols*, particularly the section entitled "How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable," (*Nietzsche, Friedrich*. *Twilight of the Idols*, 485).

and tragedy, lyric poetry designates what in tragedy (but also in lyric poetry proper) resists the Apollinian-Socratic repression of suffering.[55] What if this constituted the philosophical import that Hegel tried, but failed, to find in lyric poetry?[56]

Nietzsche is able to achieve a fundamentally anti-Hegelian and anti-Platonic understanding of the epic. But it is only through a rigorous theory of the lyrical and of the musical. We will not go into this theory now, because it is clear that in his rejection of Nietzsche, Heidegger himself largely passed over this phenomenon. Moreover, to the extent that Heidegger also achieves an anti-Hegelian and anti-Platonic theory of the epic, and through it of poetry as such (and through that of art as such), it is not through a rigorous theory of the lyrical, but through a rigorous denial of the differences created in poetry by genre. In examining the epical elements of Heidegger's thought, we will therefore return to the assumptions that are shared by Nietzsche and Hegel. But we should not forget the extent to which Nietzsche's answer to the problem of genre should echo as a challenge to the theory of genre I am proposing here.

A Heideggerian Theory of Genre?

Let me begin my analysis of the epic in Heidegger by touching on places in "The Origin of the Work of Art" where Heidegger treats art in a way that is compatible with what his predecessors have called the epical. To touch on these moments is only the preliminary step in

[55] This is why Nietzsche's discussion of tragedy begins with the chorus, whose odes are the most obviously lyrical element of tragedy. Cf. *The Birth of Tragedy*, sections 7-8.

[56] Hegel sees the poetry of Schiller as coming closest to embodying this philosophical possibility. But whereas philosophy treats universals according to their logical, necessary connections, lyrical poetry must treat them according to how they happen to fit together imaginatively and can therefore only adequately treat philosophical themes serendipitously. Cf. *Aesthetics*, 1114, 1122-1123 [where the difference between the presentation of facts in epic poetry, lyric poetry and philosophy is particularly remarked upon], 1127-1128, 1146-1147, 1156-1157. The distinction is somewhat close to the distinction Spinoza makes within knowledge between first-order knowledge and third-order knowledge. Compare in particular, the role that a properly philosophical consideration of the affects and of images plays in moving from rational, second-order knowledge to intuitive, third-order knowledge at the beginning of Part V of Spinoza's *Ethics*.

identifying the epic elements of Heidegger's thought, however. While his predecessors might call these elements epical, Heidegger does not. My initial goal is to focus attention on these elements of Heidegger's in order to show what would be distinctive about Heidegger's theory of the epic if he had explicitly articulated such a theory. Only after this will I attempt to show why Heidegger should have developed this theory and what difficulties it might have helped him navigate.

When Heidegger attempts to designate what is ontologically distinctive to the work of art as opposed to the piece of equipment or the mere thing, he designates two ways in which the work of art is essentially disclosive. The work of art is disclosive in that it sets up a world and sets forth the earth (*BW*, 169-174). Heidegger turns to the example of a Greek temple to show how this happens. For Heidegger, the temple reveals the world by establishing the boundaries of the holy and bringing the god to presence in the cult statue. In delimiting the holy and revealing the god, the world of a people is set up.

> It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human being. The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people. Only from and in this expanse does the nation first return to itself for the fulfillment of its vocation (*BW*, 167).

As the "open relational context," the world is the precondition for things being true; it is unconcealment, which Heidegger considers to be truth in the primordial sense. By deciding what is revealed in the expanse of this openness, the work of art, be it temple, sculpture or tragedy, sets the world into work. But it does this within the enclosure of nature, *physis*, such that within the openness of the unconcealed what is concealed is for the first time revealed as being concealed. This is how the earth is set forth in the work of art. In the temple,

> The luster and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, first brings to radiance the light of the day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night. The temple's firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air. The steadfastness of the work contrasts with the surge of the surf, and its own repose brings out the raging of the sea. Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they are. The Greeks early called this emerging and rising in itself and in all things *physis*. It illuminates also that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We call this ground the *earth* (*BW*, 168).

By setting the work of art into something material which is thereby set forth in its materiality, the work of art sets up a whole world of relationships. The two ontological features of the work of art are therefore only divisible analytically. In fact, Heidegger thinks of them as being one and the same, provided we understand this unity as a tension. That is to say, the work discloses the earth and world together, in a relationship of essential strife.

> In setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work is an instigating of this strife. This does not happen so that the work should at the same time settle and put an end to strife by an insipid agreement, but so that the strife may remain a strife. Setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work accomplishes this strife. The work-being of the work consists in the instigation of strife between world and earth (*BW*, 175).

This accomplishment is nothing other than the happening of the work itself, the setting-into-work whereby an artwork appears as an artwork.[57] This setting-into work of the strife between earth

[57] For Heidegger, the key to grasping how this strife is set into the work of art as what is ontologically distinctive to art is to grasp the style of art's figuration as a rift (*Riss*). Because the meaning of the work of art cannot be clarified in terms of form and matter, where either term is considered apart from the other (cf. *BW,* 153 - 156), these terms must be recast in a way that they are shown to belong together even as they are set apart. Thus, the turn to the terms world and earth announces the need for an essentially divided or polemic relationship (cf. *BW*, 188), one whose structure is analogous to how Heidegger understands logos (a theme I will treat in more depth in Part Two). On this basis, the figure of the work of art has the structure of a rift, rather than a purely formal structure: "The strife that is brought into the rift and thus set back into the earth and thus fixed in place is the figure [*Gestalt*.] Createdness of the work means truth's being fixed in place in the figure. Figure is the structure in whose shape the rift composes itself. This composed rift is the fugue of truth's shining. What is here called figure [*Gestalt*] is always to be thought in terms of the particular placing [*Stellen*] and enframing [*Ge*-stell] as which the *work* occurs when it sets itself up and sets itself forth" (*BW*, 189). The rift thus also contextualizes the work of art. This way of understanding the figure will be a crucial assumption to my interpretation, at the end of the Part Three, of how Paul Celan's use of figure in his own poetry and in his theory of poetry places the modern world and history into the context of his poems.

and world is, then, the origin of the work of art. But it is not a simple origin; from the beginning it is a doubled origin in two distinct ways.[58] First, the work of art originates only in the creation and preservation of the work of art (*BW*, 186-193). And secondly, the "origin" of the work of art designates both how the artwork itself originates in the first place and how the artwork itself functions as the origin for the historical world and the earth that is revealed to that world. In this sense, the ontological distinctiveness of art is also the mark of a duplicity:[59] it refers to what is different about the being of a work of art from other kinds of being, but it also refers to the formative role that the work of art plays in disclosing to ontology the region of truth wherein ontology unfolds. The being of the work of art grounds the account of a non-representational truth that Heidegger develops most clearly in the essay "On the Essence of Truth," but which was already suggested by his discussion of the disclosive foundations of truth in *Being and Time*.

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[58] Cf. *BW*, 196: "The essence of art was defined to begin with as the setting-into-work of truth. Yet this definition is intentionally ambiguous."

[59] My use of "ambiguity" and a "duplicity," closely linked to "ambiguity" here and throughout the book, owes a great deal to Maurice Blanchot's writings on ambiguity, particularly in "Two Versions of the Imaginary." There, Blanchot describes three levels of ambiguity. (Although he says that he names only two forms of ambiguity, keeping with his insistence on the duplicitous character of ambiguity, he adds a third in the footnote that ends the essay.) On the first level, "the level of the world, ambiguity is the possibility of understanding; meaning always escapes into another meaning" ("Two Versions of the Imaginary," 426). One being can be confused with another insofar as they have the same name, and sometimes such confusion is useful. The second level points towards Blanchot's "neutral," the outside to meaning and being (that is, outside to being and beings, to the whole ontico-ontological split). "Here, *meaning*, does not escape into another meaning, but into the *other* of all meaning and, because of ambiguity, nothing has meaning, but everything *seems* to have infinitely much meaning" (*Ibid*). But the final level of ambiguity, advanced after the end of the essay proper, suggests a proper rapprochement with Heidegger, provided we understand being as dissimulation (seeming to be, but not actually being, the duplicitous form of seeming that Parmenides denounced as the third way): "Can one go farther? Ambiguity expresses being as dissimulated; it says that being is, insofar as it is dissimulated. For being to accomplish its work, it must be dissimulated: it works by dissimulating itself, it is always reserved and preserved by dissimulation, but also subjected to it; dissimulation then tends to become the purity of negation. But at the same time, ambiguity, when everything is dissimulated, says (and this saying is ambiguity itself): all being *is* through dissimulation, being is essentially being in the heart of dissimulation" ("Two Versions of the Imaginary," 427 n.1). While Blanchot takes this in a somewhat more radical direction than Heidegger, my interpretation of this passage proceeds from the assumption that the ambiguity which Heidegger reads into the origin of art must be read as producing the meaning of being within dissimulation, resemblance and fiction. I will justify this assumption in Part Two, when I turn to the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, where Heidegger describes the meaning of being in terms of ambiguity.

[60] But in *Being and Time* this disclosive precondition of truth was not grounded in the work of art; rather it was grounded in the being of the human being, *Dasein*.[61] Moreover, it was not disclosed in the happening of the work of art, but in the authentic self-interpretation of Dasein that was fundamentally philosophical.[62] From the perspective of "The Origin of the Work of Art," it seems as if this philosophical practice of interpretation itself has an artistic pre-history.

In describing the work of art as disclosing a world, Heidegger and Hegel agree that art has performed an essential function in the history of modern Europe. We have already seen that for Hegel, this function is inherently self-defeating. Art becomes truly art only when it is

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[60] Cf. Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence of Truth," 124-132; Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*, H213-230. Theodore Kisiel notes the first real appearance of the idea of truth as unconcealment in Heidegger's translations of Book VI of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* in October 1922 (five years before the publication of *Being and Time*.) (Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time, 506). For the importance of Heidegger's interpretation of Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics to the development of *Being and Time*, compare the "Introductory Part" of his 1924-1925 lecture course on *Plato's Sophist* (Heidegger, Martin. *Plato's Sophist,* 15-130) as well as Kisiel's commentary on this lecture course (*The Genesis of Martin Heidegger's* Being and Time, 302-308). It seems to me, however, that Kisiel does not acknowledge the important privilege that Heidegger accords *sophia,* the wisdom proper to theoretical knowledge. This has led to an unfortunate tendency to devalue the positive role that a temporalized interpretation of s*ophia* could play in an interpretation of the ontological foundations of "understanding," "interpretation," "truth" and "authenticity" in *Being and Time*. While Francisco Gonzalez's "On the Way to 'Sophia': Heidegger on Plato's Dialectic, Ethics, and 'Sophist'" has helped to correct this tendency to assume that Heidegger' devalues *sophia,* he still tends to assume along with Kisiel that *phronesis* ought to privileged.

[61] More specifically, it is grounded in the structure of *Dasein* as care. Thus, the discussion of truth follows the interpretation of the totality of the structure of being-in-the-world as care and provides the transition from this preparatory analytic of the structure of Dasein (Division One) to the investigation of "Temporality and Dasein" (Division Two).

[62] It is from this perspective that Robert Bernasconi identifies the ethical import of *Being and Time* (linked for him to authenticity understood in place of the good) in the practice of philosophy and in the activity of the philosopher as they are formulated in fundamental ontology. For Bernasconi the actual, existentiell, intentional comportment of the philosopher is the key to interpreting the existential structures of Dasein ontologically. See Bernasconi, Robert. *Heidegger in Question*, xviiif, 25-39. This ontico-ontological coupling paradoxically allows Bernasconi to defend Heidegger's ontico-ontological distinction as having a certain ethical (non- or extra- ontological) importance: "Taking its starting point in the fact that neither the ontic nor the ontological holds an absolute priority over the other, the double reading [between the philosophical investigation of being and the investigation of Dasein as the being concerned with its own being] would seek to halt --- for a moment at least --- the apparent collapse of Heidegger's distinctions. It would allow Heidegger the space to maintain the language of the ontic, the ontological and the metontological, terms by which he sought to transform both the concept of philosophy and the concrete existence of the philosopher who is held by it." (*Heidegger in Question*, 38). My own decision to treat the term "authenticity" or "propriety" [*eigentlichkeit*] in such a way that its significance is severely limited in scope proceeds from the assumption that it designates an activity appropriate to philosophical life and not necessarily to human life as such. (See *infra* fn.27).

conceptualized by philosophy. This also means that philosophy relies (or, more accurately, relied) on art for its insight into the truth of spirit's kinship with nature. But the task of philosophy is to cut itself loose from its artistic and religious moorings by arriving at the self-knowing form of the concept, absolute knowledge.[63] While we have not yet seen Heidegger contest what the function of art is, it should be clear that he decisively parts company with Hegel insofar as he asserts that art remains the proper form for the disclosure of the truth that it opens up. This is why the setting-forth of the earth in its concealment is as important to Heidegger's understanding of the ontological significance of art as is the setting-up of the world in its unconcealment. This interplay between "materiality" and "ideality" or "nature" and "spirit" is an ineradicable feature of art.

While there is a great deal in common between Heidegger's earth and Nietzsche's Dionysus, we should not see the struggle between earth and world as identical to the struggle between Apollo and Dionysus. Dionysus remains a god, and as such reveals a foreign world to the world of the Olympians, but a world nonetheless. Nietzsche's departure from Hegel, which issued into the lyrical, is fundamentally different from Heidegger's, whose destination we still have not dealt with.

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[63] Thus, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the moment of absolute knowing is called for by the inability of art (and religion, to which the treatment of art is subordinated) to recognize itself in its external object:

> The Spirit of the revealed religion has not yet surmounted its consciousness as such, or what is the same, its actual self-consciousness is not the object of its consciousness; Spirit itself as a whole, and the self-differentiated moments within it, fall within the sphere of picture-thinking and in the form of objectivity. The *content* of this picture-thinking is absolute Spirit; and all that now remains to be done is to supersede this mere form, or rather, since this belongs to *consciousness as such*, its truth must already have yielded itself in the shape of consciousness (Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, ¶788).

Just as the difference between the form and the matter of our traditional understanding of art spurred him to reconfigure the way we interpret what art discloses, it serves for Hegel as the impetus to move beyond art towards conceptual philosophy.

Beyond sharing a conviction that the work of art is a world-historical event in the strong sense, Heidegger and Hegel share a common understanding of how the work of art opens up the phenomenon of the past as such. We found that in Hegel the pre-history of a people is given at its end. The epic poet describes a past time that still feels as if it were the world of the present. But in doing so the epic poet makes possible the culture and science that will change the present world, distinguish between the pre-historical past and the historical past, and in doing these two things truly experience the past as radically past.

This interplay between past and present is repeated for Heidegger, but purely within the work of art. For Hegel, the gap that establishes history is the gap between the event the poet narrates and the event of the poetic narration. It is between past act and present narration. For Heidegger, the gap is between the event of poetic creation and the event of poetic preservation. The work of art must be created, and in its creation, it already sets into work the strife of earth and world; but it is only really art, great art at any rate, when it is recognized as such in an original, hermeneutically productive preservation. "The actuality of the work has become not only clearer for us in the light of its work-being, but also essentially richer. The preservers of a work belong to its createdness with an essentiality equal to that of the creator" (*BW*, 196).

The problem is that this act of preservation runs into the same problems of world-closure that were inherent in the epic poet's act of narration. When we encounter any work of art, it is already ripped from its context. This is seen most clearly when we encounter works of art within the museum or when we feel the massive historical gap between us and any ancient work of art. Heidegger's examples of "world-withdrawal and world-decay" focus on these sorts of extreme closures (*BW*, 166). But it needs to be emphasized that this closure is built into any act of poetic

disclosure, as much (but in a different way) for the original audience who saw *Antigone* performed in the Dionysus festival as it is for those of us whom Heidegger laments can only encounter Sophocles "in the best critical edition ... torn out of [its] own native sphere" (*Ibid*). This is because a work of art, by the very fact of being an exteriorized work, is always only re-presented. Unlike a thought, which we traditionally understand as being in principle ideal and therefore separable from its expression, there is no such thing as a work of art until it is expressed. It is not useful to talk about the gap between creation and preservation in terms of magnitude. It is beside the point to say that the gap between creation and preservation was much smaller for the original Greek audience than it is for us. A set of shared assumptions, background and context might have made it easier for them to bridge the gap in the same way that Sophocles himself would have bridged it, but the phenomenon of the gap itself is in each case an ontological phenomenon that can only be described qualitatively.[64]

[64] This point is brought home in a somewhat artificial fashion by a good deal of late nineteenth and twentieth-century avant-garde art. But it is in principle as true of Britney Spears as it is of Arnold Schönberg. Heidegger and, for that matter, Theodor Adorno resist this by insisting on the priority of great art. Lacoue-Labarthe will press Heidegger to impute the representational gap to everything. This would not mean that there is no difference between "high" art and "low" art, but merely that this difference would be less ontologically relevant than we like to believe. It also means that there is much less of a difference between the expressions of art and science (and not just philosophy) than we traditionally believe. Lacoue-Labarthe is anxious to make this point also, but he does not always consistently push it to the conclusion that the sciences (and particularly philosophy) need to be positively evaluated as works of art with ontologically distinctive insights, and not dismissed for their untenable pretensions. This might sound too harsh. And so I will insist on this claim in only one instance: in granting to Heidegger the bizarre point that Heidegger does not practice philosophy, that Heidegger's texts are not philosophical works, Lacoue-Labarthe misses the possible recuperation of philosophy, and even the much maligned metaphysics, as an ontic discipline. For Adorno's hyper-valuation of the avant-garde against the culture industry, cf. in particular the chapters of the *Aesthetic Theory* on "Situation" and "Society," (Adorno, Theodor. *Aesthetic Theory*, 16-44, 225-261). While I share with Adorno his insistence against Hegel and Heidegger that the value of modern art can only be discussed when contextualized within a broad historical inquiry, rather than a "merely" philosophical situation, I do not think this justifies his endorsement of the logic of the avant-garde which, by being self-consciously dialectically related to the culture industry, fails to entirely escape from it. For, Lacoue-Labarthe, compare his account of the emancipation of the sciences from philosophy as it is accomplished within the epoch of being (Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 3-6) to the task he sets for thinking today (*Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 105-117).

The reason why the preservation of an artwork has to be original in its own right is because otherwise the problem of world-decay would be insurmountable. For Hegel, this is not a problem. As soon as the work of art steps into the world, it begins to undo itself because its truth is located outside of itself in philosophy. But philosophy recoups the truth of what has decayed in a fundamentally non-artistic way. What is interesting is that, despite this, art continues alongside of philosophy and occasionally continues to still be relevant. But Heidegger is right in recognizing that these facts support, rather than contradict, Hegel's position. Heidegger's critique of Hegel's understanding of the concept at the end of *Being and Time* makes it clear that he does not cling to Hegel's faith in philosophy's saving grace.[65] This doubt is even more marked in the way that Heidegger pursues the deconstruction of ontology during the 1930s. Once he has granted to Hegel the self-depreciating[66] character of art's relationship to truth, he must find a different way to recoup this loss. He does this by hedging his bets and making loss constitutive of the experience of art (in Hegel's language, the meaning of art for us) as it is of the creation of art (the meaning of art in itself). The truth of the work of art remains properly situated within the form of the work of art because when art is properly preserved it repeats the setting-into work of the strife of world and earth, albeit in a new way. The co-original creation

[65] *Being and Time*, H428-436.

[66] Under the influence of Heidegger's and Nietzsche's evaluations of contemporary culture, Kundera has illustrated this self-depreciating character dramatically. Through his reading of the history of the modern novel, he argues that the meaning of modernity is to be self-devaluing (Kundera, Milan. *The Art of the Novel*, 19-20). Richard Rorty has followed Kundera's own interpretation of his claims about the novel to argue against Heidegger's understanding of poetry and literature (Rorty, 66-82). However, his inability to deal with Kundera's claim that the legacy of the novel is "depreciated" (cf. Rorty, 78 fn.19, "I am not sure why Kundera says 'depreciated' here, and wish that he had not") underscores his inability to grasp the more subtle sensibility that Heidegger and Kundera share that the question of art must remain critical and therefore, in some sense philosophical, rather than merely assenting to the false optimism of the pragmatism of our age. Kundera extends the point beyond the novel to poetry, the visual arts and music in his own novels. The most clear case of the historical character of this is found in Part Six of *Immortality*, but that presentation itself depends upon Kundera's criticisms of poetry and lyricism in *Life is Elsewhere* and of pop music in *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*.

and preservation of art accomplishes the positive sense of what Heidegger calls in *Being and Time* the *Wiederholung* of the Western tradition, the transformative repetition of possible ways of comporting towards being that have been actualized in the West.[67] The "negative" side of this *Wiederholung* was the dismantling of Western metaphysics; it proceeds apace with this renewed invigoration of art.

We must still ask how this *Wiederholung* happens and why it is desirable. In the course of asking these two questions, I will finish my initial treatment of "The Origin of the Work of Art." At the end of this discussion, I will draw attention to the presence of these same concerns in the *Contributions to Philosophy* and Heidegger's writings on Hölderlin. I will end my treatment of these questions by looking at Heidegger's evaluations of Rilke and Trakl. Because of the huge scope of the texts that this work of contextualization covers, I will restrict myself to the barest exposition of those details that are relevant to the concerns we are advancing on the basis of Heidegger's putative encounter with Hegel's epic.

1. *How is art preserved?* On the basis of what we have said up to this point concerning the role that preservation plays in establishing the ontological significance of the work of art, it is possible to imagine two different, but not necessarily contradictory, strategies. On the one hand, we could imagine the elaboration of a kind of preservation that would itself be artistic, so that preservation would amount to another act of creation, albeit one essentially related to the "original" act of creation. Conversely, we could imagine a more meta-interpretive form of preservation, where the setting-into-work of the art work happens without the formation of a new work. In this strategy, the ontological function of preservation and creation are delineated as

[67] *Being and Time*, H19-27.

sharply as possible without sacrificing the ontological effectiveness of both (without, that is, making preservation wholly dependent on creation). To an extent, both strategies are in play here, as they are in Gadamerian hermeneutics where they are more fully elaborated as "play" and the "classical" respectively.[68] Heidegger and Gadamer have each in their own fashion developed ways of treating art that meld these strategies together seamlessly. But it is important to note that each strategy is in principle different and separable from the other.[69] Asking how art is preserved in "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *The Contributions to Philosophy* and in Heidegger's writing on Hölderlin requires us to recognize that each of these strategies can develop separately from the other, even when both are in play.

In "The Origin of the Work of Art" the drift of play is contained by prescriptions built into the work of art itself, but this foundation leaves open the possibility of a multiplicity of preservative or interpretive strategies. "The proper way to preserve the work is co-created and prescribed only and exclusively by the work. Preserving occurs at different levels of knowledge, with always differing degrees of scope, constancy, and lucidity" (*BW*, 193). Heidegger's focus in the essay is on the workly character of art and this remains the guiding factor in how we are to interpret the significance of both the creation and the preservation of the work of art. This leads us to a further restriction which Heidegger leaves in play throughout the work of art on the strategy of play. As the epilogue implies, art *strictu sensu* is only great art. Or rather, the only art which properly sets up a world and sets forth the earth, which originates the happening of truth in the complex interplay of creation and preservation, is great art. On the one hand, this seems to be fairly self-evident. How well would most art fare if so much was expected of it?

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[68] Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*, 101-169, 277-307.

[69] For a reading of the differences between Heidegger and Gadamer which is particularly attentive of their different strategies vis-à-vis Hegel, see Bernasconi, Robert. *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being*, 1-14.

Not only bad art, but a good deal of good art would be found lacking. This high standard of disclosing the world *in toto* should only be applied to the greatest forms of art. Nor does the circularity of the concomitant definition of great art necessarily pose a problem. What is great art? Great art is that form of art which actually lives up to the promise of being world-disclosive. It seems not to be a dismissal of some forms of art, but a qualification. Great art is art that does something comparable to what the foundation of a state or religion does; great art enacts a complete questioning in a way comparable to great philosophy.[70]

> One essential way in which truth establishes itself in the beings it has opened up is truth setting itself into work. Another way in which truth occurs is the act that founds a political state. Still another way in which truth comes to shine forth is the nearness of that which is not simply a being, but the being that is most in being. Still another way in which truth grounds itself is the essential sacrifice. Still another way in which truth becomes is the thinker's questioning, which, as the thinking of Being, names Being in its question-worthiness (*BW*, 187).

If we are seeking that kind of art which is capable of such grandeur, there is nothing wrong with restricting ourselves to "great art." Not all art does what "great art" does, and we should not let the fact that not much art is true in this original sense take away from its beauty or pleasantness. Still, we might ask whether, even within the examples that Heidegger gives of great art, all of them disclose the world in the same way. This does not mean that we are asking whether all of them disclose the same world. Such an interpretation would completely miss the historical function of art. The question is simply whether all of the examples that Heidegger gives of great art completely live up to the sweep of being the total founding of a people.

To answer this question, let us adopt the perspective of Hegel. Now, for Hegel it would be absurd to suppose that any post-classical art could be considered great art in the Heideggerian

[70] But is this form of questioning really comparable to the foundation of a state? Is it not, as Heidegger has shown in numerous places, something at once infinitely inferior, and more ridiculous, but also infinitely more valuable in its capacity to ironize all putative values? Is Heidegger right in calling philosophy useless?

sense. Properly speaking, only the classical epic or perhaps the classical sculpture is situated at the juncture where religion, art and ethics are all one and the same. We could extend this to Heidegger's example of the Greek temple. We could even extend it to the tragedy *Antigone*, but with two important caveats (but these caveats will change everything). We have already seen the first caveat, which is general to tragedy. While tragedy remains the highest form of art for Hegel, its proper time is in a world that is already historical, and therefore does not have the same inaugural historical sense that Heidegger claims is the provenance of great art. The second qualification is specific to *Antigone* and comes from Hegel's treatment of *Antigone* in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. *Antigone* is not exactly about the historical character of a people, their ethical substance, but how that substance becomes conflicted when actualized in the ethical actions of the individual.[71] This conflict, then, already presupposes the sort of division between the whole and the part which the Hegel of the *Aesthetics* will think of as un-artistic.[72] To the extent that Hegel would agree *Antigone* shows "truth establish[ing] itself in the beings it has opened up" (*BW*, 186) it would seem to consist as much in the thoughtful character of the play as in the purely artistic character of the presentation.

Although it requires a degree of conceptual wiggling, it is fairly easy to see how Hegel would grant Heidegger's understanding of this Greek set of artworks. But there are crucial reasons to insist that he would vehemently deny Heidegger the claim that the painting of Van Gogh or the poem about "The Roman Fountain" by Meyer should be considered in a world-disclosive light. This is not merely because of their lateness, although this would certainly have a place in his judgment. Their inappropriateness would, for Hegel, reside in the very claims

[71] *Phenomenology of Spirit*, ¶469.
[72] *Aesthetics*, 179-196.

of these artworks. In what way do these two works of art purport to fulfill the same grand sweep of historical founding that Heidegger's Greek examples serve? Who would say that a simple painting of a pair of shoes and a poem about the overflow of a fountain fulfill the same function as the chief religious structures and texts of an entire civilization? Nor is this simply a feature of their content. It would be impossible for Hegel to conceive of a painting, with its fundamentally romantic fashion of presentation, as fulfilling the sweep that the sculpture or the epic poem has, because the painting, with its exemplary ability to portray the whole of a particular situation, lacks the reserved ideality of these other kinds of artworks. It would be even more absurd to imagine a lyrical poem that fulfilled this function, because the lyrical poem is the genre of the individual as such, the expression of the inner life of the subjective "I" who asserts herself in the face of a larger, alienated collectivity.[73]

Nietzsche recognized that this interpretation of lyrical poetry would always prejudice those who were obsessed with great, world-historical art.

> Homer, the aged self-absorbed dreamer, the type of the Apollinian naïve artist, now beholds with astonishment the passionate genius of the war-like votary of the muses, Archilochus, who has hunted savagely through life. Modern aesthetics, by way of interpretation, could only add that here the first 'objective' artist confronts the first 'subjective' artist. But this interpretation helps us little, because we know the subjective artist only as the poor artist, and throughout the entire range of art we demand first of all the conquest of the subjective, redemption from the "ego," and the silencing of the individual will and desire; indeed, we find it impossible to believe in any truly artistic production, however insignificant, if it is without objectivity, without pure contemplation devoid of interest. Hence our aesthetics must first solve the problem of how the 'lyrist' is possible as an artist --- he who, according to the experience of all ages, is continually saying "I" and running through the entire chromatic scale of his passions and desires. Compared with Homer, Archilochus appalls us by his cries of hatred and scorn, by his drunken outbursts of desire. Therefore is not he, who has been called the first subjective artist, essentially the non-artist?[74]

[73] On painting, cf. *Aesthetics*, 797-804. On lyric poetry, cf. 1113-1127.
[74] *The Birth of Tragedy*, 48.

Let us think about this concretely in terms of the "Roman Fountain."

Roman Fountain

> The jet ascends and falling fills
> The marble basin circling round;
> This, veiling itself over, spills
> Into a second basin's ground.
> The second in such plenty lives,
> Its bubbling flood a third invests,
> And each at once receives and gives
> And streams and rests. (Qtd. at *BW*, 163).

Granted, Meyer's poem is a very objective, staid lyrical poem. There is no visible trace of the non-artistic "I" that Nietzsche says we find so appalling. Nonetheless, traditional theories of the lyric would ascribe the force of the poem to its ability to depict an experience of a Roman fountain in a way that captures what is significant to the recollecting self. Thus, Hegel emphasizes the occasional character of so many odes, with their presentation of something objective to the inner life as a way of expressing the inner life itself by a kind of metonymy.[75] Heidegger is more interested in how even a poem which seems to be a copy of something real is itself truth by virtue of saying more than what it re-produces. To be sure, this does not have to do with the lyrical self, but it reproduces in a certain way the claim that Hegel was concerned with. Lyrical poems do not talk about the world, even when they claim to. Nor do they present a totality of a spiritual world. At their best, as here, they might portray a fragment of that world reflected inwardly, in the language of contemplation, or feeling or desire. Nonetheless, Heidegger insists, truth happens in this poem. And truth happens in Van Gogh's shoes. And, yet, Heidegger himself seems to make this assertion much more modestly in these examples than in his other examples. In Van Gogh's shoes, the example that he devotes more attention to, he

[75] Cf. *Aesthetics*, 1117-1119.

shows how earth and world are revealed as what they are, but also how it is a very particularized, localized revelation; it is emphatically not the world of a whole nation, but the world of the individual peasant. This is true even if she does not see all of this going on beneath her feet (*BW,* 158-161). This attentiveness to the world of the individual is all the more striking given Heidegger's goal of deconstructing the modern subject. And yet it seems to me that far too little has been made of the difference between Heidegger's treatment of these modern examples and his treatment of the ancient models he treats them against. I must admit that to my mind, there is a kind of beauty to the painting by Van Gogh and the poem by Meyer which is lacking in the Greek temple, even if that also has a beauty of its own. And I must admit that to my mind, but perhaps here it is just my imagination, there is a softness to Heidegger's descriptions of these modern examples which is lacking in the heroism of his previous examples.

At any rate, with the presentation of the world of the individual, we are led back to the question with which we began. Does Heidegger think that the greatness of modern works of art consists in the same kind of disclosure by which ancient works of art were marked? From this perspective, Heidegger's turn to Hölderlin in the last lines of "The Origin of the Work of Art" sounds more and more like a genuine, rather than a rhetorical, question:

> Are we in our existence historically at the origin? Do we know, which means do we give heed to, the essence of the origin? Or, in relation to art, do we still merely make appeal to a cultivated acquaintance with the past?
>
> For this either-or and its decision there is an infallible sign. Hölderlin, the poet --- whose work still confronts the Germans as a test to be stood --- name it in saying:
>
> *Schwer verlässt*
> *was nahe dem Ursprung wohnet, den Ort.*
>
> Reluctantly
> That which dwells near its origin abandons the site.
>
> --- "The Journey," verses 18-19. (*BW*, 273).

As will be clear in Part Two, when we treat Heidegger's relationship to Hölderlin in more depth, what abandons the site also abandons its origin (which it is not even at, but only near) to go into what is foreign. If Heidegger's preceding questions are in fact genuine, it will not be enough to ask whether art is capable of doing what it once could do. Rather, it will be necessary to ask what is the same in any art that is world-disclosive, whether it be in the form of the classical work of art or the modern work or art. If this is a genuine question, it leaves open the possibility of whether modern works of art will in the end have to be judged against classical standards.

How are we to recognize and preserve what is disclosive in modern works of art? In order to answer this question while still taking the measure of the classical tradition, Heidegger turns to a transgeneric concept of poetry.[76] While some of his modifications of Hegel's presentation of the epic were quite close to Nietzsche's, here Heidegger completely parts ways with Nietzsche, whom we saw taking the approach of a rigorous differentiation of genres. From the perspective of this monoscopic, transgeneric theory of poetry, the question of the difference between ancient and modern kinds of art, or between an epic and lyrical kind of poetry, seems to be moot.

In order to be able to claim that he is being attentive to the role that both creation and preservation play in the happening of the work of truth and also to stay focused on the sorts of great art that are truly world-disclosive, Heidegger needs to develop an understanding of the meaning of art that is operative in all (great) art and that ties all (great) art together. "The meaning of art" does not here have the sense that, for example, "the meaning of life" has. The goal is not some hidden, grand, unitary phenomenon. Rather, the goal is commensurability and

[76] This is the sense of shifting from poetry and literature to language, in statements such as "language itself is poetry in the essential sense" (*BW*, 199).

comprehensibility, a commonality of language across the arts. To be disclosive is to be linguistic. All art, insofar as it is great is therefore "linguistic" art, i.e. is poetry. "*All art*, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of being, is as such, *in essence*, poetry" (*BW*, 197). Thus, all arts: "architecture, sculpture, and music must be traced back to poesy" (*BW*, 198). Poesy (*Poesie,* poetry in the ordinary sense) has a privileged relationship to poetry (*Dichtung*, which is identical to *Poesie* in ordinary German). This is the closest that we will get in "The Origin of the Work of Art" to a theory of genre. There are real differences between the arts to be sure, but from the perspective of truth they are all linguistic and therefore poetic. Poetry in the narrow, differentiated sense remains more closely tied to poetry in the transgeneric sense, because it performs the artistic truth-function of art in an exemplary way. But this function, which is to project the world by endowing meaning to things, apparently does not divide up the linguistic arts.

> Language, by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word and to appearance. Only this naming nominates beings to their Being *from out of* their Being. Such saying is a projecting of clearing, in which announcement is made of what it is that beings come into the open *as* ... Projective saying is poetry: the saying of world and earth, the saying of the arena of their strife and thus of the place of all nearness and remoteness of the gods. Poetry is the saying of the unconcealment of beings. Actual language at any given moment is the happening of this saying, in which a people's world historically arises for it and the earth is preserved as that which remains closed (*BW*, 198f).

This sounds as if the actual language of the people was the truest work of art. But in fact, art consists in preparing the way for the actual language of a people, who in their everyday life use words as if they were pre-given entities like sticks and stones. This massive enabling sounds as though it were again an epic theory of art. But for Heidegger art gives meaning to words by presenting what is unsayable in what is said, namely the interplay of concealment and

unconcealment that happens as the work of art. "Projective saying is saying which, in preparing the sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such into a world. In such saying, the concepts of a historical people's essence, i.e. of its belonging to world history, are preformed for that people" (*BW*, 199). This preformation happens on the level of the unsaid: in the meaningfulness of worked stone, or of oils, or of nonverbal notes, but above all in the sonorous, resonant and beautiful life of words. Because this preformation happens on the level of the unsaid, it is possible for any great work of art, even a small and simple one, to say more than it says. Homer's epics, insofar as they were world-disclosive, enacted a work the unsaid of which was the whole world of a people. Van Gogh's painting, while itself much smaller, taps into these same massive resources of the unsaid, but now the unsaid of modernity. If Heidegger were to grant that there is something distinctively lyrical about the art of modernity (and he does not grant the lyrical any such distinction), it would have to be visible in the magnitude of the question of what is unspoken in the modern work of art, and not in the relative modesty of the content and forms of the lyrical poem. The question of genre would have to be subordinated to the transgeneric saying of poetry, which says on the level of the un-said what is true about being. For Heidegger, if we were to decide that the question of lyricism had any priority, it would be from the saying of what is un-said in the present meaning of being.

The Epic of Being

It seems as if we have arrived at a transgeneric concept of being and left the question of the epic far behind. We have indeed arrived at a transgeneric concept of being, but that in no way means we have left the question of the epic behind. Let us turn to the second question remaining for our treatment of "The Origin of the Work of Art."

2. *Why is art desirable*? Have we not already answered this question? Art is desirable because, without art, truth would fall by the wayside: first and foremost, the truth of being, but also from there ordinary truth, in the derivative, assertoric sense, since it would grow enervated, cut off from its source. Art is needed as one of the essential ways in which world happens as the happening of truth. Here, we are speaking with an emphasis on the clearing of the open space of unconcealment, the happening of truth in the sense of setting up a world. With regards to this component of what the work of art does, we must admit that there are multiple possibilities for how this can happen, some of which are non-artistic. "Clearing of openness and establishment in the open region belong together. They are the same single essence of the happening of truth. This happening is historical in multiple ways" (*BW*, 186). Heidegger then goes on to the list we have already discussed: the foundation of a state or a religion/mythology; "the essential sacrifice," philosophy (*BW*, 186f). If truth happens in multiple ways, we must ask whether the senses of truth which these multiple ways arrive at are the same. This means, do they all happen at one and the same time? Do they all measure different ways in which one and the same world is set up? Or are we dealing with competing ways of opening the world that happen successively? Or in an overlapping time? Regardless of how we should answer these questions, we will also need to raise another set of questions. Is the structure of this happening the same in all of these examples? That is to say, does this setting up of world always happen alongside a setting forth of the world and under the purview of the unsaid? Or are these ways that truth happens distinct to the work of art? Leaving aside the rather enigmatic "essential sacrifice," there are good reasons to suppose that state-founding, mythology-making and philosophical thinking do not have the earth in mind as the fundamental counterpart to the worlds they

disclose: politics because it seems to depend upon the plasticity of the political subject, religion because even the most immanent god is still somewhat transcendent and philosophy because of its convoluted relationship to the ways of truth happening in art, politics and religion.[77] But perhaps their relationship to the earth is visible in the unsaid. We would then have to ask, "Do these forms of world-disclosure say the unsaid of art?" But doesn't Heidegger's demonstration that art is governed by its relationship to what is said about the truth of being in its unsaid itself depend upon the visibility of the strife between earth and world? If we grant that the history of truth happens in many ways, then we are forced to ask about the historical meaning of Aristotle's claim that being is said in many ways.[78] Depending on how we answer these questions, the claim that we need art for the preservation of truth might not follow from the fact that art is world-disclosive.

The example of Hegel is once again instructive. Hegel would agree with Heidegger that art is one way in which the history of the truth of being or of spirit progresses, but it is a way with a place determined by the teleology of that history as a whole. Since Hegel's concept of history is fundamentally progressive and is oriented by its destination in speculative philosophy, art's essential place in that history can be assigned and distinguished from the places of other ways in which the world is revealed. Ultimately, this means that there is one world of spirit, and

[77] Even if we speak of the resistance of the body to this process of political subjection, we would have to ask the question, "Is the body the same as the earth?" Even if we grant the primacy of the phenomenon of holiness, we would have to ask the question, "Is heaven the same as the earth?" And even if we were to insist on the continued materiality of philosophy's language (or the continued poetry of philosophy) we would still have to ask whether an idea actually sets forth the earth. Perhaps all of these questions can be answered affirmatively. But such answers are by no means self-evident. Moreover, they seem impossible to answer without making the presupposition that these ways of opening the truth are already determined by the unsaid.

[78] Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, 1003a.

the sense of talking about the world of particular peoples, ages, etc. must be relative to this unitary phenomenology.

As is well known, Heidegger replaces this progressive model of history with an epochal one. Because the truth of being is as much a matter of concealment and withdrawal as it is of revelation and unconcealment, being always holds itself back in beings. This historical description of the ontological difference grounds a radical dissymmetry within history. The phenomenon of world is essentially multiple, diachronic and particularized. Nonetheless, as is also well known, it is possible to establish some fashion of narrative order over this multiplicity of histories, so that Heidegger is able to sound like Hegel (although a much more pessimistic Hegel) and talk about one overarching epoch of being, the epoch of metaphysics.[79] Now, it is my contention that this tension within the epochality of being reveals an unacknowledged tension within Heidegger's supposedly transgeneric or universal understanding of the historical character poetry between an epic and tragic model of history.

The superficial connections between the sense of time suggested by Heidegger's epochal understanding of being and Aristotle's characterization of the temporality of the epic and the tragedy should be easy to see. The epic is episodic, and because of this periodicity it is capable of encompassing as much time as it needs to portray its object. Nonetheless, the best epics restrict themselves to one event. In this, they tend towards tragedy (as the best epics do in all of their essential characteristics) which compresses that one event into the unity of a single day and

[79] Heidegger touches on these points frequently in his later works, but the two texts which are most relevant for my treatment here are those found in the section of the *Contributions to Philosophy* entitled "Playing-Forth" (§§81-114) and the presentation of the epoch of modernity in "The Age of the World Picture." Note in particular Heidegger's quick transition from the epochal determination of metaphysics as such to the determination of the modern age and modern science ("The Age of the World Picture," 115-117).

thereby subordinates what would appear to be episodes to an overarching logic.[80] We could call this the logic of the scene. To make the case that this superficial connection actually elucidates the unity of several features of Heidegger's thought, I will now turn to Heidegger's *Contributions to Philosophy* and then to Heidegger's evaluations of Rilke and Trakl against the model of Hölderlin.[81]

The *Contributions to Philosophy* is an unpublished manuscript from 1938, three years after the first delivery of the "Origin of the Work of Art." In it, Heidegger attempts to systematically integrate the claims that we have seen him make above with other elements of his writings from the 1930s. In addition, he anticipates many of the concepts and methods that he will use in his continued investigations during the 1940s and 1950s. Keeping with our concern to highlight what is most historically necessary in art, as opposed to, for example, philosophy or statecraft, I will briefly sketch out two features of the text. First, I will examine Heidegger's characterization of the triadic relationship between poet, thinker and statesperson; then, I will sketch out the narrative order that Heidegger imposes on his epochal theory of the history of being through the interplay between a first beginning and another beginning. In these two motifs we can see the hardening of the epical possibilities of "The Origin of the Work of Art" into an apparently unconscious adoption of the model of the epic. This adoption will not be entirely dropped, even when it is a question of understanding the historical impact of a lyrical poem.

The need for thinkers, poets, and politicians who are related in fundamentally original ways to the truth of be-ing (*Seyn*, an archaic rending of *Sein*, "to be" which Heidegger employs to sharpen the ontological difference between being in the infinitive sense of *Sein* and the

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[80] *Poetics*, 1450b-1451a.

[81] For a good account of the relationship between "The Origin of the Work of Art" and Heidegger's writings on Hölderlin, see Fynsk, Christopher. *Heidegger: Thought and Historicity*, 131-229.

participial sense of *Seinde*) is announced in the "Preview" to the *Contributions to Philosophy*, where Heidegger envisions a coterie of the "few and the rare" who will prepare and enact anew the happening of truth in the opening of a new, non-metaphysical historical world by experiencing the fundamental distress (*Not*) of our times (C, §5). They experience this distress by taking a "reserved" attitude towards the present world-historical situation. This reservedness, "their fundamental attunement,"[82] amounts to a doubled experience of wonder. Wonder was, for Aristotle and Plato, the beginning of philosophy. As we have seen, it was also an experience that the epic was exemplarily suited to present. In contrast to this initial wonder that there is anything at all, the modern attitude of reservedness must contend with the wonder that no one wonders about this anymore. The modern founder must wonder why beings have become so self-evident. A sense of wonderment must again be reawakened, but it can only be reawakened through the ordinary language and concepts of our times (Cf. C §§41, 276). If Heidegger were more interested in the differentiation of genre, we might suggest initially that epic is exemplarily suited to do this, because it presents the wondrous in the ordinary by use of paralogism. But we might also be suspicious of the extent to which this domesticates the wondrous. Be that as it may, Heidegger does not pick up on these epical possibilities, even while he lingers with them and (almost) exceeds them.

In speaking of those who take up this attitude of reservedness in a way that might yield the power to transform the present into a hitherto un-thought of future, Heidegger speaks of politicians (i.e. those who practice statecraft in an original way), poets and thinkers, but the main

[82] Emad and Maly translate *Grundstimmung* as "grounding attunement" in order to prepare the way for the sense of "*Gründung*" involved in Part Five of the Beiträge. However, I translate it as "fundamental attunement" because I am more concerned with highlighting the similarity of this notion to the moodedness of Dasein in *Being and Time* (*BT*, H134-139), to the foundational character of art in "The Origin of the Work of Art" and, beyond Heidegger, to the classical, foundational sense of art in Hegel.

emphasis in the text is on the relationship between poet and thinker. These happy few are designated together in their ontological-temporal provenance as "The Ones to Come" (*C*, Part VI). Proceeding from this fundamental attitude of reservedness, the ones to come will enact what has been impossible since the classical moment of the first beginning: a wholly new opening up of the world that gives a people an undreamt of relationship to be-ing in the coming of the new, last (in the sense of long-awaited) god (*C*, §251). "This god will set up the simplest but utmost opposition over its people as the paths on which this people wanders beyond itself, in order to find once again what is its ownmost and to exhaust the moment of its history. World and earth in their *strife* will raise love and death into their utmost and will bring love and death together into fidelity to god and will withstand the maze --- in the manifold mastering of the truth of beings" (*C*, §252). With this return to the language of the "Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger anticipates the interpretation of that work that he will give at the end of the *Contributions*, the anticipation of a form of art that will signal, now in a complete inversion of Hegel, the end of metaphysics (*C*, §277).[83] This happening of the strife of world and earth is imputed to all of "The Ones to Come," and not just the poet. Nonetheless, the poet has a place of privilege, because he has already come, or at least one poet has come. "Hölderlin [is] their poet who comes from afar and therefore the poet most futural of the ones to come. Hölderlin is the most futural of the ones to come because he comes from the farthest away; and coming from so

[83] I use the word "inversion" fully cognizant of the fact that this is the relationship to Plato and Hegel that Heidegger ascribes to Nietzsche as Nietzsche's way of remaining metaphysical. What is interesting about this moment of Heidegger's own deconstruction is that this inversion will instead prepare the way for a re-appropriation of metaphysics "non-metaphysically." But that in no way follows from the fact that metaphysics can only be freed when it is dis-owned (not reversed). There is a puzzle here which cannot be resolved metaphysically, but only stylistically. Heidegger recognized this on occasion (Cf., e.g. the discussion of style in *Nietzsche*, 1: 124-137) but Derrida has forced this question much more pointedly in *Spurs*. In particular, the section on the "Abysses of truth" elucidates the role that style plays in Derrida's understanding of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as a metaphysician (Derrida, Jacques. *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, 118-123 157f. n.15).

far away, he *traverses* and transforms what is the greatest" (*C*, §252). As we will see, there might be other poets who are truly poets, but who are not futural in this sense. All of the ones to come, who will open the earth in manifold ways ---- in art, philosophy, statecraft and religion --- must listen to Hölderlin in order to understand how to listen properly to the truth of be-ing concealed within beings.

There are references to Hölderlin scattered throughout the *Contributions*, but he receives nowhere near the full and systematic treatment that he receives in the various lecture courses Heidegger devotes to him from the middle of the 1930's onwards. Nonetheless, on the basis of those references, we can surmise those features of the Hölderlin texts that Heidegger is most interested in here. On the one hand, Heidegger is interested in the thematic of the flight of the gods: the turning of gods and mortals away from one another as the decisive experience of modernity. But it is clear that for Heidegger it is the task of the poet to indicate the way out of this experience (this is true for Hölderlin too, but in a more ambiguous fashion.)[84] How the poet does this is revealed in what must be the dominant sense of Hölderlin's place of privilege, a sense that can be summed up in Heidegger's obsessive return to one couplet in Hölderlin. "*Was*

[84] This promise is clearly marked in Heidegger's essay on Hölderlin's "As When on a Holiday," where he does, however, acknowledge that "the poem is incomplete in many respects" (Heidegger, Martin. *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry,* 97. Hereafter cited in the body of the text as *EHP*. Despite the fact that "the higher sphere, the holy ray, threatens even the holy still more deeply with the loss of its essence" (*EHP,* 95f) Heidegger insists on the primacy of the couplet that opens the third stanza: "*Jetzt aber tagts! Ich harrrt und sah es kommen, / Und was ich sah, das Heielige sei mein Wort.*" "But now day breaks! I waited and saw it come, And what I saw, the holy my word shall convey" (*Poems and Fragments* 372, 373 --- I have modified Hamburger's translation of *das Heilige*, which he renders as "the hallowed" in order to keep with the standard translation in Heidegger scholarship.) For Heidegger, this stanza contains a final hopefulness in its determination of the meaning of the now, such that the future is decisively promised: "Hölderlin's word conveys the holy thereby naming the space of time that is only once, time of the primordial decision for the essential order of the future history of gods and humanities" (*EHP, 98.)*. In contrast to Heidegger, Blanchot emphasizes the ambiguous play between possibility and impossibility that these lines convey. (Cf. Blanchot, Maurice. *The Infinite Conversation*, 36-40). For a broader discussion of Heidegger and Hölderlin on the holy, cf. Alleman, Beda. *Hölderlin und Heidegger*, 110-128.

bleibet aber stiftet die Dichter" "But what remains is founded by the poets."[85] The earliest detailed treatment of this couplet that I have found Heidegger giving, and the one at any rate that is most contemporaneous with "The Origin of the Work" and the *Contributions to Philosophy*, is contained in the 1936 lecture on "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry," where Heidegger presents it as the fourth of five critical passages on the essence of poetry.

> This line forms the conclusion of the poem "Remembrance" [*Andenken*] and reads: "But what remains is founded by the poets" (IV, 63). This line throws light on our question of the essence of poetry. Poetry is a founding by the word and in the word. What is established in this way? What remains. *But how can what remains be founded? Is it not that which has always been present? No! Precisely what remains must be secured against being carried away; the simple must be wrested from the complex, measure must be opposed to excess. What supports and dominates beings as a whole must come into the open. Being must be disclosed, so that beings may appear.* But even this, though it remains, is transitory. "Everything heavenly is quickly passing; but not in vain" (IV, 163ff.). But that this may abide and remain, it is "entrusted to the care and service of those who make poems" (IV, 145). *The poet names the gods and names all things with respect to what they are. This naming does not merely come about when something already previously known is furnished with a name; rather, by speaking the essential word, the poet's naming first nominated the beings as what they are. Thus they become known* as *beings*. *Poetry is founding of being in the word*. (*EHP* 58f. italics mine).

Speaking with the same terminology that he employs in "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger further highlights those elements of poetry that have been traditionally treated as epical. The poet gives things their names for the first time, prior to the prosaic activity of history and philosophy. The act of this foundation is taken as a futural projection, so that what is commemorated in the poem "Remembrance" is a past that only happens in this future. Again, this is the sort of past that Hegel shows is proper to the epic. This will further be clarified in Heidegger's interpretation of the fifth passage he takes up, "*Voll verdienst, doch dichterish,*

[85] *Poems and Fragments*, 490. On my treatment of this couplet here, compare in particular Heidegger's treatment of it in his essays on "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" (*EHP,* 58-59) and "Remembrance" (*EHP,*165-172).

wohnet / der mensch auf dieser Erde," "Full of merit, yet poetically, man / dwells on this earth" (qtd. at *EHP,* 59f.).[86] Employing the language of "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger argues for the poetical revelation of earth and world in their interplay of concealment and unconcealment. This possibility is given to people in their poetry, and their dwelling itself becomes poetic. But the primary sense of this epical founding is not simply to give these people their historical world. It is to give a determinate meaning to being, to the truth of the withdrawal of being in the revelation of beings. To the extent that Heidegger's theory of poetry is epical, it is a theory first and foremost of the epic of being.

This is the basic sense that Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin seems to have in the *Contributions*. As Heidegger refines and clarifies the impact that Hölderlin has on his thought over the next three decades, this will be fundamentally altered. We will see some of the ways in which this development opens Heidegger's thought to a much more lyrical understanding of poetry, philosophy and history in Part Two, but for now we will have to be content to isolate this early epical element.

In the *Contributions to Philosophy*, the way in which Hölderlin names beings and in doing so echoes be-ing, and also in which the thinker must listen through Hölderlin to this echo, is fundamentally a form of sigetics (Cf., §13). The truth of be-ing resounds silently in beings as the echo of the unsaid in what is said. If we were to ask the Heidegger of the *Contributions* the question as to whether all the ways in which a world was disclosed were based in the "same" unsaid, it seems clear that his answer would be "Yes." With the primacy of Hölderlin, a univocal

[86] The lines are from the extremely late prose poem "*In Lieblicher Bläue,*" "In lovely blueness" (*Poems and Fragments,* 600-605).

meaning of the modern world can be imposed on the various histories of world-disclosure, and a definite narrative order can be established within the epochal history of being.

This history at first admits of multiple epochs which can be roughly divided as follows: Platonism, Scholasticism, pre-Hegelian modernism, Hegelian modernism, Nietzscheanism (Cf. particularly C §110). It is the task of the section on "Playing Forth" to trace out this development in its philosophical configuration. But the very fact that this can be called a development shows that there is at least some sense in which this history does not admit of the radical breakage or withdrawal entailed in the term "epoch." In each epoch, the manner of the withdrawal of being is different. But it is also the same insofar as being is delimited over and against a metaphysics of beings as being in withdrawal. Thus, all of these epochs can themselves be encompassed within a larger epoch, the epoch of metaphysics as such. This epoch is bounded by its beginning in the "first beginning" of ancient Greek philosophy (primarily pre-Platonic, but still present in its end in Plato and Aristotle --- cf. *C*, §§87, 95-97) and its end as a passage to a new epoch through a putative new beginning announced by Hölderlin (*C*, §§89-92). In this interplay between two narrative orders of epochality, we glimpse the logic that governs the epic of being and assigns it a very particular place: the tendency of epic towards tragedy (epic on the verge of tragedy) or else of tragedy still in an epic form. Here, I believe, we have hit upon the best way of describing the epical elements in Heidegger's thought: as the unacknowledged debt of the tragic to the epic.

This epical theory is crystallized in a particularly clear form in the way that Heidegger puts the concepts of the "Origin of the Work of Art" to work in the *Contributions to Philosophy*, and particularly in the way that this shapes some of his initial expectations of Hölderlin. While I

will ultimately argue that these elements are undone in the course of Heidegger's own philosophical development, it is important to see the extent to which they still shape Heidegger's expectations in the 1940's and 1950's for the extremely lyrical poetry of Rilke and of Trakl.

We will begin with Heidegger's insistence that Rilke's poetry remains tied to the concepts of metaphysics, most particularly in their Nietzschean configuration. While Heidegger touches on this accusation in a number of places, it is developed most fully in his essay "What are Poets For?" a lecture given in 1946. The title of the essay comes from Hölderlin's elegy "Bread and Wine" which asks "... and what are poets for in a destitute time?" (qtd. at *PLT* 91). If a poet is to speak to us today, it must be in a way which speaks to this destitute time. Here, Heidegger is particularly concerned with the way that our destitution is a mark of the "default of God" (*Ibid*) or, to use the language he will employ elsewhere, the flight of the gods.[87] This allows us to designate the time that we await as "the world's night" (*Ibid*) and the world which withstands this night as abysmal: "There fails to appear for the world the ground that grounds it" (*PLT* 92). The task of the modern poet is to search for signs of the coming day, to discover the holy in the night and to track what heralds the return of the gods (qtd. at *PLT*, 92-95). The difference of this situation from the situation of poets in classical times explains why Heidegger's theory of poetry is not a classicism even though it continues to measure poets by the function they were supposed to have filled in the classical world. Because of the destitution that the modern poet must contend against, it is incumbent for us to realize that we might find art only in the experience of

[87] Heidegger makes the centrality of this image clear in the "Preface to a Reading of Hölderlin's Poems:" "Hölderlin's poetry is a destiny for us. It waits for the day when mortals will correspond to it. What does Hölderlin's poetry say? Its word is: the holy. This word is: the holy. This word speaks of the flight of the gods. It says the gods who have fled protect us, until we are inclined and able t o dwell in their nearness" (*EHP,* 224). The default of the gods is thus the most extreme moment of this flight, because their protection seems to be turned away from mortals. This is why Heidegger prefers this term when talking about the most destitute, most needy time.

the lack of art (*C,* §277). Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin's question "What are poets for in a destitute time?" therefore does not seek (at least not yet) for poets who open up the world in the fashion that poets once did, but it does seek for poets who anticipate the signs of this renewal of the poetic function. Such a poetry, Heidegger acknowledges, will be much more humble and local than the poetry of poets who wrote in the light of day: "The more obscure the traces become the less can a single mortal, reaching into the abyss, attend there to intimations and signs. It is then all the more strictly true that each man gets farthest if he goes only as far as he can go along the way allotted to him" (*PLT*, 95).

If this is true, we could say that Hegel is right to notice the limited perspective of romantic art and lyrical poetry. But this is because these forms of art are, in a certain sense, pre-classical and pre-epic. They represent the opening up of an abysmal world through the experience of reticence, and this opening anticipates the coming of the new day. It is not clear if this analysis could still be applied to the world-disclosive character of Van Gogh's shoes and Meyer's poem, but it is clear that this is the standard by which Heidegger wants to judge Rilke. "Is Rainer Maria Rilke a poet in a destitute time? How is his poetry related to the destitution of the time? How deeply does it reach into the abyss? Where does the poet get to, assuming he goes where he can go?" (*PLT,* 96).

Heidegger's answer to this question is ambivalent. On the one hand, Rilke's determination of singing in *The Sonnets to Orpheus* and to a lesser extent in the *Duino Elegies*[88] will provide an important description of what it is in the unsaid of the truth of being that poets in destitute times must listen to and bring to voice. But the concomitant determination of the Open

[88] Rilke, Rainer Maria. *Die Gedichte*, 629-717.

or Nature that is realized in the figure of the Angel from the *Duino Elegies* remains tied up in a metaphysical subjectivism of the sort found in Nietzsche. "The creature which is Rilke's Angel, despite all difference in content, is *metaphysically the same* as the figure of Nietzsche's Zarathustra" (*PLT*, 134).[89] Such a determination of the Open can never live up to the abysmal determination of the modern world that Hölderlin's poetry demands and that Rilke's experience of the holiness of singing seemed to promise. This is not because Rilke does not equal Hölderlin as a poet --- for Heidegger, no poet could do that --- but because he does not live up to the prophetic task that Hölderlin set him. "Hölderlin is the pre-cursor of poets in a destitute time. This is why no poet of this world era can overtake him. The precursor, however, does not go off into a future; rather, he arrives out of that future, in such a way that the future is present only in the arrival of his words" (*PLT*, 142). For Heidegger, to the extent that Rilke fails as a poet of destitute times, a poet of the lack of poetry, this failure is determined by Rilke's inability to see the signs of the world announced and projected in Hölderlin's hymns. However, to the extent that Rilke is a genuine poet, it is within the time that Hölderlin thereby opens up.

But to the extent that Rilke is a genuine poet, the effects of his poetry within this time are unique and not merely reducible to their Hölderlinian function. "If Rilke is a 'poet' in a 'destitute time' then only his poetry answers the question to what end he is a poet, whither his song is bound, where the poet belongs in the destiny of the world's night. That destiny decides what remains fateful within this poetry" (*Ibid*). Without getting any deeper into the specifics of how Heidegger thinks that Rilke does this, we can see the way in which his poetry remains

[89] In his second set of lectures on Nietzsche, Heidegger organizes his treatment of "Nietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position" around the figure of Zarathustra (*Nietzsche*, 2: 198-233). For Lacoue-Labarthe, it is Heidegger's analysis of the figure (*Gestalt*) of Zarathustra which also reveals Heidegger's own onto-typological model for understanding being, and not just the being of the technological age (*Gestell*). Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. *Typography*, 43-63.

measured against the distinctively modern configuration of the age-old function of the poet within the epic of the history of being. In this double measurement of Rilke --- against the yard-stick of Hölderlin but also against its own effects --- we again glimpse the structure of the doubled concept of the epoch between epic and tragic time.

The same understanding of the task of the poet in destitute times remains in effect in Heidegger's interpretation of Trakl, although Heidegger does not explicitly refer to it. This is most clearly seen in Heidegger's focus in "Language in the Poem" on the way in which Trakl provides a lyrical account of the decay of the modern world through the metaphors of evening and autumn. This essay seeks to situate Trakl, "to discuss the site that gathers Georg Trakl's poetic Saying [*Sagen*] into his poetic work" (*OWL*, 160). Heidegger then immediately links this into the thread of concepts that have governed our tracing of the epical figure in Heidegger's thought: greatness, univocity, the nearness of the poet to the source or origin and the un-said "totality" where the epic of being goes on behind the back of individual lyrical poems.

> Every great poet creates his poetry out of one single poetic statement only. The measure of his greatness is the extent to which he becomes so committed to that singleness that he is able to keep his poetic Saying wholly within it.
>
> The poet's statement remains unspoken. None of his individual poems, nor their totality, says it all. Nonetheless, every poem speaks from the whole of one single statement, and in each instance says that statement. From the site of the statement there rises the wave that in each instance moves his Saying as poetic saying. But that wave, far from leaving the site behind, in its rise causes all the movement of Saying to flow back to its ever more hidden source. The site of the poetic statement, source of the movement-giving wave, holds within it the hidden nature of what, from a metaphysical-aesthetic point of view, may at first appear to be rhythm (*OWL*, 160).

In addition to this conceptual link to the history of the epic, there are very strong metaphorical links as well. Heidegger's choice to designate the language of the poet as a "saying" points to the epic both in its etymology ("epic" comes from epos, meaning *saying*) and in the early

designation of the epic as spoken or chanted, rather than sung, language. This "said" character of the epic is the reason why both Hegel and Nietzsche claim that rhythm is the chief musical characteristic of the epic.[90] Just as the conceptual links to the philosophical treatment of the epic point to the epical elements in the history of the truth of being, so do these stylistic links to the actual epical form point to the continued employment of an epical model for the aesthetics of the poem.[91]

Unlike the poetry of Rilke, Trakl's poetry is seen by Heidegger as responding much more unequivocally to the situation of these destitute times. In his emphasis on the decay (*Verwesung*, which in its Heideggerian configuration will come to have the strong, but also positive, sense of de-essencing or of revealing what something "is" in its refusal to be)[92] of evening and autumn, Trakl poetizes the experience of the (un)holy night. But traces of holiness are nonetheless visible in the blueness of the wild beast (the inhuman human), in the path of the stranger Elis whom the poet follows, and in the experience of greeting (mourning and awaiting) the unborn grandsons in

[90] Hegel's original claim is that rhythm is more proper for classical poetry and rhyme for romantic poetry (*Aesthetics*, 1020). But the fact that the chief form of classical poetry is the epic indicates the centrality of rhythm for the epic. Hegel solidifies this point when he restricts the usefulness of rhyme to the lyric poem. "Therefore, strictly speaking, the poetic use of assonance, alliteration, and rhyme may be confined to the sphere of the lyric" (*Aesthetics*, 1137). Nietzsche opposes the rhythmic character of Apollonian music to the melodic character of Dionysian music (*The Birth of* Tragedy, 40).

[91] This stands in marked contrast to Heidegger's emphasis in the "Language," his earlier essay on Trakl, for the differentiating function of language. That essay will by one of my principal subjects in my lyrical recuperation of Heidegger.

[92] Cf., e.g. *OWL*, 167f: "'Death' here means poetically the 'going down' to which 'something strange' is being called. This is why the 'something strange' that is being called is also referred to as 'something dead' (134). Its death is not decay, but that it leaves behind the form of man which has decayed."

the poem "Grodek."[93] In this way, Trakl's poetry becomes a much clearer example than was Rilke's poetry of the sort of world-disclosing poetry that Heidegger thinks Hölderlin calls for.

And yet, it is at this moment, when the modern world is disclosed at the site of "strangeness" or "apartness" (cf. *OWL*, 172), that Heidegger will remark on the strangeness of the style in which such a poetry discloses the world. It is at this moment that Heidegger will suggest the strangeness of calling this poetry world-disclosive, even though he will continue to insist on its linkage to the thematic of world disclosure. Heidegger discovers this strangeness in the essentiality of ambiguity to what Trakl is saying and also to what he leaves unsaid.

> The poetic work [of Trakl] speaks out of an ambiguous ambiguousness. Yet this multiple ambiguousness of the poetic saying does not scatter in vague equivocations. The ambiguous tone of Trakl's poetry arises out of a gathering, that is, out of a unison which, meant for itself alone, always remains unsayable. The ambiguity of this poetic saying is not lax imprecision, but rather the rigor of him who leaves what is as it is, who has entered into the 'righteous vision' and now submits to it.
>
> It is often hard for us to draw a clear line between the ambiguous saying characteristic of Trakl's poems --- which in his work shows complete assurance --- and the language of other poets whose equivocations stem from the vagueness of groping poetic uncertainty, because their language lacks authentic poetry and

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[93] Trakl, Georg. *Gedichte*, 88. These last two examples are particularly interesting because they can both be seen as examples of the enigmatic "essential sacrifice." This is particularly troubling in the case of the unborn grandsons mentioned in Grodek, since these are the children precluded from being born by the deaths of their fathers in the World War I battle Grodek. On Heidegger's displacement of this theme, see Caputo, John. *Demythologizing Heidegger*, 148-168. I agree with Caputo that Heidegger is insensitive to the deep mourning built into the poem. But Heidegger is right to also insist that this is a form of expectation or longing, as is seen by the anticipation of a new race issuing from "murdered fathers" and "murdered sons" in earlier poems. Some particularly interesting examples of poems that vacillate between mourning and longing are "*An Den Knaben Elis*" (To the Child Elis), "*Allerseelen*" (All-Souls), "*De Profundis,*" " *Kaspar Hauser Lied"* (Kaspar Hauser Song --- Caputo discusses this poem at 156f), "*Sebastian in Traum*" (Sebastian in Dream), and "*Die Verfluchten"* (The Accursed) (*Gedichte*, 20, 26, 31, 54-56, 57, 60-61). In these poems, the injustice of being unborn, and the horror and evil embodied in the murdered child encounter Trakl's own continued expression of a romantic longing for death. His prose poems, "*Verwandlung des Bösen*" ("Transformation of Evil") and "*Traum und Umnachtung*" ("Dream and Derangement") are also very interesting on this point because they draw together so many of Trakl's favorite images into the presentation of the unborn and offer a sustained consideration of Trakl's understanding of evil that borrows heavily from Baudelaire but that is not reducible to Baudelaire's attempt to re-evaluate evil positively. (Trakl, Georg. *Autumn Sonata*, trans. Daniel Simko, 148-159). That Trakl turns to such an ambiguous, romanticized set of images to describe the indescribable horrors of World War I is to my mind one of the most troubling, but also one of the most provocative, features of his poetry. I will return to these themes in a different context in my discussion of Oedipus and patricide in Part Three of the book. See *infra* -.

> its site. The peerless rigor of Trakl's essentially ambiguous language is in a higher sense so unequivocal that it remains infinitely superior even to all the technical precision of concepts that are merely scientifically univocal...
>
> The rigorous unison of the many-voiced language in which Trakl's poetry speaks --- and this means also: is silent --- corresponds to apartness as the site of his work. (*OWL* 192-193).

Here we finally have an "unequivocal" example of what Heidegger takes to be a distinctively modern work that responds in an appropriate way to the need for an authentically poetical form of art. We find gathered at this site all of those themes which have been guiding us to this point and which have sought to gather the essential multiplicity of world-disclosure (in its possible forms of revelation, but also in the possibility of a multiplicity of epochs) into the notion of the unsaid, where they are to be met. What can we say of the style of a poetry which navigates this slippery divide between ambiguity and univocity, between reservedness and wonder, between the apartness of the lonely individual and the gathering of the community, between authenticity and decay? We would have to say of such a poetry: "The song is lyric, tragedy, and epic all in one" (*OWL*, 184).

Heidegger's treatment of Trakl suggests the need to think of lyricism at the very moment when he gives his most complete reading of how a poet's poetry can be the site for the truth of the modern world and also of how such a poetry can thereby disclose the happening of the epic of being. The potential for this turn to the lyric is rooted in the centrality of the experience of apartness or strangeness. Heidegger further refines this thread of his argument in "The Way to Language" where he thinks of language itself as "lonely." There he claims that the essence of language as such is the saying which was here the task of the poet. He then further designates that saying as having the character of a showing or a signing. In the light of how we have seen these concepts used in the previous essays, this means: Language takes up the epic task peculiar

to the modern lyric poet by saying what is essential, that is showing the signs that remain, even in a destitute world. It is in this function that language appears essential to the happening of the history of the truth of being, in which history Heidegger insists what it essential to our own history also happens. "All human language is appropriated in Saying as such is in the strict sense of the word true language --- though its nearness to Appropriation may vary by various standards. All true language, because assigned, sent, destined to man by the way-making movement of Saying, is in the nature of destiny" (*OWL* 133). Heidegger is fond of showing that the word "destiny" (*geschick)* is closely linked to the word "history" (*geschichte*); for this reason *geschick* is sometimes rendered in Heideggerian scholarship as "sending." In this passage, these three meanings (destiny, history, sending) are tied together in the disclosive power of the poetic word to enact the site of the happening of the event (*Ereignis,* here rendered in its verbal form as "appropriated") of the truth of being. According to the sense that Heidegger gives to *Dasein* from the *Contributions* on, we are ourselves that site. The epic of being is thereby situated in epical language. The "ordinary" philosophical understanding of the epic in its function of disclosing the world of a people becomes the site for understanding this feature more properly as the disclosure of being as *Ereignis*. Now, Heidegger explicitly likens this explication of language as saying to the saying of the saga or epic.

> We have a tendency today to use the word "Saying," like so many other words in our language, mostly in a disparaging sense. Saying is accounted a mere say-so, a rumor unsupported and hence untrustworthy. Here "Saying" is not understood in this sense, nor in its natural, essential sense of *Saga*. Is it used perhaps in the sense of Georg Trakl's line "the venerable saying of the blue source"? In keeping with the most ancient usage of the word we understand saying in terms of showing, pointing out, signaling. Jean Paul called the phenomena of nature "the spiritual pointer" (*den geistige Zeigefinger*) (*OWL*, 123).

And yet, on the verge of calling his theory of language and poetry epical, Heidegger again skirts away from the concepts and assumptions of the epic by focusing on the lonesomeness of language. Once again, the essay will open onto a theory of the lyrical right at the moment that it is almost explicitly epic. However, the path by which this can be most clearly seen and by which we can also see significance of this for Heidegger's broader philosophical and ontological concerns cannot be properly described until we have sketched out the development that makes this theory possible. Before doing so, it will be necessary to anticipate what a lyrical understanding of Heidegger's encounter with poetry might look like.

Of Spirits and Plastic Figurines

I will anticipate my understanding of lyricism by moving through certain apparitions of Heidegger in the thought of Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Nancy. First, I will address some of the criticisms that Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe each make of Heidegger in their respective attempts to think Heidegger against Heidegger. I will show how these criticisms revolve around those elements that I have been attempting to call epic. Then I will use Nancy's understanding of the essential significance that multiplicity has for art in order to show how a radicalization of the multiplicity entailed by Heidegger's understanding of a poem's ambiguity could liberate a lyrical account of being from the epical tendencies that Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe and others have found in it. For the most part I will therefore be endorsing the reading of Heidegger in Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy. The one important exception, which will move me back into the Heideggerian corpus, is that I refuse to follow Lacoue-Labarthe in seeing Heidegger's greatest philosophical achievements as work-less and in finding the possibility of a philosophical work only in his greatest errors.. By developing an ontology of the lyrical work, it will be possible to

put this ontology back to work in the work of philosophy. This will be the assumption with which the next part of my book begins.

Now, I have been focused on showing the resistance of Heidegger's reading of Trakl to some of Heidegger's own unacknowledged prejudices. But a good deal of subsequent thinking on these texts has been devoted to showing them to be the site of Heidegger's own betrayal of his most important insights.[94] I think that it would be possible to show that many of these criticisms rely on singling out those elements of the Trakl readings that I am calling epical and ascribing the proper meaning of the text primarily to these elements. My concern here, however, is with identifying some of the ways in which these issues have been seen to be at the center of contemporary questions in Heidegger. From there, I am concerned with framing the way in which I think the modernity of lyricism ought to be brought to bear upon these questions. With this end in mind, I will focus on Derrida's *Of Spirit* and on Lacoue-Labarthe's *Heidegger, Art and Politics*. I will first analyze the role that Derrida sees Trakl playing in organizing a "hidden teleology" or a "narrative order" operative in Heidegger's "thinking of *epochality*."[95] I will then examine Lacoue-Labarthe's application of the Platonic model to Heidegger's understanding of the relationship between poetry, politics and philosophy. This interpretation will provide the impetus for my own attempt to develop a lyrical formulation of the question of being.

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[94] In addition to Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe, whom I take up below, John Caputo, Veronique Fóti, and Richard Rorty have been particularly concerned to show the dimensions and extent of this betrayal. When Bernasconi discusses the political features of Heidegger's theory of the work of art, he draws attention to the importance of Hegel, whose presence he thinks colors Heidegger's choice of the word "great" in "The Origin of the Work of Art," *Contributions to Philosophy* and the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. (*Heidegger in Question*, 108).

[95] *Of Spirit*, 12.

1. Derrida.

For Derrida, the place of Trakl in Heidegger's thought comes at the end of the long history of Heidegger's use of the word "spirit," a path containing many switchbacks: from his delimitation of the concept and his stated determination to avoid it in *Being and Time*, through his embrace of it in the "Rectoral Address" and in the political elements of *The Introduction to Metaphysics* all the way through to his differentiation between two senses of spirit, *geistig* and *geistlich* (both of which ordinarily mean roughly the same thing: "spiritual") in the poetry of Trakl. For reasons of space, we will have to content ourselves with joining Derrida at the end of his path. More specifically than that, we will have to be content in following only one of the four "threads" by which Derrida has been lead to this place.

Derrida justifies the controversial claim that spirit has an essential place in Heidegger's philosophy by claiming that it is involved in Heidegger's determination of the relationship within three important complexes of terms in Heidegger's philosophy: (1) translation, language and being; (2) politics and poetry; and (3) the political, the situation and decision.[96] After doing so, Derrida explains the significance that this determination might have for a contemporary understanding of Heidegger by articulating an open question traced in four places of "nodal resistance" to the totality of Heidegger's thought. Our concern will be with the last of these nodal resistances, where Derrida questions the logic by which Heidegger distinguishes epochs and also gathers them into the epoch of metaphysics.

> The fourth thread, finally, leads through the thinking of *epochality*, in itself and in the way it is put to work, into what I shall call, a little provocatively, the hidden teleology or the narrative order. I insisted on the examples of the *chora*, of the foreclosure of certain bodies of thought, such as that of Spinoza on the principle of sufficient reason, etc. But once again, we shall see that epochal discrimination

[96] *Of Spirit*, 1-6.

> can be ordered around the difference --- between the Platonic-Christian, metaphysical or onto-theological determination of the spiritual (*geistig)*, and another thinking of the spiritual as spoken, for example in the *Gespräch* with Trakl: this time it is the *geistliche*, now withdrawn, as Heidegger *would like*, from its Christian or ecclesial signification.[97]

Now, this question touches on each of the three sets of terms that Derrida sees spirit being inscribed in. On what basis do we decide what the poetry of Trakl is essentially saying? Because of the role that Heidegger ascribes to Trakl in unraveling the history of the truth of being, this has to do with deciding about the essential site in which the modern world is to be elucidated. For Richard Rorty, this move betrays and immediately defeats Heidegger's "narrative" prejudices. Heidegger picks one poet (or in other instances, one philosopher) arbitrarily and seeks to ascribe the meaning of an age to what that poet says.[98] But Rorty's caricature of Heidegger misses the essential point that for Heidegger the meaning of an age is not found in what Trakl says, but in what he leaves un-said. The logic of the un-said gives Heidegger considerable wiggle room and seems to belie a strong narrative order.[99] While Derrida's criticism of a narrative order in Heidegger might seem to be akin to Rorty's, there is in fact a strong difference. Derrida makes the destination of Heidegger's explications toward the un-said one of the central motifs of his interpretation of Heidegger and is concerned to show that even the so-called un-said can be said to have something like a narrative order. This is a much

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[97] *Of Spirit*, 13.
[98] Rorty, 66-67.
[99] In this respect, Heidegger seems to resemble Foucault, who has devoted a considerable amount of his thought to uncovering hidden and not readily apparent commonalities in the assumptions that underlie a host of linguistic shifts that happened in a variety of disciplines around the turn of the nineteenth century. While Foucault would not talk this way himself, it is certainly possible to argue that this represents a theory of history based in something like the un-said that obviously resists Rorty's criticism. That Heidegger should select in Hölderlin a poet from that period who dealt with language in an extremely creative and fluid way is not irrelevant to why he could legitimately be said to tap into the un-said of our era in a privileged way. Foucault's account of the shifts between language and literature in *The Order of Things* would be the most important text for making this case. Reiner Schürmann is particularly interested in this possibility, which for him pushes Heidegger in an essentially practical direction.

less intuitive claim. If we were to translate this into Freudian (or Jungian) language, this would be something like claiming that the historical determination of the content of the (collective) unconscious had a narrative order. Such a claim depends on a careful elaboration of the relationship between exemplarity and essentiality, text and context, and meaning and ambiguity (among other sets of relationships). Of course, this has been one of the hallmarks of Derrida's work. To claim that this structure of the un-said is governed by a narrative order amounts to saying that a whole theory of language and meaning is governed by an overarching teleological structure, one which gives it a hidden, predetermined unity. My attempt to designate the epochs of being as being situated within an "epic" has been an attempt to discover a model for the logic that governs the economy between this unity and the apparent disunity that Heidegger himself wants to discover in the "groundless" relationship between the various meanings of being that govern different epochs. Let me emphasize that while the situation which I think is uncovered in this hidden teleology is epic, the logic that governs Heidegger's explication of this teleology is tragic. Again, this accords with Aristotle's own application of the logic of tragedy onto the epic poem.

In the context of Trakl, Derrida's concern with uncovering the contours of this narrative order of epochality is to discover the principle by which Heidegger decides to split the meanings of *geistig* and *geistlich* and thereby to situate Trakl beyond metaphysics. For Derrida, the decision to split these two meanings is the underlying assumption that organizes the logic of Heidegger's reading of Trakl, particularly in "Language in the Poem." That is to say, this decision amounts to the law by which Heidegger divides what is proper to the thinker and what

is proper to the poet within their *Gespräch* (usually translated as dialogue, a translation which Derrida insists is off the mark).

> What is spirit? ... The *Gespräch* with Trakl, that collocution of *Denker* [thinker] and *Dichter* [poet], strikes the reply... The speech of the two who speak, the language which speaks *between* them divides and gathers according to a law, a mode, a regime, a genre which can receive their name only from *the very thing* which is said here, by the language or speech of this *Gespräch*. Language speaks *in* speech. It speaks about itself, refers to itself in deferring itself. Here we shall not read a *Gespräch* between Heidegger and Trakl *on the subject of spirit*. The *Gespräch* will be defined as a determinate mode of speech only from what is said of spirit, of the essence of *Geist* as it divides and gathers in conflagration.[100]

The role that Trakl will play in the thought of Heidegger is supposed to be decided by the poetic function of language that goes on behind the back of Trakl and Heidegger. This function of language, which even goes on behind the back of language, exists before genre (it is the poetry common to the thinker and the poet) but it is also the law of genre.[101] The respective functions of the poet and thinker are only set into work in fixed genres once this law of genre has been decided and has imprinted itself on what the poet and the thinker actually say to one another. For

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[100] *Of Spirit*, 83f.

[101] As Derrida specifies in the context of a reading of Blanchot's récit *The Madness of the Day*, this law takes place outside of any genre. For Blanchot, this means it takes place in the neutral; for Derrida, because the division of genre is essentially gendered, but outside of gender, it would elude the subtle discourse of the *Geschlecht* (the imprint of gender and sex) as it runs through his analyses of Heidegger and Trakl: "Once articulated within the precinct of Blanchot's entire discourse on the neuter, the most elliptical question would inevitably have to assume this form: what about a neutral genre/gender? Or one whose neutrality would not be *negative* (neither … not), nor dialectical, but affirmative, and doubly affirmative (or…or)?" ("The Law of Genre," 243). Thus, genre cannot be employed taxonomically for Derrida; it is essential generative of literature and even of literature's other:

> The genre has always in all genres been able to play the role of order's principle: resemblance, analogy, identity and difference, taxonomic classification, organization and genealogical tree, order of reason, order of reasons, sense of sense, truth of truth, natural light and sense of history. Now, the test of "*A récit?*" brought to light the madness of genre. Madness has given birth to, thrown light on genre in the most dazzling, most blinding sense of the word. And in the writing of "A *récit?*", in literature, satirically practicing all genres, imbibing them but never allowing herself to be saturated with a catalogue of genres, she, madness, has started spinning Peterson's genre-disc like a demented sun. And she does not only do so *in* literature, for in concealing the boundaries that sunder mode and genre, she has also inundated *and* divided the borders between literature and its others ("The Law of Genre," 252).

Such a miscegenated conception of the law of genre precedes the generation of genres which can therefore no longer be fixed types. Elsewhere, however, Derrida is suspicious of whether the term "genre" can be used in a non-fixed, non-taxonomic way. See *infra* fn.70.

Heidegger, this law operates on the level of the unsaid. But Derrida is suspicious of this appeal to the unsaid for a number of reasons. For our purposes, the most important reason that Derrida gives for being suspicious of this appeal is that it obscures the way in which this decision actually operates in what Heidegger says (or, as Derrida's concluding imagined dialogue between Heidegger and "certain Christian theologians" shows, what Heidegger could say)[102] in his texts. To show a narrative order underlying the epochality of being is to show that the play between the advancement of a position about being in beings and about being's withdrawal from beings is set to work on the surface of texts, and not just in their un-written depths. "What is spirit? The reply is inscribed in maxims which translate certain poetic statements by Trakl, in a form which one would call ontological if ontology were still the dominant regime of these texts."[103] Derrida therefore uses a discussion of the theme of translation and the entailed multiplicity of languages to trace how Heidegger uses the differences between various words for spirit: *Geist*, *spiritus, pneuma* (Derrida will also add the Hebrew *ruah)* to mark a non-metaphysical reading of Trakl.

Now, as we saw above, the non-metaphysical reading of Trakl that Heidegger needs is one which remains attached to metaphysics in a distinctive way. Heidegger needs Trakl because Trakl is the poet who speaks about the decay of the metaphysical world but who also finds the signs of renewal in the very saying of this decay. This happens through a partitioning of language which also both differentiates individual languages from one another[104] and makes the

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[102] *Of Spirit*, 109-113.
[103] *Of Spirit*, 84.
[104] "Languages" here obviously refer to languages in the sense that English, German, Greek, Hebrew, and Latin are all languages. But it also refers to the language of philosophy and the language of poetry. Doubtless, both of these languages should be further sub-divided and also opposed to entirely different "languages," for example the language of the novel or the language of music (which Søren Kierkegaard shows in "The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical Erotic" is only apparently a language and therefore a (non) language. See Kierkegaard, Søren. *Either/Or*, I: 47-135). On the role that the "language" of music plays in the philosophy of Nietzsche and Heidegger see Schmidt, Dennis. "Acoustics: Nietzsche and Heidegger on Words and Music."

possibility of translation questionable. This fact reveals a dimension of Heidegger's ontological determination of meaning whose consequences are far from merely poetological. Indeed, it sets into play two elements of language that mark the way in which Heidegger's mature thought seeks to disjoin (his own understanding of) the temporality of being from (Hegel's understanding of) the historicality of Spirit: *Riss* (the rift or "trait" set into work by strife, related to the pure differentiation of *Austrag*) and *Geschlecht* (the imprinting stamp of lineage --- or race --- and sex, that is to say of generation as such, the Greek *typos*).[105] With these ontological themes, and particularly with the word *Geschlecht*, Derrida situates the concerns of the dialogue with Trakl at the center of Heidegger's attempt to delimit the modern subject and to deconstruct the western tradition.

To be sure, Derrida hardly thinks of either of these goals as simply undesirable. But Derrida seems to suggest that Heidegger undertakes these tasks without paying attention to how they ambiguously implicate him in the traditions he is delimiting. We saw that Heidegger was deeply committed to the idea that Trakl's poetry was essentially ambiguous and multivalent but also therefore unequivocal in what this ambiguity said. This is why, for Heidegger, the most profound sense of language's gathering (*Versammlung)* is identical to its deepest differentiation (*Austrag*).[106] Derrida is concerned that these gestures might erase the insolubility of ambiguity. Derrida does not deny Heidegger that *Versammlung* and *Austrag* come together at one point, but he is interested with emphasizing how this point is more like a crossroads: the real, but merely local, no doubt strategically situated, crossroads of two essentially heterogeneous paths. "Schematizing to the extreme, one can perhaps see two paths of thought here crossing under

[105] Derrida treats these themes of Heidegger's reading of Trakl in more depth in "Philopolemology."
[106] Cf. *Of Spirit*, 106-107.

Heidegger's step."[107] This is the crossing of the path towards an "origin-heterogeneous: this is to be understood at once, all at once, in three senses: (1) heterogeneous from the origin, originarily heterogeneous;(2) heterogeneous with respect to what is called the origin, other than the origin and irreducible to it; (3) heterogeneous *and* or *insofar as* at the origin, origin-heterogeneous because at the origin of the origin. Heterogeneous *because* it is and *although* it is the origin."[108] The other path is the step-back or retreat to a place most primal: a pre-archi-original retreat.[109] We have seen that the work of the epic is to name both of these paths: the first as the foreign and the second as the national. By naming them, the epic is supposed to domesticate these ways of thinking and thereby to build the house of a people at this crossroads. To the extent that Heidegger seeks to stabilize the movement of thought up and down these crossroads, his famous designation of language as "the house of being" seems to amount to the gesture of constructing the epic of being.[110] As we will see at the end of Part Two, to deny Heidegger his house-building permit is not to deny the reality of this site: it is merely to refuse to call this crossroads a stable, fixed point.

Ultimately, then, Derrida shows that the epic of being that continues to govern Heidegger's expectations of Trakl ends up re-inscribing Heidegger within the metaphysical and humanistic traditions that he hoped to avoid. This is hardly the last word Derrida has to say about Heidegger, whom he sometimes criticizes much more sharply and at other times appropriates with far fewer reservations. However, my continued concern with these themes will involve orienting them toward Heidegger by attempting to move away from imputing a narrative

[107] *Of Spirit*, 107.
[108] *Of Spirit*, 107f.
[109] *Of Spirit*, 112.
[110] In Heidegger, Martin. "Letter on Humanism," *BW* 260.

order to epochality. I also want to take the measure of how this move might bring to the surface what Heidegger left in the unsaid, and in this act of surfacing unmoor it from its originary one-ness, allowing it to float freely amidst a multiplicity of works of art and philosophy.

2. Lacoue-Labarthe.

In *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, Lacoue-Labarthe elucidates the intertwining of Heidegger's determinations of philosophy, poetry and politics from the position of the difference between thinking and philosophy. Taking up and endorsing Heidegger's famous determination of the task of thinking at the end of philosophy,[111] Lacoue-Labarthe insists that our age is one which ought to modestly admit that philosophy is over with, or ought to be over with, or at any rate that it is impossible, even if we do not yet realize it.[112] This is because "philosophy is finished/finite (*La philosophie est finie*).[113] Philosophy proceeds essentially as a series of theses about being, all of which proceed from the original identity of thinking and being.

> At the beginning of philosophy or, in other words, in the initial indication that being and thinking are the same and that that 'same' is the site of truth, there was a store of possibilities: the determinations of thinking, which is to say, in each case, an interpretation of Being or, if one prefers, an experience of what is (*das Seiende*). Successively adopted in sequence in an order which owes nothing to change but a great deal to the stage-by-stage emancipation of the sciences each in its own particular rhythm, and to the domination of a 'critical' concept of truth, these possibilities which we have to imagine from the beginning as finite in number, have been exhausted --- and this has occurred ever more rapidly and precipitately since the West has entered what it has itself called its modern age.[114]

Such a diagnosis of the mise-en-scene of philosophy marks Lacoue-Labarthe's greatest philosophical debt to Heidegger. However, we should remark that there is an important reversal

[111] The reference is to the 1966 essay "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" (Heidegger, Martin. *On Time and Being*, 55-73).
[112] *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 1-6.
[113] *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 4.
[114] *Heidegger, Art and Politics* 3.

entailed here with regards to the sciences or the ontic disciplines: their emancipation is seen as in principle a positive phenomenon, and in fact as determining the history of ontology.[115] To this philosophical debt, we would have to add Lacoue-Labarthe's greatest "thoughtful" debt to Heidegger: that the path to realize the finitude of philosophy passes through the identification of the "representational" character of presence. It is in the interplay between his philosophical debt to Heidegger and his thoughtful debt to Heidegger that Lacoue-Labarthe confronts Heidegger.

Lacoue-Labarthe's indictment of Heidegger amounts to accusing him of not living up to the rigors of the task to which he had set his thought.[116] Heidegger's thought is not philosophical because Heidegger "does not produce a 'work' in the sense in which the tradition has understood the term."[117] The sense here is of a work in the scholastic sense of the Middle-Ages or of post-Cartesian metaphysics. However, this is not the essential reason why Heidegger's work is not, and should not be, philosophical. Kant, Schelling, Marx, and Nietzsche all produce philosophical "works" in the form of philosophical "worklessness:" i.e. their works do something philosophical even though the claims to being systematic are gone. The real mark of a philosophical system for Lacoue-Labarthe is that it gives rise to a positive thesis about the meaning or the truth of being.[118] Heidegger's philosophy does not do this because it interrogates the histories of these transformations and therefore cannot itself adopt an old position, much less articulate a new position. For this reason, Lacoue-Labarthe also insists that Heidegger is right to drop the language of "ontology" because this has to do with the production of such a thesis about

[115] Derrida draws attention to this in "Desistance," his introductory essay to Lacoue-Labarthe's *Typography*, particularly in his discussion of Lacoue-Labarthe's "positive" style of deconstruction ("Desistance," 27-29).
[116] Lacoue-Labarthe will make this point even more sharply in later writings, collected in *Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry*.
[117] *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 2.
[118] *Heidegger, Art and Politics* 9-10.

being.[119] Nonetheless, Heidegger falls prey to the temptation of being a philosopher, or at least of talking like a philosopher, at two critical moments. The first of these travails is found in Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism as the rector of Freiburg University in 1933, and the second is in the nearly romantic, quasi-mythological turn to Hölderlin immediately after Heidegger's withdrawal from National Socialism.

> My hypothesis is as follows: it lies, on the one hand, in the tenor and style of the commitment of 1933 which are precisely (because it is a commitment that is involved) philosophical in type and can be located as such in the tradition ... On the other hand, if it is true that certain of these statements (the most immediately political or the least distant from the National-Socialist programme) will subsequently be unequivocally abandoned and repudiated, in its deepest intentions and the essential nature of its aspirations, the injunction of 1933 will be maintained to the end ... from 1934 to the end ... it will be considerably amplified, from the *Beiträge* [*Contributions*] to the final developments of his thinking on Hölderlin, until it produces, along the lines of a model which it is impossible not to identify with the Romantic model of Jena, a 'new mythology,' albeit one which is inscribed – with all the requisite vigilance --- in negative.[120]

The relevance of these criticisms to what I have been calling the epic of being should be clear. What remains philosophical in Heidegger's way of writing, in the style of his thinking, is 1) his philosophical attempt to provide a pedagogical model for a nationalist movement and 2) his later insistence on giving the poet a mythological past. The contours that Lacoue-Labarthe indicates for this second gesture cover the same terrain that I have tried to sketch out in slightly more detail above. In order to delve deeper into how Lacoue-Labarthe challenges these elements, it is necessary to ask two questions. The first of these has to do with Lacoue-Labarthe's reasons for

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[119] It would be technically more correct, however to insist that on Heidegger's account only meta-critical accounts of theses of beings should be called ontological, and those theses themselves should be called ontic. This designation of only the question of the meaning of being as ontological leads us to the further problem of distinguishing between the ontic investigation of the being of beings (traditional ontology) and the ontic investigation of regions of beings (so-called regional ontologies). But if Lacoue-Labarthe is right, and the emancipation of these ontic disciplines plays a formative, rather than merely derivative, role in the history of the meaning of being, then this conflation of traditional ontology and what is supposedly subordinated to it beneath the purview of a re-considered "ontology" would be an advantage rather than a problem.

[120] *Heidegger, Art and Politics* 13f.

calling this engagement "philosophical," and the second has to do with his differentiation of this engagement from a closely related Romantic, lyrical form of philosophical politics.

It is fairly self-evident why Lacoue-Labarthe would identify Heidegger's philosophical pedagogy and his subsequent mythologization of that pedagogy as deeply problematic. But it is not immediately clear why he thinks we should see these problems as being distinctively "philosophical," much less why we should set these two features over and against the thoughtful content that such a judgment apparently imputes to the rest of the Heideggerian oeuvre. It is not sufficient to say that these themes are the only places where Heidegger asserts a position. Such a claim would be immediately ridiculous, and at any rate would not even explain why these positions are philosophical. Nor could we refine Lacoue-Labarthe's thesis by saying that these are the only places where Heidegger relies on the "metaphysical" sort of truth of the assertoric proposition. In neither case is Heidegger's essential concern this sort of truth. What is involved is rather the move to a more original sense of truth. On Lacoue-Labarthe's account, it is this move that is distinctively philosophical. These qualifications should serve to mark the difference between the claim that these are "philosophical" moments and the fashionable designation of anyone and everyone as still too metaphysical, regardless of whether we understand this accusation in its structuralist, post-structuralist, post-modern, Marxist, Habermasian, Foucaldian, Derridian or Heideggerian sense (indeed, particularly in its Heideggerian sense where the difference between philosophy and metaphysics is a fluid one that evolves in the course of his thought). What is meant, as Lacoue-Labarthe has already made clear, is that Heidegger's political and mytho-poetic quests advance a thesis about being. But the position that

Lacoue-Labarthe thinks Heidegger advances is not a new position about being. It is essentially Platonic.

The Platonic element of Heidegger's thought revolves around the onto-typological function that the model has within the history of being. The model which leads Heidegger's understanding of *Bildung* (formative education) in the "Rectoral Address," *The Introduction to Metaphysics*, and the lectures on *Nietzsche* is the ontological stamp. This means that it has the being of a stamp, but also that it leaves its impress upon being. The same is true of the way in which the poet listens to the world and also gives the world to be heard. The deployment of these models, argues Lacoue-Labarthe, constitutes a "philosophical engagement" with being. But what Heidegger's thought calls for is a critical elucidation of the contours of that philosophical engagement in the history of metaphysics.

The ontology of the stamp is the chief focus of Lacoue-Labarthe's first "Typography" essay.[121] This essay also makes the case for not reading Heidegger's philosophical "lapses" apart from his proper thought: Heidegger's thought and his philosophy belong together in Heidegger's ambivalent stance towards *Darstellung*, literary presentation, with its connotation of being both imitative and productive.[122] Now, Lacoue-Labarthe argues that this ambivalence is already present in Plato. For both thinkers, and indeed for the whole philosophical tradition that stretches between them, the truth of the political is contained in this ambiguous imitative production. Philosophy reveals this truth of the political in the philosophical-political production of the subject.

[121] Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. "Typography," 43-138. Cf. particularly72-95.
[122] *Typography*, 105.

It is from this perspective that Lacoue-Labarthe interprets Heidegger's writings on *techne* (which includes in the broadest sense both his writings on technology and his writings on art and poetry) as being political. "My hypothesis is that, in all essentials, it is not in the discourse of 1933 that 'Heidegger's politics' is to be found ... but in the discourse which follows the 'break' or the 'withdrawal' and which presents itself in any case as a settling of accounts with National Socialism, in the name of truth ... This discourse has at bottom only one theme, *techne*."[123] As early as "The Origin of the Work of Art," this discourse on *techne* dispenses with National Socialism in favor of a "national-aestheticism" produced by the discourse of the setting-into-work of truth.[124]

Viewed with regards to its political truth, the turn to Hölderlin (and more unambiguously to Trakl) amounts to a way of withdrawing from the explicitly political engagement of 1933 while recouping what was supposed to have been effected through that engagement: "an attempt to see in the 'movement' that had come to power, beyond all its failings and crudities, something that reached much further and that might some day bring about a gathering of what is German into the historical essence of the West."[125] For Lacoue-Labarthe, looking at the work of art from the perspective of the question of the meaning of being and keeping in mind the oblivion to the question through which we moderns experience it constitutes Heidegger's philosophical gesture as such. The philosophical work (and not the work of thought --- perhaps there is no such thing) is produced in its encounter with the poetic work.

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[123] *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 53.
[124] *Ibid*. If we take into account the linguistic shift that under girds the ontology of the work of art, we could move this shift back into the 1935 lecture series, *Introduction to Metaphysics* This lecture series will be the central text that I deal with in Part Two.
[125] From Heidegger's "The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts" pp.478-498 qtd. at *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 54.

While appearing to alter nothing about Heidegger's understanding of the relationship between poetry, philosophy, and thought, this assessment radically re-orients the whole gist of this relationship. Poetry was supposed to open up the world to a fundamentally original happening of truth to whose signs the thinker attended in order to make philosophy receptive to this "new beginning," beyond aesthetics and metaphysics. With such a conception in mind, a relapse into philosophy would represent a deafness to the poetic work. This is how Véronique Fóti interprets Heidegger's failings in *Heidegger and the Poets*,

> Heidegger's interlocution with the poets thus does not constitute a "poetic" retreat from "real philosophy," nor yet from the historical and political scene. It remains intimately connected both to his transformative reading of Greek and modern thought and to his crypto-politics. Its uncanny conflation of penetrating philosophical analysis with historical interpretation, with spiritual and ideological motifs, and with aesthetic subtleties needs to be problematized rather than espoused, ignored, or dismissed. This book traces its own genesis to what was at first an inchoate but persistently troubling awareness of a deflection in Heidegger's readings of his chosen poets, which occludes transgression, excess, or loss and constrains the poetry to fit the exigencies of an *esse*ntial if always "polemic" (or differential) unification.[126]

For Fóti, the philosophical project that Heidegger articulates is the source for his false ear to certain poetical strains. As Fóti recognizes, this brings her reading into close proximity to Lacoue-Labarthe's reading, particularly on those points that I am calling epic. What is important for me to emphasize here, however, is the critical difference: Fóti's reading presupposes the possibility of a poetical content prior to this encounter (I am tempted to call this the "proper" content of poetry) that is, paradoxically, the well-spring of its greatest philosophical insights. Heidegger's initial decision to situate the poets only in a unifying *Gespräch* (which Fóti translates as "destinal interlocution")[127] ends up rendering him unable to register the full scope of

[126] Fóti, Veronique. *Heidegger and the Poets*, xix.
[127] *Heidegger and the Poets*, xv.

the shock that poetic language ought to deliver to philosophy, leading most notably to the opening of a metaphysics of freedom to an ethics of alterity. These insights could have been the result of a dialogue between the thinker and his "chosen" poets if he had listened to the achronic injunction with which poetry inaugurates its possible dialogue with poetry. Thus, Heidegger's "missed interlocution" with Celan is to be found in the fact that Heidegger refuses to take up a dialogue that "does not offer the thinker points of engagement in his own terms."[128] This failed encounter therefore leads Fóti to the ironic judgment which could be the refrain of her book: "Whereas Heidegger, whose merit it is to instigate interlocution between poetizing and thinking, refused this poet the 'thinking word,' Levinas, the thinker of an ethics of alterity has largely maintained intact the separation between poetry and thinking."[129] Now, the criticism that Heidegger has failed to truly encounter his poets and that he has not opened his philosophy up to what they say, is a criticism that Heidegger could see the sense of, even though he would certainly disagree with it.[130] This is not the case with Lacoue-Labarthe's understanding of the philosophical character of Heidegger's *Gespräch*.

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[128] *Heidegger and the Poets*, 97.

[129] *Heidegger and the Poets*, 98. Unfortunately, it is impossible for me to go with any depth into the substance of the careful readings of poetic texts in which Fóti makes her case against Heidegger. Let me merely suggest that while I think that the four "registers" upon which she reads Heidegger's "deflection" of "his chosen poets" (*Heidegger and the Poets,* 111) are critical, the presumptively Levinasian character of "poetic" language considered prior to its collocution with philosophy renders her identification of "essentialism" with an a-historical "unification" suspect. I will only be able to trace this out with regards to Celan, whose introduction of difference into the figures of Heidegger's Hölderlin I read as belonging to a space of diachronic freedom very different from the asymmetrical temporality of Levinas's ethics of alterity. Such an understanding of poetry seems to me to replace a propriety of philosophy with an equally problematic propriety of poetry. But it seems to me that the distinctive advantage of the poetry of both Celan and Hölderlin is that their poetic "style" is inseparable from its philosophical "concerns." In the end, Fóti's Levinasian separation of poetry and thinking remains as incapable of thinking about their generic relationship as does Heidegger's collocution. The full sense of this disagreement will have to await my development of the role of equilibrium, indifference and indecision in the historical character of the encounter between Celan and Heidegger. That said, let me stress that my own attempt to develop a lyrical account of being has a considerable debt to Fóti's attempt to make Heidegger acknowledge the importance of loss in poetry's understanding of history and to recognize that poetry is "refractory to destinal constructs" (*Heidegger and the Poets*, 111) .

[130] I think the best case for this is with Fóti's readings of Rilke at 30-43. See also P. Christopher Smith, "Heidegger's Misinterpretation of Rilke."

Lacoue-Labarthe's assessment agrees with Fóti's insofar as both insist that something in Heidegger's dialogue between thinker and poet represents a relapse into metaphysics, but the caveat is that for Lacoue-Labarthe this "something" is what is essential to that dialogue rather than a failure of its dialogic. Lacoue-Labarthe is willing to grant that there is a real encounter between thinker and poet and, as is clear from his assessment of what remains valuable in Heidegger's thought, he is willing to grant that this encounter exceeds the constraints of philosophy (and poetry too?) at times. But something about that very workliness of this encounter produces the troubling "truth of the political" in its national and mythological[131] characters. At the same time that the thinker engages the poet in the free domain of thought, philosophy and the mytho-poetic (i.e. epic) work of art are produced. This production indicates that every encounter between *Dichten* (poetizing) and *Denken* (thinking) is accompanied by, involved in, and perhaps even constituted by an *Er-dichten* (fictioning or fashioning) and an *Er-denken* (thinking through deeply, but also by analogy with *Er-dichten*, thinking in a fashion that is productive like fiction --- it is with this later sense that Lacoue-Labarthe is chiefly concerned.) This is why Lacoue-Labarthe can claim that the "truth of the political" is the "fiction of the political:"[132] the fiction of politics or of the total(itarian) character of politics, but also the centrality of fashioning a model for the operation of politics. This later sense refers to the onto-typology in which philosophy, poetry and politics are con-formed. This conformation constitutes an indissoluble unity for Lacoue-Labarthe, even when poetizing and thinking depart from this ontological region.

[131] Immediately after Lacoue-Labarthe calls Heidegger's later politics a national-aestheticism, he interprets the meaning of this aestheticism as a mythologism, cf. 56-57.
[132] The original French title of *Heidegger, Art and Politics* is *La fiction du politique*.

As Lacoue-Labarthe notes, this way of thinking basically reproduces the tradition of German Romanticism, albeit in a non-Romantic way. This seemingly paradoxical claim accords with the fundamental insight of *Literary Absolute*, the study of Romanticism which he co-wrote with Nancy, that the alternative between modernism and post-modernism is in no way an alternative between Romanticism and non-Romanticism.[133] Both "eras" remain fundamentally Romantic by incorporating the work into a systematic whole of which each work is a fragment. This argument requires a great deal more attention than I can devote to it here. The point of their analysis of the fragment is not that it can be assembled into a totality, but that it already is a totality, and thus already a work. But this making of the fragment into a work or making of the work into a fragment does not do away with the fully articulated system or work in the sense of life-work. Rather, it reproduces that system on a micro-level, so that each work is already itself the whole "work."[134] The closeness of such a conception to an understanding of the work in which the said conceals what is unsaid should be clear.

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[133] "It is not difficult to arrive at the derivatives of these romantic texts, which still delimit our horizons. From the idea of a possible formalization of literature (or of cultural productions in general) to the use of linguistic models (As a model based on the principle of the auto-structuration of language); from an analytic approach to works based on the hypothesis of auto-engendering to the aggravation of the problematic of a subject permanently rejecting subjectivism (that of inspiration, for example, or the ineffable, or the function of author, etc.) from this problematic of the (speaking or writing) subject to a general theory of the historical or social subject; from a belief that the work's condition of production or fabrication are inscribed within it to the thesis of a dissolution of all processes of production in the abyss of the subject. In short, we are implicated in all that determines both literature as auto-critique and criticism as literature. Our own image comes back to us from the mirror of the literary absolute. And the massive truth flung back at us is that we have not left the era of the Subject" (Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe and Nancy, Jean-Luc. *The Literary Absolute*, 16).

[134] "Undoubtedly, the fragment is thus a 'small work' in that it is a miniature or microcosm of the Work. But also in that, functioning in some sense as the work of work, or as putting-into-work of the work, it always operates both as a sub-work and as a super-work. The fragment figures --- but to figure, *bilden* and *gestalten*, is here to work and to present, *darstellen* --- the outside-the-work [*hors d'oeuvre*] that is essential to the work. It functions as the exergue in the two senses of the Greek verb *exergazomai*; it is inscribed outside the work, and it completes it. The romantic fragment, far from bringing the dispersion or the shattering of the work into play, inscribes its plurality as the exergue of the total infinite work" (*The Literary Absolute*, 48). As becomes clear in the subsequent analysis, this movement with and without of workliness is possible by virtue of the fragment's organic, self-enclosed and auto-productive character.

It is here that we see the link between the philosophical work in the sense of a system (as Lacoue-Labarthe employs it) and the artistic work in the sense of a self-contained, world-disclosing whole (as Heidegger employs it). They are originally situated alongside one another by the demands of their manner of language. They are determined by a *Zwie-Sprache*, a partition of language erected by this duality in their workly character. This is the sense of the original poetic language that in "The Origin of the Work of Art" opens truth as such as world and as the retreating advent of being. By restoring dignity to the artwork, Heidegger had hoped to wrench thinking free from Plato and Hegel. Lacoue-Labarthe's argument is that the mytho-poetic elements of the Heideggerian determination of the poetic artwork actually condemn him to repeat the founding gestures of their philosophies. In their shared ambivalence to the import of the mimetic being of the work of art, all three inaugurate the same epochal moment. For Lacoue-Labarthe, the tragedy of this fact is that Heidegger's understanding of the Hölderlinian caesura represents the greatest resource that thought has for representing to itself the trauma that was inflicted by the Holocaust.[135] But this possibility remains unrealized, and perhaps unrealizable because of the silence to which Heidegger's concomitant mytho-poesis consigns him. As Lacoue-Labarthe suggests at the end of *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, and as he will explore in more detail in *Poetry as Experience*, these are the stakes of the failed encounter with Heidegger that Celan commemorates in the poem "Todtnauberg."[136] I will follow this

[135] H*eidegger, Art and Politics*, 114-117. See also Lyotard, Jean-François. *Heidegger and "the jews," 86*: "The Holocaust is a caesura, according to Lacoue-Labarthe, if I understand him correctly, on the one hand, because it interrupts the 'furious' and thus tragic fate of the West, reveals the 'categorical turning away' of God and man (the 'death of God') and because, as *catharsis*, in this annihilation, it makes understood the pure Law, the categorical imperative in the impossibility of its actualization, the 'Judaic-Kantian.'" The revelation of the law in the caesura is a critical moment for my consideration of how Celan thinks about the caesura in his poetry. See *infra* fn.106.
[136] *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 117; See also Lacoue-Labarthe, *Poetry as Experience*, 33-38. After Lyon's work on Heidegger and Celan, however, it is impossible to continue see this encounter as merely a failed encounter. See Lyon 159-191.

suggestion in more detail at the end of my book when I turn to the different non-epic sets of possibilities for thought represented by Celan's appropriation of Heidegger. What needs to be kept in mind for now is the staging through which Lacoue-Labarthe sets the philosophical work alongside of the poetic work of art. This staging underscores the unity of poetry and philosophy presupposed by this division and found also in Heidegger's understanding of language and logos.

A Heideggerian Theory of Genre

My turn to the question of genre is intended to find a way of thinking about the problems that arise at the very moment that Heidegger wants to turn to poetry to think his way out of philosophy's bind in modernity. By thinking about the mytho-poetic style that Heidegger seems to favor in his philosophical and poetical pedagogy, we have linked a whole nexus of philosophical and literary problems that emerge in the wake of German Romanticism and German Idealism and that Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe and others have shown to be at the heart of Heidegger's most serious problems. While I think Heidegger's way of taking up this problematic nexus is contained in those epical gestures that accompany the tradition of treating tragedy in which he situates himself, the closeness of this position to Romanticism suggests a serious obstacle to imagining that a theory of genre emerging from lyricism will steer us clear of danger.

While Heidegger shares many of the background assumptions of Romanticism, we cannot simply import the richly variegated literary tradition of Romanticism onto Heidegger in order to make up for his inattention to the question of genre. The crucible for the "Romantic" engagement with philosophy is clearly lyrical, but the speculative tradition that culminated in Hegel and that Heidegger responds to is fundamentally tragic. Of course, the common root of

the speculative and romantic traditions is to be found in Kant. In "The Caesura of the Speculative," Lacoue-Labarthe sketches out how these two traditions depart in their respective tragic and lyrical appropriations of Kant. Asking "to what point" he is "authorized to say that it is tragedy, the re-elaboration of the philosophical or 'poetic' (Aristotelian) conception of tragedy, that furnished the scheme which is the matrix of dialectical thought,"[137] Lacoue-Labarthe acknowledges the closeness of speculative tradition to the lyrical philosophy of Romanticism:

> One could perfectly well demonstrate, and have every right to do so, that it is not primarily within the theory of tragedy that things begin to be organized in speculation. At the very least, it would be necessary for us to recall that the step leading to the speculative was first taken through the question of art in general (as inherited from Kant's Third Critique) and, more specifically, through the question of *Dichtung* and the relation between literature and philosophy. Hegel was the first to recognize this and emphasized it in a well-known homage to Schiller at the beginning of the *Aesthetics*. The overcoming of the aesthetic (of taste) in a theory of the Beautiful and of Art, the attempt to constitute a grand philosophical lyricism, the recasting of the poetics of "modes" (as Genette says), and thus the systematization of the poetics of genres, the general problematic of the (absolute) work or of the Organon (that is, of the self-engendering, as Subject, of the Work), what could be called, consequently, the "literary operation" (that is, the invention of literature as its own theory or auto-conception), also the will to decision concerning the old (and still open) debate between Ancients and Moderns: all of this was played out in the last decade of the eighteenth century, between Weimar and Berlin (between Schiller's essays on aesthetics and the *Athenaeum*, the lectures of Schelling and the remarks of Goethe) --- all of this works to constitute the crucible of speculate philosophy and in all probability takes precedence over all other, more clearly delineated points of transition.[138]

Lacoue-Labarthe argues that the role of tragedy in the thought of both Hegel and Hölderlin is to take up these themes, but also to critique and delimit the "mimetology" that produces and organizes these disparate Romantic themes. Because Lacoue-Labarthe is more concerned in "The Caesura of the Speculative" with Hölderlin's (tragic) interruption of the operation of speculative tragedy, he does not fully elaborate the shape that this critique takes in Hegel. But,

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[137] Lacoue-Labarthe Philippe. "The Caesura of the Speculative," 214 in *Typography*, 208-235.
[138] *Ibid*.

from our perspective, we can see it as one of the fundamental purposes of the elaboration of genres at the end of the *Aesthetics*. This is the reason why the section of the *Aesthetics* on "The Different Genres of Poetry" pays so much more attention to the genres of epic poetry and dramatic poetry than to the genre of lyric poetry. By emphasizing the commonality of themes between epic and dramatic poetry and by using lyric poetry only to differentiate epic and drama, Hegel is able (at least momentarily) to wrench his theory of art away from what Lacoue-Labarthe calls an "indissociable" theory "of the Subject, of Art, and of History."[139] He concurs with the Romantics in designating lyrical poetry as the poetry of the subject, but for Hegel art is not about the subject: art is the objectification of Spirit, whose proper subjective meaning is contained only in philosophy. Art and history remain linked, but their bond to the subject is severed. Lyrical poetry is the genre in which the inner life is represented, but for this reason it is inherently inartistic. Lyrical poetry lies on the side of the Subject more than on the side of Art. But the proper representation of the inner life is philosophical and conceptual, which is why at its highest moments lyrical poetry resembles philosophy.[140] If, however, the content of lyrical poetry were to be presented in its proper *artistic* form --- that is to say naturalized, exteriorized, and objectified --- then it would no longer be lyric poetry, but tragedy. So the difference that Lacoue-Labarthe marks between forms of modern thought which employ lyric and tragic models can be understood as involving at bottom a debate about the form that the subject takes or about how the subject is formed.

Viewed in this way, it is not the non-philosophical character of lyricism which is suspect for Hegel, but its distinctively modern philosophical content coupled with an insufficiently

[139] *Typography*, 214f.
[140] *Aesthetics*, 1122, 1156f.

artistic form. This basic assessment holds true for Heidegger as well. Because of its distinctively modern content, a theory of lyricism and of genre cannot provide the rallying point around which Heidegger can muster his defense of art against philosophy, even though Hegel himself acknowledges that this is the weak point in his philosophical appropriation of poetry.[141] Heidegger's reasons for rejecting Romanticism, and for that matter Idealism, preclude a turn to lyricism, because lyricism and its outgrowths --- the novel and literature --- are rooted in the presentation of the modern subject. Rather, by linking his critique of modernity to a deconstruction of the subject, Heidegger decentralizes the decision between a lyrical and tragic appropriation of Kant. The deconstruction of the subject therefore marks the ground for the fundamentally non-Romantic appropriation of Romanticism's concerns.

As both Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe make clear, the difficulties with Heidegger's understanding of poetry come from his unthematized, but ambivalent, attachment to the subject that he is de-centering. While turning to lyricism has the advantage of presenting a possible way of thematizing that attachment without eliminating the ambivalence, it is clear that our turn to lyricism cannot amount to a return to the subject in the subject's move towards absolutization. On the contrary, rather than identifying lyricism as the genre of the subject as Romanticism did, [142] my move towards framing the question of genre in terms of lyricism will involve identifying lyricism as the genre of multiplicity as such.

To make the move from considering lyricism as the genre of subjectivity to considering it as the genre of multiplicity, it is necessary to keep in mind the force of the critique of the subject and also to keep in mind why it leads Heidegger to privilege tragedy. Although Heidegger's

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[141] *Aesthetics*, 1132.

[142] What I think takes the place of the subject in this theory of lyrical poetry will not be entirely visible until my discussion of Celan's use of *Gestalt* at the end of this book. See *infra* -.

deconstruction of the modern subject marks his difference from both Romanticism and speculative Idealism, his conscious decision to employ a tragic model for his thought means that the exact contours of his relationship to speculation change in fundamental ways as his understanding of tragedy develops.[143] Derrida's description of the evolution of Heidegger's understanding of spirit serves as a good index for this evolution. The fundamental point that we need to note about this evolution is that Heidegger's decision to "raise the curtain"[144] on spirit coincides with his turn to the tragic model explicitly. During the time of *Being and Time*, when Heidegger sought to separate the Hegelian conjunction of time and "spirit" in the concept, this model was much more subdued. And while the period after this contains many significant changes (probably even more than those seismic shifts that Derrida focuses on), the epical tinge to his determination of tragedy remains in play in the very decision to see tragic art as a "model" or as world-forming, in the very decision to see art as elucidating "spirit" (rather than, for example, elucidating the subject that spirit already suspends) or as affording a narrative view of the history of being.

In singling out the epic elements of Heidegger, I have been designating the epic as a style of "thinking" or "poetizing" proper to a certain way of partitioning language. In this respect, the epic appears as one of the possibilities proper to tragedy, and this is precisely how we already saw Aristotle, Hegel and Nietzsche treating it. For them (with the partial exception of Nietzsche) it remained privileged as the primary mode of tragedy except for tragedy proper. But we are now in a position to question this assumption as it is worked out in Heidegger's thought.

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[143] For an account of the moments in Heidegger's philosophy where he turns explicitly to the model of tragedy see Schmidt, Dennis. *On Germans and Other Greeks,* 225-266.
[144] *Of Spirit*, 31.

As Hölderlin clearly understood, the significance of tragedy lies much less in what it is as a particular genre than in the fact that it represents the locus at which the arts must take into account the relationality that obtains between irreducible genera.[145] This is the point of Hölderlin's *Wechsel der Töne*, the introduction of multiple poetic forms and genres into one poem in order to enact the ambiguity of becoming that determines the being of any particular being or mode.[146] Heidegger's epical-tragic conception of poetry stands as one of these possible relationships and also as one way of understanding this relationality. It might therefore be possible to internally limit the scope of Heidegger's claims about poetry by working out their historical and topical place as an epically intoned tragedy or tragically intoned epic. But to my knowledge, Heidegger never shows much interest in this particular element of Hölderlin's thought.[147] It is certainly not his primary interest. The questionability of the place of genre

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[145] Hölderlin's most sustained attempt at working out the interplay between the epical, lyrical and tragic is the essay "On the Difference of Poetic Modes" (Hölderlin, Friedrich. *Essays and Letters on Theory*, 83-88). It is interesting that here Hölderlin calls *Antigone* a lyrical tragedy (*Essays and Letters on Theory*, 86). This point will be important for my treatment of both Hölderlin and *Antigone* in the next two parts of the book. The privileged position that tragedy plays in regulating the movement between poetic modes (*Wechsel der Töne*) has to do with its "pure" or empty expression of the caesura or tragic transport (*Essays and Letters on Theory*, 89, 102.)

[146] Derrida thus employs the theory of the *Wechsel der Töne* in his treatment of Celan right at the moment where he has shown that Celan's multivocity of expression and his manner of inscribing foreign words into his poetry gives rise to a circulation or movement that approaches universality:

> During the finite time of incineration, the password is transmitted, there is communication, the *shibboleth*, [the completely singular password whose thematics Derrida is unfolding] circulates from mouth to ear, from heart to heart --- among a few, a finite number, always. For it can vanish with them, be left as an indecipherable sign, and yet a universal one (by right, in principle): a token, a symbol, a tessera, a trope, a table or a code. Despite appearances, there is no contradiction here which could be organized dialectically … ellipsis, discontinuity, caesura, or discretion do not allow themselves here to be reduced or sublated … this is the gift of the poem, and of the date, their condition made of distress and hope, the chance and the turn, the shift of tones, the "*Wechsel der Töne*." (Derrida, Jacques. *Shibboleth*, 43)

In the parts of the text I have skipped over, Derrida contrasts the *Wechsel der Töne* to the move to universalization in Hegel's inscription of the date at the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. While important, this theme moves too far beyond the scope of our own investigation here.

[147] Beda Alleman, for example, argues that Heidegger is concerned almost exclusively in Hölderlin's *Vaterländische* Umkehr, the turn back towards the homeland or fatherland (*Heidegger und Hölderlin*, 11-66, 135-161). But both of these elements of Hölderlin's poetry can be properly situated within the framework of his later poems, and particularly of the hymns. (Cf. particularly Alleman's treatment of *Der Rhein* at *Heidegger und Hölderlin*, 140-151). The common thread that ties together the historical-political notion of the re-turn to the fatherland and

within Heidegger's tragic conception of philosophy is further exacerbated by the fact that Heidegger treats the question of the tragic much more broadly than he does the question of tragedy.[148] By raising the question of genre as one of the central questions with which Heidegger must contend, we will seek to limit the scope of this broadening and thereby to delimit Heidegger's style as a particularly illuminating mode of enacting the ambiguity of things, but one which needs to be opened up to the irreducible modes of writing --- both philosophy and poetry. Heidegger's theory of tragedy is necessary in order to take the measure of the impact that art has on the understanding of being advanced in the speculative tradition that runs from Aristotle to Plato. But because of its inherent ambiguity and its incorporation of epical structures into this ambiguity, his theory of tragedy is not sufficient to theorize the full scope of art or to theorize the speculative tradition which was supposed to take this full scope in.

Now, for Lacoue-Labarthe, this particular mytho-epical configuration of the tragic seems to be an irreducible feature of the speculative treatment of tragedy. The possibilities that philosophy affords us for thinking about the tragic are tied up in this configuration of the tragic, and philosophy is exhausted when these possibilities are exhausted. Thus, for Lacoue-Labarthe philosophy is an exhausted genre.[149] Its exhaustion effects its engagement with other genres and, over and beyond this, with the literary logic of genre as such. Their blindness to this exhaustion inhibits even the attempts of thinkers such as Aristotle and Heidegger to open philosophy to art. As we develop an interpretation of the lyrical as multiple, we will have to consider whether this interpretation exceeds or renews the engagement of poetry with philosophy, and thus whether it

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the stylistic-conceptual notion of the change in tones is the caesura, which I will discuss in more depth in Part Two of my book. See *infra* -.

[148] *On Germans and Other Greeks*, 228.

[149] *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 1-6.

indicates the demise of philosophy or whether it spells out the possibility for philosophy's renewal beyond its conclusion, and perhaps even whether it concludes that all of this discussion has been, like the death of Mark Twain, "greatly exaggerated."

I therefore have three goals in the remainder of this chapter: 1) to specify in a preliminary way what I mean by multiplicity in terms of the style of art and poetry, 2) to narrow this sense of multiplicity to its poetical context, and 3) to suggest the consequences that this specification has for Heidegger's understanding of the dialogue between poet and thinker. Specifically, I want to suggest that this line of thinking suggests a way of freeing the play of difference within the meaning of being by reading this dialogue as the introduction of difference within ossified structures of thought. This introduction of difference, which itself has multiple senses, is what Heidegger means by the operations of "poetry" or "thought" that are going on together simultaneously in all significant philosophy and poetry.

Our initial model for specifying the genre of multiplicity will be Nancy's essay, "Why are there Several Arts And Not Just One?"[150] Nancy derives his understanding of the multiplicity of the arts from the problematic relationship between the arts and the senses. This relationship is presupposed in the designation of the philosophy of art as aesthetics. The reason why this relationship is always problematic is that while the diversity of senses and media that are employed in art or in the arts requires that there be many different kinds of artworks, the claim that these works of art are significant gathers this multiplicity beneath the unity of an idea or concept.[151] To put it another way, the arts are multiple by virtue of the multiplicity of the senses; but, because the senses are sensible, and therefore meaningful, because they signify something

[150] Nancy, Jean-Luc. "Why are there Several Arts and Not Just One?" in *The Muses*, 1-39.
[151] Cf. "Why are there Several Arts," 2-9.

linguistically or by recourse to a "logical" structure (by virtue of logos or a structure that amounts to a particular translation of logos), the significance of this multiplicity is itself univocal. This gesture is at the heart of what Nancy considers to be the philosophical understanding of art, whether it be found in philosophers like Kant and Hegel or in artistic manifestoes like those of Duchamp. Moreover, Nancy argues that it is found even in the philosophy of Heidegger, where art oversteps the bounds of the concept but still functions as a way of disclosing the world or the meaning of being with a primarily univocal sense.[152] The ultimate sense of the philosophical understanding of the work of art is to make the ontological meaning of art univocal and make its multiplicity merely a technical feature of how art is produced.[153]

Against this, Nancy himself wants to argue for a truly multiple sense of the arts by showing that the multiplicity of arts does not lie in the multiplicity of the senses (which physiology and neurology have shown up are divided in partially arbitrary ways and which Nancy therefore sees as a secondary form of multiplicity)[154] but in the fact that the interplay between the senses and their signification itself calls for multiplicity. While the multiplicity of the senses is itself arbitrary, it is necessary that the significance of sensuous life be irreducibly multiple. And this multiplicity is of world-disclosive significance.

> So sense is multiply unique, and uniquely multiple. That itself, however, needs to be specified. No more than there is a simple reciprocal exteriority of the senses, except by rather crude abstraction, and no more than there is, by contrast, a homology between a distribution of the arts and a distribution of the senses (or

[152] "Why are there Several Arts??" 3-4.
[153] "Why are there Several Arts?," 2-3.
[154] Cf. "Why are there Several Arts?," 18-27. Oliver Sacks, for example, has described the diversity of ways in which the brain of a person who goes blind will reorganize the "normal" mapping of the brain's sensory pathways. While the fact of synesthesia is necessary, there is no one proper form that this synesthesia ends up taking. See Sacks, Oliver. "The Mind's Eye: How the Blind Imagine Vision."

> even material elements or states), can there be a simple multiplicity that would come in the place of the One.
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> Instead, multiplicity exposes unity in multiple ways. Not, however, as its divers figures, which would then be but its representations and which would not allow one to grant the plurality of arts ... Plurality exposes or expresses unity in the sense in which it puts unity outside itself at birth, in the sense, consequently, in which the One of unity is not One "once and for all," but takes place "every time for one," so to speak. Each one of the arts exposes in its way the unity of "art," ... . still more, the unity of a single art is ex-posed in this sense only in its works one by one. Each work is in its fashion a synesthesia and the opening of a world. But it is this insofar as "the world" as such, in its being-world (the being of that *to* which opens a being-*to-the*-world*),* is plurality of worlds.[155]

Nancy thus explicitly adopts Heidegger's understanding of the significance of the work of art in order to wrest it away from a theory of unity. The significance that this would have for a philosophical concept of art is enormous. Art would not reveal the being of the world in the senses by reference to some common sense that first gathers each sense and then refers itself to a logical or linguistic thought or concept, whether this operation be understood through a rational or an empirical model. Rather, art would reveal the being of the world in the dis-location of the common sense. Our relationship to the world would have to be understood as irreducibly ecstatic. It would therefore have to permit simultaneous and irreducibly multiple understandings of the epochal meaning of being. "The ground [of the world revealed in art] is the obviousness or manifestness of Being: existence, with which one cannot have done, at least as long as one does not manipulate it towards some end, existence as the 'infinite multiplicity of the world.' But the multiplicity of the world does not remain even the multiplicity of *a* world: it qualifies the world as heterogeneity of worlds *in which consists the unity of the world*."[156]

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[155] "Why are there Several Arts?," 31. As Kamuf makes clear in her footnote, the phrase she translates as 'being-to the world" *etre-au-mond*, is the French rendering of "being-in-the-world." Cf. *Muses*, 112 fn.57.
[156] "Why are there Several Arts?," 27. The quotation is from Alain Badiou's *Conditions*. Cf. *The Muses*, 110 fn.47.

In addition to moving the meaning of being away from the un-said towards its very patency, Nancy also shifts the style in which being is said. The model for this understanding of the meaning of being is no longer the concept, not even the deconstructed concept of a philosophy turned on itself, but the metaphor, or rather metaphors: "effective transports or communication across the incommunicable itself, a general play of *mimesis* and *methexis* mixed together across all the senses and all the arts."[157] Like Lacoue-Labarthe,[158] Nancy describes this manner "according to which the arts or the senses of the arts endlessly meta-phorize each other" as rhythm.[159] The metaphor through which philosophy[160] grasps the movement of multiplicity is itself musical. This suggests that when we turn our attention to the multiplicity internal to poetry we might be wise to look at the most musical form of poetry, the lyric.

While Nancy does not develop an account of the multiplicity of genre that is distinctive from his account of the multiplicity of works of art generally, we can see what sort of features of the lyrical poem would be picked out as essential. When we examine the way in which lyricism plays with sense and sensibilia, the primary feature of the lyrical poem is no longer its presentation of the subjective life. Rather, it is in the musicality of the lyric poem, in the repetitive nature of its rhythms, and in its use of rhyme and counter-point that we find what is distinctive to lyrical poetry manner's of playing with the reference between sense and significance. Now, to be sure, Hegel already understood the importance of this feature of lyrical poetry when he tried to isolate what is significant about the lyrical poem, but he thought of the

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[157] "Why are there Several Arts?," 24.
[158] Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. "The Echo of the Subject," in *Typography*, 139-207. Compare particularly 159-165; 196-203. For Derrida's own understanding of his relationship to this idea, see "Desistance," 31-42.
[159] "Why are there Several Arts?," 24.
[160] Or if you prefer the metaphilosophical form of reflective discourse that thinkers like Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe claim to be engaging in rather than philosophy proper. But is all genuine philosophy not by definition meta-philosophical?

musicality of the lyrical poem as an expression of the self against the generality of the prosaic world.[161] To develop a theory of the lyrical poem in Nancy's terms requires us to sever the essential features of the language of the lyrical poem from their moorings in the inner life of the subject.

What is most distinctive about the lyrical poem would then be its rebellion against prosaic forms of diction. Now, while Hegel thinks that all poetry must be non-prosaic, we have already seen that it would be more appropriate to call epic "pre-prosaic." "Poetic diction may become alive amongst a people at a time when language is still undeveloped, and only through poetry does it acquire its proper development ... In this case the chief thing is the power of expression, the creation of language, though not yet its manifold formation and development, while on its side the diction remains entirely simple."[162] The first time that the linguistic character of poetry becomes a thematic concern for the poem itself is in lyrical poetry. Thus, the truth of much of what Hegel says about poetic expression, which he chiefly characterizes by its difference from prose, while implicit in epic poetry, is only fully worked out in lyric poetry and is one of the central concerns of lyric poetry. It is only in lyric poetry and in dramatic poetry (that is, drama treated poetically and not scenically)[163] that poetic language emerges clearly as poetic language.

Because lyric poetry exists alongside the prosaic world in a way that epic does not, it must deal with the lyric in its "manifold formation and development;" and it is in this development that the lyrical poem employs the resources of musicality self-consciously, in order

[161] *Aesthetics*, 1111-1128, 1137-1138. Kierkegaard pushes this identification in interesting ways when he talks about the formal associations between music and language in his (largely Hegelian) interpretation of *Don Giovanni*. *Either/Or*, 1:47-135.
[162] *Aesthetics*, 1008-1009.
[163] Cf. *Aesthetics*, 1158-1159.

to distance itself and differentiate itself from the generality of the prosaic world-order. For Hegel, this makes the lyric poem the poem of subjectivity or individuality. But, given that the contrast is with the epic's formation of the national or collective world, it would be more proper to talk about the lyric poem as the genre which deals with the formation of individual worlds that do not pretend to have the unity of the epic world view. This is precisely what Nancy means by his understanding of a plurality of worlds. While the lyric poem might express this form of world-disclosure in the form of the world-view of the individual, this is not necessary.

Now, when Hegel approaches both lyric poetry and the linguistic character of poetic expression generally, he recognizes that his philosophical treatment of these texts cannot deal with them in the breadth that they deserve.[164] Moreover, he recognizes that lyric poetry could only be properly treated historically. Hegel thinks that this lacuna is acceptable because his philosophical theory still circumscribes the essence of poetic expression and of lyric poetry. But we have shown that he has missed something essential. This "something essential" is very different than the "something essential" that Hegel saw poetry once performing and that Heidegger had implicitly adopted from Hegel.[165] It bears an essential relationship to it in the retention of the notion of world-disclosure, but the worlds that lyric poems disclose must be set into relationship to one another in a way that is respectful of the generic and historical particularity of each particular poem.[166] This is because lyric poetry responds to the historical world instead of the pre-historical world, so the particularities of its configuration of language can only be fully understood within the purview of a broader treatment of history. In this way,

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[164] *Aesthetics*, 1007, 1112-1113.
[165] See my discussion *supra* at 2-4.
[166] Hegel himself thus recognizes that a proper history of the significance of the lyric poem would have to be historical. Cf. *Aesthetics*, 1113.

the lyrical poem reveals that Hegel and Heidegger have covered up an essential characteristic of the play of all linguistic arts, be they lyrical, epic, or dramatic. The proper philosophical understanding of the lyrical poem might even require a treatment of history from the perspective of the history of the meaning of being which, by being opened up to a multiple sense in the multiplicity of world-disclosure accomplished by works of art, would no longer be fully explicable in either conceptual or metaphorical terms. This remains true even if we carve up the sphere of the linguistic arts differently, in terms of the genres of literature, for example. What is crucial is that we see that the particular form of play between sense and signification of the linguistic work of art requires a generic and historical treatment that opens up individual worlds to a finite, but ongoing, play. What would be crucial to define the ontological significance of a particular work of art would be to see how language opens this play up. Because this play happens within meaningful language, we can designate this as the essential ambiguity of poetic language.

But it is here that we run into the most difficult problem with merely applying Nancy's discussion of the multiplicity of the arts to a discussion of the multiplicity of genres. As Nancy himself recognizes, language, the peculiar medium of the poem, is not like other media. Because language deals with meanings, it underlies all meaningful play, whether it takes the form of the arts meta-phorizing one another or the form of the concept gathering this play into a unified structure of meaning. Language goes beyond implicitly enacting the play of art to explicitly describing that play. This is why for both Hegel and Heidegger, the truth of art is ultimately to be found in language. Nancy himself grants that poetry, as linguistic, already gathers up the arts into a structure of unity, and that it is this act of gathering which is properly the locus of

world-disclosure, of the creation of things in their relationship to a world.[167] "But if this 'creation' is not secretly governed by a mystical and romantic (and, in a sense, Heideggerian) model, it must turn out to be a *technique* of the world" where technique is understood as the "singular multiple" of style.[168] Nancy finds this technique in the specifically poetic way that metaphor operates. "The poetic or poetizing subsumption turns out to be *in itself* heterogeneous. The place or the form in which art would come to touch on its essence can only be the *partes extra partes* of artistic worlds. Poetry names its proper outside, or the outside as the proper: the sense of sense."[169]

Nancy does not fully specify how the poetic metaphor does this. It seems to me, however, that he is employing the model of the Hölderlinian caesura, which can itself only be understood by reference to Aristotle's treatment of the metaphor.[170] I will give a more complete description of the caesura at the end of Part Two of this book,[171] but for now it will suffice to say that the caesura operates as a form of metaphor between heterogeneous forms of language. The caesura, which originally denotes the pause in the middle of the line in various lyrical meters,[172] is for Hölderlin the silent mark which enacts linguistic difference. It sets up a term that is characterized by essential, irreducible ambiguity and sets that term into relationship with itself. Here, we see a function of the metaphor that goes beyond its function in non-linguistic forms of art, where the metaphor plays different senses across different modes of signification. It is now signification that is playing itself, internally. The metaphor that is operative in poetry and that

[167] "Why are there Several Arts?," 28-30.
[168] "Why are there Several Arts," 30.
[169] Ibid.
[170] *Poetics*, 1457b-1459a.
[171] See *infra* .
[172] Dramatic poetry, which adopts the meters of lyric poetry, also contains caesurae. It is with these that Hölderlin is primarily concerned.

gathers the arts into a unity while maintaining their irreducible plurality is thus distinctively different from the other metaphors that we see operative across the arts. For Nancy, it is this possibility that provides the answer that Heidegger needs in order to adequately respond to Hegel and to identify a proper description of the ontological function of art in modernity. "Philosophy will never reduce the difference of art except in the mode of a reduction that is 'only thought,' and that, in these conditions, the 'end of art' as its philosophical sublation is an end that one may call indifferently *infinite* or else always-already *finite* as end, that is, as destined to repeat itself. The end of art was always yesterday."[173]

It is by making art finite and by spelling out that finitude through a positive description of the phenomenon of multiplicity that we renew art. But we do not renew art as a future project. Rather, we show that art is constantly self-renewing.[174] Nancy here aligns his response to the question of the origin of the work of art that begins with Blanchot, that is shared in some way or another by Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe, and that has dominated the scene of French Heideggerian thought through their influence.[175] On the basis of this lyrical theory of genre, we are therefore finally able to spell out a Heideggerian answer to Hegel: art happens in modernity through the contestation of art. This self-contestation opens up a world that, as historical, is also particular and set into relationship with other worlds. Art therefore contains a reference to the grand philosophical project that Hegel saw in it, but that reference is ironic. Art is indeed

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[173] Ibid.

[174] This is why for Nancy the sense of creation of the work of art is "auto-deconstructive." Cf. "Why are There Several Arts?," 90.

[175] The most important starting point is Blanchot, Maurice. "How is Literature Possible?" (*Faux Pas*, 76-84). Compare also the double-bind to which Derrida consigns literature in *Passions* (*On the Name*, 3-31). It is interesting that in both of these cases the principle model is not literary, but philosophical and largely Kantian. For Blanchot, the model is the difference between phenomenon and noumenon as it is worked out in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. For Derrida, the model is the aporia of duty as it is worked out in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

ontologically significant, because it inscribes ontology with the force of history in all the irreducible and manifold ontic regions of its unfolding. Art indeed says what is not said in modernity, but it turns out that the unsaid of modernity is the silent enabling of language's differential resources in the operation of the caesura, which is the operation of pure division. And the way in which the caesura sets forth the multiplicity of worlds is fundamentally foreign to any narrative order, since strictly speaking there is no un-*said*, at least no sayable unsaid, that organizes it. Or, to put it more simply, the un-said that is contained in the silence of the caesura is radically unsayable.

But all too often this answer is interpreted as implying that philosophy is dead. We have already seen this in Lacoue-Labarthe's diagnosis of the exhaustion of philosophy's finite possibilities. But, if we grant Lacoue-Labarthe the proposition that ontology is constantly being reinscribed by the ontic, why should we imagine that philosophy's finitude necessarily entails that it is finished? Because Nancy wants to focus on the metaphorical, as opposed to the conceptual, meaning of art, he sharply distinguishes the way that poetry gathers the arts from the way that philosophy does. But if we grant that the meaning of the metaphor in its poetical form exceeds the metaphoric operation of art, why should we not re-envision the metaphorical possibilities of the concept? The value of reintroducing a specifically Heideggerian understanding of genre into these post-Heideggerian understandings is that it promises to show the impact that art has already had, continues to have, and will always have on philosophy as a viable discourse. Over and beyond this, it will show that the philosophical concepts which have been so useful, but which seem to be dead, can themselves be reinvigorated: concepts such as

"essence," "necessity," and, most importantly the "concept" itself, of which philosophy is the genre.

How is this possible? According to what sense of language is this possible? At those moments where Heidegger is able to free himself from his allegiance to a mytho-poetic structure of language and would thus be able to recognize the post-Heideggerian configuration of his question, his answer: "poetry and thought" would come into its own. Poetry and thought seem to denote irreducible meanings of the operation that the caesura accomplishes within language. This operation does not constitute any particular genre, the genres of poetry or philosophy, for example, but rather describes how heterogeneous genres can learn from one another without being subsumed by one another. Because all the linguistic arts deal in the same medium, and because that medium is a structure that is already both sensible and ideal (that is to say, already gathers the play of sense and significance), the need for this operation is more apparent in the distinctions between multiple genres of literature than between multiple forms of art. Nancy's explanation of the multiplicity of art is insufficient to explain the multiplicity of genre because it does not delve into the multiple structures operative within language. Thus, while the caesura, the operation of metaphor, is not generic (poetry and thought are not genres, but are operative in all language, and are particularly visible in particularly original works of art), linguistic works that can be characterized as "poetic" or "philosophical" or even "metaphysical" can be distinguished by certain generic configurations of this operation. Thus, we must distinguish between the metaphorical operation of the caesura and the metaphor as the linguistic medium of the genre. Where the latter suggests a set of regions within the way in which language maps out beings the former operation reveals a division taking place within language itself. It is this

operation that must somehow be sketched out if we are to be able to really develop a Heideggerian theory of genre. In the next section of this book, I will accomplish this by distinguishing, within the phenomenon of language, two structures, which I will designate as language proper and as logos.

II. Pathos and Representation

I have argued that Heidegger's understanding of the world-disclosive character of the dialogue between poetry and thought needs to be opened up by a consideration of how the operations of poetry and thought structure the irreducible multiplicity inherent in the development of the arts. While Heidegger's transgeneric understanding of thought and poetry is attentive to the fact that these genres say something ontologically significant and irreducible to the region of beings they treat ontically, the very fact that this ontological significance is treated transgenerically occludes an appreciation of the positive value that these finite genres or disciplines can have for our understanding of the ontological difference between being and beings. By setting the world into a work in an epical way, Heidegger risks giving a univocal name to being and thereby erasing the ontological difference. I have argued that it is necessary to free certain elements of Heidegger's thought in order to develop a lyrical understanding of art. Following Nancy, I have argued that the multiplicity inherent in lyrical poetry's treatment of history and of regions of beings sets up the "world" only as a plurality of worlds. Such an interpretation of Heidegger seems necessary if we are to take seriously the significance of the ontological difference. While I have argued that Heidegger should be interpreted in this way, the actual elaboration of this interpretation remains to be worked out. Here, in Part Two, I work out the structure that underlies that interpretation by tracing the development of Heidegger's understanding of the relationship between language and logos. I will do this in order to demonstrate the possibility of finding in Heidegger's thought a theory of genre that is both more rigorous than the "epical" distinction between thought and poetry and that as "lyrical" is more open to a fully differential, multiple understanding of the modern meaning of being. In the final

part of the book, I will apply this structure to those intersections between philosophy and poetry that are particularly relevant for our discussion.

My reason for focusing on the relationship between logos and language is that this relation gives us a concrete picture of what various configurations of the "operation" of poetry or thought might look like. In Part One, I suggested that these operations are modeled off of Hölderlin's caesura and that they should describe both how the arts (including philosophy considered literarily) metaphorize one another and also how philosophy conceptualizes itself (including how the "philosophical" content of the arts is conceptualized). To ask about the ontological significance of the works of poetry and art in a way that is appropriate to our lyrical reading of "The Origin of the Work of Art" it is necessary to ask how concepts and metaphors are formed in the work. Nancy's treatment of art worked this out in terms of the play between a somewhat unitary structure of significance and the multiple ways in which the senses refer to that structure. But we saw that this treatment is inadequate to poetry insofar as the multiplicity of poetry is entirely internal to significance. I will argue that Heidegger's philosophy can provide an answer to the question about the origin of concepts and metaphors which respects the multiple configurations that this formation takes. Heidegger's philosophy thereby provides us with a theory of the ontological significance of various genres that respects the historical and generic differences in how different works of art are "poetic" and "thoughtful."

This possibility can be found in Heidegger's mature philosophy insofar as it identifies a play between logos and language that is entirely internal to signification. In this context, language and logos refer to two separate aspects of meaning that are present to a greater or lesser degree in any significant expression. For the most part, the terms overlap (particularly for Heidegger) and

their full sense for Heidegger can only be worked out in the course of the development of his philosophy. Be we can initially say that language refers to the inherently multiple, historically and geographically particular modes of expression, whereas logos designates the unitary structure of meaning insofar as this form is separable from a particular structure of meaning and makes possible a "translation" of sense across languages by virtue of this separability. Insofar as both concepts and metaphors must be linguistically expressed and both also permit some degree of translation or (what is etymologically the same) meta-phorization, the difference between concepts and metaphors is not identical to the difference between logos and language. But, like the difference between concepts and metaphors, the difference between logos and language is hardly a difference at all. In my pursuit of the thread in Heidegger's thought that leads to the multiple senses, I will therefore attempt to take into account the historical and generic difference in the "manifold ways" in which being is said. This attempt will be organized around two passages where Heidegger says, "language is logos," but where he seems to mean two very different things. These two passages are:

1. The beginning of the discussion in the section of *Introduction to Metaphysics* dealing with the "Restriction of Being" in terms of the opposition between "Being and Thinking," preceding Heidegger's interpretation of the first choral ode from *Antigone* (*IM* 122-156). I will focus on Heidegger's attempt here to expose the roots of the historical domination of thought by the discipline of logic and his attempt to counteract this domination by rethinking the essence of logos through a reading of logos and *phusis* in the fragments of Heraclitus and Parmenides. For my purposes, the culmination of this discussion will come in Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus's saying that "If you have heard not me, but logos, then it is wise to say accordingly:

all is *one*."[176] Most particularly, I am interested in Heidegger's understanding of Heraclitus's assignation of the essence of language. "Properly understood, fragment 50 proves precisely the opposite of what people read into it. It says: you should not cling to words but instead apprehend logos. Logos and *legein* already mean discourse and saying, but this is not the essence of logos, and therefore logos here is opposed to *epea*, discourse" (*IM* 136f).

2. The discussion that begins "Language," preceding Heidegger's interpretation of Georg Trakl's poem "*Ein Winterabend*" (PLT 189-194).[177] Here, Heidegger attempts to talk about language in terms of nothing other than language. This monological quality of language, which will become even more important at the end of this part when we turn to "The Way to Language," becomes particularly compelling and troubling when we use it to evaluate claims of the sort made by Johann Georg Hamann: "If I were as eloquent as Demosthenes I would yet have to do nothing more than repeat a single word three times: reason is language, logos."[178] Heidegger himself brings up this mysterious tripled definition of language only to push it aside almost immediately.

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[176] Heraclitus, Fragment 50, qtd. in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 136. For the Greek text and a more conventional English translation compare Kirk, G.S. et al. *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 187. "*ouk emou alla tou logou akousantas homologein sophon estin panta einai* . Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree that all things are one."

[177] The fact that these first two passages, which I intend to oppose to one another, both precede close readings of particular poems is significant. It will be necessary to thematize this significance, particularly by paying attention to the historical elements of the difference between Sophocles and Trakl. This will be discussed when we apply the structure of Hölderlin's understanding of history to Heidegger but will not be fully worked out until the next part, when I offer an interpretation of the philosophical content that Heidegger reads in Sophocles's poems in order to distinguish it from the philosophical content of modern poetry.

[178] Qtd. in "Language," 191. The quote is from a letter to Herder. Just as it will be necessary to thematize the relation that both of the first two passages have to specific poetic texts, it will also be necessary to thematize the fact that both of these passages come out of interpretations of philosophical texts on the nature of reason. What I mean here when I say that both texts explore the nature of reason could also be said less technically but more precisely: Both texts deal with the fact that language is capable of making binding claims on the basis of "evidence" that does not itself proceed beyond the scope of language, and both texts attempt to explore the conditions under which such claims are possible. The set of problems entailed by this question stands in close proximity to Heidegger's discussion of the role truth plays in the work of poetry.

> For Hamann, this abyss consists in the fact that reason is language. Hamann returns to language in his attempt to say what reason is. His glance, aimed at reason, falls into the depths of an abyss. Does this abyss consist only in the fact that reason resides in language, or is language itself the abyss? We speak of an abyss where the ground falls away and a ground is lacking to us, where we seek the ground and set out to arrive at a ground, to get to the bottom of something. But we do not ask now what reason may be; here we reflect immediately on language and take as our main clue the curious statement, "Language is language." This statement does not leads us to something else in which language is grounded (PLT 191).

Where Hamann is reflecting on the philosophical importance of the peculiar semantic range of the word "logos," Heidegger seeks to emphasize the abysmal quality of the relation between two modern translations of logos as reason and as language by grounding the essence of logos, what would be the common denominator in all of its manifold meanings, in language.

In its concern with the kinships between reason, language and logos, this passage from "Language" is quite close to Heidegger's concerns in the passage from the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Moreover, I will show below that Heidegger's characterizations of this kinship in both passages are generally speaking, quite compatible.[179] Nonetheless, there is a subtle tension that should not be too quickly passed over. If the accent of Heidegger's discussion in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* falls on logos, then in "Language" it falls on language. And this difference, while subtle, is by no means insignificant. By tracing out the reasons that underlie Heidegger's decision to place the accent where he does in each case, I will show that Heidegger's account of the kinship between language, logos and reason conceals a paradox

[179] This compatibility is underscored by William Richardson's treatment of the evolution of Heidegger's understanding of logos and language. For his treatment of the two passages I am discussing here, compare Richardson, 282-296; 577-582. By isolating these two usages, I am severely restricting the scope of Heidegger's intentions. However, the priority that Richardson gives logos even in the essay on "Language," seems to me to be largely assumed. By isolating this essay, we might better be in a position to see what is irreducible in its manner of characterizing language. In identifying this irreducibility, we might be in a better position to reassess the possibilities these later essays afford us for understanding our own situation in the western philosophical tradition.

which is not dissolved in his monological treatment of these terms' essences. In fact, I will show that the possibility and the force of his monological treatment depends on the existence of this paradox: that the force of the ancient Greek concept of logos in its various senses (including but not limited to) of language, reason, speech and relation depends in its essence on the being of language, and that our modern understanding of language as (among other things) speech and articulated discourse depends upon the "non-linguistic" elements of the being of logos. By situating these two passages in the development of Heidegger's understanding of language, I will argue that all three of the words in the sentence "language is logos" are determined by an essential ambiguity. The axes of meaning in which these ambiguities unfold are historicity (so that the sentence means something different in ancient Greece than it means in modernity) and genericity (so that the structure of this ambiguity maps out differently according to different ways of understanding metaphors and concepts.) I will argue that that we can see how multiple configurations of the operation of the caesura yield irreducible, but equally true (in the sense of being equally world-disclosive) meanings of being. This will be the interpretation of Heidegger that I will call a "lyric of being" against the "epic of being" we saw in Part One.

The Meaning of "Is"

The differential sense of being that underlies Heidegger's claim that language is logos relies on an essential ambiguity, a concept that I have already touched on a number of times in Part One without fully developping. When I say that the sentence "language is logos" is essentially ambiguous, what I mean is that its ambiguity is determined by the manifold ambiguity of the meaning of being. It is therefore necessary to first get clear on what it means for Heidegger to say that the meaning of being is ambiguous. According to Heidegger, this was

the first philosophical question that really inspired him. He describes the beginning of his philosophical development in Franz Brentano's treatment of Aristotle's claim that being is said in many ways.[180] This claim is the touchstone of Heidegger's ontology and is itself stated in many different ways throughout Heidegger's philosophy. I will focus on the way in which the ambiguity of the meaning of being is determined in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* because of the importance of the *Introduction to Metaphysics* to my discussion here and also because Heidegger's explicitly linguistic treatment of the meaning of being in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* also leads him to a particularly clear designation of the manifold sense of being as "ambiguous."

For Heidegger, any predication which is not simply a matter of identity (any synthetic proposition) can only be meaningful by virtue of the fact that being is implicitly understood as an indeterminate manifold. This insistence that the question of being lies at the center of any thought of difference is, of course, one of the most persistent and distinctive characteristics of Heidegger's appropriation of German Idealism. Following the tradition of German Idealism, we would also have to say that for Heidegger what applies to synthetic propositions also applies to analytic propositions, since statements of identity depend upon the implicit, reflexive difference between the thing conceived of as the subject and the thing conceived of as the predicate.[181] But we also would have to acknowledge that the reflexivity that Heidegger relies on is not immediately the self-reflexivity of the self or the knowing subject, or any other version of the

[180] See, for example, the way in which Heidegger himself describes the path by which he was led from this question to his involvement with and ultimate departure from Husserl in the preface to William Richardson's *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, viii-xii). Compare also Heidegger, Martin. "My Way to Phenomenology," 74-75.

[181] See, example, my discussion below of Heidegger's statement that "Language itself is language" in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 192.

human being, but is rather the multiplicity of reflexive qualities inherent in a language that is determined in its entirety by its self-reflexive relation to the various words denoting "being." The self of Idealism is then only a secondary self determined as Dasein to be the locus for the reflection of language.

In the section of the *Introduction to Metaphysics* on "The Question of the Essence of Being," Heidegger attempts to demonstrate the importance of having a fore-conception of being as a determinate manifold. He quickly runs through a series of sentences that use "is" (*ist*) in manifold ways, albeit in ways where a common sense of presence is connoted.[182]

> We say, "God is." "The earth is." "The lecture is in the auditorium." "The man is from Swabia." "The cup is of silver." "The peasant is in the fields." "The book is mine." "He is dead." "Red is the port side." "In Russia there is famine." "The enemy is in retreat." "The vine disease is in the vineyards." "The dog is in the garden." "Over all the peaks / is peace" [*Über allen Gipfeln / ist Ruh*] (*IM*, 93).[183]

But this common reference to a form of presence does not provide anything that would amount to a unitary understanding of being. "However we may interpret the individual examples, this saying of the 'is' shows us one thing clearly: in the 'is,' Being opens up to us in a manifold way"

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[182] *Introduction to Metaphysics,* 96. Heidegger describes this common sense of presence as both *Gegenwärtigkeit* and *Anwesenheit*, a distinction which will be significant when I turn to the passage on "The Temporality of Discourse" in *Being and Time*.

[183] The last sentence, as Heidegger goes on to explain, is a quote from Goethe. It should come as no surprise that Heidegger would select a poem as the paradigmatic example of a case where the meaning of being is inexplicable but nonetheless richly concrete and immediately comprehensible. That Heidegger would choose to use a poem by Goethe is somewhat more surprising. Given Goethe's titanic status in German literature, the paucity of references to him in Heidegger's reflections on poetry is noticeable. It would be interesting to contrast the relationship between the simple and concrete understanding of Being in this line with the highly structured relationship between "being" and the "holy" in Heidegger's understanding of Hölderlin, especially since one could largely see Goethe's rejection of Hölderlin as a function of the blending of tragic and epic elements with the lyrical in his hymns. Given that for Heidegger, it is largely the difference in the understanding of being that determines the different modes of discourse in philosophy and poetry, an analysis of the difference between the understanding of being that Heidegger draws from this line from Goethe and the understanding of the holy that he draws from Hölderlin would be instructive. For an account of the divergence between Goethe and Hölderlin on the status of the holy and divine in modern poetry, see Mason, Eudo. *Hölderlin and Goethe*, 46-52. For an important discussion of Goethe's poetry as accomplishing the deconstruction of reason which Heidegger makes central to his understanding of the history of philosophy, see *The Principle of Reason*, 123-127.

(*IM,* 95). What is more important for our purposes here is that this manifold determination of being entails an indeterminacy in the meaning of the words linked by the "is" such that the "is" indeed posits a relation between them, but a relation short of identity. The co-presence of the predicate with the subject[184] entailed by the "is" is not self-presence, even if it is understood (as Heidegger will increasingly come to understand it) as a gathering of what is the same in what is being talked about. Nonetheless, the co-presence of subject and predicate with one another presupposes a mutual determination such that one wonders why it is necessary to maintain that the "is" does anything significant at all.

This difficulty animates Heidegger's anticipation of the objection that the manifold sense of the "is" is entirely a function of the being of the terms in the assertion.

> But --- one could now object --- the "is" is certainly meant in a manifold way. But that has nothing at all to do with the "is" itself; it simply depends on the manifold contents of the assertions, whose contents refer in each case to a different being: God, earth, cup, peasant, book, famine, peace over the peaks. It is only because the "is" in itself remains indeterminate and empty in its meaning that it can lie ready for such a manifold use, and can fill and determine itself "according to the situation" (*IM,* 95).

[184] In my discussion of the role that the meaning of being plays in shaping the ambiguity inherent in Heidegger's understanding of the meaning of beings, I will occasionally have recourse to talk about the subject and predicate, which many Heidegger scholars might reject as clinging too closely to the idea of the very metaphysical subject that Heidegger criticizes at such length. For now, let two comments suffice: (1) My use of these terms here is largely employed in the interest of elucidating Heidegger's comments about language in terms that are readily comprehensible in ordinary grammar. While I agree with Heidegger that our understanding of grammar entails a certain metaphysical position (see *IM*, 57), it does not follow that the names for these categories cannot be used otherwise. That is to say, transforming our understanding of the "is" such that it no longer accords with the copula (one of the primary goals of the section of *Introduction to Metaphysics* being discussed) implicitly changes the relationship between subject and predicate. This is the point of calling attention to the nature of the "is" as a praxis relating to language. Retaining the names "subject" and "predicate" for purposes of explicating this critique of the copula highlights their connection to an ordinary, pervasive, and well-understood phenomenon of language. (2) While Heidegger does criticize the subject understood as a subject with predicates, and the force of this criticism does need to be accounted for, this criticism should not be confused with his far more pervasive criticism of the subject conceived of as a subject in relation to objects. The latter sort of subject is much more immediately relevant to the development of the modern metaphysical subject.

This approach merely shifts the accent from one form of the verb "to be," the third person singular present active indicative, to another, the gerund (in both English and German). This is more striking in German since *Das* S*eiende* is hardly the most natural way to denote the broadest and most indeterminate class of things. Heidegger himself calls attention to the grammatical form of the participial noun by using it in a highly differentiated fashion along with, and in distinction to, the participle *seiend*.[185] Heidegger therefore recognizes that there is a significant difference between an empty "is" whose meaning is determined by the content of the beings under discussion and a manifold "is" that constitutes the meaning of the beings under discussion. But this difference is internal to the question of the meaning of being. The difficulty Heidegger raises does not indicate a conflict between an account of meaning where the meaning of being matters and one where it does not. Rather, it indicates a disagreement about the forms in which its meaningfulness is manifest: whether it lies in the generality of what is the same in everything, or whether the meaning of this capacity to identify sameness is determined in such a way that its own linguistically articulated differentiation is significant.

If the manifold character of the "is" is initially indeterminate, becoming meaningful on the basis of the beings we are talking about, then the "is" functions as that which indicates the genus in which the differences between the entities talked about are meaningfully related to one another. The affiliation of this line of thought about being to the heritage of speculative thinking is clear: it runs from Aristotle's attempt to determine the unity of ontological structures in the *Categories* and the *Physics*, and his resultant puzzlement in the *Metaphysics* as to whether being

[185] Compare Fried and Polt's "Translators' Introduction," x-xii on the difficulties of translating "Das Seiende, "seiend," and "Das Sein." Compare also Ralph Manheim's "Translator's Note" at the beginning of his translation of *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, viii-ix

could itself be counted as a genus,[186] up to the role of spirit in Hegel's speculative philosophy.[187] This position entails a strong metaphysical position which Heidegger by no means merely dismisses. On the simplest level, this interrogation of how a being could be is the basic expression of the metaphysical drive to interrogate the being of beings.

Nonetheless, the being of beings refers to only one form of a word whose meaning is highly articulated. Even if we turn to the meaning of being in the verbal form most closely tied to the substantive form, the "is" is more than merely the place where the relations between beings can be established. While the interrogation of the being of beings is what is distinctive about metaphysics, this interrogation cannot restrict its investigations to the entities called beings but must overtly or covertly involve itself with the way in which these beings are.

Heidegger's belief that it is necessary to interpret the nature of predication on the basis of both the being of beings and the being of the "is" can be seen in his interpretation of Plato's account of the construction of the logos as the interweaving of *onomata* and *rheumatic,* terms

[186] Heidegger calls attention to this feature of Aristotle's thought in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 85. Thomas Sheehan gives a good overview of Heidegger's treatment of being as transgeneric (Sheehan, Thomas. "*Kehre* and *Ereignis*: A Prolegomenon to *Introduction to Metaphysics*," 265f. n.11). But the only sense of non-generic being Sheehan allows for is a transgeneric notion of being. While this is certainly the dominant sense in which being is not a genus for both Aristotle and Heidegger insofar as both are concerned with discovering the meaning of being across the various genera, treating being transgenerically does not exhaust Heidegger's treatment of the meaning of being. Indeed, one of my goals in this section is to identify other (non-trans-generic) non-generic features of the meaning of being that are salient for understanding philosophy's relationship to poetry, such as the way in which being articulates temporalization. The point is not that the significance of temporalization is not evident across the genera, but that it is evident in its differential character and not in its sameness, and thus is not, strictly speaking, "trans-generic."

[187] For a treatment of the critical differences that emerge in Hegel's and Heidegger's understanding of language because of their primary concern with spirit and being respectively, see Bernasconi, Robert. *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being*, 1-15. There, Bernasconi is primarily concerned with refuting Gadamer's attempt in *Truth and Method* to bring the insights of Hegel and Heidegger together by criticizing their reliance on both spirit and being.

which come to be distinguished as nouns and verbs respectively but whose domains overlapped much more before Aristotle.[188] Heidegger claims that for Plato:

> *Onoma* in the wider sense is *deloma tei phonei peri ten ousian*: a revelation by means of a sound in relation to and in the sphere of the Being of beings. In the sphere of beings we may distinguish between *pragma* and *praxis*. The former are the things we have something to do with, the things with which we are concerned. The latter is doing and acting in the broadest sense, which also includes *poiesis*. Words are of two kinds. They are *deloma pragmatos* (*onoma*), a manifestation of things, and *deloma praxeos (rhema)*, a manifestation of a doing. Wherever a *plegma*, a *sumploke*(a construction that weaves both together) happens, there is the *logos elachistos te kai protos,* the shortest and (at the same time) the first real discourse" (*IM* 61).

In a simple proposition what is indicated is the being or beings, but this indication is accomplished by virtue of the "is," a verb that is at once a *praxis* and a *rhema* or *deloma tes praxis*, i.e. a verb that is itself an act and the indication of an act. This reflexivity, inherent in the meaning of the "is," is what justifies logicians in their constant recourse to the copula (even if this reflexivity is not acknowledged) and is also what justifies Heidegger in insisting that the meaning of being plays a privileged role in how we understand things generally. The "is" is necessary to metaphysics even when it goes unnoticed or is seen as merely empty and indeterminate. It authorizes the interpretation of being in terms of the being of beings even when its own being implicitly exceeds it. Of course, the being of the "is" is also itself only one form of a verb whose forms and meanings are highly articulated and inform many aspects of our language, our writing, and our speech. Its importance lies in its importance to metaphysics, and even more in the fact that that importance (tied in with metaphysics' emphasis on the being of beings) points to non-metaphysical or extra-metaphysical ways of thinking about the meaning of

[188] *Introduction to Metaphysics* 60-62. Heidegger's account in *Introduction to Metaphysics* accords in its main features with his earlier account of the same distinction in his lecture course on the *Sophist*. Compare Heidegger, Martin, *Plato's* Sophist, 402-412.

being for metaphysics. Insofar as the terms involved in a proposition can be shown to be ambiguous (and this is what we will discover with language and logos), that ambiguity will not itself be indeterminate. Its determinacy will, moreover, be a function of the determinacy of the verbal form of being.[189] This line of reasoning, which I will develop in more depth once I have developed the contours of Heidegger's understanding of logos and language more concretely, moves the ambiguity that I take to be inherent in Heidegger's account of the meaning of being away from its character as a self-differentiation within the beings towards that act of differentiation.

Being Beyond in the Night

The basic features of the ambiguity of the meaning of being have been sketched out in the metaphysical treatment of the being of beings. This ambiguity emerges when we try to ask about whether there is a structure that unifies the manifold ways that being is meant in various metaphysical determinations of the being of different kinds of being. This ambiguity, therefore, is shown to have a certain importance for our thinking about the meaning of being within the epoch of metaphysical thinking. But we have already seen that that epoch is for Heidegger determined by the partition between philosophy and poetry. The operation of thought cannot be formulated without the help of poetry. It is therefore necessary to further broaden our understanding of the impact that the ambiguity of the meaning of being has on metaphysical ways of thinking. We will do this by examining the philosophical and poetic content of the

[189] I do not, however, disagree with Heidegger's claim that "the fact that both terms originally governed an equally wide domain [helps to show that] the much-discussed question in linguistics of whether the noun or the verb represents the primordial form of the word is not a genuine question. This psuedoquestion first arose in the context of a developed grammar rather than from a vision of the essence of language, an essence not yet dissected by grammar" (*IM,* 60). My purpose in focusing on the verbal component of our modern understanding of the grammar of the proposition is to call attention to the implicit undermining of the metaphysical structure of that grammar contained within its own presuppositions.

meaning of being within poetry. It is necessary to interweave our treatment of Heidegger's development of the meaning of the relationship between language, logos and the "is" in a conceptual fashion, with a metaphorical or poetical treatment of the meaning of "is." Does Heidegger's determination of the ambiguous meaning of being hold up when we consider the way in which the "is" is used poetically? Now, there is a certain sense in which *any* poem, or at least any poem written in the European literary tradition, ought to serve as a valid test for this question. But the poetry of Paul Celan is particularly exemplary, as we will see below. Because one of the effects of Celan's poetry is to force difference into Heidegger's thought lyrically, a poem by Celan furnishes the obvious choice. I have chosen to draw out the poetic sense of the ambiguity of the meaning of being by thinking about Heidegger's understanding of this ambiguity through the final two lines of the first stanza of Celan's poem *Dein Hinübersein*, where the meaning of "is" functions as a critique of presence, rather than as a form of presence. The poem is from the first cycle of the 1963 collection *Die Niemandsrose.*

> *Dein*
> *Hinübersein heute Nacht.*
> *Mit Worten holt ich dich wieder, da bist du,*
> *alles ist wahr und ein Warten*
> *auf Wahres.*[190]
>
> Your
> Being far out there on this night.
> With words I brought you back, there you are,

[190] Celan, Paul. *Gesammelte Werke*, 1:218, hereafter cited in the body of the text as *GW*. Unless otherwise noted, translations are mine. Michael Hamburger translates: "Your / Being beyond in the night / With words I fetched you back, there you are, / all is true and a waiting / for truth" from *Poems of Paul Celan*, trans. Michael Hamburger, 139, hereafter cited in the body of the text as *PPC*. Another translation by John Felstiner reads, "Your / Being over there tonight. / I fetched you back with words, here you are, all things are true and a waiting / for trueness" (from *Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan*, trans. John Felstiner, 145, hereafter cited in the body of the text as *SPP*.) While the first two lines of Felstiner's translation bring out the features of the poem that I am concerned with here more clearly than Hamburger's translation, the immediate connection to the passage I am dealing with in Heidegger is slightly obscured by the rendering "all things are true and a waiting for truth." Nonetheless, I will often use "over there" and "here" in preference to "beyond" and "there."

All is true and awaiting
the truth.

If I were to examine the statement *"alles ist Wahr und ein Warten / auf Wahres*" to see whether or not the meaning of "*ist*" in it accorded with the examples of predication that Heidegger gives in *Introduction to Metaphysics* and referred, despite its specificity, to some form of presence, it would be necessary to further specify what the difference is between Heidegger's use of *Anwesenheit* and *Gegenwärtigkeit* and whether or not the use of "*ist*" here already fit into one or both of these terms. It would be necessary to ask whether this usage required us to broaden the meanings of presence or whether it instead fell outside of the concept of presence entirely. Given the generality of Heidegger's claim, such a treatment of the line from the poem would be legitimate, whether it was taken to be one arbitrary example of a myriad array of possibilities or to exemplify in some way something particular and striking.

My goal, however, is not to ask whether or not this passage provides us with either an arbitrary or essential example of a statement about presence, but rather to raise the possibility that, in Celan's self-conscious connection of his poetry to Heidegger's philosophy,[191] the

[191] Celan's relationship to Heidegger is complex and has been the subject of a great deal of scholarship. It will be one of the main themes of the third part of my book, but until then I will largely assume that there is a connection and only point to the specifics of that connection when it is necessary to back up a specific claim. For discussions of some of the many philosophical and textual resonances see Colin, Amy. *Paul Celan: Holograms of Darkness*, 137-140; Fóti, Veronique. *Heidegger and the Poets*, 78-110; Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. *Poetry as Experience*, (particularly "Catastrophe," 41-71); Pöggeler, Otto. "Mystical Elements in Heidegger's Thought and Celan's Poetry," 75-109; Pöggeler, Otto. *The Path of Heidegger's Life and Thought*, 200-265; Schmidt, Dennis. "Black Milk and Blue: Celan and Heidegger on Pain and Language" 110-129; Udoff, Alan. "On Poetic Dwelling: Situating Celan and the Holocaust," 320-351. For how I will treat this connection, compare particularly Schmidt, "To understand Celan it seems important to realize that 'Heidegger' is a strange and difficult sort of raw material for him, and that Celan was deeply concerned with finding a way through Heidegger to what he spoke of as 'a hope today, / of a coming word, / thinking, / in the heart' ('*einer Hoffnung, heute, / auf eines Denkenden / kommendes / Wort / im Herzen*') (GW 2:255)," (Schmidt, 119 --- the translation is his). Compare also Lacoue-Labarthe, "It would be an understatement to say Celan had read Heidegger. Celan's poetry goes beyond even an unreserved recognition of Heidegger; I think one can assert that it is, in its entirety, a dialogue with Heidegger's thought. And essentially with the part of this thought that was a dialogue with Hölderlin's poetry" (*Poetry as Experience*, 33). For a discussion of the personal relationship between Celan and Heidegger along with biographical evidence of the extent to which Celan studied Heidegger, see John Felstiner. *Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew.* See particularly 242-247 for

meaning of the phrase "*alles ist Wahr und ein Warten auf Wahres*" in the context of the poem can point to a way in which "is" is used critically. This is because my goal is to show how the question of the ambiguous meaning of being is as much a poetical question as a philosophical one. For now, let us therefore leave aside questions of the meaning of this poem within the oeuvre of Celan and focus on a few salient points of this stanza for our discussion of ambiguity and the meaning of being.

First, it is striking to what extent different forms of the verb "to be" are used in the stanza. Of course the verb is so pervasive in language that we might not even consider its prevalence here important except for the fact that the opening compound word "Hinübersein" calls attention to it. Once this has been established, even the more simple forms become interesting. "*Da bist du*." You are beyond and at a distance tonight (or you were earlier in the night --- this state is named, but not assigned a time), but with words I bring you back so that now you are here. The thematized "*Sein*" used in conjunction with a preposition characterizing the location of the self calls to mind the description of the human being in terms of its spatial and temporal locality in Heidegger's use of the word "Dasein," existence," as a descriptor for the kind of being of the human being. "*Dein Hinübersein heute nacht*." You were, or are, over beyond the ken of human existence. Perhaps you were dead, or perhaps you were merely sleeping. Or perhaps you never were at all. Even this would not mean that you could not be brought back with words. Even before the collection *Die Niemandsrose*, *The No-one Rose*, Celan had linked the image of the flower, the beloved, and non-existence. This is how Celan describes the relationship between the you and the I in a poem from his first major collection,

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the description of Celan's visit to Heidegger's retreat at *Totdnauberg* which occasioned his poem of the same name. The most comprehensive treatment of this topic is Lyons, James K., *Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger: An Unresovled Conversation, 1951-1970.*

Mohn und Gedächtnis, published in 1952. The poem begins with the call for love, "*Der Tauben Weisseste flog auf: ich darf dich lieben!"* (The whitest of doves flew up: I should love you!") (*GW*, 1:61). "*Du bist so nah, als weiltest du nicht hier…Wo sie [die grosse Blume] nie war, da wird sie immer bleiben. / Wir waren nie, so bleiben wir bei ihr.*" ("You are as near as if you weren't waiting here …Where it [the large flower] was not, there it will always remain / We never were, so we remain with it.") (*Ibid*). The dove which is the most white is the dove which augurs the love that never was. The being of this relationship is described from your perspective as *Dein Hinübersein*, your being over there in the night.

Lest this association of "*Hinübersein*" with "*Dasein*" seem too far-fetched, it is important to note that one of the most constant and basic forms of the existence of the "you" in Celan's poem is at a distance from the "I" or the "we" such that any foreseeable connection is denied but such that this connection is called for. And this situation is often designated by a use of "*über*" or "*hinüber*." The collection *Die Niemandsros*e marks the culmination of a certain trajectory of Celan's engagement with the literary tradition in his early and middle poetry.[192] But this designation can still be seen in two examples from Celan's later poetry that also demonstrate this use of *über* to designate the manner of existence of "you" or of "we" (in the sense of the relation between "you" and "me" and not in the sense of we two or more considered as a whole). The first passage is from *Lichtzwang*, which was completed right before Celan's death in 1970, but which was not actually published until later that year. The second passage is from a posthumous

[192] This shift tends to be one of the most basic assumptions of Celan scholarship and already dictated the treatment of Celan's poetry in the first major treatment of Celan in English. "[*Atemwende*, breath-turn, the title of Celan's next collection after *Die Niemandsrose*] would imply a continuation of the trend away from, and against, the past, begun in *Die Niemandsrose,* but a new turn or shift in direction is also suggested" (Glenn, Jerry. *Paul Celan*, 133). But Amy Colin shows that this shift is not as stark as it is often made to be in her treatment of "*In der Luft*" the final poem from *Die Niemandsrose,* and of "*Osterqualm,*" collected in *Atemwende* (*Paul Celan: Holograms of Darkness*, 133-153).

collection of Celan's latest poetry, *Zeitgehöft*, published in 1975. These poems are among the last that Celan wrote and still reflect a concern with the kind of existence that we share, but that also divides us.

> *Wir lagen*
> *schon tief in der Macchia, als du*
> *endlich herankrochst.*
> *Doch konnten wir nicht*
> *hinüberdunkeln zu dir:*
> *es herrschte*
> *Lichtzwang.* (GW, 2:239).
>
> We were lying
> deep in the macchia, by the time
> you crept up at last.
> But we could not
> darken over to you:
> light compulsion reigned. (*PPC*, 227).
>
> *Die Pole*
> *sind in uns,*
> *unübersteigbar*
> *im Wachen,*
> *wir schlafen hinüber, vors Tor*
> *des Erbarmens.* (*GW* 3:105).
>
> The Poles
> are inside us,
> insurmountable
> when we're awake,
> we sleep across, up to the Gate
> of Mercy. (*PPC*, 333).

I have chosen these two passages (the first an entire poem, the second the first stanza of a longer poem) because, in addition to illustrating this usage of "*hinüber*," they also shed light on some of the other essential features of the way in which this distance is mapped out in "*Dein Hinübersein*." In the latter two poems, the temporality and spatiality of the distance between "here" and "there" is described in terms of light and wakefulness, whereas it is darkness and

sleep which suggest the possibility of contact. This might be, but is not necessarily, opposed to the fact that it is tonight that you are over beyond in "*Dein Hinübersein*." It depends upon how we understand the temporality of the infinitive "*sein*" in relation to "*heute nacht*." Am I still in this night when I bring you over here through words, or is this night past? What becomes clear is that the way in which the "you" and the "I" are determined in all of these cases by their locations relative to one another.[193] One might think, for example, of the way in which the various demonstrative pronouns in Latin and other romantic languages are correlated to a particular person: "*hic*" (here) referring to the place of the first person, "*iste*" (there) referring to the place of the second person, and "*ille*" (over there) referring to the place of the third person.[194]

How, then, would we determine the final clause, "*alles ist wahr und ein Warten auf Wahres*?" When are all things true? Is this the case once I have brought you back or is this true throughout the night? This seems, again, to depend upon how we decide the temporality of "*Hinübersein*" and therefore how we decide to place the fact that "all is true and awaiting the truth." Is everything both true and awaiting the truth at once? Does the phrase "*ein Warten auf Wahres*" introduce a sense of futurity into this statement that is apparently about the present, a sense of expectation that the truth is yet to come, and therefore not yet here (*da*, with me and

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[193] The co-determination of the meaning of "you" and "I" is the central axis for Gadamer's investigation of Celan's *Atemkristall* cycle in "Who am I and Who are You?," "We do not know at the outset on the basis of any distance overview or preview, what I or You means here, or whether I is the I of the poet referring to himself, or the I that is each of us. That is what we must learn" ("Who am I and Who are You?, 70; cf. also 68-70).

[194] See, e.g., Greenough, J.B. et al. *Allen and Greenough's New Latin Grammar*, §297. This personal characteristic of the demonstrative is why when Levinas talks about his account of otherness in terms of illeity (the locality of the third person), he can be taken to be implicitly rejecting Heidegger's account of *Dasein* as *Mitsein*. But "*Da*," while it can have the sense of being the "here," as it seems to have in "*Dein Hinübersein,*" has a broader semantic range and Heidegger's use could at least conceivably account for something like illeity. The same distinction exists in other Indo-European languages, such as in the Greek distinction between *hode, houtos,* and *ekeinos*. See Smyth. *Greek Grammar*, §1241. I focus on its Romantic form because of the relevance of Levinas to studies of Heidegger and Celan, particularly since one common way of approaching Celan's understanding of the "you" is through Levinas. Fóti's reading of Celan is the most significant avowedly Levinasian reading of Celan vis-à-vis Heidegger.

with you brought back in word, if not in deed)? If there is a sense of some sort of truth not being here yet, how can this be reconciled with the fact that all things are true? Perhaps these difficulties can be reconciled, but it seems here that we have at least hit upon an example of the meaning of "*ist*" which is quite different from the immediately determinate, but almost empty, manifold of meanings that characterized Heidegger's understanding of its ambiguity. Here, the phrase is concretely sensual but not immediately sensible. It is difficult to understand what "is" means. To borrow from a cliché that is too-often employed in discussions of lyrical poetry, we might say that it is difficult to put into words what the words bring to mind. Nonetheless, the possibility that the meaning of this passage can be made sensible is held out: What the last two lines of this stanza mean depends upon the rest of the poem and, given the carefulness with which Celan constructed each of his collections of poetry and each of the individual cycles within them, on its (literal) placement within the Celan oeuvre. We must hold on to the expectation that these lines can be sensibly understood (even if they do not prove to be true), but if we say that they are already meaningful, they are only meaningful in an ambiguous way, by taking the "is" and the "true" to refer both to presence and futurity.

In "*Dein Hinübersein*" we encounter a sense of "is" which neither proves nor immediately disproves the rule about co-presence, differentiation, and ambiguity that we tentatively advanced on the basis of Heidegger's treatment of the "is" in *Introduction to Metaphysics*. But if all the other forms of "to be" in the stanza taken together with the temporal tension between all things being true and awaiting the truth pose a difficulty to Heidegger, we ought at least be able to state more precisely what this difficulty is. Granted, the example of "*ist*" in this poem by Celan is particularly stilted, given that it takes place in the poem of a poet who

wants to question our usual understanding of meaning and given that, he had almost certainly chosen self-consciously to confound or trouble a point in Heidegger's philosophy of language and poetry. So it seems unfair to focus so much attention on one difficult example when so many different kinds of statements prove the rule. But Heidegger insists throughout the *Introduction to Metaphysics* that we are dealing with the essence of language, and essences, traditionally understood, are universal and general. An essential commonality should be able to cover *all* legitimate uses of a concept, idea, or word.

This suggests one possible response. Heidegger could deal with Celan's use of the "*ist*" here by saying that it is illegitimate: it is another example of a poet playing with words without any regard to what they really mean and substituting images, sensual resonances, and metaphors for the rigor of the concept. Celan could respond that Heidegger's theory of language is overly restrictive: it is another example of a philosopher using theory to fix what ought to be fluid, to eradicate the most significant traits of the particular in the sterile wash of the universalized concept. I bring these possibilities up for the sake of completeness and because they in fact represent, albeit in a stereotypical form, the "typical" responses of many philosophers and poets. But it is clear that neither approach is attractive to either Heidegger or Celan. Both approaches run counter to Heidegger's persistent concern with making philosophy listen to poetry's way of saying things and to Celan's persistent concern with poetically coming to terms with the difficulties that the philosophy of language poses for thinking.

It is therefore necessary to take seriously both Heidegger's interpretation of the meaning of the being of the "is" and the understanding implicit in Celan's use of "is." This does not necessarily mean that both need to be affirmed. What has to be acknowledged is the potential

meaningfulness of both passages. This acknowledgment puts into question what the meaning and truth of each passage is for the sake of asking about the possibility that there could be a meaningful, universal concept underlying the "is," a meaning which would prove to be true. To be true here would mean actually to run through every legitimate use of "is." With this in mind, let us examine the passage in which Heidegger declares that, despite the manifold meanings of "is," the ubiquitous presence of something like presence provides us with an essential common trait that runs through them.

> Let us count up one by one the various meanings that we have interpreted by paraphrase. The "to be" said in the "is" signifies: "actually present," "constantly present at hand," "take place," "come from," "consist of," "stay," "belong," "succumb to," "stand for," "come about," "prevail," "have entered upon," "come forth." *It is still difficult, and perhaps even impossible because it goes against the essence of the matter, to extract a common meaning as a universal generic concept under which these modes of the "is" could be classified as species*. However, a definite, unitary trait runs through all these meanings. It points our understanding of "to be" toward a definite horizon by which the understanding is fulfilled. The boundary drawn around the sense of "Being" stays within the sphere of presentness and presence <*Gegenwärtigkeit und Anwesenheit*>, subsistence and substance, staying and coming forth (*IM*, 96 — the italics are mine).

Heidegger suggests a distinction between an understanding of presence as the genus in which all species of "is" are gathered and an understanding of presence as a unitary trait, horizon, or boundary. The sense of "is" can already be understood within the horizon of presence, even though we cannot say for certain yet that presence is therefore the generic, universal meaning of which all senses of "is" would be variations. In fact, this generic theory of presence is probably an unrealizable dream because it runs counter to the essence of the "is". Heidegger needs, therefore, to be able to split apart the ideas of "genericity," "essence," and "commonality," which are generally taken to have significantly overlapping, if not identical, meanings. The very

possibility of there being an irreducible significance to the manifold senses of being depends upon the difference between a genus and a horizon.

So Heidegger could reply that he is not in fact claiming that the way Celan uses the "*ist*" in "*Dein Hinübersein*" needs to be contained within the concept of presence. Rather, the claim might be that presence informs our understanding of the "is," such that its meaningfulness will only be understood on the basis of something like presence. Such a horizonal interpretation of presence does not exclude futurity or pastness, "staying or coming forth" (*IM* 96).[195] Of course, the extent to which the phenomenological idea of a horizon of presence can really take into account the meaning of futurity and pastness any better than a more static, linear concept of time can has been famously called into question by Jacques Derrida in his *Speech and Phenomena*.[196] While Heidegger's concept of the horizon is importantly different than Husserl's, Derrida's criticism might apply here also.

Since Heidegger himself became increasingly skeptical about the possibility that phenomenology could radically raise the question of being, the suggestion that the "unitary trait" of the "is" might be a boundary needs to be conceived of in non- (or post-) phenomenological ways also. Rather than say that the meaning of the "is" is contained within the concept of presence or is interpreted within a horizon of presence, Heidegger could respond that the meaning of the "is" is articulated in terms of a decision about presence, where the trait refers to what carves out the space for such a decision, and the decision (as cutting up: de-cision or *Ent-scheidung*) refers to how the boundaries around words and concepts get determined as a response to this trait. One possibility of what it means to define the "is" by reference to presence

[195] Cf. Richardson, 147-150 for an account of the role that horizon plays in Heidegger's early understanding of being.
[196] Derrida, Jacques. *Speech and Phenomena*, particularly 49-69.

is to say that our understanding of the "is" is, at least within the history of Western metaphysics, always a response to an experience of presence. And because the being of the "is" along with the being of "beings" (*Sein des Seindes*) has been the privileged form of talking about the meaning of being, this means that the meaning of being as such has always been determined as a response to the experience of presence. "At one blow, our search for the definiteness of the meaning of the word 'Being' thus becomes explicitly what it is: a meditation on the provenance of our *concealed history*" (*IM*, 97). To inquire about how presence influences how we understand "is" is to make explicit something that is implicit in any "metaphysical" understanding of the "is," including the "is" understood by modern logic as the copula. And this meditation has as its object the history of the implicit development of this response to the pervasiveness of presence as the unitary trait running through all possible meanings of "is."

So if the clause "*Alles ist Wahr und ein Warten auf Wahres*" turns out to be meaningful for us (regardless of the answer to the different question of whether it turns out to be true to us) such that we call into question whether its meaningfulness is actually grounded in presence, might not this question itself show its connection to the understanding of the "is" in terms of presence, albeit as an ironization or criticism of such an understanding? In saying that the meaning of the "*ist*" in "*Dein Hinübersein*" criticizes the interpretation of the meaning of the "is" as a form of presence, it might not seem that we have moved beyond the question of whether Celan's use of "*ist*" calls Heidegger's interpretation of "*ist*" into question. Perhaps not, but now we can see that this criticism can be understood in the technical sense of drawing a boundary or limit and that this act of drawing a limit might not be too far from what Heidegger means by saying that there is a "unitary trait" behind all uses of "is." While the understanding of being in

terms of an anonymous presence is called into question, this calling into question might continue to be responsive to presence. Perhaps in both Celan and Heidegger the "is" becomes a counter-word in relation to the "is" understood as presence.[197]

The idea of a counter-word is central to Celan's most important piece of prose, "The Meridian: Speech on the Occasion of the Award of the Georg Büchner Prize." While discussing Büchner's play *Dantons Tod* (Danton's Death), Celan says,

> *Da ist Lucile, die Kunstblinde, dieselbe Lucile, für die Sprache etwas Personhaftes und Wahrnehmbares hat, noch einmal da, mit ihrem plötzlichen "Es lebe der König!"*
> *Nach allen auf der Tribüne (es ist das Blutgerüst) gesprochen Worten --- welch ein Wort!*
> *Es ist das Wort, das den "Draht" zerreisst, das Wort, das sich nicht mehr vor den "Eckstehern und Paradegäulen der Geschichte" bückt, es ist ein Akt der Freiheit.*
> *Es ist ein Schritt* (*GW*, 3:189).
>
> Here comes Lucile, blind to art, the same Lucile for whom language is something personal and perceptible, once again with her sudden "Long Live the King!"
> After all those words uttered on the rostrum (it's the scaffold) --- what a word!

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[197] Let me note in advance the differences between the interpretation of the counter-word [*Gegenwort*] that I put forth here and employ throughout my discussion of Celan and the notion of the *Widerruf* (which Glenn translates as "poetic refutation" (Glenn, 25). The notion of the *Widerruf* was proposed by Götz Weinold as a way of reading Celan's dialogue with Hölderlin in the poem "Tenebrae" (*GW* 1: 163) (a poem which contains allusions to Hölderlin's hymn "Patmos" – *Poems and Fragments* 488-491) in "*Paul Celan's Hölderlin-Widerruf*." Glenn makes this notion central to his interpretation of Celan. "The technique consists of an allusion --- often extended over several lines or even through an entire poem --- to a religious or literary work or works, for the purpose of denying or poetically 'refuting' the work in question . . . The literary work generally expresses some form of optimism and affirmation, which is contradicted in Celan's poem, often by means of irony" (Glenn, 25). Such a simplistic reading of Celan's relationship to his predecessors caricatures his relationship to the poetic tradition. As Colin shows, Glenn's reading in particular depends upon underplaying the ambiguity of Celan's relationship to both Germany and Judaism (Colin, xx-xxi). While few scholars explicitly invoke this sense of *Widerruf*, it seems to me that there is nonetheless a widespread assumption that many references are fundamentally forms of denial. But the binary logic of affirmation and denial is too simple to deal with Celan's explorations of the way in which history has changed the possibilities available to language. Saying something different does not necessarily imply denial, particularly when the exigencies of history have changed the context so drastically. This is why I am much more sympathetic to Dietlind Meinecke's decision in *Wort und Name bei Paul Celan: Zur Widerruflichkeit des Gedichts* to treat Celan's *Widerruflichkeit* as an internal feature of his poetry's linguisticality. Rather than focusing on how Celan's allusions to other poems potentially deny a particular position, Meineke seeks to show how the conceptual meanings of the words which Celan himself uses are constituted out of anonymity, ambiguity and a tendency towards silence or internal denial. (cf. particularly Meineke 30-31, 188-189). My own understanding of the philosophical and poetical possibilities of the counter-word is more compatible with Meineke's understanding of the *Widerruf* than with Wienold's or Glenn's.

> It is a counter-word, a word that snaps the "wire," a word that no longer bows to "history's loiterers and parade-horses," it is an act of freedom. It is a step (*SSP* 402f).

Just as "you are here," "brought back with words," Lucille is here, here again, by virtue of the words she speaks. Her words, as Celan goes on to explain, have nothing to do with being a monarchist but rather signify her rejection of the impossible state of the present. "*Gehuldigt wird hier der für die Gegenwart des Menschlichen zeugended Majestät des Absurden*" (*GW*, 1:190). "Homage here is to the Majesty of the Absurd, testifying to human presence" (*SPP,* 403). Because the significance of Lucille's words lies more in their character as a witness and response than in what they say, because, that is, her language is personal and perceptible, sensuous and concrete, her words form a counter-word. The counter-word (*Gegenwort)* testifies to human presence (*Gegenwart*)[198] in the face of a form of presence that eradicates the person. The "wire" that Lucille cuts is the wire that holds a puppet up and allows it to be manipulated. This is why her act is an act of freedom. It is an act which, by making possible unconstrained steps, sets up a new measure (*Schritt)*. I will return to this passage, and to "The Meridian," in Part Three of this book. For now, let these remarks suffice to indicate the character of the counter-word in "The Meridian" and to indicate some of the connections between this address and "*Dein Hinübersein*."

"*Alles ist Wahr und ein Warten auf wahres*" might be another such counter-word, one which specifically counters an understanding of what is and of what is true (*wahr*), or at least what is traditionally taken to be true, in terms of presence. This might confirm or disconfirm Heidegger's reading of the meaning of the being of the "is" and from there the meaning of

[198] I am grateful to Jeffrey Gower for pointing out to me the homophony between *Gegenwort* and *Gegenwart*, as well as their closeness to one another, in "The Meridian" in a seminar on the "Meridian" conducted by Dennis Schmidt. (Nov. 12, 2002).

"being" within metaphysics in terms of presence. This criticism is not out of place in Celan's work, particularly in *Die Niemandsrose* (*The No-one's-rose*), since *die Niemandsrose* comes to be the name of God as the creator who is wholly absent, so wholly absent that it is questionable whether this absence can even be understood in terms of negative theology as the withdrawal of God. *Die Niemandsrose* names God as the creator who is absent in the sense of not even having created us, pointing to the abysmal character of nature in general and of human beings, who in their mortality and vulnerability take the place of God.[199]

Before if we want to explore the extent to which "*Dein Hinübersein*" can be understood by Heidegger as uttering a counter-word then we must first ask under what conditions Heidegger's philosophy of language explains the legitimate shift of the meanings of words. That is to say, we must reconcile the nominalism inherent in the elasticity of the sense of a word or phrase with the essentialism that is necessary for the changed sense of a word to continue to be relatable to its previous uses, and thus still to be actually meaningful. In short, we must ask what it means to impute an "essence" to language while maintaining that language has a fully historical and contingent character.

Before we can say to what extent Heidegger's understanding of the ambiguity and multivocity of "being" is compatible with Celan's understanding of the counter-word and to what extent Heidegger is therefore open to a critical sense of "being," we must sketch out more concretely how it is that Heidegger characterizes the essence of being in language. Let us therefore turn to an examination of the proposition that "Language is logos" in order to interpret Heidegger's own philosophical understanding of the words "language" (*Sprache),* "is", and

[199] See the earlier development of this theme in "*Tenebrae*" in the collection *Sprachgitter* (GW, 1:163).

"logos." In the course of this interpretation, we will also discover that Heidegger's understanding of the ambiguous relationship between language and logos itself depends upon this way of treating the "is," which promises to reconcile nominalism and essentialism.

The Temporality of Discourse

The meaning of the sort of multiplicity that I hope to find in lyrical language is, for Heidegger, firmly rooted in the manifold ambiguities that attach themselves to the word "is." As we have just seen, it is important to insist that we are not immediately asking about the meaning of "being" or "to be" in the broader sense, but only of one inflection of the verb "to be." When we consider this restriction of our question in light of our interrogation of the sentence, "language is logos," this means that built into our understanding of the situation of poetry and language, which we draw on the basis of the relationship between logos and language, there is entailed a determinate understanding of temporality that informs it. And this form of temporality privileges presence in an ambiguous way. However, the roots of the account of this form of temporality precede Heidegger's awareness of this situation. The temporality that underlies the encounter between thinker and poet can be found near the end of *Being and Time*, well before the first formulation of the encounter between poet and thinker and well before the full linguistic turn. I will therefore preface my treatment of the *Introduction to Metaphysics* and "Language" with a consideration of Heidegger's final, and most sophisticated, understanding of the temporality of the world in *Being and Time* by showing how Heidegger positively appropriates this understanding of temporality to his own poetological concerns in his earliest writings on Hölderlin. The light that *Being and Time* sheds on Heidegger's turn to poetical language will be crucial for understanding the manifold sense of being that underlies the encounter between

thinker and poet. And this manifold sense of being will show that modern poetry does not open up the world in a unitary way, but opens up the world in multiply determinate, ambiguous ways such that the world is itself always plural.

While the temporality of *Being and Time* will prove crucial to Heidegger's understanding of the relationship between poetry and philosophy, between language and logos, and between the concept and the metaphor, it seems to predate an awareness of these divisions insofar as it predates a thematic concern with poetry, with the metaphor, or even with language except as a derivative structure of discourse (*Rede*, Heidegger's earliest translation of logos).[200] In *Being and Time*, the temporality that is proper[201] to a proper understanding of presence is elucidated conceptually and promises to indicate the avenues through which the renewal of philosophy can be accomplished. The arc of thought which Heidegger will follow in order to arrive at a sense of the relationship between poet and the thinker very different from the epical sense that we saw in the previous chapter begins in the final two chapters of Part Two of *Being and Time*, where Heidegger develops an understanding of the proper temporality of discourse and signification. It is here that Heidegger begins to suggest the possibilities that might remain open to the modern discipline of philosophy. Examining these suggestions will therefore serve to orient our attempt to develop an ontology of the work which explains the distinctiveness of both the work of philosophy and the work of art and which also allows them a truly differential, but productive relationship. In order to ground the potential of this project within modernity, I will sketch out

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[200] See Feick, Hildegard. *Index zu Heideggers >Sein und Zeit<*, 68-70. For a treatment of the distinction between *Sprache* and *Rede*, see Francoise Dastur. "Language and *Ereignis*," 357-362.

[201] I would prefer to use forms of the word "proper" consistently to treat what Heidegger understands in terms of "eigentlichkeit." However, when it seems more appropriate, I will follow the convention of calling this authenticity. Throughout my treatment of *Being and Time,* I will use the terms more or less interchangeably. See Feick 15-16. I think that treating authenticity in this way is a natural outgrowth of Bernasconi's restriction of ontological interpretation to the life of the philosopher. See *supra* fn.58.

the ambiguous privilege that Heidegger accords to presence in the section on the "Temporality of Discourse." This will elucidate the temporality that lies beneath Heidegger's scattered allusions in the section on the "Temporality of Discourse" (section 68b) and in sections 79-81 (which deal with the root of our ordinary understanding of time in public time and which provide an "authentic" interpretation of the temporality of beings other than Dasein) to a re-invigorated practice of philosophy and consequently, in our terms, a renewed treatment of the concept. Because we are attempting to establish a diachronic (and not merely a-chronic) relationship between poetry and philosophy, opening up the present practice of philosophy to a productive future will also transform the situation of poetry as Heidegger understands it. In this way, I will be bringing out a possibility of Heidegger's thought that is closely in line with Celan's critical use of the "is" in *Dein Hinübersein*. Thus, while we will primarily be concerned with the development of a critical interpretation of the philosophical meaning of the word "is" as it sheds light on the sense in which "language is logos," we will also need to ask ourselves whether this also sheds light on the poetical sense of "is" in "everything is truth and awaiting the truth." By tracing how the concepts of temporality with which we concern ourselves both authentically and inauthentically can be understood properly by recourse to a certain philosophically delimited form of presence, we will open up the possibility of interpreting linguistic works of art and philosophy in light of a theory of the presentification of language that opens these texts up to the future. It is in the meaning of ambiguity inherent in this theory and in the suggestions that Heidegger makes about it in places such as the end of the essay on "The Way to Language" that we see Heidegger's own critical use of the "is," his own suggestion that all might be truth and the promise of truth. But this secondary operation will have to await the turn to Hölderlin in the

1930s. Here, our concern will be more exclusively with philosophy and with the meaning of the concept.

The first signs of the projected recuperation of the concept can be found in Heidegger's treatment of the "Temporality of Discourse." After Heidegger has sketched out the basic temporal structure of resoluteness, the "authentic disclosedness of Dasein," he goes on "to exhibit its concrete temporal Constitution, [which] means to give a temporal Interpretation of the items of its structure, taking them each singly: understanding, state-of-mind, falling, and discourse" (*BT*, H335). While each of these plays a critical role in explaining the significance of Dasein and the world and therefore in informing the practice of philosophy suggested at the end of *Being and Time*, it is in the section on "discourse" that Heidegger makes his clearest statements about the kind of discourse such a philosophy should enact. This gap in treatment is further justified by the fact that discourse takes up the other structures in a thematic fashion: "The understanding which has its mood attuned in falling, Articulates itself with relation to its intelligibility in discourse" (*Ibid*).

As the articulation of the "there" whose complete "disclosedness is constituted by understanding, state-of-mind, and falling," (*BT* H349) a proper interpretation of the temporal structure of discourse plays a critical role in elucidating the unity of the ecstasies within the temporality of everydayness. This everydayness is the only proper ontological foundation for philosophy, whatever the distance that ultimately separates philosophical thinking and everyday ways of thinking. This privilege exhibits itself in the tense structure and in the privilege of the present tense within that tense structure. "Factically, discourse expresses itself for the most part in language, and speaks proximally in the way of addressing itself to the 'environment' by

talking about things concernfully; because of this, *making-present* has, of course, a *privileged* constitutive function" (*Ibid*). As is already clear in our ordinary concept of language, both language and discourse have to do with making-present. But if we want to develop an adequate philosophical conception of the ontological significance of discourse, we cannot merely fix onto this phenomenon of making-present. This is because our usual science of language remains in the thrall of an ordinary concept of time and so distorts language and discourse by virtue of its very reliance on the concept of presence. Consequently, a broader explication of all three temporal ecstasies is necessary if the proper sense of this making-present is to be made available to philosophy.

> But because in any discourse one is talking about entities, even if not primarily and predominantly in the sense of theoretical assertion, the analysis of the temporal Constitution of discourse and the explication of the temporal characteristics of language-patterns can be tackled only if the problem of how Being and truth are connected in principle, is broached in the light of the problematic of temporality. We can then define even the ontological meaning of the "is," which a superficial theory of propositions and judgments has deformed to a mere "copula." Only in terms of the temporality of discourse --- that is, of Dasein in general --- can we clarify how "signification" "arises" and make the possibility of concept-formation ontologically intelligible (*Ibid)*.

Nor is this problem limited to science, since our lives are structured by our ways of knowing. There should be something that does the job of a science of language, tackling the problem of discourse in terms of a proper understanding of Dasein's temporalization of temporality. Such a science would remain attentive to the presence of entities. This is what it means to say that the privilege of the present is ambiguous in *Being and Time*. Presence has to be redefined on the basis of its relation to the future and also to the past. Doing so yields a new understanding of presence which has to be put into contact with the improper understanding of "presence" in order to explain how significance happens and how an apparently abstract word like "is" is in fact

richly concrete and, although manifoldly indeterminate, yet explains the structure of our relationship to things. Because we continue to talk about presence, we ought to be able to explain not only how "signification" "arises" but also how it consequently falls into ordinariness.

Properly understanding how signification arises depends upon understanding the temporality proper to "concept-formation."[202] What does Heidegger mean in the passage from *Being and Time* by "concept-formation?" Heidegger initially referred this passage to Chapter Two of Division Three, which was to have treated "Time and Being" (*BT,* H349 fn.xiii). But since Division Three was never written this is not immediately helpful. The context here seems to be the concepts that are the object of the science of linguistics, its "basic concepts" whereby it determines its domain within the totality of entities (*BT*, H9-11). But Heidegger makes clear that these "concepts" are implicitly determined by how we understand being, truth, and temporality. In the "Introduction" to *Being and Time*, Heidegger talks about the "concepts" of being, phenomenon, and logos (see H3-4, 28, 32), but this seems to be a bow to their usual, unthematic use in philosophy specifically and in intellectual discourse more broadly. He explicitly moves away from the understanding of logos as concept (H32) in order to assert the apophantic character of logos. And it is the apophantic understanding of logos which will be the basis for his later interpretations of logos as *phusis* (qua *phenomenon*)[203] and a sign (*Zeigen*).[204] Generally

[202] By beginning my interpretation of the relationship between language and logos in an account of concept-formation, I am taking my cue from Gadamer (*Truth and Method*, 405-437). For Kisiel, Heidegger's early investigations of "philosophical concept formation" in, for example, the 1919 lectures on the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* constitute the core of an engagement with the possibilities of modern philosophy: "A theory of philosophical concept formation is not an extraneous reflection for phenomenology, but the concrete way and access to the idea of its fundamental structure. It is thus related to the attempt to derive the very idea of philosophy. It raises the basic question of the position of the concept in philosophy. This will be developed out of the present situation of philosophy, which is itself concerned with the very idea of philosophy" (*The Genesis of Martin Heidegger's* Being and Time, 123; cf. 117-137).
[203] As it is determined in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 75; 132-144.
[204] As it is determined in "The Way to Language," 113-125.

speaking, in the rest of *Being and Time* he only uses "concept" in a sort of loose way to talk about the objects of sciences. Why, then, should I attach any importance to this question of how an ontologically clarified science of linguistics could tell us something interesting about concept-formation?

I take it that this claim about concept-formation has to do with the concept as such, as it is understood in the German Idealist tradition (the source of discussions of the concept in analytic philosophy also). It therefore indicates a possibility for understanding how philosophy can reinvigorate itself through a radicalization of our understanding of temporality. "The real 'movement' of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is *capable* of a crisis in its basic concepts" (*BT*, H9). But philosophy, which is not a science (or at least metaphysics, which as a branch of philosophy would not be a science) is directed towards the concept.[205] This is the crux of Heidegger's reading of Hegel.

> The essence of spirit is the *concept*. By this Hegel understands not the universal which is intuited in a genus as the form of something thought, but rather the form of the very thinking which thinks itself: the conceiving of *oneself* --- *as the grasping* of the not-I. Inasmuch as the grasping of the *not*-I presents a differentiation, there lies in the pure concept, as the grasping of *this* differentiation, a differentiation of the difference. Thus Hegel can define the essence of the spirit formally and apophantically as the negation of a negation. This 'absolute negativity' gives a logically formalized Interpretation of Descartes' "*cogito me cogitare*" [I think that I think, i.e. self-consciousness --- AA], where he sees the essence of the *conscientia* (*BT,* H433).

While Hegel tries to make the relationship between spirit and time concrete, he cannot succeed because the concept interprets time as a form of "abstract negativity" (*BT*, H433-435). This understanding of the concept belongs to a long tradition that distorts the role presence plays in

[205] For the role of the concept in Heidegger's understanding of philosophy, and phenomenological philosophy specifically, see Heidegger, Martin. *Basic Concepts*.

discourse and that paves the way for Hegel's concept. This is the significance of the metaphysical tradition and how it filters into our everyday understanding. Even for the latter Heidegger, it will be just as important to deconstruct Hegel's metaphysical understanding of the concept as it will be to free the work of art from this conceptual schema.

Regardless of how we want to eventually understand presence, Heidegger thinks that it is clear that the ordinary understanding of presence is built upon a covering over of the relationship between time and our finite discourse , so that time is conceived of as infinite (*BT*, H424). The two crucial moves that our ordinary understanding of time makes come from Aristotle and Plato.[206] First, we conceive of time, or more precisely public, world time (terms which will be explicated below), as consisting of a sequence of now-points. Then, we conceive of the "now" in all of these "now-points" as denoting an identical, ideal, and therefore eternal "now." "In *every* 'now' the 'now' is now and therefore it constantly has presence *as something selfsame*, even though in every 'now' another may be vanishing as it comes along. Yet as *this* thing which

[206] The implicit link between Heidegger's interpretation of the "ordinary" concept of time and his interpretation of metaphysics is crucial. If we accept the claim that our preontological understanding of something can be conceived of either ontically and ontologically, and if this conception itself determines our practices, we are already very close to arriving at the urgency which Heidegger will later impute to the task of deconstructing metaphysics for our practical lives. But this does not necessarily mean, as has often been argued, that Heidegger's philosophy privileges practice over theory. Rather, it suggests that we ought to conceive of the very distinction between an "authentic" and an "inauthentic" understanding in terms of a particular theoretical point that proves to be critical to the history of our practices. Does a particular understanding of something's ontological underpinnings, what the Greeks would call its *arche*, really give us a good description of what we mean by that thing or not? In either case, how we understand a thing's ontological underpinnings determines the evolution of our everyday understanding also. Of all the uses of the terms "authentic" and "inauthentic" in *Being and Time*, this interpretation is nowhere more clear than in the way that Heidegger employs them in the final chapter on time. Compare, for example Heidegger's description of the division of the day and the measuring and numbering of time at H413-422 with Plato's attempt to deal with the question of how every moment can participate in a day in the *Parmenides* Plato, *Parmenides*, 131b-c. The point is not that this question should be considered in terms of practice before theory, but only that our theories are not practically neutral. For this reason, I agree with Robert Bernasconi's conclusion that "authentic Dasein" should be understood in terms of the philosophical ethos (*Heidegger in Question*, . See *supra* fn.58. I would push this point slightly further, however, by suggesting that this shows what should already be clear from the lectures on *Plato's Sophist*: Heidegger remains committed to a form of disclosure related to *sophia* over *phronesis*. The ontological underpinnings of a thing, its structure or foundation, is what is disclosed by *sophia* and shows that existential structures have to be understood as *archai*. Of course, the important difference is that for Heidegger the *arche* is not what is eternal, *aeizoon*, but how it breaks into time. This is the point we are trying to address here.

changes, it simultaneously shows its own constant presence" (*BT*, H423). When conceived through the "now," time appears sequential, infinitely divisible, and utterly continuous (*BT*, H422-423).

It should be clear that this way of understanding time is utterly inadequate for our purposes. If the "is" refers to the now-point, usually to a particular now-point, but philosophically to the now-point as such, then it is difficult to see how saying "The essence of language is a [non-linguistic] logos and the essence of logos is language" is anything but a bare self-contradiction masking itself as a circle.[207] It is difficult to see how it could be the case here that "*alles ist wahr und ein warten auf Wahres*" since it would only be the awaiting of truth insofar as it "is" not yet, or is not yet true. It is difficult to see how we are both finite (that is to say how we have a determinate starting point) but also how temporality emerges in our way of being with one another. This is the sense in which Heidegger will follow Hölderlin in characterizing the human being as a conversation. We need to find out how we can impute an origin to this originary, interminable conversation without contradicting the claim that temporality does not precede this conversation. And this seems occluded by the very way that we usually understand these phenomena. "In the everyday way in which we are with one another, the leveled-off sequence of 'nows' remains completely unrecognizable as regards its origin in the temporality of the individual Dasein" (*BT*, H425). Of course, these claims might be false, meaningless claims. Or they might be true and contradictory, provided we reject certain basic assumptions about logic. But I want to argue, and I think this is the only way of

[207] It is interesting to note that Daniel Dahlstrom argues that Heidegger, for all his criticisms of logic, never attacks the law of non-contradiction as did the German idealists and other dialectical thinkers (Dahlstrom, 99). I agree, provided we have a concept of logic attentive to the possibility of change over time. But on such a model of logic, dialectical thinking might not violate the law of non-contradiction either.

understanding Heidegger's intentions as well, both that they say something important to us about ourselves and the world and that they are not necessarily at odds with the way of thinking we clear-headed, representationally inclined Westerners have developed.

Heidegger claims that the metaphysical way of interpreting time is the most trenchant feature of our understanding of time in general. As we saw above, he criticizes it as leveling off the actual temporal structure of Dasein. But what it levels off is not the temporality of individual Dasein, at least not immediately. What it levels off is our understanding of public, or world time, which is properly understood in terms of the ontological structure of Dasein's temporality. "From temporality the full structure of world-time has been drawn; and only the Interpretation of this structure gives us the clue for 'seeing' at all that in the ordinary conception of time something has been covered up, and for estimating how much the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality has been leveled off" (H, 426). World-time or public-time, the time that we share with one another and in which we can therefore hear from one another, is an essential feature of how we share language with one another; as such it is, properly understood, the origin of significance. Significance, which Heidegger initially argued revealed the (primarily equipmental) referential structure by which things were co-determined together as world,[208] is shown to depend upon the correlation of this referential structure with time, where some times are appropriate for certain things and some times are inappropriate (*BT,* H414). Thus,

> The time which has been made public makes manifest that structure with which we have earlier become acquainted as *significance*, and which constitutes the worldhood of the world. As "the time for something," the time which has been made public has essentially a world-character. Hence the time which makes itself public in the temporalizing of temporality is what we designate as 'world-time' (*Ibid*).

[208] Cf. *BT*, H76-89. In contrast, Hubert Dreyfus argues that the theory of signification in Division One can be separated from Division Two, and indeed should be insofar as Dreyfus takes the referentiality of the equipmental world to be Heidegger's most important philosophical contribution.

In the phenomenon of a shared, immediately meaningful world, we find the confluence of language and time in the relational structure of significance. This fundamental way of Dasein's "temporalizing of temporality" is exhibited in datability, "the most primordial way of *assigning a time*" (*BT*, H409). "Primordial" here should be understood in the sense of disclosing the *archai*, the ontological underpinnings, of the world. If there were not something like dates, the world would be unthinkable. Dates describe how we assign both a time and a place to things, to ourselves and to one another, because they set up the measure which can relate these manifold sorts of beings to one another meaningfully (*BT*, H416-419). As such, Heidegger claims that the concept of temporality grounded in datability performs the work that Kant assigns to the preconceptual transcendental aesthetic in the *Critique of Pure Reason.*[209] But where for Kant cognition determined temporality according to an inner sense and spatiality according to an external sense, this distinction makes no sense on the basis of datability. "Thus, contrary to Kant's opinion, one comes across world-time *just as immediately* in the physical as in the psychical, and just roundabout by way of the psychical." (*BT*, H419).[210] Temporality structures the world before it is broken into physical and psychical phenomena. It also structures the world

[209] Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A19-50 / B33-73. What would be interesting would be to evaluate this claim in conjunction with the claim of Heidegger later in the chapter that unlike Hegel, Kant allows us to think the disjunction of time and human being or "spirit."

[210] Compare to Ricouer's account of Heidegger's resolution of the aporia between physical and psychical time in *Discourse and Narrative*, 60-96. The passage in *Being and Time* continues: "'Time' first shows itself in the sky --- precisely where one comes across it when one regulates oneself naturally *according to it* --- so that 'time' even becomes identified with the sky." This will be an important consideration for the later Heidegger who follows Hölderlin's lead in assigning a pre-eminent philosophical role to the "figure" of the sky. We will soon see the role this plays in Hölderlin's claim that we have named many of the celestial ones --- a claim which should be taken to refer as much to the stars as to the gods. This corporalization of the sky is also critical in understanding Celan. In "Schibboleth," Derrida has shown the importance of the structure of "datability" for understanding the legibility of even Celan's most cryptic poems. He is, moreover, particularly interested in the multiple, contrary apparitions of this operation of dating: as an enciphering (and therefore potential deciphering), as a form of calculability (in the return of the calendar date), but also as the mark of an irreducibility and unrepeatability, the "one time" which Celan returns to obsessively, particularly in his later poetry.

before it is divided into public and private spheres, because we assign and co-assign dates to one another as much as to the world. "In addressing itself to something interpretively, it expresses *itself* too . . . this very addressing and discussing [of beings alongside Dasein in the world] is based upon a *making-present* and is only possible as such" (*BT,* H408). Language, this address, imputes meaning to things and to Dasein by virtue of this datability.

Against the concept of time understood in terms of the eternal self-sameness of the "now," Heidegger ventures a certain privilege of the future in the world-time inscribed in dates.[211] "Ecstatico-horizonal temporality temporalizes itself *primarily* in terms of the *future*" (*BT*, H427). This is largely because Dasein is oriented in its ecstatic unity towards the future. But the future is unthinkable as an orientation upon a continuity of now-points because such a future never comes, but always remains absent.

> Correspondingly, the future as ecstatically understood --- the datable and significant "then" --- does not coincide with the ordinary conception of the "future" in the sense of a pure "now" which has not yet come along but is only coming along … The "now" is not pregnant with the "not-yet-now," but the Present arises from the future in the primordial ecstatical unity of the temporalizing of temporality (*Ibid*).

There is a clear difference between the future understood in terms of ecstatic temporality and the future understood in terms of the "now." The concreteness of the ontologically proper understanding of the future demonstrates its priority over the ontologically improper form of understanding.

On the basis of this concretion, it is possible to reinterpret the present in non-metaphysical ways. While there is a certain, irreducible priority to the future in Heidegger's thought, easily visible because of its clear difference from an inadequately conceived future,

[211] This is in keeping with his earlier privilege of certain futural structures of Dasein, most importantly Being-toward-Death (*Sein-Zum-Tode*), cf. *BT*, H234-267.

there is also a certain, irreducible priority to the present. But this priority is less visible because of the murkiness of a proper understanding of presence, ambiguously related to the ordinary conception of presence that pervades our language and our thinking. The priority of presence lies in its importance for properly understanding the function of discourse, significance, and language in constituting the worldhood of the world. The murkiness of this conception of presence lies in the fact that what gets clarified is nothing different than the inauthentic, common form of language, shaped for millennia by its own inadequate self-conception and deeply sedimented in the bed of its own history.

Saying "now" is the act that inaugurates metaphysics and the metaphysical character of Western Dasein generally. "Saying 'now,' however, is the discursive Articulation of a *making-present* which temporalizes itself in a unity with a retentive awaiting" (*BT*, H417). In other words, saying "now" is also how we exhibit the structure of datability and thus how we establish ourselves as a conversation together with the world (as Heidegger will put it when he turns to Hölderlin). If we can exhibit how the now is understood in its ecstatic unity with the past and the future, then we will be in a position to delimit the truth of the metaphysical tradition and its scientific offshoots and ultimately, thereby to positively reappropriate them.[212]

> *The ordinary representation of time has its natural justification*. It belongs to Dasein's average kind of Being, and to that understanding of Being which proximally prevails. Thus proximally and for the most part, even *history* gets understood *publicly* as happening *within-time*. This interpretation of time loses its exclusive and pre-eminent justification only if it claims to convey the "true" conception of time and to be able to prescribe the sole possible horizon within which time is to be Interpreted (*BT*, H426).

[212] Keep in mind that this positive reappropriation is fundamentally linked to a lyrical theory of Heidegger, as our discussion of Lacoue-Labarthe in Part One showed.

Nonetheless, we have seen that the tradition of metaphysics profoundly influences the history of our understanding of ourselves, and in a way which should not be dismissed as merely illegitimate. The task of the *Wiederholung* is a sort of reversal whereby the concept is put into crisis. This is announced throughout *Being and Time*, but when Heidegger treats the "Discourse on Temporality" he puts a positive spin on it. With a reevaluation of the meanings of "being," "truth," and "time" (all traditionally understood as concepts) we might find ourselves in a position to also reevaluate the status of the concept in language. I do not think that describing this reevaluation as a reversal is too strong. Heidegger refers to the (unfinished) discussion of "Time and Being." This title reflects a real fondness for reversals throughout his thought: The question of the being of truth becomes the truth of being and the essence of truth the essence of truth, [213] the essence of language needs to be thought of in terms of the language of essence. In *On Time and Being*, Heidegger reflects on the role that the *Kehre* (turning, but also inversion) has come to play in his thought since *Being and Time*.[214] Indeed, to the extent that we can read Heidegger as giving an ultimate answer to what the meaning of being is, along with the significance of that meaning, it would be *Kehre im Ereignis*, a turning in the event, or the event of turning as this turning being set into the world through the event.[215] I do not want to reduce what Heidegger is doing in these gestures to a mere stylistic game; in each case I think he has good reasons for making the move that he does. But it does reveal a certain stylistic claim that Heidegger seems to obey, perhaps even a stylistic law. As we will see, Hölderlin's letter to

[213] *Contributions*, §§204-237.
[214] "Time and Being," 2-5;"Summary of a Seminar on 'Time and Being'", 51-54; There, Heidegger also refers to his letter to Richardson (Richardson, xvi-xxiii).
[215] See Richardson, 209-298; Sheehan, 3-16.

Böhlendorff is a description of the stylistic law of reversal as it can be actualized either philosophically or poetically.

In *Being and Time* the enactment of the reversal of the concept is understood as a discursive possibility that would make clear what is implicit, but covered over in our prethematic, everyday way of discoursing: idle chatter and everyday language. These modes of discourse would be shown to reflect a sort of conceptual self-understanding whereby their own character is misunderstood. And this conceptual self-misunderstanding would be shown to have its foundations in the traditional metaphysical understanding of the concept, whose own presuppositions prove to be the prejudices actualized in everyday Dasein's way of discoursing inauthentically. But the form of thinking that adequately clarifies the ontological character of discourse would itself be a particular (existentiell) way of actualizing the possibilities contained in the (existential) structure of discourse and language as such.[216] Now, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger is still confident in calling this "philosophy." As philosophy, this form of thinking remains related to the development of the highly scientific and logical forms of knowledge achieved by Western Dasein. It should still be thought of as potentially enacting a continuation of these traditions, renewing them by putting them into crisis. What this philosophy would be like is seen most clearly 1) in the sections immediately preceding Heidegger's final treatment of Hegel, where he thinks about temporality and historicality in terms of the significance of the date for world-time; and 2) in the remarks indicating how concept-formation, the work of philosophy, could be resituated within a more proper understanding of temporality. And in both cases, philosophy proceeds within an interpretation of time where the saying of the "now" in which this

[216] On the distinction between the existentiell and the existential, compare *BT*, H12f. On the difference between the pre-ontological and the ontological, compare *BT*, H11-19.

authentic possibility of Dasein situates itself in the present is understood as a saying which clarifies the unity of three ecstatically opened forms of temporality: "Temporality does not signify that ecstases come in a 'succession.' The future is *not later* than having been, and having been is *not earlier* than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been" (*BT*, H349).

In his discussion of the temporality of discourse, Heidegger further specifies how philosophy would enact this understanding in its interpretation of language,that is to say in its interpretation of how it uses language but also in its interpretation of how language in general really functions. The mark of a successful philosophy of language would be one which could "define even the ontological meaning of the 'is'" by tackling "the problem of how Being and truth are connected in principle . . . in light of the problematic of temporality" (*Ibid*). Philosophy would be the activity that explores the problems of being, truth, and temporality in light of a new understanding of the "is" and therefore of significance as such. It would rework the structure of significance while simultaneously clarifying and remaining in contact with everyday modes of significance.

In *Being and Time*, before his turn to poetry, it is possible to read Heidegger as locating the operation whereby words again become truly meaningful within philosophy. It is worth paying attention to the specific call for an "ontologically intelligible" interpretation of the "possibility of concept formation" (*Ibid*), because this seems to be the most concrete answer we get in *Being and Time* to the question of how words will be reinvigorated in a way that brings a proper form of presence to light while remaining connected to the history of the word being addressed. The continued practice of philosophy seems itself to be the practice of overturning

the traditional understanding of philosophy. The development of logos stands under the law of reversal even before Heidegger fleshes this out in Hölderlinian terms. But, where it seems possible to talk at least in principle about a basic continuity in *Being and Time* in regard to questions about the significance and the being of the world, and therefore in regard to questions about language and temporality, it is on the question of the role of philosophy itself that Heidegger's later philosophy seems to diverge most fundamentally from *Being and Time*.

Remains Are the Poet's Foundation

Let me summarize the conclusions about the project of philosophy that we have reached at the end of our reading of the final chapters of *Being and Time*. There needs to be a form of philosophical practice which will make clear the present in its presence and, in this presence, reread the past. The hope for this new reading, this regathering, will occasion the promise for a new relationship for ourselves to the future. This dream stays with Heidegger notwithstanding the changes, transformations, upsets, and betrayals it undergoes. But it is important to keep in mind that this hope entails a form of temporality and that this temporality already specifies what the practice of this philosophy will be like. However sketchily and schematically it may do so, the understanding of datability presents a real conception of what this philosophy might look like. And the full picture of the temporality of this conception is presented even earlier, albeit sketchily and schematically, in the temporality of discourse, one of the fundamental existential structures of Dasein.

Heidegger had visualized this practice of philosophy as a *Wiederholung* of the history of philosophy, a repetitive retrieval of the possibilities that philosophy had actualized in a way that illuminated their proper temporal and ontological foundations. This retrieval of the tradition is

what is promised in the second part of *Being and Time*. The roots contained in the word *Wiederholung* suggests its character as bringing something past again to presence (and, of course, make an appearance in the Celan poem we have already considered). As is well known, this promise was never brought to fruition in the way that Heidegger conceived it in *Being and Time*. Nonetheless, in his later thought, as Heidegger turns away from neologisms and conceptual idiosyncrasies and towards an attempt to rethink the tradition in terms more germane to ordinary language, the need for this *Wiederholung* becomes increasingly pressing. Heidegger needs this *Wiederholung* most pressingly when he turns to poetry. If it is important for the authentic discourse that responds to the call of conscience or for the saying that listens to a non-human logos to be able to make itself heard in ordinary language, it is critical for a form of poetry which is thoroughly linguistic.

For the rest of this part of the book, I will turn my attention to texts which are contemporaneous with or later than "The Origin of the Work of Art" and that therefore proceed from the assumption that philosophy cannot renew itself without the help of poetry. But while these texts all in their own way implicitly enact the sort of retrieval that Heidegger is talking about, the language has shifted so much from *Being and Time* that the temporal underpinnings of this retrieval are no longer very clear. Nonetheless, the possibility that these underpinnings can be projected onto the later philosophy needs to be kept in mind throughout the ensuing discussion. We need to keep in mind that Heidegger has already insisted on the essential need to relate the proper understanding of the dating-function of the now to the ordinary understanding of the now. He recognizes that this further entails a relation between a properly conceived, ontological theory of language and the ordinary metaphysical theory of language. This need to

speak in two registers informs Heidegger's attempt to read Hölderlin's poetic oeuvre as an ontologically significant document. And it is in this double reading that we first get a sense of the workly character that ought to be common to both philosophy's and poetry's way of renewing themselves by contesting their own histories.

But by the time that Heidegger begins to develop a positive account of the linguistic style of this contestation, he has become much more skeptical of the ability of philosophy to enact such a radical reversal. The language of metaphysics, epitomized by Hegel's philosophy of the concept, is too barren and sterile a language to immanently engender the requisite concrete understanding of language that such a movement needs. Philosophy itself, like Theatetus's theory of knowledge, turns out to be a wind-egg.[217] What is needed for the question of the meaning of being to proceed is a new day and the appearance of a stranger whose language promises to enact the weaving of being with sameness, difference, motion, and rest. But where Socrates encountered a philosopher, a stranger from Elea who may also have been a god, we encounter a poet who gropes his way in the absence of gods. For Heidegger, the modern poet who comes in the place of the Eleatic stranger is of course Hölderlin, whose poetry gives us a non-metaphysical alternative to his erstwhile friend Hegel.

While Heidegger remains confident that philosophy can make us aware of its own limitations by inquiring into the meaning of being through the being of beings and the being of the "is,"[218] he recognizes that it remains incapable of bringing what is distinctive to poetry, its

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[217] *Theatetus*, 210a.

[218] This would, I think, encompass both asking the guiding question "why are there beings rather than nothing" and the grounding question "how does it stand with being." Philosophy can recognize its limitations by asking the guiding question in terms of the grounding question. But to grasp the manifold possibilities for asking the grounding question, philosophy must venture outside itself. This differentiates Heidegger's understanding of the "leap." There is a "leap" within philosophy from the guiding question to the grounding question but then another leap outside of philosophy posed by the poetic experience of "sacred *pathos*." On the grounding and guiding

sensuousness or "pathos,"[219] to language on its own terms. Thus, a realization derived in some way from poetry has to interrupt the tradition of philosophy before philosophy has any hope of realizing what in *Being and Time* would have been possible as a proper ontological understanding of the phenomena which underlay the improper understanding of these phenomena by traditional philosophical understanding. The possibility for an ontological science of concept-formation must await the poetic word.

This is seen most clearly in Heidegger's interpretation of the final couplet of Hölderlin's hymn "*Andenken*" (Remembrance), "*was bleibet aber stiftet die Dichter*" "but what remains is founded by the poets."[220] Heidegger returns to this couplet again and again in his writings on Hölderlin.[221] Here I will confine my attention for the most part to his treatment of this fragment in "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry." [222]

The treatment of this fragment depends upon a previous fragment, where Heidegger takes up the discussion of the tensedness of language with explicit reference to his treatment of the tensedness of language in *Being and Time*. In "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry," Heidegger broaches the question of the tensedness of language in terms of Hölderlin's characterization of our human being as a "conversation." Hölderlin says,

> *Viel hat erfahren der Mensch.*
> *Der Himmlischen viele genannt,*
> *Seit ein Gespräch wir sind*
> *Und hören können voneinander*.
>
> Much has man experienced.

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questions, see *IM*, 1-54 (where Fried and Polt translate "*Grund" as* "fundamental" rather than "grounding"). On the leap as the movement between these two questions, see *C*, §§115-167. This account should be compared to Søren Kierkegaard's leap of faith in *Fear and Trembling*, 27-53.

[219] I am anticipating the use of "pathos" in the Böhlendorff letter.

[220] *Poems and Fragments*, 490, 491.

[221] See *supra*, at p. , n. 81.

[222] Heidegger, Martin. "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry."

> Named many of the heavenly ones,
> Since we have been a conversation
> And able to hear from one another (qtd in *EHP*, 56).[223]

Heidegger interprets this to mean that language is essentially conversational (whether between human beings or in the world-disclosing conversation between the human being and the earth), that we become who we are by virtue of this conversation. He argues that that this becoming happens in terms of the opening up of time, enacted in language by the "tensedness" of language.

> But Hölderlin does not simply say "we are a conversation" --- rather --- "Since we have been a conversation . . ." [where "since" translates "*Seit*" and must therefore be understood as a temporal, not circumstantial, qualification --- AA] Even where man's ability to speak is present and is put and is put into practice, the essential event of language --- conversation --- does not necessarily occur. Since when have we been a conversation? If there is to be *one* conversation, the essential word must remain related to what is one and the same. Without this relation, even a quarrel is impossible. But the one and the same can be manifest only within the light of something that remains. However, permanence and endurance come to appearance only when persistence and presence lights up. But this occurs in the moment in which time opens itself up in its dimensions. Since man has placed himself in the presence of something lasting, he can expose himself to the changeable, to what comes and goes; for only the persistent is changeable. Only since "torrential time" has been broken up into present, past and future, has it become possible to agree upon something that remains over time. We have been *one* conversation since the time when there "is time." Ever since time arose and was brought to stand, since then we *are* historical. Both --- to be *one* conversation and to be historical --- are equally ancient, they belong together, and they are the same (*EHP*, 57).

There would be much to say about this passage. Let me focus only on what is immediately relevant. Delivered in the spring of 1936, around the same time as *The Introduction to Metaphysics*, it reiterates Heidegger's basic claim about the nature of the "is." We tend to understand the world, and consequently intermundane beings, in terms of what is. But, properly understood, this does not mean that we should understand things in terms of an eternal present.

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[223] I am quoting the German text from *Poems and Fragments*, 428. As Hamburger notes, the poem is a preliminary draft for "Celebration of Peace," "*Friedensfeier*." I will return to the theme of peace in terms of Heidegger, Hölderlin, and tragedy (and, to a lesser extent, comedy) in Part Three. See *infra* pp. -.

The present only refers to being as opposed to becoming (what remains)[224] when it is broken apart from past and future, articulated and joined like a finger or, as Derrida will famously say, like a hinge.[225] But time, unlike becoming, structures being internally. Or, at the very least we have to consider that it might. Heidegger well known end to *Being and Time* is the question, "Does *time* itself manifest itself as the horizon of *Being*?" (*BT*, H437). We have already seen the extent to which the phenomenological concept of the horizon has been called into question and put aside in favor of the concept of the definition, trait, or boundary by 1936. But this basic feature remains. The structuring that time does internally defines us as a conversation both amongst ourselves and with the world. This structuring manifests itself in the basic structure of language. It reveals itself in a unitary trait of something like presence across the tensedness of language.[226] While this unity is traditionally understood as referring to something eternal, here this unity is essentially historical, and in fact defines our own historicality. The meaning of the "is," usually understood as what "always is," is often taken for the whole of the meaning of being. But "is" is one tense attached to one person among many forms of "to be." Here, more strongly than in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, the connection between the assumption of a particular tense and person is made, and Celan will draw this connection into even sharper relief. But Heidegger wants to insist that the basic insight of this passage is already worked into his early theory of temporality in *Being and Time*. Thus, in reference to the "moment in which time opens itself up in its dimensions" (*EHP*, 57), Heidegger points to the temporality of the date as he developed it in sections 79-81 of *Being and Time*. Heidegger is concerned to show how

[224] Cf. *IM* section on "Being and Becoming," 100-103.
[225] Derrida, Jacques. *Of Grammatology*, 65-73; as Derrida acknowledges, the idea of thinking of the articulation of difference in terms of a hinge, comes from Roger Laporte.
[226] Heidegger continues to insist on this second meaning for presence as late as "Time and Being," where he thinks of it as "the nearing nearness" or the "fourth dimension of time" ("Time and Being," 15).

something can be properly said to last over time without recourse to a concept of eternity or of the selfsameness of the "now." On his reading of Hölderlin, we are a conversation once we have sought to bring into linguistic presence a measure of constancy to the world. But this constancy is not just present; it is also directed to the past by retaining a determinate starting point and to the future by anticipating what remains.

The ending couplet of *Andenken* clarifies how this happens by asserting that this occurrence of meaning happens in poetry. "Poetry is a founding by the word and in the word. What is established in this way? What remains. But how can what remains be founded? Is it not that which has always already been present? No!" (*EHP*, 58). Poetry now provides us with that picture of the temporalization of presence in terms of the future. Such a picture contradicts the usual understanding of presence as the self-same identity of the "now." And in *Being and Time,* this way of thinking was still the distinctive characteristic of Heidegger's project for philosophy.

Heidegger further links the activity of poetry with what his early philosophy had promised that it would do by appropriating for the activity of poets those acts of transcendence which Heidegger had insisted in his 1929 lecture "On the Essence of Reason"[227] were the provenance of the transcendental operations of language. There, Heidegger identifies the basis of the ontological difference between being and beings in the transcendence of Dasein. This transcendence is therefore the ground of Dasein as being-in-the-world, just as it was considered to be in *Being and Time*.[228] There are three relevant features of "On the Essence of Reason" for our purposes. First, Heidegger draws attention to the character of reason [*Grund*] as this ground

[227] *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. Here I am departing from the title of the English translation of *Vom Wesen des Grundes*: Heidegger, Martin. "On the Essence of Ground," 97-135, hereafter cited in the body of the text as *PM*.
[228] See *BT*, H200-202.

[*Grund*]. Reason, interpreted primordially, means this transcendental ground (*PM,* 107-125). This is the main thrust of the essay, while the following two points come in the conclusion to the essay. Secondly, the transcendental character of grounding is threefold: in "establishing" (*stiften* --- the word Hoeller translates as "founding" in "*Andenken*"), "taking up a basis" (*bodennehmen*), and "grounding *of* something" (*Begründen*) (*PM*, 127). Finally, "Freedom as transcendence . . . [is] the *origin of ground in general. Freedom is freedom for ground*" (*Ibid)*.

These second two features of the transcendental function of reason are specifically imputed to poetry in "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry," again, in terms of the ontological difference.

> Being is never a being. But because being and the essence of things can never be calculated and derived from what is present at hand, they must be freely created, posited, and bestowed. Such free bestowal is a founding.
> But when the gods are originally named and the essence of things comes to expression so that the things first shine forth, when this occurs, man's existence is brought into a firm relation and placed on a ground. The poet's saying is not only foundation in the sense of a free bestowal, but also in the sense of the firm grounding of human existence on its ground. (*EHP*, 59).

But while this characterization of poetry preserves the foundation of human life in a way of founding that freely bestows a sense on the world and thus on ourselves, the character of this foundation is radically changed by the severance of this form of grounding from ground as reason. The turn to poetry over philosophy does not seem to have the sense of changing what Heidegger thought was necessary in *Being and Time* and his other earlier writings, but rather of changing the understanding of how this point is to be accomplished.[229]

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[229] But while Heidegger attempts to shift the manner in which this is accomplished to art and poetry, he does not abandon the idea that this should elucidate the character of the human being as *Dasein,* and thus clarify a way of thinking about the meaning of being "philosophically:" See, for example, *Contributions* §31," The Style of Inceptual Thinking:

> Style is the self-certainty of Dasein in its grounding *legislations* and in its withstanding the fury.

For this reason, Heidegger is able to continue to develop an understanding of temporality and historicality which draws on his systematic treatment of *Being and Time* even as he distances himself from the specifics of the practice that would have most appropriately elucidated them. We can see the continuity in his understanding of the temporality and historicality of language now applied to poets at the end of "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry:"

> Hölderlin puts into poetry the very essence of poetry --- but not in the sense of a timelessly valid concept. This essence of poetry belongs to a definite time. But not in such a way that it merely conforms to that time as some time already existing. Rather, by providing anew the essence of poetry, Hölderlin first determines a new time. It is the time of the gods who have fled *and* of the god who is coming. It is the *time of need* because it stands in a double lack and a double not: in the no-longer of the gods who have fled and the not-yet of the god who is coming. The essence of poetry which is founded by Hölderlin is historical in the highest degree, because it anticipates a historical time. As a historical essence, however, it is the only true essence (*EHP*, 64-65).

Hölderlin's poetry entails a new history because it opens us up to a proper understanding of temporality. In *Being and Time* such an understanding seemed to be a possibility for a transcendentally conceived reason, where reason is understood as apprehending and properly explicating the features of things which show themselves *qua* phenomena to be ontologically relevant. Here, that temporality is reread in terms of Hölderlin's concept of history. On the basis of this understanding of history, the specific understanding of the language which best elucidates time and history seems to change dramatically. Philosophy seems to depend for its

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> The style of *reservedness* is the remembering awaiting of enowning [*Ereignis* --- the event of appropriation], because reservedness thoroughly attunes the inabiding.
> This reservedness also thoroughly attunes every strifing of the strife between world and earth. Reservedness yields --- in reticence --- to the soft measure and carries out utter fury, both of which --- belonging each to the other --- meet up with each other in very different ways, from the earth as from world.
> As growing certainty, *style* is the law of enactment of truth in the sense of sheltering in beings. Because art, for example, is setting-into-*work* of truth and because in the work the sheltering comes *in itself* to stand unto itself, therefore style is visible, although hardly understood --- especially in the field of art. But the thinking of style is here *not* expanded further and transferred from art to Da-sein as such.

world-disclosive possibilities on poetry, or else on a non-metaphysical and, increasingly, non-philosophical thinking. But as our explication of "The Origin of the Work of Art" showed, this thinking is nothing more than thought attuned to poetry.

While I might be belaboring the obvious here, it is nonetheless worth calling attention to and specifying these features of the relationship of philosophy and poetry because it is extremely important to be clear on the functions of philosophy and poetry and the possibilities that Heidegger imputes to them at various points in his career if we are going to engage the traditions of philosophy and poetry in a meaningful way in terms of the understanding of gathering which he claims undergirds language and logos. I am moving slowly through some fairly well-established features of Heidegger's development because understanding these features is vital if we are going to be able to give some historical concretion of language through a characterization of both philosophy and poetry as potentially setting truth into work in a world-disclosive way. I am calling attention to these well-established features because I do not think that they actually give us the answers to certain questions of Heidegger interpretation that we expect them to. It is at this point that Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin seems to be most compatible with that trajectory of his thought that I characterized in the previous part of this book as "epical;" but it is also at this point that the possibility of a non-epical theory of history emerges in Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin.

Let me recall the basic understanding of the work of art which dominated our discussion in the previous chapter in terms of our discussion of *Being and Time* and "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry." What Heidegger calls "the essence of poetry" in "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" is most well-known in Heidegger's characterization of poetry in "The Origin of the

Work of Art." The account of the workly character of the work that Heidegger gives there is generally taken to be his best case for why his concerns in *Being and Time* require him to turn to poetry and art. There, Heidegger asserts that all art is essentially poetic (*BW*, 197) and that the character of the poetic is to disclose truth historically, by setting it into the work (*BW*, 196-203). And this setting into work is accomplished in a decisive way in the language of poetry. Language, in its specific appearances, reflects the historical happening of poetic language. This is manifest in a particularly clear way in world-disclosive works of art (*BW*, 199-200). These works reflect a specific form of being which is fundamentally different than things (what Heidegger would have talked about in *Being and Time* as *Das Vorhandene*, what is present at hand or present to theoretical cognition) and equipment (In *Being and Time*, Das *Zuhandene,* what is ready at hand or present to practical activity).[230] The introduction of an essential new ontological category allows Heidegger to shift language away from a structure of Dasein and therefore from the existentialist danger of seeing language, and its founding quality, as a subjective "tool" of Dasein. Thus, "Language itself is poetry in the essential sense" (*BW*, 199).

But in his discussion of the structure of time in *Being and Time* Heidegger had already grasped the need for a form of being that was not interpreted as having the being of Dasein but was also not interpreted as having the being of equipment or a mere thing. This was required by the way in which world time's "reckoning with time" "naturally" tended towards an obfuscation of the proper temporality of the time of intermundane beings in the leveled-off "now." Heidegger saw this obfuscation happening in our relationships to equipment as much as to what is merely present. "In the ordinary interpretations of time as a sequence of 'nows' [derived in the previous

[230] Cf. *BT*, H83-88.

paragraph from our concern with equipment], both datability and significance are *missing*" (*BT*, 422). The sort of significance which is revealed in the datability of worldly beings is therefore not identical to the use-relational significance that was the basis for our understanding of the environment in Heidegger's earlier discussion of the worldliness of the world. The "Origin of the Work of Art" is largely held to provide a new sort of relationship to beings other than ourselves with its exploration of the workly character of the art work. But the need for this exploration is already announced at the end of *Being and Time*. While our relationship to worldly beings significant in a non-equipmental way comes to be understood as poetic, in *Being and Time* it seems to be a feature of the ontological character of a thing's timeliness, revealed in its datability as drawn into a relationship with us irreducible to its use. This is what the poetic work of art discloses in "The Origin of the Work of Art" and what philosophical *sophia* promises to disclose in *Being and Time*.

We should therefore not see Heidegger as proposing a radical rethinking of his ontology in the 1930s. It is not his new attention to the work as opposed to Dasein that shifts him to thinking about art. Since the "work" is simply shorthand for the "work of art," or "works whose way of being is like the being of a work of art," this would be redundant. The relevance of the "work" reflects the concern that Heidegger already said Dasein had for the beings which are alongside it in the world and reflects the need for an ontological account of a non-equipmental significance. He was already developing this account at the end of *Being and Time* where the being of things was understood by virtue of the significance of their dates, i.e. historically. What we should ask then is not a question about history or about temporality directly, but a question about Heidegger's understanding of the activities of philosophy and poetry in their ecstatic

character. Why would a philosophical text not be a work of art? What about its language sets it apart from poetry? Why does poetry relate to the world in a way that philosophy cannot? Why is its way of thinking better able to be temporal and historical in the sense of being able to reckon with dates? Why is it that when a work of poetry makes something present it does so by saying a "now" which is a historical date, but when philosophy (or at least metaphysics) makes something present it does so by imputing an unchanging, a-temporal and a-historical quality to it? By asking these questions and by seeing how Heidegger develops an answer to them, we move away from an epical theory of poetry at the very moment that we seem to be heading most directly for it.

The Essence of Language is Logos

In order to identify the eccentric movement that Hölderlin introduces into Heidegger's thought and that gives Heidegger a way of avoiding some of the traps inherent in metaphysics' traditional way of relating philosophy and poetry at the same time that he continues along the path that that tradition has cleared, it is necessary to ask about the relative priorities assigned to philosophy and poetry in Heidegger's thought. We will ask this by reconsidering our interpretation of the claim that the meaning of "being" or of "to be" has been dominated by the meaning of the "is." According to Heidegger, this dominance is a covert function of the philosophical importance of the metaphysical tradition that asks about the being of beings.

> We understand the verbal noun "Being" <*Sein*> on the basis of the infinitive, which in term remains linked to the "is" and into the manifoldness we have pointed out in this "is." The definite and particular verb form "is," the *third person singular of the present indicative*, has a priority here. We do not understand "Being" with regard to the "thou are," "you are," "I am," or "they would be," although these all represent verbal inflections of "Being" that are just as good as "is." We take "to be" <*Sein*> as the infinitive of "is." To put it the other way around, we involuntarily explain the infinitive "to be" to ourselves on

> the basis of the "is," almost as if nothing else were possible (*IM* 96 --- The italics are Heidegger's).

Our reading of the poem "*Dein Hinübersein*" has suggested the possibility of interpreting the "is" in reference to its relationship to other persons and temporal tenses of the verb "to be." This must now be distinguished from Heidegger's own attempt to delimit the meaning of being within metaphysics by referring to its "restriction" by other critical philosophical concepts.

> Just as we find a completely ordinary mode of saying Being in the "is," we also find entirely definite manners of speaking that have already become formulaic in the naming of the name "Being:" Being and becoming; Being and seeming; Being and thinking; Being and the ought. When we say "Being," we are driven, almost as if under compulsion to say: Being *and* … The "and" does not simply mean that we incidentally attach and adjoin something additional but rather that we speak of something from which "Being" is distinguished: Being *and not*... But at the same time we mean, in these formulaic titles, something more that somehow properly belongs to Being as something distinguished from *it*, if only as its Other (*IM*, 98 --- The italics and the ellipses are Heidegger's).

Defining being in its relationship to the concepts that bound it, Heidegger attempts to reveal the trait of presence in all of these definitions of being. Heidegger elucidates the modern interpretation of the meaning of being on the basis of the historical roots of the modern understanding of presence in the Greek interpretation of the meaning of being, where being was already understood on the basis of the "is." This elucidation dominates the bulk of the lecture course and provides Heidegger's discussion with a measure of concretion that was lacking in the more abstract "grammatical" considerations of the previous two chapters. By referring to the interwoven significance of historicity and temporality, we are reminded of Heidegger's own attempt in *Being and Time* to conceive of the meaning of being on the basis of the temporality of Dasein. But unlike the "Being and …" formulations that Heidegger brings up here, temporality is supposed to structure the meaning of Being internally. Just as Heidegger only refers obliquely,

if somewhat obviously, to the title of his most famous work, he treats temporality only indirectly, insofar as these "restrictions" of Being reveal the contours of the metaphysical interpretation of temporality in terms of presence. I have argued in my examination of the "Temporality of Discourse" and "Hölderlin and The Essence of Poetry" that Heidegger's interpretation of time in *Being and Time* remains of critical importance to his goals in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* and that it implicitly undergoes a shift from being interpreted *horizonally* to being interpreted *decisively*. This shift is similar to the sort of shift in the understanding of what it means to talk about the essence of being that I mapped out above. However, this re-appropriation of *Being and Time* happens in the background of *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Therefore, in discussing the passage from the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, my focus will not be directly on Heidegger's understanding of the temporality of presence. Rather, I will focus on his claim that language, the locus of our understanding of the meaning of being, needs to be understood in terms of logos. When taken in conjunction with Heidegger's later writing on language, this claim will reveal an ambiguity in how Heidegger understands the meaning of being. And the sense of this ambiguity goes beyond the manifold determinations of the "is" to a form of ambiguity that must be understood in a temporal context broader than the present tense of the "is."

Heidegger's claim that language must be understood as logos comes in his discussion of "Being and Thinking." Heidegger devotes far more attention to this distinction than to any of the other distinctions that he mentions: the section on "Being and Thinking" alone takes up almost half of the book. Heidegger argues that the division between Being and Thinking is the most important for "Western Dasein" (not just for Western metaphysics, but for the whole of the existence of human beings in the West) because its distinctive opposition between subject (the

thinker) and object (beings) opposes thinking not just to being but to the whole of the division between being and becoming, being and seeming, and being and the ought. Becoming and seeming are encountered within beings such that they "lie on the same level, as it were, as the Being of beings" (*IM,* 123); they are different, but not separate, from being. But thinking represents beings in such a way that it seems to remain totally separate; it represents not only the being of beings to itself, but also their becoming and their appearance.[231] "Consequently, thinking is no longer just the opposing member in some new distinction but becomes the basis on which one decides about what stands against it, so much so that Being in general gets interpreted on the basis of thinking" (*Ibid*).

Heidegger acknowledges that Aristotle already suspected that being was not a genus, that there is no such thing as being in general. Nonetheless, he insists that Plato's and Aristotle's philosophies, taken in conjunction with their interpretation of the pre-Platonic philosophers, contain the roots of the form of thinking that appears to make possible the representation of being as a genus. And the root of this element in Greek philosophy is to be found in the critical importance of logos, in those elements of the Greek understanding of logos which led to the development of the modern science of logic, "the science of thinking, the doctrine of the rules of thinking and the forms of what is thought" (*IM*, 126).

Heidegger therefore launches an "attack" (*IM*, 124) on what he calls "that fundamental orientation of the spirit of the West" (*IM*, 123) that has interpreted being as the object of thought and has interpreted thought on the basis of "the science of assertion" (*IM*, 127). Now, we might

[231] The way in which thinking represents the division of being and the ought is somewhat different than the way it represents the other two divisions, but the division of being and the ought receives scant attention here. See *Introduction to Metaphysics,* 210-214. Heidegger's critique of traditional ethics in the "Letter on Humanism" presents his most sustained justification for this strategy.

suspect that Heidegger will adopt a phenomenological strategy. That is to say, he could adopt an approach similar to the one that Husserl was developing around the same time in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* and even more directly in "The Origin of Geometry."[232] In these texts and in related lectures and fragments from the 1930s, Husserl criticizes modern rationality as overly formalistic. Modern science, mathematics, and logic do not recognize that the rules which govern their symbolic and formal way of thinking were intuitively grounded for the ancients. Formal systems of thought arose from conscious insights into the structure of the appearance of beings in the life-world. Because modern thought has lost this connection to consciousness, we moderns inappropriately manipulate these symbols without fulfilling these empty intentions. Moreover, this has been allowed to progress to the point that these original intuitions might have become unfulfillable. To make thinking relevant to our lives, we must go back through the sedimentations of meaning that underlie science, mathematics, and logic and reactivate the meaningful content implicit in their formal way of looking at things. While Heidegger and Husserl had fallen out by the 1930s, the basics of this line of thought are already implicit in Husserl's earlier phenomenology. The very idea of a crisis is a re-description and reevaluation of the problem which in the late nineteenth century provided the impetus for Husserl to develop phenomenology in the first place: the question of whether or not there could be an axiomatic foundation for mathematics and for logic. Moreover, it was Brentano who provided the insight that this problem might depend on a misreading of the Greeks. He does this in his book *On the Manifold Meaning of Being According to Aristotle*, the very book in which Heidegger was first introduced to the problem of the meaning of being. And the most important

[232] Available in English as an appendix to the *Crisis*, 353-378.

insight for a phenomenological attempt to undo the claim that thinking and being were radically different, the critique of the subject-object relationship as it was formulated in Descartes, was already a well-established feature of Husserl's thought.[233]

To be sure, Heidegger makes gestures towards this putative phenomenological approach to overcoming the division between thinking and being. Like Husserl, Heidegger traces the roots of the problems he identifies in modern logic to logic's development as a technique, "When does the formation of logic begin? When Greek philosophy comes to an end and becomes a matter of schools, organization, and technique" (*IM*, 128).[234] Heidegger argues that we need to recover an earlier, pre-metaphysical understanding of logos in the philosophy of Heraclitus and Parmenides and see how this understanding is still operative in the inception of metaphysics in Plato and Aristotle. "[The division between being and thought] can be overcome only *originally* --- that is, in such a way that its inceptive truth is shown its own limits and thereby founded anew" (*IM*, 124). While this strategy sounds superficially similar to Husserl's, a critical difference arises. Our own relation to thinking should not merely reactivate and build upon these earlier thinkers in order to eliminate the split between thinking and being. This is because it was the philosophy of Heraclitus and Parmenides that, before the inception of metaphysics, already announced the division between thinking and being. "Logic, as the exhibition of the formal structure of

[233] For a particularly clear resolution of the subject-object split dating back to Heidegger's early involvement with Husserl, see, e.g. the redescription of subject and object in terms of *noesis* and *noema* in Husserl, Edmund. *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Vol. I*, 211-235.

[234] But whereas Heidegger situates the misinterpretation of logic as early as Hellenistic philosophy, Husserl is more interested with the mathematization of science in Galileo. Compare *Crisis*, 21-66. This difference has to do with their different sets of concerns: where Husserl is primarily concerned with revitalizing the sciences by bringing them into the movement of our life-world, Heidegger argues that the separation of thinking and being is a determinative feature of our everyday world as much as of philosophy and the sciences. Compare *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 99, "The distinctions [discussed as restrictions of being] have not remained dominant only within Western philosophy. They pervade all knowing, acting, and speaking, even when they are not expressed explicitly or in these words."

thinking and the exposition of its rules, was first able to develop after the division between Being and thinking had already been carried out, and carried out in a definite way and in a special respect" (*IM*, 128). Heidegger therefore turns to the philosophy of Heraclitus and Parmenides not to show the solution to a modern problem (at least not directly to show this solution) but in order to elucidate the covered over origin to the problem. Heidegger's phenomenological heritage is most visible in the approach he takes to unearthing the problem, but he characterizes the response which he tries to take (the attack) as a different sort of thoughtful, poetic engagement with metaphysics.

Heidegger needs to show that the origin of the modern metaphysical subject lies in premetaphysical Greece, as evidenced by the philosophy of Heraclitus and Parmenides, even if the keys to the subject's dissolutions are also found in our historical meditation on this origin. Throughout his discussion, it needs to be kept in mind that Heidegger's goal in turning to Heraclitus and Parmenides is to shed light on the modern domination of thinking by logic and the fact that this domination is neither necessary nor accidental, "'Logic' and 'the logical' are simply not *the* ways to define thinking without further ado, as if nothing else were possible. On the other hand, it was no accident that the doctrine of thinking became 'logic.'" (*IM*, 127). Heidegger's claim is that this one particular possibility among other possibilities, perhaps at one point a contingent possibility, became so essential to modern Western life that the proper contours of the existence of the human being can longer be understood without reference to the logos. To uncover the hidden origins of this decision about the meaning of logos, he turns to the relationship between *phusis* and logos where the precursors of being and thinking were decisively separated but nonetheless still related. In order to uncover how *phusis* and logos came

to be conceived of in terms of "being" and "thought," he turns to the saying of Parmenides, "*to gar auto noein estin te kai einai.*"[235] Heidegger argues that far from saying, "But thinking and Being are the same," this fragment testifies to the same differential unity between thinking and being that Heraclitus located between *phusis* and logos (*IM*, 145). I will focus primarily on Heidegger's exposition of Heraclitus, because it is there that he differentiates logos from language. But while his emphasis in the section of the *Introduction to Metaphysics* is on the primacy of logos, his interpretation of logos leads him to a conclusion about the centrality of poetry very similar to the sort of claim that he will make in "Language," where the place of primacy will be given to language over logos. While I will be mostly concerned with Heraclitus, I will outline how Heidegger uses the kinship that he identifies between Heraclitus and Parmenides to arrive at the necessity of poetry and to introduce a consideration of the poetry of Sophocles. I will then turn to Heidegger's use of Sophocles in more depth in the final part of this book.

While logos is generally understood to refer "originally and authentically" to "thinking, understanding, and reason" (*IM*, 130), Heidegger claims that "this conception will never give us any insight into 1) why logos could be separated from the Being of beings at all, and 2) why this logos had to determine the essence of thinking and bring thinking into opposition to Being" (*IM*, 131). To be sure, logos is the Greek name for what in modern times is called language as well as what in modern times is called thought or reason. This concentration of contiguous, but not identical, modern philosophical concepts in one word will be the starting point of our consideration of language in the essay on "Language." But here, Heidegger is concerned to

[235] Heidegger identifies this as fragment 5, but it is actually fragment 3. See Kirk and Raven, 246.

show that these modern concepts do not do a good job of explaining the original meaning of logos and the cognate verb *legein*. Announcing one of the most critical and discussed developments of his understanding of language, Heidegger insists that we ought to understand the original meaning of logos as gathering, *Sammlung* (*Ibid*).[236]

Heidegger immediately justifies this claim by reference to Homer and by the etymological connection of the Greek *logos* to the German *lesen,* meaning to collect and additionally to read (*Ibid*). But the primary justification of this claim lies in the traction that such a conception of logos gives him in understanding the peculiarities of the way that Heraclitus uses

[236] See Heidegger, Martin. "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)" and *Heraclitus Seminar*, where he insists on the priority of logos over Eugen Fink's phenomenological emphasis on fire.. With regards to the development of Heidegger's understanding of logos as *Sammlung* and his concomitant move away from phenomenology proper, compare Courtine, Jean-François. "The Destruction of Logic." Despite adopting his account of the closeness between Parmenides and Heraclitus and continuing his assumption that the polemical character of logos is the central thread of Heraclitus' thought, Walter Brogan nonetheless argues that Heidegger's decision to emphasize this *Sammlung* is unfairly restrictive to Heraclitus. See Brogan, Walter. "Heraclitus: Philosopher of the Sign, 263-366.274f.fn.6).

"logos". Heidegger focuses initially on fragments one and two,[237] arguing that the use of logos in both of these fragments entails that:

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[237] Fragment 1reads:

> *tou de logou toud' eontos aei axunetoi gignontai anthropoi kai prosthen e akousai kai akousantes to proton; ginomenon gar panton kata ton logon toned apeiroisin eoikasi, periomenoi kai epeon kai ergon toioutown hokoion ego diegeumai kata phusin diaireon hekaston kai phrazon hokos exei; tous de allous anthropous lanthanei hokosa egerthentes poiousin hokosper hokosa heudontes epilanthanontai.*

Heidegger translates this as:

> But while logos constantly remains itself, human beings behave as those who do not comprehend (*axunetoi*), both before they have heard and after they have first heard. For everything becomes a being *kata ton logon tonde*, in accordance with and in consequence of this logos; yet they (human beings) resemble those who have never dared anything through experience, although they attempt words and works such as I carry out, laying out each thing *kata phusin*, according to Being, and explicating how it behaves. But as for other human beings (the other human beings as they all are, *hoi polloi*), what they really do while awake is concealed from them, just as what they did in their sleep conceals itself from them again afterward (*IM*, 134).

Kirk and Raven translate:

> Of the Logos which is as I describe it men always prove to be uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For although all things happen according to this Logos men are like people of no experience, even when they experience such words and deeds as I explain, when I distinguish each thing according to its constitution and declare how it is; but the rest of men fail to notice what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do when asleep (Kirk and Raven, 187).

Fragment 2 reads, "*dio dei epesthat to <xuno>; tou logou d' eontos xunou zoousin hoi pollos hos idian echontes phronesin.*" Heidegger translates this as, "Hence one must follow the Together in beings --- that is, adhere to it; but whereas logos essentially unfolds as this Together in beings, the mass lives as if each had his own understanding (sense)" (*IM*, 135). Kirk and Raven translate, "Therefore it is necessary to follow the common; but although the Logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding" (Kirk and Raven, 187).

Let me point out three interesting features that emerge from these fragments and their various translations.

1) It is interesting that Heidegger's translation of fragment 1 is relatively conventional, as Fried and Polt note in their translation of *Introduction to Metaphysics* --- they also indicate some of the essential departures from such translations; see *IM* 134-135, fn. 27. It is noteworthy that all of the differences they list involve concepts which are important to Heidegger elsewhere, but not in the *Introduction to Metaphysics,* while terms which are important in *Introduction to Metaphysics* are transliterated and interpolated rather than translated. Perhaps this is also why Heidegger does not give the Greek here, as he generally does when he attempts less conventional translations, not just in *Introduction to Metaphysics* but throughout his corpus. Perhaps this entire fragment is not really a translation in Heidegger's sense as much as a transcription. The translation would instead be implicit in the ensuing discussion of Heraclitus.

2) By leaving "Logos" untranslated, Heidegger and Kirk and Raven are following a common convention in both analytic and continental philosophy. Unlike many of the claims that Heidegger makes about the Greek language, the claim that Logos does not originally mean language, and certainly does not mean language in Heraclitus, is quite uncontroversial.

3) In the references that Heraclitus makes to wakefulness and sleep we touch again upon the interrelationships between consciousness, knowledge, and language, all of which were so important in "*Dein Hinübersein*," "*Wir lagen schön tief*," and *"Die Polen*." H.G. Gadamer has treated the theme of sleep and wakefulness in Heraclitus extensively (cf. in particular "Heraclitus Studies," 220-228) and has called attention to this connection between Heraclitus and Celan on this point in the context of Celan's *Atemkristall* [Breathcrystal] cycle. See Gadamer, H.G., *"Who am I and Who are You" and Other Essays*.

> 1) constancy, lasting, is proper to is; 2) it essentially unfolds as the Together in beings, the Together of the being of that which gathers; 3) everything that happens, that is, that comes into Being, stands there in accordance with this constant Together; this is what holds sway. What is said of logos here corresponds exactly to the authentic meaning of the word "gathering." But just as this word denotes both 1) to gather and 2) gatheredness, logos here means the gathering gatheredness. (*IM*, 135).

Just as the variety of meanings possible for our understanding of "being" was found to encompass both nominal and verbal meanings and therefore to supercede the difference between the verb and the noun, so does logos refer in Heraclitus to both what is gathered (the being of the entity) and the gathering, (the being of the "is").[238] As naming what is constant, and what holds sway, Logos names how things come into presence. Heidegger had already prefigured this essential feature of Heraclitus's usage of logos in his discussion of "The Grammar and Etymology of Being," where he offered the following translation of Heraclitus, "Confrontation is indeed for all (that comes to presence) the sire (who lets emerge), but (also) for all the preserver that holds sway. For it lets some appear as gods, others as human beings, some it produces (sets forth) as slaves, but others as the free" (*IM*, 64-65).[239] While Heraclitus's understanding of coming to presence (*Anwesen*) is not identical to the notion of presence in modern philosophy, some version of what Aristotle interpreted as *parousia* is contained in his understanding of such key notions as *polemos, xunon*, *logos,* and *phusis*. And all of these terms, in their own way, are fundamental names for being. Thus, "for the Greeks, 'Being' fundamentally means presence"

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[238]Cf. *IM*, 60. I will justify my projection of Heidegger's concepts from the discussion of "The Question of the Essence of Being" onto his discussion of Heraclitus below, when I explicate the implicitly Hölderlinian concept of history that Heidegger is employing here. See infra, pp. -. The reason that I restrict the meaning of Heraclitus's "gathering" to the being of the "is" is the centrality of the present for his understanding of logos (and also *phusis* and *polemos*), which I take up immediately.

[239] Heraclitus, Fragment 53: "*polemos panton men pater esti, panton de basileus, kai tous men theous edeixe tous de anthropous, tous men doulous epoiese tous de eleutherous*." Kirk and Raven translate: "War is the father of all and king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as men; some he makes slaves, others free" (Kirk and Raven, 193).

(*IM*, 64). In "The Grammar and Etymology of 'Being'," Heidegger goes on to explain in more detail how *phusis* is originally understood as a form of coming to presence, its etymological links to being in the Indo-European root *bhu*, and how our understanding of the presence of both *phusis* and being have devolved from the Greek understanding of these terms.

So when Heidegger takes up Heraclitus in his discussion of the division between "Being and Thinking" he has already shown that *phusis*, as the emergence, appearance, and duration of what has become, is the Heraclitean name for being. Once Heidegger establishes his interpretation of logos as "the originally gathering gatheredness that constantly holds sway in itself" (*IM*, 135), the unity of logos and *phusis* becomes clear. Both are names for being. "*Phusis* and logos are the same. Logos characterizes Being in a new and yet old respect: that which is in being, which stands straight and prominently in itself, is gathered in itself and from itself, and holds itself in such gathering" (*IM,* 138f).

Now, when Heidegger says in the "Letter on Humanism" that "language is the house of Being" he is interpreting yet another Heraclitean fragment, "*ethos anthropoi daimon*, 'The (familiar) abode for man is the open region for the presence of god (the unfamiliar one)' (*BW*, 258).[240] So it is striking that in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger seems to set up an opposition between logos and language, rather than simply offering an expanded reading of logos. That he does envision such an opposition is most clear in his reading of fragment 1. "Logos here does not mean sense, or word, or doctrine, and certainly not 'the sense of a doctrine" (*IM*, 135). Even more emphatically, "Logos here is opposed to *epea*, discourse" (*IM*,

[240] Heraclitus, Fragment 119. Kirk and Raven translate, "Man's character is his *daimon*" (Kirk and Raven, 211).

137).[241] Heidegger acknowledges that "the context in fragment 1 seems to invite an interpretation of logos in the sense of word and discourse, and even to demand it as the only possible interpretation; for its speaks of the 'hearing' of human beings" (*IM*, 135). Fragment 50, which speaks of "hearing" the logos seems to call for this even more directly. To resolve this difficulty, Heidegger points to the difference between hearing words and really listening to or hearkening to the inaudible "words" of the logos. "Heraclitus wants to say: human beings do hear, and they hear words, but in this hearing they cannot 'hearken' to --- that is, follow --- what is not audible like words, what is not *talk* but logos" (*IM*, 136). This basic move --- locating the essence of what it means to hear in something not heard --- repeats Heidegger's famous analysis of the silent call of conscience, albeit with slightly different terms.[242] It remains to be seen whether the difference between logos and *Sprache* or *Rede* is the difference between an ontological form of hearkening and an ontic form of hearing. But it is clear that, just as the call to conscience entailed a call to an authentic form of resoluteness, a way of Dasein's being that afforded an adequate understanding of its own structures (what was "truly" proper to it as Dasein), and consequently away from the inauthentic understanding of everyday Dasein,[243] so

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[241] Heidegger's use of discourse (*Rede*) here rather than language (*Sprache*) hearkens back to *Being and Time* and shows that his reading of Heraclitus cannot be seen as repeating his claim from *Being and Time* that logos is discourse before it is language. See *BT*, H160-166.

[242] Cf. *Being and Time*, "Dasein's Attestation of an Authentic Potentiality-For-Being, and Resoluteness" H267-301, particularly up to the discussion of Being-guilty. Derrida contrasts Heidegger's discussion of the silent voice of conscience with Heidegger's later polemical conception of logos as it is articulated in Heidegger's treatment of Trakl in "Philopolemology." Derrida's interpretation of Heidegger's reading of Trakl is more fully worked out in *Of Spirit*, which I discussed in the previous part of my book. See *supra* , -

[243] Cf. *Being and Time*, "The Existential Structure of the Authentic Potentiality-for-Being which is Attested in the Conscience," H295-301. Note in particular that:

> The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience, is thus constituted by anxiety as a state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence. This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience, . . . we call "*resoluteness*." In resoluteness we have now arrived at that truth of Dasein which is most primordial because it is *authentic*. Whenever a "there" is disclosed, its whole Being-in-the-world --- that is to say, the world, Being-in, and the Self which, as an "I am", this entity is ---- is disclosed with equal primordiality (*BT*, H296f).

too does hearkening to the logos entail a form of listening to language that does not amount to the usual way in which human beings listen to language. But whereas "the discourse of the conscience never comes to utterance" (*BT*, H296), the language of "poets and thinkers" represents a possibility for that language which is of the sort that one hears to open itself to the logos, even if this possibility turns out to be a form of language deeply marked by silence.

For everyday Dasein, the silence of the call of conscience masks the fact that idle talk does not say anything. Heidegger therefore calls attention in both *Being and Time* and *Introduction to Metaphysics* to the "deaf" ear that our usual way of hearing turns to conscience and logos respectively. "'They' . . . hear and understand nothing but loud idle talk, [and so], cannot 'report' any call;" in inauthentic Dasein's dismissal of the call, "the 'they' merely covers up its own failure to hear the call and the fact that its 'hearing' does not reach very far" (*BT*, H296f). Similarly, in *Introduction to Metaphysics* those who are not thinkers and poets "just reel about within the orbit of their caprice and lack of understanding. They accept as valid only what comes directly into their path, what flatters them and is familiar to them . . . They continually deal with beings everywhere. Yet Being remains concealed to them. Being cannot be touched or tasted, can neither be heard with the ears nor smelled" (*IM*¸141). Nonetheless, the words[244] in which thinkers and poets hearken to being qua logos are the same words that everyone else uses and they even endow them with their usual usages.

> Saying and hearing are proper only when they are intrinsically directed in advance toward Being, toward logos. Only where logic opens itself up does vocabulary become word. Only where the self-opening Being of beings is apprehended does merely keeping one's ears open become hearing. They are incapable of bringing their Dasein to stand in the Being of beings. But those who do not grasp logos *akousai ouk epistamenoi oud' eipein*, "are able neither to hear nor to say"

[244] Or sounds, or marble, or oils or colors or bricks --- since all art is for Heidegger, essentially poetic.

> (fragment 19). Only those who are capable of this, rule over the word --- the poets and thinkers (*IM*, 140f).

Although Heidegger says that the logos is not audible in the way that words are, and that "hearkening has nothing do with the earlobes" (*IM*, 137), this has to be qualified by the fact that the manifestation of logos is in the works of thinkers and poets, which are only accessible sensibly. Because the logos does not refer to the ideal content of the words of poets and thinkers, but rather to that to which they direct their words in order to situate themselves, this exhibition does not point beyond the words to some ideal realm. Heidegger makes this clear in "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry:" "Language, gives expression to what is most pure and most concealed, as well as to what is confused and common. Indeed, even the essential word, if it is to be understood, and so become the common possession of all, must make itself common" (*EHP*, 55). The words of a thoughtful or poetic text exhibit as words what in *Being and Time* could only be attested to in the silent call of conscience. What was fully interiorized becomes exteriorized, and, at least in principle, publicly visible in the materiality of the work of philosophy or poetry. In this way, Heidegger eschews an idealization of the logos or discorporation of the ear whereby our relationship to logos is announced in an immaterial thinking, even though this idealization is the direction that the historical relationship between

thinking and being will move.[245] Words can relate to being, and we can hear the logos, but we have to do this on the basis of the logos and not on the basis of our own selves.

This divergence between the accounts of the call of conscience and the logos explains the specific way in which language both belongs to and is opposed to Heraclitus's understanding of logos. This unity and opposition is the basis for the eventual split between thinking and being. It points to the character of logos itself as being internally divided. This division is found in the polemical character of logos.

> The whole of beings in its Being is always thrown from one opposite to the other, thrown over here and over there --- Being is the gatheredness of this conflicting unrest. . . . As maintaining, logos has the character of pervasive sway, of *phusis*. It does not dissolve what pervades into an empty lack of opposites; instead, by unifying what contends, the gathering maintains it in the highest acuteness of its tension (*IM*, 142).

In this polemical tension, being is exhibited in such a way that "*logos*, *harmonia, aletheia, phusis,* [and] *phainesthai* <logos*,* harmony, unconcealment, *phusis*, self-showing>" (*Ibid)* all name the same "thing." Understanding being through these names is, Heidegger insists, "anything but arbitrary" (*Ibid*). Rather, it reveals the necessity of understanding the unity of being and thinking once being is interpreted on the basis of coming-to-presence and in terms of the linguistic categories inherent in the Greek language.

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[245] See, for example, the way in which the *Theatetus* makes any corporeal talk of thought metaphorical (184d-185e) and the way in which Augustine pushes reason beyond the senses by referring them all to an internal, common sense, which is the only sense that can itself communicate with reason. See Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will*. The modern thought of Descartes would be for Heidegger the paradigmatic case of the destination of this way of thinking since it refers all bodily things to something cognitive. In his analysis of Heidegger and Trakl in "Philopolemology," Derrida shows that by employing the notion of the *Austrag*, the translative or metaphorical component of language, in place of this common sense, Heidegger conforms to this tradition at the same time that he seeks to displace it. In "On Eating Well," he suggests that turning to Spinoza, rather than Descartes, might have given Heidegger a more fruitful way of thinking about bodily life than through the operation of eidetic incorporation or representation (See in particular, "Eating Well," 265).

But this unity is covered-up or forgotten when the terms under discussion start to shift in meaning. Logos becomes understood increasingly in terms of language, or word, or reason, the first two of which (at least) were already inherent in Heraclitus's understanding of logos. The tension between the meanings of words when they are appropriate to the logos and when they are not appropriate to the logos, a tension that lies at the heart of the paradoxical character of Heraclitus's own language, proves to be too great for us to bear. Like a tightly strung bow, it must be relaxed, if only because of our own exhaustion, and in this tired state we become like people who cannot distinguish between wakefulness and sleep.[246]

Language, understood as an ordinary phenomenon, is opposed to logos. But in this opposition, it belongs in a certain way to logos. For this reason, we cannot say that "language is not logos;" nor can we say, "logos is not language." Rather, Heidegger's explanation of Heraclitus suggests that the essence of language is logos, even though logos itself is nothing linguistic. But if this is true, it is clear that what we mean by "essence" is no longer what is

[246] Cf. Heraclitus, Fr. 1, 51. By locating the possibility of logos's internal decline in Heraclitus, I depart from commentaries such as Dahlstrom's, whose reading I otherwise generally subscribe to. Dahlstrom divides his treatment of the development of the division between being and thought into four stages, in which thinking is "(a) in some sense unified with being, [but] came to be (b) differentiated from being, (c)identifies with this differentiation, and (d) ultimately construed as determinant of being" (Dahlstrom, 90f). As he makes explicit in his footnotes, the first stage corresponds to the thinking of Heraclitus and, to a lesser extent, Parmenides and we only enter into the second stage with Parmenides (292f.fn.42). But if we separate Heraclitus and Parmenides in this way, it is impossible to explain why the terms should ever split. For Dahlstrom, the polemical character of logos is primarily harmonic. "In the subsequent demise of this inceptive insight, the world turns away from *this* conflict [in which beings come to be what they are by struggling with "countervailing forces"] … the nihilism of metaphysics, the technological conquest of all that is, lies in waiting." On the contrary, I would argue that it lies in waiting in the inceptive insight, since conflict entails the possibility of dissolution, as Heraclitus was well aware. Heidegger suggests this with one of his introductory inquiries into the division between being and thinking: "To what extent are Being and logos originally and unitarily the same for the Greeks, so that later they can and even must be disjoined, for definite reasons" (*IM*, 132). In the context of Heidegger's identification of the world views of Heraclitus and Parmenides with the world-view of Sophocles, it becomes clear that this means that the disjunction is always built into the unity. This happens in the uncanniness of the human being as it is revealed in the relationship between *dike* and *techne*, as originary of names for being as *phusis* and logos are. I will return to Heraclitus to argue that his philosophy contains a built-in understanding of its own dissolution in the development of a "Heraclitean tradition." See infra .

common, since according to both Heidegger and Heraclitus most, if not all, of the things that we say have nothing directly to do with the logos. Nonetheless, the implicit unity of all things in the logos ("listening not to me, but to the logos, it is wise to say that all things are one"[247]) exhibits the fact all things that we say or hear are somehow marked by the logos. The proper way of conceiving of the claim that the essence of language lies in Heraclitus's understanding of logos and that the essence of logos, for Heraclitus, is nothing linguistic, is to understand the "is" critically. By making this claim depend upon the history of metaphysics, Heidegger suggests that the sense in which the "is" is used critically is temporal, but also historical. Before we can interpret this sense of history concretely, it is necessary to show how Heidegger seems to pass the truth of what we are saying over into its opposite, in Heraclitean fashion. Let us turn to Heidegger's apparently contradictory claim that the essence of logos is language.

The Essence of Logos is Language

Heidegger begins "Language," a 1950 lecture devoted to Trakl's poem *Ein Winterabend*, with a criticism of the attempt to represent the "essence of language." "Reflection tries to obtain an idea of what language is universally. The universal that holds for each thing is called its essence or nature. To represent universally what holds universally is, according to prevalent views, the basic feature of thought" (*PLT*, 189). Heidegger argues that such an attempt, whether it thinks of the essence of language in terms of a representation [*Vorstellung*] or a concept [*Begriff*], is inadequate to the peculiarity of language, whose nature can only be thought about in self-referential (or monological) terms. "We do not wish to ground language in something else that is not language itself, nor do we wish to explain other things by means of language" (*PLT*,

[247] Heraclitus, Fragment 1.

191). Instead, Heidegger argues that language must be understood by virtue of the meaningfulness of the apparent tautology, "Language itself is language" *(Die Sprache selbst ist die Sprache*) (*PLT*, 190), a tautology which Heidegger almost immediately sharpens to the form it takes throughout most of the essay: "Language speaks" (*Die Sprache spricht*) (*Ibid*). This latter form, which verbalizes the apparently tautological statement of identity, answers the question, "In what way does language occur as language" (*Wie west die Sprache als Sprache)* (*Ibid*)? The word that Hofstadter translates as "occur", *west*, is an archaic conjugation of "*Sein*" from the root *Wesen* (which Hofstadter translates variously as "nature," "essence" and "being"). In his later writing, Heidegger uses conjugated forms of *Wesen* to emphasize the dynamic character of being.[248] This question has to do with how the essence of language comes to be rooted, or to reveal itself, in language itself. The answer is that this happens when language is present or presents itself.

The self-grounding character of language seems to go against Heidegger's characterization of the Greek understanding of language as being grounded in the phenomenon of logos, where logos itself is in no way originally linguistic. This fact is particularly striking given Heidegger's implicit endorsement of Heraclitus's view. And it is also impossible to claim that Heidegger abandoned his understanding of the Heraclitean logos in the intervening fifteen years because this understanding of logos remains at the heart of Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus well past 1950.[249]

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[248] In this way, he remains firmly within the name of being as opposed to the more common *Werden*, becoming, which while also belonging to the conjugations of "*Sein*" is more familiar and therefore less striking. There is also an implicit tense difference between *Wesen* (past) and *Werden* (future) which Heidegger might be playing on. See my discussion of Heidegger's characterization of the significance of the tensedness of language for an understanding of temporality in "The Temporality of Discourse" (-) and "Remains are a Poet's Foundation" (-).

[249] The *Heraclitus Seminar*, for example, was conducted in 1966/67.

But in the lecture on "Language," Heidegger does more than merely emancipate language. He makes it clear that language is the best way of understanding the nature of logos, or at least of all that logos has come to be understood as, in modernity. In a move that echoes the critique of logic in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger insists that "the understanding that is schooled in logic, thinking of everything in terms of calculation," is inadequate to thinking about the meaning of the statement "language itself is language" (*PLT*, 190). While this sort of criticism of the scope of logic is extremely common in Heidegger's work, it is worth calling attention to because it almost immediately becomes a thematic concern. Immediately after Heidegger has insisted that language must be understood in its own terms, he goes on to explicate a letter by Hamann: "If I were as eloquent as Demosthenes I would yet have to do nothing more than repeat a single word three times: reason is language, logos. . . There still remains a darkness, always, over this depth for me; I am still waiting for an apocalyptic angel with a key to this abyss."[250] Leaving the question of how to properly translate logos in abeyance, Heidegger focuses on the relationship between reason and language. "For Hamann, this abyss consists in the fact that reason is language. Hamann returns to language in his attempt to say what reason is. His glance, aimed at reason, falls into the depths of an abyss" (*PLT*, 191) On Heidegger's reading, Hamann's statement is not directly about language or about logos, but about reason which, by virtue of the fact that logos meant both language and reason, is characterized as being the same as language.[251] But, for Heidegger, this is the wrong way to

[250] Qtd. in "Language," 191. See *supra* footnote 3.

[251] In fact, the situation is perhaps more complex than that. In Hamann's deployment of the idea of repetition, he approximates the effect of stuttering. Demosthenes was said to have originally been a horrible orator because he stuttered. He overcame his stutter by putting marbles in his mouth. Perhaps Hamann is referring as much to Demosthenes's eloquence as a stutterer as to his eloquence as an orator. How this stuttering would differ from Heidegger's own tortured tautologus locutions would be worth considering.

understand both language and reason. As opposed to the statement "reason is language", the statement "language is language" "does not lead us to something else in which language is grounded. Nor does it say anything about whether language itself may be a ground for something else" such as reason (*Ibid*). This difference in direction between Hamann and Heidegger inverts everything. Whereas Hamann tumbles into an abyss, "If we let ourselves fall into the abyss denoted by this sentence ['language is language' or 'language speaks'], we do not go tumbling into emptiness. We fall upward, to a height" (*Ibid*). While Heidegger's criticism of Hamann's understanding of reason does not tell us anything immediately about the relationship between language and logos, it does offer an extremely important indication of how the essence of logos relates to language in this text.

If we begin with a traditional, generic understanding of the essence of logos as "the universal that holds for each thing" (*PLT*, 190), properly denoted by logos, it becomes immediately clear that Heidegger, in keeping with his critique of logic in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, refuses to locate the essence of logos in the rules for thought. Reason and logic, while not coextensive terms, are both inadequate ways of understanding the underlying meaning of logos. It is not, however, immediately clear whether or not the underlying meaning of logos can be understood in terms of language. When Heidegger rejects the claim that to see "reason is language, logos" is to "repeat a single word three times," does this unite or divide language and logos? Because logos is never again explicitly referred to in the text, this question seems to be undetermined.

But there are a number of covert references to logos which end up giving it a determinate meaning in terms of language. Heidegger begins the essay by reiterating or "translating"

Aristotle's characterization of the claim that the human being is the *zoon logon echon*, the living thing that possesses logos, into the claim that the human being is by nature linguistic.

> Man speaks. We speak when we are awake and we speak in our dreams. We are always speaking, even when we do not utter a single word aloud, but merely listen or read [*lesen*], and even when we are not particularly listening or speaking but are attending to some work or taking a rest. We are continually speaking in one way or another. We speak because speaking is natural to us . . . Man is said to have language by nature. It is held that man, in distinction from plant and animal, is the living being capable of speech. . . . . It is as one speaks that man is --- man (*PLT*, 189).

Logos is implicitly translated here as *Sprache*, and Heidegger even refers to "*lesen*" as a form of language.[252] The Greek understanding of logos as determinative of the character of the human being is expressed for us in the statement of people like Wilhelm von Humboldt that the fundamental activity of the human being is language.[253] But in this joining of language and logos, Heidegger is doing no more than stating a widespread understanding about the world. There is a certain necessity to relating logos and language for the sake of understanding the history of the development of Western thought. This was also the case in *Introduction to*

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[252] Cf. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 131. "[Greek] *Lego, legein,* Latin *legere,* is the same word as our *lesen* <to collect>: gleaning, collecting word, harvesting grapes, making a selection; 'reading <*lesen*> a book' is just a variant of 'gathering' in the authentic sense." While Heidegger's acknowledgement that reading refers to a founded sense of *lesen* might be taken as an argument against associating language with Heidegger's understanding of logos, the fact that reading is taken in *Introduction to Metaphysics* as a founded sense of *legein* and in "Language" as a founded sense of *Sprache* argues for the claim that Heidegger is implicitly translating logos as "language." This possibility is further supported by the fact that language is understood here as what gathers, as I discuss presently.

[253] The reference to von Humboldt will be important in my discussion of "The Way to Language" where Heidegger frames his own understanding of language in terms of a discussion of Humboldt and Novalis. (See *infra* -). The importance of the relationship between the human being and language is, of course, critical and I have been self-consciously skirting this issue. In fact, my consideration of *Introduction to Metaphysics* ended at the point where Heidegger shifts to an understanding of the human being in relation to the division between thinking and being in the philosophy of Parmenides and the poetry of Sophocles. And the discussion of the temporality of discourse in *Being and Time* was, of course, rooted in the being of Dasein. In each of these cases, Heidegger continues to focus on the question of the human being at the same time that he seeks to "dehumanize" his own understanding of language. Because I am currently dealing with those threads of his arguments which bracket the question of the relationship between the being of language and the being of the human being, I am putting these issues to one side. However, we should keep in mind our reason for turning to this discussion, which was to dissociate a certain thread of Heidegger's poetological claims from his political understanding of these claims.

Metaphysics. But there, it was also the case that this connection involved a certain misunderstanding of logos, while logos itself needed to be understood in non-linguistic ways. Given Heidegger's own idiosyncratic understanding of both logos and language, it is still not clear that our consideration of language says anything important about logos.

But once we see that Heidegger is implicitly raising the question of the relationship between language and logos, the full significance of his characterization of what it means to think about language comes to light. "To discuss language, to place it, means to bring to its place of being not so much language as ourselves: our own gathering into the appropriation" (*Die Sprache erörten heisst, nicht so sehr sie, sondern uns an den Ort ihres Wesens bringen: Versammlung in das Ereignis*) (*PLT*, 190).[254] Just as logos was understood as a form of gathering in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, so is language here understood in terms of a gathering. To be sure, there are crucial differences between the two accounts introduced by the fact that what is gathered here is us and that this gathering has to be understood as having the character of the *Ereignis*. This is important to bear in mind because in the *Introduction to Metaphysics,* Heidegger does not yet think of being in terms of *Ereignis*. But the essential claim that the proper way to understand language is in terms of gathering remains intact. On one level then, we see a tremendous continuity between *Introduction to Metaphysics* and "Language." In both cases, language (more specifically, poetic language) is linked with logos and both are understood on the basis of a gathering. But this continuity, profound as it is, should not cover over the fact that in *Introduction to Metaphysics* this gathering was understood as being non-linguistic. Logos meant gathering first and language secondarily. Language that reflected a hearkening to the

[254] All references to the German text throughout this section can be found in Heidegger, Martin. *Unterwegs Zur Sprache*, 9-14.

logos was also a form of gathering, but insofar as it hearkened to logos it was distinguished from ordinary language. Thus, the essence of language was not itself linguistic. In "Language," the essence of language is said to be nothing but language. Language cannot be understood by a non-linguistic or arche-linguistic gathering, but can only be understood by the gathering which happens in language itself. In light of this change, the effect of Heidegger's continued association of logos and language is to impute the linguistic character of language to logos. The essence of logos is language.[255]

There is a profound continuity in Heidegger's characterization of what is essential to both language and logos from the *Introduction to Metaphysics* to "Language." But this continuity should not be used to explain away the apparent contradictions in the role that language and logos play individually in each text. And this tension in Heidegger's understanding of language and logos extends to his understanding of the nature of philosophy and poetry. In both texts, Heidegger begins with a consideration of a philosopher (or a philosophical problem) and ends with a consideration of a poet (or, more specifically, a poem). Despite modifications, Heidegger maintains his understanding of the Heraclitean logos and the critique of the development of logic or reason which this understanding entails. He also insists in both texts on the primacy of poetic language for language as such. I am not trying to claim that there is a major change in these basic features of Heidegger's philosophy. What I do want to argue is that this continuity of concerns, referring to two of the most discussed elements of Heidegger's philosophy, is situated on unstable ground. If the force of the development of Heidegger's thought is to unsettle this terrain, what happens to the house that Heidegger claims is situated there, our house, the house

[255] Fynsk's analysis of "Language" in "Noise at the Threshold" seeks to emphasize the non-logical elements of language by drawing attention to the occurrence of poetic language at the threshold between noise and significance. (*Language and Relation*, 17-38).

of being? Does an abyss open up? Does the house shelter us, or do we fall with it? And if the house, and we along with it, fall, do we fall down or do we fall up?

After a brief consideration of the force that poetic language might have on these questions, I want to suggest that Heidegger has a possible answer, provided we thematize the understanding of history implicit in these texts.

Thoughts about the Moment of Indecision

If we tumble up out of this dwelling, if the house of language falls upwards, might not we --- and it along with us --- make good on the promise of the tower of Babel and falling, reach Heaven? Or, if we should find the way barred, failing and falling from Heaven, at least find our way to another present, perhaps to Oz?

In the same cycle of Die *Niemandsrose* as "*Dein Hinübersein*" Celan envisions another, apparently radically reoriented, description of an encounter with the you who is beyond.

> *Mit allen Gedanken ging ich*
> *hinaus aus der Welt: da warst du,*
> *du meine Leise, du meine Offne, und ---*
> *du empfingst uns* (*GW*, 1:221).
>
> With all that is thought I went
> Far out from the world: There you were,
> You my soft one, you my open one, and –
> You received us.

Rather than bringing you back from some great beyond in the night, I leave the world behind, taking my thoughts with me, and when I have left the world entirely, I find you. You receive us. Does "us" refer to "me with all my thoughts" or "me and hitherto unnamed others who are, in some important respect, like me?" It seems clear that it does not refer to "you and me." This is less clear in the next stanza.

> *Wer*

sagt, das uns alles erstarb,
da uns das Aug brach?
Alles erwachte, alles hob an. (GW, 1:221).

Who
says, that it all went dead,
when our eyes failed?
All awakened, all taken up.

Beyond the ken of our vision, is this where our thoughts reside? "*Anheben*" has the sense of elevation. When our eyes failed, we awoke (to you?), and we (or I), with our (or my) thoughts, were carried up out of the world, to the place where you, in your openness received us (where us could refer to either me with my thoughts or us with our thoughts). Who says that this means that everything is dead? Notice that Celan does not say, "Everything has not died," nor does he say "We (or I) did not die."

This apparent vagueness is, of course, fitting for a lyric poem and does not preclude the fact that various (possibly even contrary) determinate references could be found by showing the poem's links to larger chains of signifiers than the one half of one poem that I have pulled out of context here. But this does not mean that a chunk of a poem cannot be meaningful on its own, nor does it mean that it cannot be meaningful in its vagueness. In the context of our discussion, what emerges here is a description of a past event which contrasts with, and further develops, the meaning of the first stanza of "*Dein Hinübersein*."

Without "contradicting" one another (because poems are relatively independent and do not all need to say the same thing),[256] the two poems describe contrary states of affairs and

[256] I am implicitly referring to Heidegger's claim that all poems by a poet say the same thing, (*OWL*, 160). This claim needs to be interpreted and evaluated in light of the complex question of what Heidegger thinks it means to say the same thing (a task which involves interrogating the character of the unsaid, as we began to do in our discussion of Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe, but which also involves interrogating the meaning of logos as *Sammlung*) . Nonetheless, I follow more closely his (different) claim in "Language" that "The mastery [of a masterful poem] consists precisely in this, that the poem can deny the poet's person and name" (*PLT*, 195).

different ways that you and I relate. Nonetheless, three good possibilities as to who the you is remain the same: lover (clearly feminine in the case of "*Mit Allen Gedanken*" but not necessarily in "*Dein Hinübersein*), mother, and God. This raises a host of interesting questions about both poems, and about these themes in *Die Niemandsrose* generally. For example this might shed an interesting light on the description of God in "*Dein Hinübersein*," "*Gott, das lasen wir, ist / ein Teil und ein zweiter, zerstreuter*" (*GW*: 1, 218) ("God, so we we've gathered, is / one part and a second, scattered"[257] and the further claim that our "relations" (*Umgang)* are with the scattered half could, I think, provide a provocative description of Celan's poetic reckoning with God in *Die Niemandsrose* (and, to a lesser extent in the previous collection *Sprachgitter* and the subsequent collection *Atemwende*) by way of Aristophanes' poetic description of love in terms of mortal halves in Plato's *Symposium*.[258] For now, to stay in the area of what is of concern for our discussion of Heidegger, let me briefly develop two other themes: the relation of words and thoughts, and the difference in the presentation of the present and the past.

In *Hamlet*, when the murderer and usurper Claudius has allowed his conscience to be pricked by a play, he prays to God for forgiveness, but almost immediately realizes the inefficacy of his prayer. "My words fly up, my thoughts remain below: Words without thoughts can never to heaven go."[259] But the space of time between when Claudius attempts to be forgiven and realizes that he cannot is just enough time to spare his life, because it is just long enough to fool

[257] I translate "lasen," which most commonly means "read," as "gathered" to accentuate the connection to Heidegger. This is actually less far-fetched than it may seem at first both because of the colloquial sense of "gathering" a piece of information in some general, impersonal way and because of the distinction between the first part of God and the part that is scattered, or ungathered. On this meaning of *lesen* in Celan's poetry, see *Heidegger and the Poets*, 81-84.
[258] Plato. *Symposium*, 189a-193e.
[259] Shakespeare, William. *Hamlet*. III, iii.

Hamlet, at very the moment when Hamlet finally decides how he will deal with both his step-father and his mother.

> Now might I do it pat, now he is praying
> And now I'll do't; --- and so he goes to heaven;
> And so am I reveng'd: --- that would be scann'd:
> A villain kills my father; and for that,
> I, his sole son, do this same villain send
> To heaven.
> O, this is hire and salary, not revenge.
> He took my father grossly, full of bread;
> With all his crimes broad blown, as flush as May;
> And how his audit stands who knows save heaven?
> But in our circumstance and course of thought
> 'Tis heavy with him: and am I, then, reveng'd,
> To take him in the purging of his soul,
> When he is fit and season'd for his passage?
> No.
> Up, sword; and know thou a more horrid hent:
> When he is drunk, asleep, or in his rage;
> Or in the incestuous pleasure of his bed;
> At gaming, swearing; or about some act
> That has no relish of salvation in't; ---
> Then trip him, that his heels may kick at heaven;
> And that his soul may be as damn'd and black
> As hell, whereto it goes. My mother stays:
> This physic but prolongs they sickly days.[260]

I employ this well known episode here, not to claim that Celan consciously had this in mind, although he did know Shakespeare well. Instead, I employ it as a familiar moment of a concept that I believe is operative in the play between "*Dein Hinübersein*" and "*Mit Allen Gedanken.*" Let me call the moment between Hamlet's and Claudius's monologues (because there can be no sense that they are talking to one another --- they do not connect even when they are on the same stage) *the moment of decision*. It marks the space of time it takes to move from Claudius being saved to Claudius being damned. It is an imperceptible, inaudible amount of time, borne in

[260] *Ibid*.

silence and only conceivable as an imaginary entity. But it is just enough time to save Claudius's life, or at least momentarily forestall his tragic end. It buys him precisely two acts and two scenes.

Between the meaning of "words" and the meaning of "thoughts" in "*Dein Hinübersein*" and "*Mit Allen Gedanken*" there is a similar moment of decision. In Heidegger, we discovered a movement from the description of conscience in *Being and Time* through the hearkening to logos in *Introduction to Metaphysics* and up to listening as letting language speak in "Language" whereby thought became increasingly verbal, if no less audible. My main goal in calling attention to this movement is to resituate the movement between poetic language and philosophical language in terms of time in order to break those points about the character of poetry (and by extension philosophy) which we saw Heidegger tacitly concede to Hegel. For Hegel, the movement between poetic and philosophical language is between a language that is still sensuous and a language that is wholly ideal. This assumption is shared with the common sense distinction between thoughts and words and is thematized in the philosophical presupposition of a common sense that mediates our senses and our knowledge. But in "*Dein Hinübersein*" and "*Mit Allen Gedanken*" we find a good model for how the difference between thoughts and words can be reinterpreted temporally instead of abstractly without losing the phenomenon that is captured in the traditional distinction between thoughts and words.

In the two poems under discussion, it is thoughts that go out of the world and words which preserve or represent something in the world which has otherwise gone beyond. Claudius's villainous hopes not withstanding, this is a better description of the traditional philosophical understanding of the relationship between thoughts and words. But the further

specification of this relationship does not proceed materially-sensibly. The second half of *"Mit Allen Gedanken*" reads

> *Gross kam eine Sonne geschwommen, hell*
> *standen ihr Selle und Seele entgegen, klar,*
> *gebieterisch schweigen sie ihr*
> *ihre Bahn vor.*
>
> *Leicht*
> *tat sich dein Schoss auf, still*
> *stieg ein Hauch in den Äther,*
> *und was sich wölkte, wars nicht,*
> *wars nicht Gestalt und von uns her,*
> *wars nicht*
> *so gut wie ein Name* (*GW*, 1:221)?
>
> Giant, a sun came swimming, bright
> stood soul opposite soul, clear,
> domineering they silenced it
> upon its path.
>
> With ease
> your womb opened up, silently
> a breath rose up in the aether,
> and what formed a cloud, was it not,
> was it not figure and of our own stuff,
> was it not
> as good as a name?

The heaven being described here is only implicitly the immaterial home of God. More immediately, it is the sky, with its swimming sun and with its clouds suspended in the aether. Even the souls are material, like breath or the aether, since they will give birth to a cloud.[261] In this heaven, something happened already: I went with my all my thoughts, which come in the second stanza to encompass everything as such, that is to say, the remainder of that world I left

[261] This is the main point of Irigaray's interpretation of Heidegger in *The Forgetting of Air In Martin Heidegger,* where she works to open Heidegger's understandings of the world, the heavens, the open ,and light (among other terms) to materiality and elementality, and through these concepts, to sexuality. Ultimately, she argues, these later terms play a formative role in the constitution of the ontological difference. Thus, for Irigaray, Heidegger's personal forgetting of air becomes the condition for him to be able to talk about the ontico-historical forgetting of being.

behind, and there I engendered and you conceived something, a thought or a child[262] which, like a cloud was visible in the heavens, and therefore became a name. And it is with this name that I now bring you back, and everything becomes true, or at least bears within it the promise of becoming true. In the case of "*Dein Hinübersein*" this name is further specified in a predication which, like the earlier predication "everything is true and awaiting the truth" is split into two parts. "God, so we've gathered, is one part and a second, scattered [part.]" The part of God that is scattered is like the fact that everything still awaits the truth. But this is where we find ourselves directed.

> *Dorthin*
> *führt uns der Blick,*
> *mit dieser*
> *Hälfte*
> *haben wir Umgang (GW,* 1:218).
>
> That's where
> the look leads us,
> with this [the latter, scattered]
> half
> we have our relations.

Inherent in the tension of what is named in the poem is an act of uniting and an act of scattering. The emphasis on the scattering, just like the emphasis on the futural expectation of what is present, speaks to the force of Heidegger's description of the meaning of the "is" as gathering what comes into presence, but insists that this gathering must reckon with its relations with division and expectation.

I acknowledge that much is left out of this interpretation that is clearly going on in this poem and that undercuts, ironizes, or further specifies the character of this act. Most notably, it

[262] *Empfangen* can refer to either form of conception.

needs to be taken into account that one of the ways in which the heavens are, for Celan, most material is that they bury the bodies of the cremated victims of the Holocaust and that it is on this basis that Celan finds, in poems such as "*Tenebrae*" and "*Psalm*," the bodies of dead human beings in the place of God. In "*Dein Hinübersein*," for example, we are told that "in the death of all that's mowed down" God "grows into himself" (*Im Tod / all der Gemähten / wächst er sich zu*" (*GW*, 1:218). The force of history will make the truth which is formed by the poetic encounter with the heavens bitter, but this does not mean there is not a description of the character of poetic language here.

In Celan's poems, the thought and the word happen at different times, and this temporal difference describes the back and forth movement between the "you" and the "I." In this way, the meaning of presentation seems to be able to incorporate more than just the present tense. Conversely, we could say that the present tense, in its apparent response to the experience of presence, ends up controlling how the past is verbalized in such a way that the past is concealed. The word might gather the whole of the thoughts conceived by my intercourse with you back into the world. Or, this might be a thought which remains scattered, and merely promised. If the relationship between the poems marks the moment of decision, then we, like Hamlet, do not know enough to know what happened, or is happening, or will happen. It is still too early for us to decide.

Language is Logos is Language

In order to shed light on the relationship between language and logos in Heidegger, I turned to a further explication of Celan's poem "*Dein Hinübersein*," this time in conjunction with "*Mit Allen Gedanken*." There, I attempted to draw out the character of a relationship

between the poetic word and thought that would relate them temporally rather than dualistically (materially-ideally). While this responds to a need which we perceived on the basis of our reading of Heidegger, such a reading of the relationship between word and thought is not in itself adequate to answering the question of the relationship between language and logos. What is missing from a poetic redescription of the relationship between thought and word is the historical consideration of how logos came to be understood as thought. This discussion is entirely lacking from the essay on "Language," which deals with the modern poetry of Trakl and situates it counter to a modern understanding of language. However, the history of the concept of logos does play a large role in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* where Heidegger traces the devolution of logos from the Presocratics to Plato and Aristotle and from there to us. Heidegger's interpretation of this history is well known and has been the subject of a great deal of scholarship. But what is not immediately visible is a different form of historical consideration, which explains why this devolution is still of interest to us moderns. This sense of history, implicit in Heidegger's text, is strongly Hölderlinian. And it is this Hölderlinian sense of history which establishes the basis on which Heidegger can affirm apparently contradictory positions in *Introduction to Metaphysics* and "Language" on the basis of their historical difference.

The contours of Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus is strongly Hölderlinian. This can be seen through Heidegger's criticism of modern misinterpretations of Heraclitus, where Hegel and Nietzsche are singled out for attention.

> Among the most ancient Greek thinkers, it is Heraclitus who was subjected to the most fundamentally un-Greek misinterpretation in the course of Western history, and who nevertheless in more recent times has provided the strongest impulses toward redisclosing what is authentically Greek. Each of the two friends Hegel and Hölderlin stands under the great and fruitful spell of Heraclitus in his own way, with the difference that Hegel looks backward and closes off, while Hölderlin gazes forward and opens up. Nietzsche has yet another Heraclitus. To

> be sure, Nietzsche fell prey to the commonplace and untrue opposition of Parmenides to Heraclitus. This is one of the essential reasons why his metaphysics never found its way to the decisive question, although Nietzsche did reconceive the great age of the inception of Greek Dasein in its entirety in a way that is surpassed only by Hölderlin (*IM*, 133).

Of the three modern thinkers who have moved towards what Heidegger thinks of as a properly Greek understanding of Heraclitus, it is only Hölderlin who really grasps what is essential. And for this reason it is Hölderlin's reading which "gazes forward and opens up" (*Ibid*). But in the *Introduction to Metaphysics,* Heidegger does not specify how Hölderlin does this. Heidegger's own confrontation with Nietzsche exhibits to us the contours of the way in which Heidegger takes Hölderlin to be opening up the Presocratics.

Nietzsche did not fully grasp the character of Greek thought because he still set Heraclitus and Parmenides in opposition to one another. A more complete reading of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's respective understandings of the Presocratics[263] would show differences in their understandings of both Heraclitus and Parmenides, but the differences are much more marked in their reading of Parmenides. Heidegger acknowledges that Nietzsche's understanding of Heraclitus advanced beyond the the understanding put forth in the Christian metaphysical tradition, including by Hegel, who read Heraclitus's logos in terms of the use of

[263] In addition to the texts dealing with Heraclitus, Heidegger deals with Parmenides and the Presocratics principally in the essays collected in *Early Greek Thinking* and in his 1943 lecture course on Parmenides, which was also to have covered Heraclitus. For Nietzsche, consult in particular Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks.* (Cf. in particular 76-78 for the "unhappy encounter" between Parmenides and Heraclitus). Fóti discusses the intersections in Nietzsche's, Heidegger's and Hölderlin's treatments of the Presocratics in "Empedocles and Tragic Thought: Heidegger, Hölderlin, Nietzsche." There, she complicates Heidegger's appropriation of Hölderlin against Nietzsche by reminding us that Nietzsche is himself already responding to Hölderlin. Thus, "Heidegger's engagement with Nietzsche is, in this context, indissociable from his dialogue with Hölderlin. He certainly was aware of the complex interconnections that constrained his meditation of the work of art to engage with the theory of tragedy as developed in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German thought" (Empedocles and Tragic Thought," 277). Far from allowing Heidegger to disentangle himself from nineteenth centuries debates about idealism and romanticism in a more pure return to the Greeks, the figure of Hölderlin reveals the implicitly modern context of any possible recovery of the Presocratics, even one which is explicitly anti-modern.

logos in the New Testament. Nietzsche recognized the fundamental characteristic of logos as a confrontation (*Aus-einander-setzung*), even if he did not recognize that this entailed a form of gathering. As Heidegger makes clear in his *Nietzsche* lectures, this recognition lies at the basis of Nietzsche's understanding of the Dionysian and Apollonian drives,[264] which Nietzsche describes as a duality "involving perpetual strife with only periodically intervening reconciliations."[265] "Of course, what Nietzsche could not have realized, even though since his youth he knew more clearly than his contemporary who Hölderlin was, was the fact that Hölderlin had seen and conceived of the opposition in an even more profound and lofty manner" (*N*, 103). Heidegger finds the connection in Hölderlin's distinction between "the holy *pathos*" and "the Occidental *Junonian sobriety* of representational skill" (*N*, 104).[266]

Heidegger characterizes the duality operative in both Hölderlin and Nietzsche as a "stylistic law:" "The variously named conflict of the Dionysian and the Apollonian, of holy passion and sober representation, is a hidden stylistic law of the historical determination of the German people . . . By recognizing this antagonism Hölderlin and Nietzsche early on placed a question mark after the task of the German people to find their essence historically" (*N*, 104).[267]

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[264] Heidegger, Martin. *Nietzsche*: 103. "Nietzsche may well lay claim to the first public presentation and development of the discovery of that opposition in Greek existence to which he gives the names 'Apollonian' and 'Dionysian.'"

[265] Nietzsche, Friedrich, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 33.

[266] This distinction is found in the letter to Böhlendorff. The translation which I will use is Dennis Schmidt's in *On Germans and Other Greeks*, 165-167. That Heidegger has the difference between both these distinctions in mind when he outlines his own ontology of the work of art in terms of world and earth is found in Haar, Michel, *The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds for the History of Being*

[267] While Heidegger consistently interprets us or "our nation" to refer to the German people, I think that we can legitimately expand this to refer to modern European culture without distorting what Heidegger means to say, even if it radically changes what he intends to say. Heidegger's identification of the Germans with "us" proceeds on good grounds: Hölderlin's ardent concern with expressing the needs of a republican, nationalist Germany and his poetization of the historical place of the German people. But the elements of his poetry which set this people into relationship with Greece are historical features which apply across Europe: To name a few examples, the impact of the ancient pagan-Judeo-Christian world on the modern world and all that that impact has obscured about the character of the ancient world, the authoritarianism of the State and of the Church, the emergence of new forms of oppression in the wake of the Industrial revolution that seemed to threaten our relationship to the earth as much as to

The conflict which Nietzsche and Hölderlin identify shapes the structure of who we are. This structural shaping is a "stylistic law" because it exhibits itself in the mark it leaves on our modes of expression, just as a stylus leaves the marks of its own characteristics in the figure it draws. It is named as an *Aus-einander-setzung* and therefore implicitly linked with the sort of gathering imputed to logos and language. But the elements in conflict, Apollo and Dionysus or representation and *pathos*, do not really accord with logos or language, which are in some way supposed to be more or less identical. If they name the elements of the struggle that characterize either logos or language *qua* gathering, then how do they elucidate the difference between the Greek accent on logos and the modern accent on language?

The characterization of history common to Nietzsche and Hölderlin that Heidegger ventured above is inadequate to explaining this feature of the stylistic law. We have to push beyond what Nietzsche and Hölderlin share in common to where they differ. Like Nietzsche's oppositional Apollonian and Dionysian drives, pathos and representational skill are differentiated

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one another, the promise of freedom held out by the Enlightenment, and the obsession with the Renaissance of Classical Culture are all striking traits of Western civilization generally. While Hölderlin's poetry is attentive to the specificity that these features take in the Germany of his day (Weimar classicism, Romanticism, the Napoleonic invasion, the nascence of the Prussian state, the relatively slow industrial development of Germany generally, and Swäbia in particular, the relative lateness of the German Enlightenment, Pietism and Lutheranism), this does not mean his themes should be restricted to these specifics. That this impetus towards identifying a historically determined "transnational" nature still attentive to the specifics of a particular nation is appropriate for Hölderlin could be shown within his poetry by attending to such features as his admiration of Rousseau in "*Der Rhein*", his attempts to come to terms with the French Revolution, his characterization of modern Greece in *Hyperion*, and the description of Bordeaux in "*Andenken*." Externally, we might find kinships to the poetry of William Blake that show the impact of these same sets of concerns on a quite different English society in ways that reveal a real relation without having to say that Hölderlin and Blake say the same thing. Heidegger is clearly right to identify the "for us" of the Böhlendorff letter with the German people, but he is wrong to restrict the domain of the "for us" to the German people. It is no accident that Nietzsche, another German with a profound understanding of Hölderlin, eventually preferred to think of himself as a good European. I do not think that calling attention to and treating the "for us" according to an expanded sense of modern Western humanity or Dasein changes the conclusions about the character of logos and language that I am drawing here. I think that Courtine is right to insist that "The concern of language and what is said in and through it is unfolded no doubt in multiple modes, without having necessarily to favor that of the agreement taken as essential or destinal: Hölderlin-Heraclitus, Germanien" (Courtine, 44). However, I recognize that such a transposition might have a huge impact on the closely related, but different, question of the understanding of the political character of this history.

by one another through a productive opposition. The reason why Heidegger claims that Hölderlin understands this duality more profoundly that Nietzsche does is that Hölderlin conceives of this difference historically. "We learn nothing with greater difficulty than to freely use the national. And I believe, that it is precisely the clarity of presentation which is so natural and original for us, as the fire from heaven is for the Greeks."[268] While what is natural changes over time, the duality or struggle that proceeds from this opposition happens not only in the historical difference between the ancients and the moderns, but must also happen in its own way within the present of a given historical moment.

> It sounds paradoxical. But I will say it yet again, and submit it to your test and your free employment, that in the progress of culture, the truly national becomes of limited advantage. That is why the Greeks are less masters of sacred pathos, because it is innate to them, whereas they excel in the gift of presentation from Homer onward, because this extraordinary man was sufficiently soulful to conquer the Western Junoian sobriety for his Apollonian empire, and thereby to truly appropriate the foreign. With us it is the reverse.[269]

According to Hölderlin we ought to be able to distinguish within ancient Greek culture the struggle of a pathetic ethos to attain an "unnatural" clarity of presentation. This clarity itself should allow those Greeks who attained it to fully express the deep pathos lurking at the heart of that culture. Now, this same double movement should be visible in reverse. Our greatest goal, and the yardstick by which we ought to measure our achievements, is the extent to which we can experience and come to terms with the strangeness that "suffering" and the "holy" mean for us, and beyond even that, the extent to which this experience allows us to really master the rational, presentative nature of our own "natural" way of thinking.[270]

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[268] Qtd. in Schmidt, 165.
[269] *Ibid*.
[270] But this reversal is not complete. As Beda Alemann argues against Friedrich Beissner, the meaning of art is the same in both cultures. For Hölderlin, art always expresses the movement from pathos to representation. But that

Considered in this way, Hölderlin's and Nietzsche's accounts of history still seem basically compatible. Both Hölderlin and Nietzsche recognize the decisive, what Hegel would call world-historical, character of the conflict internal to this duality. And they both recognize that this character changes over time. For Nietzsche the main features of this struggle are the shift from an Apollonian element of this duality to a Socratic, and finally a Christian element. The productive and fertile sense of a conflicted duality that underlay both ancient Greek art and philosophy[271] ends with Socrates because, "philosophic thought overgrows art and compels it to cling close to the trunk of dialectic. The Apollonian tendency has withdrawn into the cocoon of logical schematism . . . as well as a transformation of the Dionysian into naturalistic affects."[272] The daimon of Socrates reveals a new ethos, Socratism, that shunts the Apollonian aside and stands in an infertile, more complete opposition to the Dionysian.[273] This sterility is then further exacerbated with the conflict between the de-divinized Dionysianism impulse and the monotheistic impulse embodied in Christ.[274] Tragedy represented the highest expression of both the Apollonian and Dionysian impulses, and it died with the birth of Socratic philosophy.

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sameness fundamentally redescribes the nature of art (and philosophy and indeed any form of knowing) for the ancients and for us moderns. See Alleman's discussion of "*Die Sogennante Abendländische Wendung*" at 41-47.

[271] On Nietzsche's belief in a common cultural root of ancient Greek philosophy and tragedy see *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, 33f: "Only a culture such as the Greeks possessed can answer our question as to the task of the philosopher, and only it, I repeat, can justify philosophy at all, because it alone knows and can demonstrate way and how the philosopher is *not* a chance random wanderer, exiled to this place or to that. There is a steely necessity which binds a philosopher to a genuine culture." This is perhaps the closest Nietzsche will come to domesticating the philosopher. In contrast, Hölderlin's understanding of art presupposes a foreignness.

[272] *Birth of Tragedy*, 91.

[273] *Birth of Tragedy*, 90-91.

[274] This last feature is not as developed in the body of The *Birth of Tragedy*, but Nietzsche acknowledges that it is already operative. "Perhaps the depth of this antimoral propensity is best inferred from the careful and hostile silence with which Christianity is treated throughout the whole book . . . The unconditional will of Christianity [is] to recognize *only* moral values . . . It was against morality that my instinct turned with this questionable book . . . As a philologist and man of words I baptized it [this artistic, anti-moral instinct], not without some liberty --- for who could claim to know the rightful name of the Antichrist? --- in the name of a Greek god: I called it *Dionysian*" ("Attempt at a Self-Criticism" in *Birth Of Tragedy*, 23-24). This impulse is even more pronounced in later works such as *Thus Spake Zarathustra, The Anti-Christ,* and *Will to Power*. Heidegger's own understanding of Nietzsche proceeds most directly from the *Will to Power* and, to a lesser extent, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.

Nietzsche therefore argues in the second half of *The Birth of Tragedy* that what the world needs now is the "rebirth of tragedy."[275] While tragedy expresses both an Apollonian and a Dionysian world-view, his description of how the rebirth of tragedy is to unfold relies primarily on reawakening the Dionysian spirit. Nietzsche's emphasis on the Dionysian, which becomes more pronounced the more his philosophy develops, leads him to assert the predominance of the Dionysian. "Thus the Dionysian is seen to be, compared to the Apollonian, the eternal and original artistic power that first calls the whole world of phenomena into existence."[276] This is how Nietzsche already develops a lyrical understanding of what art needs to do in the modern world. But the historical picture of this understanding is very different from that of Heidegger's, and obscures the sense of multiplicity that I want to draw out of lyricism.

With this point we see the limit of the strong parallels between Nietzsche's and Hölderlin's accounts of the duality of what Heidegger calls gathering. Nietzsche's account of the development of Western culture parallels Heidegger's, at least in broad strokes: a fertile pre-Socratic (Nietzsche) or pre-Platonic (Heidegger) period that ends with the transformation of critical concepts, terms, or ideas at the inception of metaphysics and results in the aridity of Western rationalism and science. And Nietzsche's account of how to interpret the moderns and the Greeks is very similar to Hölderlin's: the "brightness" (clarity of representation/ Apollonianism) of the Greek world has to be understood against the backdrop of a fundamental darkness (pathos / Dionysianism). We must exceed reason through a productive encounter with this "darkness." But Nietzsche only briefly and occasionally recognizes what is explicit in Hölderlin, that this is one step in freeing our "natural" clarity of representation. Nietzsche does

[275] The *Birth of Tragedy*, 99.
[276] *The Birth of Tragedy*, 143.

have to acknowledge that "these two art drives must unfold their powers in a strict proportion, according to the law of eternal justice. Where the Dionysian powers rise up impetuously as we experience them now, Apollo, too, must already have descended among us, wrapped in a cloud; and the next generation will probably behold his ample, beautiful affects."[277] But the realization that the recovery of the Apollonian is as important as the recovery of the Dionysian is underdeveloped because of the transformations that the Dionysian has undergone in opposition to drives which are no longer Apollonian.

Heidegger interprets this deficiency in Nietzsche as a deficiency in his account of history; consequently, it reveals a deficiency in his understanding of the ancient character of this struggle also. The reason why Nietzsche's concept of history is lacking is that he does not seem to grasp the historicality of nature. Thus, while the development of a particular historical ethos might demonstrate "how highly these *artistic impulses of nature* were developed in them,"[278] it is difficult to find any account of these impulses changing in and of themselves. This naturalness lies at the basis of the fundamental, natural primordiality of the Dionysian over the Apollonian. But, as Heidegger argues, Hölderlin's concept of what is natural is quite different. "What is *natural* to a historical people only becomes truly nature, an essential ground, when the natural has become historical, truly history."[279] What was primordial in the strict sense of preceding and/or grounding the world for the ancients is no longer what is primordial for us. What was originally originary is not originary anymore. But this shift is a fact whose historical necessity, Heidegger thinks, can be shown.

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[277] *The Birth of Tragedy*, 143f.
[278] *The Birth of Tragedy*, 38.
[279] Heidegger, Martin. "Remembrance," 113. In *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry,* 101-174.

This interpretation of Heidegger's understanding of the character of the oppositional duality in the thought of Hölderlin and Nietzsche would explain why Heidegger insists that Nietzsche ultimately misunderstands the Greeks where Hölderlin does not. If Nietzsche conceives of the opposition between Dionysus and Apollo statically, even if its expression has a historical development, then it is difficult to see how its greatest expression already contains the seeds for its own dissolution. As we have already seen, this is a critical component of Heidegger's account of Heraclitus and Parmenides in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Thus, he says that "The Greeks' weakness lies in that [not being able to determine the ground of their world, their *polis*, in the holy or in pathos], in the face of the excess of destiny and its dispensation, they could not hold onto it. It is their greatness to have learned what was foreign to them, the ability to be self-collected" (*EHP*, 112). The thought of Heraclitus, Parmenides, and even Sophocles attains greatness by virtue of its clarity of representation in such a way that it eventually loses its own basis in an insight into suffering. Whereas Heidegger wants to insist that these thinkers' greatness contains the seeds of its own dissolution, Nietzsche has to interpret the greatness of Heraclitus and Sophocles as being destroyed by the intrusion of new, foreign, fundamentally un-Greek ways of thinking in Euripides and Socrates, and even in Parmenides. "Nietzsche fell prey to the commonplace and untrue opposition of Parmenides to Heraclitus. This is one of the essential reasons why his metaphysics never found the way to the decisive question" (*IM*, 133). On Heidegger's reading, Nietzsche gets something right and something wrong about both Heraclitus and Parmenides, but consequently gets the relation between them entirely wrong. This interpretation of the history of philosophy hampers his own philosophy, his own metaphysics, because it keeps him from asking about how thinking and being are

determined from the beginning both to belong together and to be divided and how the movement of this confrontation contains the immanent possibility of turning into a simple opposition. But this also means, and Heidegger is himself less clear about this, that Nietzsche misses the possibility of glimpsing within the modern character of the "opposition" a productive sense of division or difference that remains inherent in the immanent development of logos to reason. These crucial, subtle insights are found in Hölderlin.

Our goal was to understand how Heidegger could say that the gathering essential to both logos and language was originally both linguistic and non-linguistic. We further specified this to be asking about how Heidegger can affirm both that the essence of language in ancient Greece was to be found in a non-linguistic logos and that the essence of logos, or at least the modern development of the concept of logos, is now to be found in the pre-eminent linguisticality of the poetry of language. Simply appealing to a version of historical relativism was not enough, because Heidegger insists that there is a necessity to this movement. We therefore turned first to Nietzsche's attempt to explain a similar historical movement and from there to Heidegger's Hölderlinian criticism of Nietzsche's attempt. On the basis of his reading of the Böhlendorff letter, we have finally hit upon Heidegger's solution to the question of how a concept's origin --- and by extension its essence --- can shift.

The passages from the *Introduction to Metaphysics* and "Language" that we have been discussing are situated in the context of discussions of the works of a number of philosophers and poets: Heraclitus, Parmenides, Sophocles, Hamann, Hölderlin, Hegel, Nietzsche and Trakl. If we accept for the sake of argument the idea that all of these works are shaped by a response to "nature," where nature refers to the traits historically determined to be essential to a particular

ethos, then it no longer becomes problematic to assert 1) that in the writings of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Sophocles logos revealed itself as a form of gathering that was essentially non-linguistic but to which language had to respond, 2) that in the poetry of Trakl, among others, we see a form of language which determines the character of the gathering that shapes modern European thought, even in such "non-linguistic" forms of thought as reason, 3) that the current state of affairs is a natural result of the historical development of the state of affairs in ancient Greece, and most importantly 4) that the possibility of a continued relevance for future poetry and philosophy depends upon our being able to affirm the necessity of both ways of looking at things.

Heidegger's way of fleshing these claims out depends upon the interplay between what is natural to a particular *ethos* and what is foreign to it. On this count, it is critical to keep in mind that for Heidegger what is most marked in a particular work is what is foreign, since this is the way by which the natural is appropriated (the foreign is more --- but not exclusively --- marked in what is said and the natural in the unsaid). Thus, the fact that Heraclitus's philosophy depends upon listening to a non-linguistic, divine logos reveals the importance of establishing a clarity of presentation against the backdrop of his natural, holy *pathos*. The presence of this *pathos* is still strong in Heraclitus. But what we moderns see most clearly is the nascence of a philosophy that brings the presence to more full presence and that will be further developed by Plato and Aristotle. Plato and Aristotle continue to build up this clarity of presentation in response to the holy *pathos*, but they do not make the move of using this clarity to try and appropriate the experience of this *pathos*. As their philosophy goes global through Hellenization and Latinization, it loses even this implicit attachment and instead plays an essential role in forging a

new culture. This culture will come to find that the reason into which logos has developed is the most natural trait of its members' way of being human.

But what we have not done, except perhaps occasionally in our greatest works of art and philosophy, is to seek to understand the experience of *pathos*. To the extent that we have done this, it is in modern poetic language. And it is in this language that we find the hints of a promise for the future development of a form of "reason" which has developed itself from the recognition of the need for what is most strange to its accustomed ways of thought.[280] Poetic language figures what is silent (the call of conscience, the non-human logos, or in "The Way to Language" the showing sign [*Zeigen*]) into the word. Logos figures the word into what is silent, what loves to conceal itself, nature (*phusis*). Because of the apophantic structure of language, logos is what allows nature to appear as nature. The gathering Heidegger speaks of in both cases is this figuration itself, whose movement changes its dominant direction with the times, but always needs a counter beat. Language is originally logos. But we must now search for the origin of logos in a renewed poetic language.

As Heidegger makes clear in *Being and Time*, our understanding of history is dependent upon our understanding of temporality. We can now see the unique sense of this claim in the movement of the history of philosophy. In both the *Introduction to Metaphysics* and "Language," presence has appeared as a thematic question time and time again. Even before the dawn of metaphysics, in the philosophy of Heraclitus and Parmenides, and particularly in the Parmenidean pronouncement "to think and to be are the same" "*to gar auto noein estin te kai einai,*"[281] the meaning of being was already understood primarily through its association with

[280] This is the sense that the "other beginning" has in the *Contributions* (§§89-95) as Courtine points out (Courtine, 39-40).
[281] Parmenides, Fragment 3.

presence. *Phusis* and logos describe being in terms of coming to presence. "Being as *phusis* is the emerging sway. In opposition to becoming, it shows itself as constancy, constant present. This presence announces itself in opposition to seeming as appearing, as revealed presence" (*IM*, 132). The division of being by becoming, appearing, and thinking further underscores the main thesis of *Being and Time*. The meaning of being is internally structured by temporality. And the form of that temporality in metaphysics reveals itself in the priority of the "is" and the essential trait of the "is" as presence (*Anwesenheit, Gegenwärtigkeit*) (*IM*, 96).

In "Language," Heidegger elucidates the meaning of language through the phrases "language is language" (*Die Sprache ist die Sprache*) and "language speaks" (*Die Sprache spricht*) (*PLT*, 190). This drive towards the presentment of language becomes even clearer when Heidegger insists that saying that language speaks [using the verbal cognate of the noun in the present tense] answers the question of how language occurs as language (*Wie west die Sprache als Sprache*). *Wesen* is, among other things, the root for one of the words Heidegger uses to name presence, *Anwesenheit.* Thus, Heidegger insists, "In what is spoken, speaking gathers the ways in which it persists as well as that which persists by it --- its persistence, its presencing. But most often, and too often, we encounter what is spoken only as the residue of a speaking long past" (*Im Gesprochenen versammelt das Sprechen die Weise, wie es währt, und das, was aus ihm währt --- sein Währen, sein Wesen. Aber zumeist und zu oft begegnet uns das Gesprochene nur als das Vergangene eines Sprechens* (*PLT*, 194). In his translation, Hofstadter relies on the point about *Wesen* mentioned above[282] to translate it as "presencing" where he usually prefers "nature" or "essence" (and where I would almost exclusively use "essence").

[282] See *supra* 73.

Hofstdater's "presencing" is entirely appropriate, since what is spoken, *das Gesprochene*, builds from the past stem of the verb *Sprechen*. This past residue, the word, whether authentic or "common" assembles the meaning of the whole infinitive "to speak," to comport oneself linguistically. But while it commonly does this by reference to the past (*das Vergangene*), when it properly preserves what is essential to the meaning of the act of language implied by the word, it does so by assembling what is spoken into "*sein Wesen*," which may or may not mean "its presencing" but certainly is opposed to what, in the word, is bygone. Heidegger turns to Trakl, because in his poem language is revealed in its "presencing element" (*das Wesende*, what in language constitutes essences) (*Ibid*).

The set of problems about the character of the relationship of language and logos can be understood as historical because they are temporal. By returning to the language of *Being and Time*, we can further now specify what this means. There is entailed in each statement the presentation of a datable "now." But we do not intend the same thing by that "now" in both cases. Nor do these "nows" mean something absolutely different. These nows are stretched out in a way that reveals the "stretch" in what is meant by "language" and by "logos." Moreover, in this relationship, they describe the historical character of this stretch as a "gathering" wherein the world's intelligibility is specified. But the differences between these ways of gathering are themselves temporal and depend upon how we have understood ourselves: how we have understood who we have been and how we have understood who we now are. Understanding these differences entails coming to terms with how we have become, and might become again, strange to who we are. But to really appropriate this understanding it would be necessary, in that stretch, to continue to say with Celan, "We remain ourselves."

We moderns find our lives pervaded by a philosophically derived concept of presence which gives us our fundamental way of relating to the world in terms of presentation, here the presentation of an object to a thinking, reasoning, knowing, or speaking subject. But the less we realize the pervasiveness of a particular form of presence the more it comes to limit what we can know and experience. What we need is to be awakened to this limitation, but then to surmount it by letting the thinking, reasoning, knowing or speaking subject (which we think we are but are not) be invaded by a way of thinking or speaking that gives meaning to our suffering and to experience what is beyond ourselves in the holy. Thinking and giving voice to an experience of suffering natural to the human being opens our language and self-understanding to a non-subjective but also non-presentifying operation of language and thought. And only when we recognize this non-subjectivity and non-logicality already operative in our "natural" way of thinking and speaking in terms of presence can we see ourselves for what we are and really come to put our natural gifts for reasoning to good use. This is precisely the sense in which I take lyrical poetry to be 1) about multiplicity without being about subjectivity and 2) to be incumbent upon the modern world..

Through this interpretation, I have shown that it is possible to read these disparate texts in Heidegger's oeuvre as compatible and continuing to develop some common threads of his thought without eliminating any sense of a real difference or internal paradoxicality. Despite the differences between discourse and language, between an analytic of the account of the temporality of Dasein, the history of logos as a name for being, and the thinking of the poetic word, there are strong consonances that suggest these things must be understood in the context of a history based on a proper understanding of language. The essence of language has to be

understood as making something present through the assignation of meaning to the world taken as a totality,[283] whether the act of that assignation should properly be understood as an articulation of a whole or a gathering that also divides. These consonances are concretized through a history of our own selves and our relationship to nature. And Heidegger comes increasingly to understand this history in Hölderlinian terms.

It is this reading of Heidegger which harmonizes most clearly with the way in which I have been calling the tensedness of Celan's poems "critical." In my readings of "*Dein Hinübersein*" and "*Mit Allen Gedanken*," I showed the difference between thought and words purely in terms of temporality, where words occupied a place in the present, but where the presence was referred to the past and the future by its connection to thought, to the world, and to the beyond of the world in "thought." Moreover, we saw that Celan also questioned the implicit third-personality of our traditional understanding of presence. While Heidegger does not deal as directly with the personality of presence in language, his treatment of language grants a limited privilege to presence, but one where "presence" itself is understood ambiguously. This sort of limited, ambiguous reference to presence is what I understood in my treatments of Celan's poetry as a critical understanding of the meaning of the "is." Whether or not Heidegger's understanding of the ambiguity of the meaning of being affords this insight into the significance of personality in anything but a cursory way depends upon specifying why poetry becomes the privileged point of access to the history of the meaning of being.

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[283] In contrast to this, Dieter Thomä argues that it is only the Heidegger of *Being and Time* which gives a fully holistic, contextualized theory of language, while the later Heidegger (of the Stefan George essays in *On the Way to Language*, for example) divorces names entirely from their context. (Thomä, Dieter. "The Name on the Edge of Language," 104-105). While it is clear that Heidegger's understanding of language changes, something like a horizon or world plays in determining the shape or figure of a thing. Nonetheless, Thomä's suggestion that the constitutive role which the meaning of being plays in language in *Introduction to Metaphysics* might have an underdeveloped ethical import (Thomä, 121) is worth pursuing.

I have characterized the gathering that Heidegger imputes to language and logos in terms of a particular historical description of our struggle to come to terms with our own history. We have to recognize who we are by recognizing the difference between who we are and who our predecessors were. But, in this strangeness, we must recognize a kinship, a historical exigency that can be the occasion for rethinking the basic character of the world we inhabit. While Heidegger holds out the possibility that philosophy once did this productively, it seems to him that its own internal history has made this impossible now. A set of philosophical problems can only be answered by a certain kind of poetic thinking that recognizes a particular trait running through art and through history. This, trait, lost to the modern form of reason, has to accomplish for us what earlier forms of that very reason accomplished for the Greeks: It must show us our limits so we can understand our own potential. We now find this rooted not just in the history of the relationship between language and logos but also in the presentation of that history philosophically and poetically. Let me stress, I am not equating philosophy with logos, nor am I equating poetry with language. What I mean by philosophy and by poetry here is merely two different activities whose development in Europe has depended on these two words. Our question about the ambiguity in the expression "language *is* logos" therefore becomes a question about dates by asking about how two specific forms of writing have internally dated themselves, and, in the intimate association that a date posits between "style" and "content," how that dating dates history. We must now flesh out our historical treatment of this ambiguity through a generic treatment of it. We can do this by seeking the operative difference in the ways that modern philosophy and modern poetry differently enact the same historical event. I will end Part Two with a treatment of the operations of poetry and thought in "The Way to Language." It is in this

text that Heidegger comes closest to designating ontological language as epical in his characterization of language as a saying. But it is also here that I will argue that we see Heidegger realize the historical and generic advantages of a lyrical treatment of being.

Monology

We are starting with the assumption that implicit in how Heidegger understands the practice of both philosophy and poetry there is a position regarding language and logos. Following the place of preeminence that Heidegger gives to Hegel, I have designated that position in philosophy as the "concept." Following the place of preeminence that Heidegger gives to Hölderlin, I have designated that position in poetry as the "metaphor."

The difference between the Hegelian "concept" and what I am calling the "metaphor" here is best understood in Hölderlin's discussion of the "tragic transport" that begins his "Remarks on 'Oedipus.'"[284] The association of "metaphor" and "transport" is justified not only by their etymological kinship as "carrying-across" (in Greek and Latin respectively), but even more by the role that transport plays in poetically presenting poetry's form such that it appears to be akin to what Aristotle understood a metaphor to be. Tragic transport refers to the presentation of an equipoise between certain critical elements of the understanding in their poetical development. "The law, the calculation, the way in which a sensuous system, man in his entirety develops as if under the influence of the element, and how representation, sensation and reason appear in different successions yet always according to a certain law, exists in tragedy more as a state of balance than as mere succession."[285] The law, an ideal (and ideally teachable) structure of poetic composition requires that three elements of thought, namely representation, sensation

[284] Hölderlin, Friedrich, "Remarks on 'Oedipus'," 101-102, in *Essays and Letters on Theory*, 101-108.
[285] "Remarks on 'Oedipus'," 101.

and reason, be balanced in the sensuous presentation of a poem. The form of this presentation is most visible in tragedy, "for indeed, the tragic *transport* is actually empty and the least restrained."[286] So in the tragic poem we see the operation which characterizes the metaphor displayed in an exemplary, thematic fashion:

> Thereby, in the rhythmic sequence of the representation wherein *transport* presents itself, there becomes necessary *what in poetic meter is called caesura*, the pure word, the counter-rhythmic rupture; namely, in order to meet the onrushing change of representation at its highest point in such a manner that very soon there does not appear the change of representation but the representation itself.[287]

Transport is something that happens in poetry and that creates a caesura, a break in the line, where breath, or silence, is supposed to be audible.[288] This happens in a poem's rhythm: for Hölderlin not just in the phonic language of the poem, which is how the structure traditionally called a caesura arises (not just in this traditional sense, but to be sure in this traditional sense also), but also in language's way of presenting things. This expanded caesura forms a "pure word", a "counter-rhythmic rupture," which does not exhibit any particular moment of sensation, representation, or reason, but rather reveals the form in which these moments are represented.[289]

The form of the pure word reverses the particular form of the kind of language that Aristotle called metaphor. "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy."[290] We are not concerned with the first three

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[286] *Ibid*.
[287] *Ibid*, 102.
[288] Compare Allen and Greenough, §§611, 615.
[289] The impact that this "pure word" has on Celan's "counter word" is clear.
[290] Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1457b7-10.

of these insofar as they do not relate to what Hölderlin calls transport and, in terms of our larger questions, insofar as they do not shed any light on the question of the meaning of being, since Heidegger maintains that being is not a genus. The first three senses of metaphor cannot be fundamentally operative in an understanding of the essence of language as the gathering of what is. If metaphor is to provide us with a name for poetic language as such it will be through what Aristotle calls analogy. "That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second [b] is to the first, [a] as the fourth [d] to the third [c]; for one may then put the fourth [d] in place of the second [b], and the second [b] in place of the fourth [d]"[291] The source of the meaning of an analogy is not any of the elements of the analogy (*a, b, c* or *d)* but the sameness or the difference involved in the relationships. The sameness is invoked when Aristotle refers to the wine-bowl as the "shield of Dionysus" and the shield the "cup of Dionysus."[292] These metaphors do not depend immediately on the character of (a) Dionysus, (b) cups, (c) Apollo or (d) shields, but on the fact that (b) and (d) are the symbols of the provenances of the gods denoted by (a) and (c). The analogy by difference is slightly different. "There is another form of qualified metaphor. Having given the thing the alien name, one may by a negative addition deny of it one of the attributes normally associated with its new name. An instance of this would be to call the shield not the 'cup of Ares,' as in the former case, but a 'cup that holds no wine.'"[293] Difference is here founded upon the sameness within the relationship and involves naming what distinguishes (d) the shield from (b) the cup, rather than what makes them stand in a similar relationship to (c) and (a) respectively. So any analogy can (and in principle must) be at the same time an analogy by both sameness and difference. This could be

[291] *Poetics*, 1457b17.
[292] *Poetics*, 1457b18-22.
[293] *Poetics*, 1457b33-34.

understood in the context of our discussion to mean that all analogies are essentially ambiguous. We see this ambiguity most clearly in the fact contingent interpretation and contextualization are needed to decide what elements of an analogy count as analogies by sameness and what count as analogies by difference.

Hölderlin's tragic transport can be considered a very peculiar metaphor by analogy, because it sets the sameness and differences involved in different forms of poetic thinking into a relationship of equipoise, where equipoise connotes both sameness and difference. In this sense, it can be seen as a radicalization of one element of Aristotle's definition of metaphor for the sake of employing poetic language (rather than Aristotle's philosophical language) to think about the character of poetic language. But in the "word" or "name" that expresses this insight, Hölderlin's transport reverses Aristotle's metaphor. Aristotle acknowledges that analogy can be used to form neologisms:[294] "It may be that some of the terms thus related have no special name of their own, but for all that they will be described in just the same way. Thus to cast forth seed-corn is called 'sowing'; but to cast forth its flame, as said of the sun, has no special name. This nameless act, however, stands in just the same relation to its object, sunlight, as sowing to the seed-corn. Hence the expression in the poet, 'sowing around a god-created flame.'"[295] The sense here is clear. The metaphor itself becomes the name for the element that is nameless. But in Hölderlin it is the transport itself, rather than any of the things it transports, which is silent, as figured by the silence of the caesura. There is no name; all there is is the movement of the poem as a whole. This is how the metaphor comes to name the form of the poem as a whole and how the language of poetry can be conceived of as enacting that struggle between gathering and

[294] Schmidt argues that this feature of Aristotle's interpretation of metaphor is critical for understanding its speculative capacities. See *On Germans and Other Greeks*, 63-66.
[295] *Poetics*, 1457b28-30

difference which Heidegger sees as the essence of both language and logos. Thus in a text "On the Operations of the Poetic Spirit,"[296] where Hölderlin is concerned to show that poetry thinks about the "harmonically opposed" in terms of temporality, he poses the question of what sort of poetic subject-matter is receptive to spirit (where subject-matter is implicitly opposed to spirit) in terms of the movement of the metaphor. "What then, must the subject matter be like which is especially receptive to the ideal, to its content, to metaphor and its form, its transition?"[297] As I suggested at the end of Part One, the metaphor that governs the movement of a poem as a whole is less a name than a structure or operation, and in this respect it seems analogous to the concept.[298]

On the basis of this discussion let us therefore compare the metaphor operating in my characterization of Hölderlin to the concept operating in Heidegger's treatment of Hegel in *Being and Time*.[299] Conceived in this way, there are broad features of sameness and difference. Both are "pure" or formal structures which attempt to grasp the thoughtful, logical, or linguistic structure of a certain kind of self-reflexivity through a theory of difference. Of course, within this broad sameness, there is much that is different. For now, let me merely highlight two elements of this difference. First, where Hegel appeals to a structure of self-consciousness to explain spirit, which is the central term, for Hölderlin spirit, and not just spirit restricted to self-consciousness, is just one of the elements set into play by the metaphor. This is what I was getting at when I stated earlier that the reflexivity of the Idealistic self is a secondary reflexivity from the perspective of the reflexivity of language. Secondly, where Hegel recognizes the

[296] Hölderlin, Friedrich, "On the Operations of the Poetic Spirit" in *Essays and Letters on Theory*, 62-82.
[297] "On the Operations of the Poetic Spirit," 64.
[298] See *supra,* .
[299] Cf. *BT*, H 433.

movement of the concept primarily in the development of philosophy and only secondarily in poetry when poetry grasps the truth of art and thereby passes over into philosophy, in Hölderlin, the movement of the metaphor develops as the happening of poetry.

Assuming for the sake of argument that concern for the "concept" and the "metaphor" gives us a good description of at least a certain kind of philosophical practice and a certain kind of poetic practice, we are now in a position to differentiate how we understand the statement that "language is logos," not just historically, but also comparatively, i.e. with regard to *genre*. In the concept, we see a certain way in which modern philosophy has come to understand the position that "language is logos." In the metaphor, we see another way in which modern poetry has come to understand the position that "language is logos." But this means that the metaphor is already in a certain sense conceptual and vice-versa. A certain degree of translation is permissible between the two. Thus, Heidegger can understand Hölderlin's attempt to appropriate the native in "Remembrance" [*Andenken*] in terms of the concept and clarity of presentation: "Thus greeting, the poet thinks of the *heavenly fire*, which must be experienced first of all and always, if the presentation, that is to say, his very own capacity, may have something to present, something on which his capacity to grasp may be able to prove itself" (*EHP*, 137). We have in short, a set of oppositions which all stand in an analogy to one another: logos and language, concept and metaphor, philosophy and poetry, modern and ancient, pathos and representation. There is a sameness to the character of these oppositions, but the elements in each must be distinguished from the elements in all of the others. The only hint that we have for the name of this relationship is "being" where the meaning of "being" is taken to be something like an event

of historical reversal that sets them up against one another.[300] Heidegger wants to insist that this reversal happens in a way that is not dialectical or conceptual but instead accords with a non-metaphysical point of view as revealed, for example, in the equipoise of the tragic transport. For Heidegger, this comes to mean that it happens poetically more than it happens philosophically. But, apart from philosophy, there does seem to emerge a form of thinking in his later writings which is like philosophy, but is somehow supposed to learn from poetry. Let me end my treatment of logos and language by turning to one such passage late in Heidegger's career. By examining this passage from "The Way to Language," I will introduce the sets of questions that emerge from this treatment and that I will consider in the final part of the book as the point of entry for a lyrical theory of modernity.

Two themes that we have been discussing come together in Heidegger's treatment of Novalis in "The Way to Language." First, this text seeks to think of language "monologically," that is to say in terms of the sameness, self-reflexivity, and immanence of language and its "object." We have already seen this impulse at the beginning of the essay on "Language," but it structures the argument of "The Way to Language" much more profoundly. As our preceding discussion of analogy has made clear, it will be necessary to juxtapose this sameness with our treatment of language and logos differentially. Secondly, Heidegger's confrontation with German Idealism and Romanticism is made explicit here when he attempts to wrest from Novalis

[300] Let me draw brief attention to the fact that this means that there is a five part structure in how being is revealed in the "phenomenon" of language or logos. In each case "being" is woven together with two other elements that are both "the same" and "different." This accords exactly with Heidegger's interpretation of The Eleatic Stranger's account of logos as the weaving together of "being," "motion," "rest," "sameness" and "difference." See Plato, *Sophist,* 254d-257d [which immediately precedes the role this weaving plays in naming]; Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist,* 369-386. It is worth calling to attention the fact that a) this is characterized as a form of *aletheuein* to be understood in terms of *sophia* and b) that for Heidegger, "difference" and "being" occupy the place of privilege within this weave.

an insight into the monological structure of language that he claims is suggested by Novalis, but hampered by Novalis's "dialectical" understanding of language. It is clear from what Heidegger means by this that this sort of "dialectic" must be opposed to the way in which similar insights are won non-dialectically in Hölderlin's "conversation."

In "The Way to Language" Heidegger follows the same basic trajectory that we are already familiar with from *The Introduction to Metaphysics* and "Language." A philosophical treatment of language, in this case von Humboldt's theory of linguistics, is juxtaposed with the poetic practice of language, in this case a fragment by Novalis. But "Monologue," the passage by Novalis, is much more explicitly about language than the Sophocles and Trakl texts were.

Heidegger is particularly concerned with Novalis's claim that "The peculiar property of language, namely that language is concerned exclusively with itself --- precisely that is known to no one."[301] On the basis of his reading of von Humboldt, Heidegger takes this to "say two things: it is language *alone* which speaks authentically; and, language speaks *lonesomely*" (*OWL*, 134). The relevance of the first two of these claims to our discussion of *Being and Time* should be made clear: the relative priorities of language and Dasein have been reversed. A proper understanding of the structures of things can only be conceived on the basis of a proper understanding of language, but the authenticity of Dasein when Dasein understands this properly is merely derivative of the propriety inherent in language. Language is no longer a property of the human being, as *Being and Time's* emphasis on a non-linguistic hearing still implied. Rather, we are who we are "on the way to language" (*OWL*, 111). This first feature of language explains why language is lonesome (*einsam*), which Heidegger takes to depend upon the etymological

[301] Qtd. in *OWL*, 111, 133. Heidegger's discussion of Humboldt is framed by these two citations.

connection between the prefix "-sam:" "-some" and "same." " 'Lonesome' means: the same in what unites that which belongs together" (*OWL*, 134). This uniting is the "way-making" that "puts language (the essence of language) as language (Saying [*Sagen*]) into language (into the sounded word)" (*OWL*, 130).[302]

On the basis of his interpretation of the "monological" structure of language, Heidegger has argued that we are on the way to language. This gives him the opportunity to rework his claim in the "Letter on Humanism" that "language is the house of being." There, Heidegger already considered this claim in terms of the event character of the history of being, but this claim now has to be considered in the fact that the "house" is also a "path," a "whereto" more than a "whereat." Given our traditional misunderstanding of language, we need something to happen for us to see this new character of language. "In order to pursue in thought the being of language and to say of it what is its own, a transformation of language is needed which we can neither compel nor invent. This transformation does not result from the procurement of ready formed words and phrases. It touches on our relation to language which is determined by destiny" (*OWL*, 135). By calling attention to the transitory character of our relationship to language and the need for something to happen to change our relationship to language, Heidegger sets both sides of the oppositional relationship between language and logos firmly within language. This realization promises a profound effect on the traditional conception of the

[302] As should be clear from Heidegger's discussion of Aristotle and Humboldt in *OWL* 113-119, the reference to the sounded word here is supposed to be arbitrary and could refer to any sign system. Whether or not this supposed arbitrariness holds out is another question. This is why Derrida's critique of Heidegger in *Of Grammatology* is irreducible to his critique of phonocentrism. Rather, the logocentrism of Heidegger's thought, if it remains logocentric, is written into the question of the meaning of being. Compare *Of Grammatology*, 18-24. As Derrida argues, by writing "being" in its deletion, Heidegger writes the opening of metaphysics as much as its closure: "In as much as it de-limits onto-theology, the metaphysics of presence and logocentrism, this last writing is also the first writing" (*Of Grammatology*, 23).

relationship between philosophy and poetry. Throughout this section we have been brushing against the question as to whether language is at heart a matter of the unfolding of a poetic saying or of the development of the operations of reason. The traditional answer of philosophy, as exemplified by Hegel, is that reason is the key to grasping language. We have seen that Heidegger, like Nietzsche, tends to privilege poetry, but not without some qualifications.

Heidegger ends "The Way to Language" by citing a text where von Humboldt tries to set philosophy and poetry alongside one another as both developing language in a privileged way.

> Without altering the language as regards its sound and even less its forms and laws, *time* --- by a growing development of ideas, increased capacity for sustained thinking, and a more penetrating sensibility --- will often introduce into language what it did not possess before. Then the old shell is filled with a new meaning, the old coinage conveys something different, the old laws of syntax are used to hint at a differentially graduated sequence of ideas. All this is a lasting fruit of a people's *literature*, and within literature especially of *poetry* and *philosophy*.[303]

The fact that, so late in his career, Heidegger quotes approvingly a text which refers to the gradual shift of language in a "differently graduated sequence of ideas" and which places poetry and philosophy alongside of one another in a mutually positive evaluation is striking enough, given his own growing emphasis on broader, epochal shifts and his unabated appetite for poetry over philosophy. This is all the more striking in light of Heidegger's claim at the end of the "Letter on Humanism" that "What is needed in the present world crisis is less philosophy, but more attentiveness in thinking; less literature, but more cultivation of the letter" (*BW*, 265). In the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger seems to be implicitly rejecting both elements of von Humboldt's claim: what we need are not slow shifts occasioned by the refinement of philosophy

[303] Von Humboldt, 65. Qtd. in *OWL*, 136.

and literature but dramatic movements that respond to a crisis by rethinking the essences of philosophy and literature.

But at the end of "The Way to Language," he puts forth a position which is actually more radical than either his earlier claim or von Humboldt's claim, since it sees the operations of poetry and philosophy at work in one another. "We might perhaps prepare a little for the change in our relation to language. Perhaps this experience might awaken: all reflective thinking is poetic, and all poetry in turn is a kind of thinking (*OWL,* 135-136). Retaining his distinction between "literature" or "poesy" and "cultivation of the letter" and the "poetic" on the one hand and "philosophy" and "thinking" on the other, Heidegger accepts both sorts of change.[304]

This way of looking at things introduces a set of distinctions that cut across the oppositions we discussed above in the same way that the association of "being and time" cuts across the divisions of "being and becoming," "being and appearing," and "being and thinking." That is to say, the autonomy of "thinking" introduces a new element into "philosophy" that changes its relationship to "poetry," just as "poetry's" (as *Dichtung*) internal relationship to "poetry" (as *Poesie*) changes its relationship to philosophy. By setting both of these internal "structures" into both poetry and philosophy, Heidegger suggests the need to rework the oppositions between language and logos and the concept and the metaphor in a way that allows for a broader range of historical shifts then just the massive upheaval and reversal that characterizes our relationship to the ancients. This need is what I would call the need for simultaneous multiple, lyrical ways of disclosing the world rather than successive single, epical

[304] See Bernasconi's discussion of the difference between this account and other places where Heidegger discusses the dialogue between thinker and poet (*Heidegger in Question*, 146-148)

forms of world disclosure. So it should not be surprising that Heidegger turns here to the language of music.[305]

What is needed, Heidegger suggests, is a form of language that "defines itself in terms of the mode in which we, who are needed in the usage of language, belong to the appropriation [*Ereignis*]" (*OWL*, 136). This mode picks up both the sense of mood (*Bestimmung*) that fundamentally determined Dasein in *Being and Time* and, by way of the concept of *modus* in medieval ontology, the sense of belongingness of the human being as a part of a larger substantial structure. But it picks up both of these things primarily by way of musicality: "Saying is the mode in which Appropriation speaks: mode not so much [but partially --- AA] in the sense of *modus* or fashion, but as the melodic mode, the song which says something in its singing" (*OWL*, 135). And musical modes have the advantage of allowing for large and small shifts: key changes that change the relative values of every note, but also within the same key or mode subdominant melodies, harmonies and contrasts which reflect a different kind of internal development. By examining how the productive relationship of poetry, philosophy, and thinking develop this nuanced account of history in light of the continued problems of temporality, being, and truth, I hope to develop in more depth what such a picture of language and history might look like.

Unfortunately, it seems to me that this account of language and history remains, for Heidegger, a minor theme in a largely undeveloped song. Let me end Part Two by suggesting

[305] Of course, the notion of a canonical (Austro-Germanic) development in music could undermine the claim that music gives us a good understanding of lyricism qua multiplicity. Against this, I would adopt something like Edward Said's argument for a de-canonized understanding of classical music which does not do away with the power of this canon. Compare in particular his discussion of the critical power of the melody in Said, 94-105.

one way in which Heidegger represses this theme. This way will reveal to us the figure through which I will concretize a lyrical theory of poetry, philosophy and history in Part Three.

Drinking Wine from Two Glasses

Novalis's fragment "Monologue" provided the occasion for Heidegger to articulate his own "monological" account of a language which is underway and which developed in the unfolding of poetry and philosophy and their essential relationship to one another. But because his account of the constitutive character of language risked resembling Idealism, which he wanted to avoid for essential reasons, he was quick to distance himself from Novalis. "The monologue character of the nature of language finds its structure in the disclosing design of Saying. That design does not and cannot coincide with the *monologue* of which Novalis is thinking, because Novalis understands language dialectically, in terms of subjectivity, that is, within the horizon of absolute idealism" (*OWL*, 134). He then goes on to replace Novalis's "monologue" with Hölderlin's "conversation," the broad features of which reading we have already sketched out.[306] Heidegger seems to be dismissing Novalis as a proxy for Hegel. But, as we have already seen, the relationship between Hölderlin and Hegel is also as much one of proximity as it is of difference. While the account of language at the end of "The Way to Language" suggests a potentially extremely fruitful way of thinking about this relationship in terms which respects the distinctiveness of both thinkers, Heidegger instead distances the two.

In conscious opposition to Heidegger, Roberto Calasso attempts to describe Novalis's "Monologue" in non-dialectical terms in *Literature and the Gods*:

> Never before had language and reflection on language come so close together. They skim over each other without coinciding. And that they don't quite coincide is only a heightened pleasure added to the text, as if they might coincide at any

[306] See *supra* -.

> moment, but instead leave open a tiny gap, to breath through. Heidegger, who revered this text, nevertheless objected to the way it conceives language "dialectically, within the perspective of absolute idealism, on the basis of subjectivity." A specious objection: There is no trace of dialectical machinery in the "Monologue." Nor does one sense any need to resort to something called "subjectivity." What disturbed Heidegger here, one suspects, was something else altogether: the volatile, even flighty nature of the passage, *its strenuous resistance to conceptualization*, [my italics --- AA] the effrontery with which it offers us "contemptible chatter" about *chatter*, unfathomable speculations that take us as close as possible to the wellspring of the word. This is the characteristic gesture of absolute literature. And it is this that worries Heidegger; he senses it is uncontrollable, even with all his powerful strategic apparatus. . . In these few lines quickly whispered like some demonic *presto*, absolute literature presents itself in all its recklessness: irresponsible, metamorphic, carrying no identity card that a desk sergeant might examine, deceptive in its tone . . . and finally, subject to no authority, whether it be the venerable rhetoric or metaphysics, or even a system of thought like Heidegger's that claims to be *beyond* metaphysics. Because committed only to its own elaboration, like a child playing alone, absorbed in his game.[307]

Calasso, who as these lines make clear, is concerned with exploring the impact that absolute literature has on our ideas of knowledge, is absolutely right to point out that Heidegger is wrong to dismiss Novalis. Reading Novalis much more carefully and astutely than Heidegger does, he uncovers an altogether different text. But what Calasso does not acknowledge is that the text he uncovers would have been much more useful to Heidegger, at least to the Heidegger that I find at the end of "The Way to Language," than the text that Heidegger himself read. Calasso, like Heidegger, draws much of his theoretical framework from the Böhlendorff letter.[308] But the place where Calasso's treatment of this letter differs from Heidegger's is in a hypothesis as daring as I think it is obvious given Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin. If Hölderlin is the poet who announces the coming of the new gods, and if those gods come nowhere else than in the poetry of Hölderlin, should we not suspect that *these gods have already come* (even if they

[307] Calasso, Roberto, *Literature and the Gods*, 182f.
[308] Cf. Calasso, 44-48.

come on the horizon of the future)? Calasso cites another, later letter to Böhlendorff, where Hölderlin says, "As they tell of heroes, I can say Apollo struck me down."[309] This happens on the way to Bordeaux, and presumably becomes the germ of the poem "Remembrance." Given that Heidegger's own reading proceeds from the assumption that the Bordeaux trip is the occasion in whose memory the poem "Remembrance" can enact the recovery of one's own through the encounter with the foreign here in the present (cf. *EHP*, 107-109), it is clear that Heidegger should agree with Calasso that "in rare moments of pure incandescence the gods themselves can still take on a presence that leaves us speechless, overwhelmed, as the encounter with an unknown traveler may overwhelm and bewilder. This is what happened to Hölderlin."[310] But like Heidegger, Calasso argues that "what is unique about Hölderlin is not his perception of a new presence of the ancient gods . . . but his focusing on the *difference* that the gods had acquired in now manifesting themselves in the moderns."[311] To be sure, this difference continues after the trip to Bordeaux, but what happens there reveals a determination of the relationship between sacred pathos and clarity of presentation which might not be exhausted in the sterile opposition of modern philosophy and poetry. If Hölderlin actually announces the coming of the gods in the holy, perhaps we have to rethink history from then on.

Out of this reading of Hölderlin, among others, Calasso therefore arrives at his hypothesis:

> Like so many refugees from time, [the gods] have taken shelter together in the amorphous psychic mass. . . For whatever they may be, the gods manifest themselves above all as mental events. Yet, contrary to the modern illusion, it is the psychic powers that are fragments of the gods, not the gods that are fragments of psychic power. If they are thought of as no more than that, the impact can be violent, something that we don't know how to speak about except by resorting to

[309] Qtd. in Calasso, 10.
[310] Calasso, 36.
[311] Calasso, 42.

> the degrading lexicon of pathology. And that's precisely the moment when literature can become an effective stratagem for sneaking the gods out of the universal clinic and getting them back into the world, scattered across its surface where they have always dwelt . . . In these circumstances they may even travel incognito, indistinguishable from anyone else entering or leaving a cosmic Hotel du Libre Echange; or they may show themselves in their ancient robes in hyper-real decal images. But one way or another the world will go on being the place of epiphanies.[312]

With the advent of modern literature, heralded in large part by Hölderlin himself, the world has changed fundamentally. Not so much so that Hölderlin's basic theory of the structure of history does not hold: now more than ever, we must learn to get clear about things by looking through dark glasses (what with the degradation of the ozone layer). But the world may already have changed enough that the oppositions between reason and emotion, concept and metaphor, etc., which seemed to hold so well before Hölderlin (and Hegel), have to be thought of differently. While such a reading is in one sense profoundly un-Heideggerian, it promises to fulfill those features of Heidegger's understanding of history that he insisted awaited a radical new beginning, but which may have already come (at least partially) in a series of small beginnings he (partially) overlooked: the openings of many poems and the beginnings of many books, but also the opening lines of many melodies, the under girding of many buildings and the first flecks of oil on many canvases. Where I differ from Calasso and maintain that Heidegger has something critical to add is that I find such beginnings as much in the opening lines of philosophical texts (and not just potentially non-metaphysical philosophers like Nietzsche) as in the opening lines of poems. Moreover, I cannot accept that it is legitimate to read the opening of a Hölderlinian history as the end of the concept (as both Calasso and Heidegger sometimes imply without every fully endorsing).

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[312] Calasso, 169f.

Calasso is right that we ought to rethink the significance of the categories of the Böhlendorff letter in light of the developments of modern literature (and also philosophy). But he is wrong not to see the nascence of this idea in Heidegger. And he is wrong not to consider the problems with invoking an "absolute," problems first recognized by Hegel in his own attempt to develop a concept of the absolute, but further explored in philosophers like Heidegger who took up, without necessarily endorsing, Hegel's understanding of the concept. In order to take into account Calasso's insights while proceeding to read Heidegger as presenting a viable theory of the relationship between the differentiation of literature into genres, I would read the Böhlendorff letters not merely in terms of the *difference* between the ancients and the moderns, but also through a form of *indifference* that arises in light of the developments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

I find one way of understanding this indifference vis-à-vis Hölderlin prefigured in Celan's very late poem, "*Ich Trink Wein Aus Zwei Gläsern*." In the last of his poems that explicitly deal with Hölderlin, Celan identifies his own feelings of dividedness with those that lay at the base of Hölderlin's understanding of history.

> *Ich trink Wein aus zwei Gläsern*
> *und zackere an*
> *der Königzäsur*
> *wie Jener am Pindar,*
>
> *Gott gibt die Stimmgabel ab*
> *als einer der kleinen*
> *Gerechten,*
>
> *Aus der Lostrommel fällt*
> *unser Deut* (GW, 3: 108).
>
> I drink wine from two glasses
> and plow away at
> the royal caesura

As One did at Pindar

God gives his tuning fork up
as one of the little
just ones.

From fate's drum
falls our
insignificant lot

The "one" who plows away at Pindar is Hölderlin whose Pindar translations occasioned his most sustained poetic consideration of the caesura but which also stand as perhaps his most idiosyncratic translations. There, more than anywhere else in his work, both his contemporaries and his later readers detected his impending madness.[313] Celan writes these lines about Hölderlin soon before he takes his own life, at a time when he is struggling to recover from his own depression and from the clinical therapies that were to have treated his depression: semi-voluntary confinement and electro-shock therapy.[314] There is a strong sense of desperation here: it seems unlikely to Celan that his own work plowing the field of poetry will end any happier than did Hölderlin's.

Celan's identification with Hölderlin works its way into three instances of division. First, the caesura is a furrow that marks the poetic text by splitting its lines in two.[315] Celan performs

[313] For a discussion of this see Pfau's notes to the Remarks on Antigone and Oedipus, 173f.
[314] See Felstiner 230-231 for a discussion of some of the figures which he introduced into his late poetry during his hospitalization.
[315] Fóti is particularly interested in the theme of "pointedness" in this poem (*Heidegger and the Poets*, 82-83). Her notion of Celan's relation to Hölderlin being one of "disseverance (which is not, of course, a simple lack of connection)" is a crucial one . But I think she is wrong to then read Celan as simply rejecting the Hölderlinian motif of divine dispensation in the next stanza. "Hölderlin's God, furthermore, has given over the 'tuning fork' (and thus the possibility of an Heideggerian *Umstimmung* of presencing) to the inconspicuous 'small just ones' of Jewish mysticism. Poetic meaning, which has become communalized, and even vulgarized as *Unser* Deut, no longer allows itself to be col-lected at the acme of convergence prepared for by the craftsmanship (Handwerk) of Heideggerian poetizing and thinking. It falls, as chance may dictate, out of the spinning drum that allots destiny --- not because the poet is careless but because the possibility of a convergence in the 'unsaid' has been superseded" (*Heidegger and the Poets*, 83). The situation is somewhat more complicated, however, because God does not immediately turn

this activity but he does not know whether anything will grow from it. In Hölderlin the textual division that the caesura marks brings the form of poetry to view and reveals the two sources of that representation in clarity and pathos. This leads us to the second form of division in *Ich Trink Wein*. In Hölderlin's "*Andenken*," the glass of wine, "the fragrant cup full of the dark light,"[316] provides both clarity and pathos. Because it provides shade, rest, and intoxication while remaining light and permitting conversation it makes possible the poet coming to her own through what is foreign. This is the dominant thrust of Heidegger's reading of this passage.

> The dark light does not deny clarity; rather, it is the excess of brightness which, the greater it is, denies sight all the more decisively . . . The poet asks for the gift of dark light in which the brightness is tempered and softened. But this softness does not weaken the light of the brightness. For the darkness permits the appearance of that which conceals, and thus in its appearing preserves what is concealed within. The darkness preserves in the light the fullness of what it has to bestow in its shining appearance. . . This filled cup does not produce a stupor. Its work is not to make one inebriated, but does nevertheless make one intoxicated. The intoxication is that sublime elevation of mood wherein that single voice can be heard that sets a tone. . . This [sober] intoxication lifts one into the illuminating clarity in which the depths of the concealed are opened up and darkness appears as the sister of clarity . . . When the poet calls out for a fragrant cup, he is asking to be confirmed in the essential law of his poetic activity, which is to think of one accord of what has been and of what is coming, instead of sleeping through the time which now is (*EHP*, 141-143).

The poet asks for the wine that will give clarity to pathos, mix darkness with the light. Asking for the wine brings the commemoration of the foreign and of what is proper to oneself together

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over the tuning fork to the just ones, as Fóti suggests, (in this case the phrase would be in the dative and the lines would read *Gott gibt die Stimmgabel ab einem der kleinen Gerechten* or simply "*… ab den kleinen Gerechten*." At any rate, if God were to pass on his tuning fork to someone just, even if it were a "small just one," it is unclear why fate would then be random. Rather God gives up his tuning fork insofar as he is one of the little just ones. *Abgeben seine Stimme* can also mean to cast a vote, which coupled with the lines about the lottery drums, suggests a confluence of destiny and chance, destiny only in chance, rather than their opposition. For an interesting post-Heideggerian attempt to reconfigure Hölderlin's measure in human practices see Marx, Werner. *Is There a Measure on Earth?: Foundations for a Nonmetaphysical Ethics.*

[316] "Andenken," in Hölderlin, Friedrich, *Poems and Fragments*, 489.

and joins them into the single poetic act. This is why it is supposed to confirm the law of the poetic activity.

But in Celan, this wine, which is neither pathos nor clarity, is itself a source of division. We might think of Hölderlin's caesura as being the ploughed field for the grapes. The caesura represents the form of representation of the poem that accomplishes what is accomplished by the wine in "*Andenken*." But Celan says, "I drink wine from two glasses." This is an ambiguous form of division. There does not seem to be one source which will bring together the duality that is to be exhibited in the caesura. The furrow, like a deep wound, will not close up and will not accomplish a synthesis. On the one hand, then, the division of drinking wine from two glasses expresses the feeling of a contradiction.[317] Conversely, the image of two wine glasses is a fairly old and well-established trope for the lovers' tryst. The poet is like two lovers, gone inward to have the conversation promised by Hölderlin's vintage ("But good / Is converse, and to speak / The heart's opinion, to hear many tales / About the days of love / And deeds that have occurred.")[318] It is this ambiguous division --- the inability to bring differences together --- that brings together the lovers' encounter and the experience of "divided loyalties."

To what does Celan owe divided loyalties? He suggests that his divisions are like the divisions that Hölderlin felt between himself and Pindar. A complete answer as to how this analogy would be worked out could only be given by specifying what happens in the whole of Celan's poetry. But several immediate divisions suggest themselves. We should continue to think about the divisions that governed Hölderlin's poetry and the divided loyalty that Celan

[317] See Fóti, "The labor of the poet who oscillates between 'two glasses' carries even a connotation of sterility of the ridiculous" (*Heidegger and the Poets*, 83).
[318] *Poem's and Fragments*, 491.

himself felt to Hölderlin.[319] There is also a strong suggestion of Celan's divided loyalties to both the German and Jewish languages and literary traditions. Just a few years before "*Ich trink Wein*" Celan had suggested, albeit hesitantly, in the poem "*Weil du den Notscherben fandst*" that two peoples might be brought together: "*Vielleicht ist es wahr, / dass hier der Friede zwei Völker besprach, / aus Tongefässen*" (GW, 2:204) ("Perhaps it's true / that peace conjured two peoples here / out of clay vessels" (*SPP*, 305).[320] But this possibility now seems less likely to be true. In place of this peace between two people we find the experience of a bitter choice. But beyond any specified element as to what Celan's divided loyalties are to, I would merely want to insist for now that these signify a manifold of possible divided loyalties that do not necessarily need to be determined.

According to Heidegger's reading, the wine in "*Andenken*" sets the mood, gives the tone, or brings the meaning of poetry in its historical specificity its particular accord. Celan's "clay vessels" could be rendered in English somewhat more creatively as "setting into tone." This is what the "shadow centuries" (*SPP*, 305) in "*Weil du den Notscherben fandst*" hear you thinking. But the tone which would harmonize these two voices is missing in "*Ich Trink Wein*" because God has abdicated (or, conversely, cast his vote in favor randomness and indecision). Instead, it is a lottery drum which dispenses "meaning" (where *Deut* can mean meaning or coin). Replacing the specificity of a determinate, richly differentiated, and highly articulated difference unified in the poetic activity, Celan presents what I am calling an indifference: a not fully worked out differentiation that sets up multiple possibilities for divisions, multiple glasses of

[319] Two of Celan's poems that deal with his relationship with Hölderlin are particularly relevant here: *Andenken* (Remembrance) (*GW* 1: 121) and *Tübingen, Jänner* (Tübingen, January). On the dialogue with Heidegger and Hölderlin in Celan's *Andenken*, see Felstiner, 75f). On *Tübingen, Jänner*, see *Poetry as Experience*, 9-33, 41.
[320] This poem is in *Fadensonnen*, published in 1968. On this point, Colin's discussion of the German-Jewish literary scene in the Bukovina during Celan's childhood is particularly useful. See Colin, 3-50.

wine. The possibility that these things cannot be resolved, and therefore implicitly the possibility that they can be resolved, is suggested. But all we are presented with here is their standing in an unresolved tension. In the absence of God or the gods, this is where "our meaning" comes from.

Actually, there are already places for this form of indifference in Heidegger's interpretation of "*Andenken*." We find this in the time of the equinox and in the journey of the mariners who are still out at sea. Hölderlin describes the time of the festival as "*Märzenzeit / Wenn gleich ist Nacht und Tag*" ("The month of March / when night and day are equal.")[321] Heidegger interprets this as the time when the differential elements of the poem: gods and mortals, the foreign and the proper stand in equilibrium. "In a hidden pause there is prepared the reconciliation of winter with summer, a pause, however. . . Reconciliation sets the combatants free and gives them an equal right to their being, that right which each one has. Such a transition is like that equilibrium whose essence corresponds to the moment of a lingering destiny" (*EHP*, 132). Spring is the plowing time, the time of the caesura where the two sides of the furrow are held to be equal, but in Heidegger's interpretation of "Andenken" the shape of that reconciliation is already destiny. It has already been assured by what has been prepared. The equilibrium of the equinox is shown as a more pure indifference prior to the festival: when night is not yet punctuated by the radiance of the holiday, "*wo nicht die Nacht durchglänzen / Die Feiertage der Stadt*" (*"Where through the night do not gleam / The city's holidays*").[322] This is the condition of the mariners who are still abroad in the oceans and have not yet undertaken the journey upriver to the homeland. As Heidegger points out, this is the condition that makes the holiday possible, "The night of the mariners' voyage, who has departed to experience the heavenly fire, still

[321] *Poems and Fragments*, 488.
[322] *Poems and Fragments*, 491.

remains the mother of the day, which is defined as the holiday on the day before the festival, during whose time destiny hangs in the balance for a moment" (*EHP*, 158). When the festival commemorates the mariners' journey, it is as the journey abroad which enabled the discovery of the source of one's one river, the course of one's own time and history. But Heidegger acknowledges that things look different from the perspective of the sea, which is the terminus of many rivers, some more foreign than others. The sea itself has a breadth and abundance that proffers many possibilities, many more than a simple dualism. Heidegger interprets Hölderlin's claim that "wealth begins in the sea"[323] to refer to the "plenitude of what is offered" (*EHP*, 155) in the expanses of the sea. This plenitude hides the source of the river which feeds it, but hides it in the very multiplicity of rivers that feed it. So it is not only that the mariners at sea have not come home yet; journeying in the foreign they have not yet encountered the foreign as foreign. "In it [the night of the mariner's wandering] neither the foreign nor the homelike is already purely decided" (*EHP*, 158). The foreign only becomes foreign and the homelike only homelike when the poet, here explicitly named as Hölderlin himself, leaves the sea to journey up *the* river, the one particular river that carves out a home.[324] Prior to this, and as a more general feature of poetry,[325] we encounter only a number of sources that hide one another and run together in an

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[323] *Ibid*.
[324] Cf. *EHP*, 159-163.
[325] Although not, Heidegger will insist, a more general feature of the poetical. See *EHP*, 155. This distinction between the poetical and the poem will be called into question by both Celan and Derrida. Celan questions this distinction in the "Meridian Address," which I discuss below (see p. ff). Derrida discusses this in "Che cos'è la poesia?" and the accompanying interview "*Istrice 2: Ick bünn all hier*." Cf. in particular his discussion of Heidegger's interpretation of "Remembrance: "This passage toward the poetic sets sail, as you put it, toward a poetic that is also a mooring, a political mooring or home port, the Hölderlin of "*Der Rhein*" and "*Germanien*." And this passage occurs against the background of a mourning, on the them of sacred mourning, and in a scene of sacrifice. Whether one is talking about that Hölderlin or this Heidegger, there is always some address to the German people, if not a speech to the German nation. It is an address that seeks as much to institute its address as to reveal that addressee to itself" (*"Istrice* 2", 324). By moving to a place of indifference I am implicitly shifting at least temporarily away from the poetical in favor of the poem.

indifferent manner. Although this indifference of the sea is not the focus of Heidegger's essay, it is an essential element of his interpretation because it makes possible the time of the festival and the fact that the foreign and the homelike must be remembered conjointly.

In "*Andenken*" the moments of indifference, prior to the decision about what constitutes the homelike and what constitutes the foreign and also prior to the decision about how these are to be related in the poem, are resolved in the activity of Hölderlin's own hymns. But Celan's poetry suggests that these differences stand in a new tension, prior to their resolution and that his activity of poetry raises the question of these differences in a manifold way where not even what constitutes our "own" or our "other" can be determined. Where differences are manifold, but indeterminate, where they are not yet or no longer joined, this place "out at sea" (for Hölderlin) or "in the air" (for Celan) is where I will seek to place my own discussion of how lyricism can gather important intersections in the history of poetry, philosophy and thought. This is how I interpret the modern sense of Heidegger's "way to language," the non-domestic "house of being."

III. People of Water and Air

The need to develop an account for how lyricism can talk about the meaning of being led us to ask the question of how Heidegger understands the ontological formation of metaphors and concepts. In the course of developing this idea, I have argued that Heidegger understands language and logos to largely overlap but in a way that permits a degree of historical and generic differentiation. However, the site of this differentiation is itself a site of indifference and indecision. While it seems that Heidegger had hoped to follow Hegel in identifying an onto-typological structure that informed the development of key philosophical concepts, what his thought in fact uncovers is a series of ruptures in the history of the language and "logic" of philosophy and poetry. And this logic cannot be described according to the very notions of reason and meaning that govern their development. Thus, the origin of the work of art proves to be inherently multiple, and this multiplicity is revealed in a distinctive way in the modern, lyrical work of art.

Understanding the temporality of this moment as a moment of indifference grounds the ontological understanding of the lyrical work of art that I had sketched out at the end of Part One. Where an epical understanding of being calls for a ground that would be analogous to the bedrock of an acropolis, a city center filled with nationally significant monuments, a lyrical understanding of being situates itself in the open air, or on the edge of the sea. This seems to accord better with Heidegger's call for a groundless ground. But it remains to be seen what we would call what we find there, if it is no longer *terra firma*. We have clarified that the ground of the lyrical account of being is the structure of indifference that obtains in the play between language and logos. In accordance with our discussion in Part One, where we provided the

reasons why we sought this ground, it is now necessary to show how that ground provides a way of thinking about the thoughtful and poetical function of various genres, including the genre of philosophy. It is necessary, in short, to concretize our theory of lyricism and show what can happen when we deploy it.

With that it mind, I will identify five moments of indecision that obtain in instances of interpretive play between poetry and philosophy central to the Heideggerian *ouvre*. In order to draw the sharpest relief possible on the difference between this Heideggerian theory of lyricism and a Romantic theory of lyricism, I will pay particular attention to the picture of the human being that these moments draw out. At these moments, I will argue, we see a picture of the human being which is neither national/natural, nor individual and subjective. The human being which emerges at the place of indifference is a person who stands outside the determinate history of a particular genre or tradition, but at a place that affords a unique perspective on that tradition.

Throughout the previous parts of this book, I have skirted around the question of the human being. I have been talking about language, logos, thinking and reason, philosophy and poetry, as if they existed independently of the human being. This is entirely appropriate because to an extent they do. These things have their internal structure --- we have identified two ways of characterizing this structure as the concept and the metaphor. But we must acknowledge that the concept and the metaphor are the products of human activity, even if they are not always intentional products. And so Heidegger has to constantly contend with two sets of claims. First, keeping with the basic thrust of *Being and Time*, where he argues that the question of being can only be broached in light of the being of the human being as being situated,[326] Heidegger insists

[326] Cf. *BT*, H15-19.

that a proper understanding of the nature of language, etc. depends upon a proper understanding of the being of the human being. But, additionally, Heidegger insists that *Being and Time* not be interpreted existentially,[327] where the question of being would be reducible to the question of the human being. Language, logos, thinking and reason are not merely (accidental or essential) properties of the human being, nor are philosophy and poetry conceivable as purely subjective acts. Any interpretation that does not recognize the difference between the being of the human being and the being of language will distort the character of both. For Heidegger, these two claims are navigated by characterizing philosophy and poetry as useless.[328] *Sophia*, wisdom, the form of truth-disclosure that deals with archeological origins and ontological foundations, is, from a technological standpoint, a useless byproduct of the activity of knowing rooted in practical reason. For Aristotle, *sophia,* understood as *nous kai logos* (intellect along with logos) was, of all the forms of truth-disclosure available to the human being, the form which departed the furthest from the being of the human being.[329] In focusing on the character of the difference between language and logos without explicit reference to the human being, I have been more faithful to the second set of Heidegger's intentions than to his first. While this is acceptable, it

[327] As Heidegger argues in "The Letter on Humanism."

[328] See for example, the opening of "Time and Being" where Heidegger speaks of a "kind of thinking [that] is today placed in a position which demands of it reflections that are far removed from any useful, practical wisdom" and compares such a thinking instead to the sensuous abstractions of modern art on the one hand and the abstractions of quantum physics on the other. ("Time and Being," 1f.) See also *IM* 9-10. Gadamer uses this characterization of philosophy as useless to explain Heidegger's political involvements as a form of ineptitude and naiveté in "The Political Incompetence of Philosophy." If we see that this characterization in fact proceeds from an uncanny attentiveness to questions about human life, we will have less reason to grant Gadamer this conclusion.

[329] *Nichomachean Ethics*.1114a-b. Note in particular that a) Aristotle ascribes a possible form of wisdom to the fine arts and b) links wisdom's greatness to its being interested in beings superior to humans: "Wisdom in the arts we ascribe to their most finished exponents, e.g. to Phidias as a sculptor and to Polyclitus as a maker of statues, and here we mean nothing by wisdom except excellence in art; but we think that some people are wise in general . . . Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also posses truth about the first principles. . . For it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world."

must nonetheless be acknowledged that the character of language, etc. reveals itself nowhere but in the being of the human being. *Sophia* goes far away from the human being, but it remains a human form of comportment. It is necessary to clarify the relative independence of the set of questions from Part Two by acknowledging that they entail a picture of the human being who thinks philosophically or poetically. This clarification will answer to our concerns in Part One, showing how our discussion in Part Two gives us a concrete, historically determined, but still ambiguous understanding of genre. We therefore have to ask ourselves, "What sort of human being exists in the open?"

But once we seek to locate the human being in the space of indifference, we discover a description has already been given. The mariners who are permanently at sea, the lover who, drinking two glasses of wine, is caught up in conflicting loyalties: these are people who do not stand in the usual relationship to history or to destiny. This is the condition of the human being before decisions have been made about what it means to be human. The human being, when she finds herself indifferent, is indecisive. Ambivalence can also lead to indecision, if no one drive is strong enough to prevail against competing and contradicting drives.[330] But Nietzsche, who recognized this possibility, also recognized that it was much more likely that these drives would express themselves in a surfeit of decisions.[331] The ambivalent person, if she is ambivalent because her drives are overdetermined, will be hyperdecisive. Indecision proper can only happen when the drives, impulses, or capacities that determine a person are underdetermined.

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[330] See, e.g., Spinoza's account of the effect of the affects on reason in Book III of the *Ethics*. Note in particular the way in which Spinoza defines a thing's essence in terms of the struggle of the affects to persevere at EIIIP6-7. As Derrida notes, a subject determined in this way would be very different from the representing subject of Cartesian philosophy and would potentially reveal to Heidegger a more interesting modern subject. See *supra* fn.70.

[331] See, e.g. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Beyond Good and Evil*, 215: "Willing seems to me to be above all something *complicated*, something that is a unit only as a word … so let us for once be more cautious, let us be 'unphilosophical': let us say that in all willing there is, first, a plurality of sensations."

But there is a critical ambiguity between indifference and ambivalence, between indecision and hyperdecision. Because the world is nothing but a chain of causes, and everything that is is determined to be what it is, there is no such thing as underdetermination, no pure indecision. Or if there is, it is only for a moment: when indecision and hyperdecisiveness, overdetermination and underdetermination, stand in complete equilibrium. Hölderlin's caesura enacts this equilibrium as the tragic transport in which the poetic comes to appear as such. Hölderlin's thesis is that such a transport is involved in any genuinely poetic act. But Heidegger's thesis is that Hölderlin's poetry is itself poetological.[332] This means it poetizes the caesura as such. And the moment at which this equilibrium brings the caesura itself to appearance is the moment of indifference. It is a time of indecision. My thesis is that this is the time of essential ambiguity (an ambiguity of the present).[333] It is the time of the critical "is," when the present describes what has become necessary but also sketches vistas that the past could not have anticipated.

In this chapter, I will provide a few short examples of the sort of ambiguity that I have in mind through the figure of the sort of person who might stand in the condition of equilibrium between indecisiveness and hyperdecisiveness: Nietzsche's Hamlet, Hölderlin's Empedocles, Kierkegaard's Heraclitus, Heidegger's Sophocles and Celan's Lucile. I will treat the first three relatively quickly, focusing merely on those aspects that prepare the way for a more in depth treatment of Heidegger's Sophocles and Celan's Lucile. In the course of treating these three figures of indecision, I will draw out a set of concerns that run across the grain of several Heideggerian motifs that often accompany the problematic of the epic of being. I will thus

[332] *EHP*, 64.
[333] For the influence of Blanchot in this choice of phrasing see *supra* fn.55. My decision to locate this ambiguity in the space of indecision follows Blanchot's own interest in the neutral. (See in particular his discussion of the neutral in the last part of *The Infinite Conversation*, 285-434).

develop in the space of indecision (at the multiply determinate origins of historical genres) a discourse about writing and progress, suicide, patricide and sacrifice, war and, most importantly, peace that cannot be called wholly compatible or wholly incompatible with Heidegger's epochal understanding of the history of being. Because I have argued that this understanding of the epoch is rooted in a conflation of the epic and the tragic, I will show how this reconfiguration yields a new understanding of tragedies by looking at these themes in Aeschylus's *Seven Against Thebes*. The first three examples, each taken from an important nineteenth century precursor to Heidegger and Celan, thus introduce a set of themes that I reconfigure on the basis of my own reading of one particular Greek tragedy. I will use this reconfiguration in order to reconsider the interpretation that Heidegger's offers of Sophocles, the greatest of the Greek tragedians, immediately following the sections of the *Introduction to Metaphysics* that I dealt with in Part Two.[334] This reconsideration attempts to understand the nature of human action within the space of indecision. I will end this chapter by arguing that this same picture of the relationship between human action and history underlies the absurd freedom that Celan imputes to Lucile in the "Meridian Address" and that Celan employs this model for understanding the sort of freedom he seeks in his own poetry. This picture, and the notion of figure that accompanies it, provides the most concrete model for the lyrical theory of modern philosophy and poetry that I develop in this book.

[334] *IM*, 155-176. For my discussion of the preceding section, see *supra* -.

Three Intersections Within Poetry and Philosophy

1. Nietzsche's Hamlet.

Nietzsche relies on the difference between indecisiveness and hyperdecisiveness in his treatment of Hamlet in *The Birth of Tragedy*. There, he allies Hamlet, and the "Dionysian man" in general, with indecision proper.

> In this sense the Dionysian man resembles Hamlet: both have once looked truly into the essence of things, they have *gained knowledge*, and nausea inhibits action: for their action could not change anything in the eternal nature of things; they feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that they should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint. Knowledge kills action; action requires the veils of illusion: that is the doctrine of Hamlet, not that cheap wisdom of Jack the Dreamer who reflects too much and, as it were, from an excess of possibilities does not get around to action. Not reflection, no --- true knowledge, an insight into the horrible truth, outweighs any motive for action, both in Hamlet and in the Dionysian man.[335]

Too many motives and too many possibilities can lead to the form of indecision that I am calling hyperdecisiveness, but this does not explain Hamlet's indecisiveness. This is certainly true insofar as Hamlet is like the Dionysian person. This also shows something important about the Dionysian impulse for the treatment of drives in Nietzsche's later writings and in Sigmund Freud's appropriation of Nietzsche. The Dionysian impulse is not strictly a drive at all; rather it is the impulse to break away from, or not respond to the motives, drives, and reasons which generally determine our actions and our thoughts. Of course, it must further be acknowledged that this non-impulse has its own "wisdom" and its own form of action and expression. And Nietzsche's interpretation seems to be borne out in Hamlet's way of comporting himself, particularly in the first half of the play. Nietzsche's claim that Hamlet resents being put in the position of having to respond to the world's being out of joint is a paraphrase of Hamlet's "the

[335] *The Birth of Tragedy*, 60.

time is out of joint: --- o cursed spite, that ever I was born to set it right!"[336] From the moment Hamlet first sees the ghost of his father he knows what needs to be done, but that knowledge does not move him to action.

Nietzsche does not address whether or not *Hamlet* is for him *strictu sensu* a tragedy because his example from *Hamlet* is a way of elucidating a point about his main object: ancient Greek tragedy. But if *Hamlet* is in fact a tragedy it should express in some way the conflicted character of his actions and not just the urge to nonresponsitivity presupposed by this conflict. If *Hamlet* is a tragedy then for Nietzsche, Hamlet must be Apollonian, or in some modern way Apollonian, just as he is in some modern way Dionysian. And, in fact, an explanation of Hamlet's indecisiveness has to contend with Hamlet's manic activity in the last half of the play, where he takes responsibility for the whole of the situation he finds himself in. From the moment he kills Polonius up to the moment he entrusts Horatio with ensuring the survival of Denmark and of Hamlet's own story, it is difficult to see the effect of a nausea which kills action. The play within a play that Hamlet puts on in Act III[337] seems to spur him to this new resolution

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[336] *Hamlet*, I.v. When Derrida treats *Hamlet*, he will use this out-of-jointedness of time as the starting point for a political analysis of the play and of the figure of the specter in Karl Marx (*Specters of Marx*, 1-29). That it is the same figure which informs his political analysis of Heidegger in *Of Spirit* is worth noting since Derrida will designate the response that responds to the figure of the spectral in Marx as the "philosophical" or "ontological" response (*Specters of Marx*, 29). I think it is possible to interpret Derrida's interrogation of the conjunction of justice (*Fug*, *dike*) and presence (*Anwesenheit*) in Heidegger as developing a critical notion of presence (*Specters of Marx*, 23-28). As Caputo emphasizes, this passage also introduces the notion of an "undeconstructible justice," which for Caputo is at the heart of the ethico-political import of Derrida's work (*Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida*, 118-134), although, for Caputo, such a justice is too disjointed to be described through the Heideggerian logic of *Fug* and *dike* (*Prayer and Tears of Jacques Derrida,* 123*)*. I would suggest that the presence of such a future in the horizon of presence, if it were possible, would resemble the sort of critical presence that I have been trying to draw out of Heidegger.

[337] A play which, in its purposes and effects, can be seen as exemplarily a play governed by a "clarity of presentation." Peter Szondi's claim that Celan turned to Shakespeare in order to develop a "poetry of constancy" should also be considered in this regard. (Cf. Szondi, 1-26). Note in particular, his claim that "constancy, the theme of Shakespeare's sonnet [105], becomes for Celan the medium in which his verse dwells and that impedes the flow of his verse, imposing constancy upon it. Constancy becomes the constituent element of his verse . . . Celan's intention in his version of Shakespeare's Sonnet 105, is a realization of constancy in verse" (Szondi, 21). Celan's translation can be found at *GW*, 5: 345. But, as Werner Hamacher points out, the presence that Szondi shows Celan

and this manic quality. These traits have to be juxtaposed alongside Hamlet's indecisiveness as an example of Hamlet's hyperdecisiveness.

But there is a moment soon after the play within the play where Hamlet's indecisiveness and hyperdecisiveness meet and, instead of conflicting, run together perfectly. This is the moment which I already discussed in the previous part of this book.[338] When Hamlet decides not to kill Claudius while he is at prayer his conflicting desires to kill Claudius and to insure that Claudius goes to hell meet on the same path as his previous indecision. This coincidence of indecisiveness and hyperdecisiveness is the result of a mistake: Claudius had not really repented his sins. But Hamlet makes a very different mistake than the sort of mistake he makes in the following scene where he mistakenly kills Polonius instead of Claudius. If I may borrow Heidegger's manner of speech, the latter sort of mistake is ontic; it mistakes one entity for another. But the first sort of mistake is ontological; it misunderstands the structure of the relationship between God and humans, between heaven, hell, and earth.

2. Hölderlin's Empedocles.

Any handbook on ancient philosophy will tell you that Empedocles' philosophy is one of conflict. But it is not just a philosophy of conflict; it is one where conflict itself conflicts with love. The advance that Empedocles makes over his predecessors is that he posits two *archai* in order to explain both generation and destruction as the separation and coming together of the four elements. "I shall tell a twofold tale: at one time they grew to be one alone out of many, water and earth and the immense height of air, and cursed Strife apart from them, equal in every

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to achieve is accomplished by means of paranomasia. As a more general feature of Celan's poetry, paranomasia is where "the phonetic proximity of the word whereby one affects the other with its semantic potential sets a verbal unity into oscillation" (Hamacher, 233f., 258n.15). The presentation of presentation, in Celan's translations of Shakespeare and in his own poetry, is like Celan's caesura in that it presents it in its transition.

[338] See *supra* f.

direction, and Love among them, equal in length and breadth . . . All these are equal and coeval, but each has a different prerogative and each its own character, and they prevail in turn as time comes round."[339] The way in which love and strife drive things about is responsible for the change in the totality of beings and sometimes approaches pure unity and sometimes approaches utter dissolution. But within this movement there is a point where love and strife themselves stand in an equilibrium and together determine the most radical sorts of change. Let me quote in whole the fragment where Empedocles describes the time when Strife is withdrawing, but has not yet withdrawn, and where Love is advancing, but does not yet predominate.

> But I shall turn back again to the path of song I traced before, as I draw off one discourse after another --- to that path. When Strife reached the lowest depth of the whirl, and when Love comes to be in the middle of the vortex, there it is that all these things come together to be one only, not suddenly, but combining from different directions at will. And as they mingled countless tribes of mortal things poured forth; but many remained unmixed, alternating with those that were being mixed --- all those that Strife still held back from above, for it had not all yet retired blamelessly to the furthest limits of the circle, but in some of the limbs it remained while from others it had withdrawn. *As much as it was always running ahead in escape, so much was it always pursued by a gentle immortal impulse of blameless Love*. *Then straightaway those things grew mortal that before had learned to be immortal, and those that were unmixed before became mixed as they exchanged their paths.* And as they mingled countless tribes of mortal things poured forth, fitted with forms of all kinds, a wonder to look upon.[340]

This story about the commerce between gods and mortals is the story of the place of equilibrium. It is also that place at which Empedocles seems to situate himself as a philosopher (as one who wonders). Thus, Empedocles claims he has been divinized: "An immortal god, mortal no more, I go about honoured by all, as is fitting, crowned with ribbons and fresh garlands."[341] This is because he recognizes that the view of the whole he claims to have attained is the provenance of

[339] Empedocles, Fragment 17 in Kirk and Raven, 289f.
[340] Empedocles, Fragment 35 in Kirk and Raven, 296.
[341] Empedocles, Fragment 112 in Kirk and Raven, 313.

the gods alone. "Men behold in their span by a little part of life, then swift to die are carried off and fly away like smoke, persuaded of one thing only, that which each has chanced on as they are driven every way: who, then, boasts that he has found the whole?"[342]

While all of the other passages I have brought up come from his treatise *On Nature*, the fragment where Empedocles declares himself to be a god comes from the later text *Purifications*. As Kirk and Raven point out, the chronological ordering of these texts is necessary for conceptual reasons, "It [*Purifications*] contains numerous reference to themes and concepts (e.g. Love, Strife, the four elements, the oath) which assume in it a key function fully explicable only within the theoretical framework of *On Nature*."[343] But it is Hölderlin who provides an interpretation of this presupposition that explains how it could lead Empedocles to "accomplish" this divinization by a dramatic suicide.[344] Hölderlin does this in his drama "The Death of Empedocles" by imagining that Hölderlin has been alienated from the gods in the interim.[345] At the beginning of the play, we find that Empedocles has run afoul of the religious authorities because he has abrogated divine knowledge for human beings, as we saw at the beginning of *On*

[342] Empedocles, Fragment 2 in Kirk and Raven, 285.
[343] Kirk and Raven, 314:
[344] Since, in keeping with the roots of Empedocles' claim in the Orphic occult, the divinization happens through death, the accomplishment of mortality, as it were. See, e.g., Kirk and Raven, 314, and also their discussion of the roots of Presocratic philosophy in Orphic mysteries at 21-34.
[345] I will be referring to Hölderlin's second version of *The Death of Empedocles*, translated in *Germans and Other Greeks*, 173-190. For a more detailed account of this play within Hölderlin's thought as well as its relation to the other two versions and to the theoretical text on "The Ground of Empedocles," see *Germans and Other Greeks*, 154-162. For an account of the developments of each of the three drafts as a precursor to the *Vaterländische Umkehr* enacted in the hymns and the letter to Böhlendorff, see Alleman, 20-27. I am making the assumption of situating the drama between Empedocles' two texts. Hölderlin himself does not refer to either of Empedocles's works. The philological work of Diels and Kranz was, of course, not available to him. As Schmidt points out, Hölderlin relies mostly on Diogenes Laertius's account of Empedocles (which contains the fragment where Empedocles calls himself an immortal). See *Germans and Other Greeks*, 154-155. Of course, strictly speaking both of Empedocles' texts must predate the action of the drama, since the drama ends with his death. But, again, in keeping with Orphic tradition, the "purification" is the preparation for death. On a consideration of Hölderlin's interpretation of Empedocles in light of modern Presocratic scholarship and in light of Heidegger's scholarship, see Fóti, "Empedocles and Tragic Thought," 278-287.

Nature. So Hermocrates says, "That which made him too powerful was that he won the trust of gods. His words sounded to the people as if it rang out from Olympus. They gave him thanks for stealing from Heaven the flame of life, and for betraying it to mortals."[346] But this sacrilege also causes Empedocles to run afoul of the gods themselves, who once favored him but have now abandoned him. For our purposes, we can conceive of this in terms of the categories of the letter to Böhlendorff. In his philosophy, Empedocles has presented the holy to mortals, when it is originally known only through the cult (and therefore not known at all). And while these hard-won insights will eventually "deify" Empedocles, at first they separate him from the divine. The period between *On Nature* and *Purifications* is the period of Empedocles' own "search for the source" just prior to the decision that he makes when he reaffirms his link to nature and the holy by leaping into a volcano. It is the period marked by a despair very different than the moox of the arrogant Empedocles who reveals himself in the fragments we have, as we see in Hölderlin's presentation of Empedocles in Act One.

> Oh, by the holy wells
> Where waters from the veins of the earth
> Gather themselves and
> On hot days
> Satisfy those who are thirsty! In me,
> In me, you sources of life, you once flowed
> Out of the depths of the world
> And Came together in me, and
> The thirsty came to me --- but how is it now?
> Saddened? Am I completely alone?
> And is it night out here even in the daytime?
> One who saw higher than ever a mortal eye,
> Is now struck by blindness, and gropes his way around ---
> Where are you, my gods?[347]

[346] *Death of Empedocles*, 173f.
[347] *The Death of Empedocles*, 180.

By postulating the necessity of such a despairing Empedocles, Hölderlin suggests an indecisive Empedocles within the Empedocles who self-consciously lives the hyperdecisive life pulled apart by the conflicting origins of the divine. In this way, Hölderlin situates Empedocles in the time of the waning of Strife and the waxing of Love that Empedocles himself describes. It is from this place that Hölderlin is able to describe Empedocles' suicide as an act of freedom.[348]

It is interesting to note that Heidegger situates Hölderlin's attempts to write *The Death of Empedocles* at the time of despair between Hölderlin's attempt to come to what is his own through a self-conscious imitation of the Greeks in *Hyperion* and the (for Heidegger more successful) attempts in the hymns to think the historical difference between Greece and modernity. Heidegger reads this evolution in Hölderlin's thought in "*Remembrance*" "*Wo aber sind die Freunde*? *Bellarmin / Mit dem Gefährten*?" ("But where are the friends? Where Bellarmine / And his companion?")[349] As Heidegger points out, Bellarmin is the friend to whom Hyperion writes his letters in Hölderlin's early novel *Hyperion*. But:

> In the meantime, since the poetic period of Hölderlin's novel *Hyperion*, the poet has experienced other things. In the drama *Empedocles* the friend is no longer Bellarmin's companion. He has journeyed to another essential place. But even this place has been left behind in the interval. The *Empedocles* still belongs to the journey. *Homecoming* begins only where *The Wanderer* has crossed over to the poetic saying about the homeland's rivers ("The Rhine" and "The Ister"). Yet even the homecoming only begins the return to what is home. That is why the arriving one asks for the cup, and aspires to be able to abide in what is proper to him (*EHP*, 150).

In *The Death of Empedocles*, Heidegger sees Hölderlin as being somewhere between the pure indifference of the poetic practice of mariners such as Bellarmin and Hyperion, and

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[348] But cf. *On Germans and Other Greeks*, 162 (where Schmidt argues that Hölderlin never satisfactorily resolved the shape of this freedom with destiny). Fóti notes that this freedom has to be considered in conjunction with the republican aims to which Hölderlin wanted to put it ("Empedocles and Tragic Thought," 283).

[349] *Selected Poems & Fragments*, 490. I have modified Hamburger's translation from "companions" to "companion." The fact that it is singular in German is important for Heidegger.

therefore of the young Hölderlin himself, and the highly differentiated relationship between the foreign and the natural articulated in the hymns. This restless indifference which wanders on the currentless sea but already feels the pull of the river that is one's own, this is the Empedocles of Hölderlin's tragedy, but it is also the Hölderlin of the time of the Empedocles tragedy. While Heidegger finds a more successful Hölderlin in the hymns, one who really succeeds in founding a place and a destiny, he admits that Hölderlin's own fate is to return to this other, more indeterminate place. Thus, "Hölderlin's verse in *Empedocles* resounds like a premonition: 'He must / leave on time, through whom the spirit spoke" (*EHP*, 62).

3. Kierkegaard's Heraclitus.

It seems to me that the figure of Heraclitus plays a critical, if underdetermined, role in Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*. In determining this context, I will be going beyond Kierkegaard's intentions. I should therefore begin by acknowledging the roots of this turn to Kierkegaard in my anticipated interpretation of Heidegger's Sophocles. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, after Heidegger completes his interpretation of the differential unity of *phusis* and *logos* in Heraclitus and Parmenides, he turns to an analysis of the first choral ode from Sophocles's *Antigone*. This shift implicitly announces the question of genre. And it announces it in a way that calls to mind both the initial indeterminacy of the "genres" of poetry and philosophy and also the nascence of their determination. "The thinking of Parmenides and Heraclitus is still poetic, and here this means philosophical, not scientific. But because in this poetizing thinking, thinking has precedence, thinking about human Being also acquires its own direction and measure. In order to clarify this poetic thinking sufficiently in terms of its proper counterpart, we will now interrogate a thinking poetry of the Greeks" (*IM*, 154). The

oppositional harmony that characterizes the relationship between *logos* and *phusis* is the basis for the oppositional harmony between the "poetic thinking" of Heraclitus and Parmenides and the "thinking poetry" of Sophocles, but it is not identical to it. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger turns to Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Sophocles because they all think about *phusis* and *logos* in a certain way that prefigures, but also disfigures, our own contemporary ways of understanding the relation between being and thinking. This makes the relationship that Heidegger posits between the three fundamentally different than the sort of non-relation presupposed between Hamann and Trakl in "Language" or even Novalis and von Humboldt in "The Way to Language" (although I have tried to suggest a potentially different sense of this relationship at the end of Part Two).[350] Because they are still dealing with similar sets of concerns and from a similar perspective, the differences inherent in a poetical and philosophical treatment of *logos* (and therefore for us, implicitly, language too) will come to the forefront. But these differences, for Heidegger, do not introduce anything into the interpretation of *phusis* and logos which is not already there: These differences between early Greek poetical thinking and early Greek thoughtful poetry proceed from the (different) differences between *phusis* and logos; the former arise because of the indeterminate, indecisive character of our response to the latter.

But before we can grasp the equilibrium of determinacy in Sophocles, it would be instructive to watch how these themes play out in Heraclitus and, against this Heraclitean backdrop, also of Parmenides. If Heraclitus is characterizing the logos in a certain way, even if it is as a unity standing in the highest tension of differentiation, where is there room for indecision? But if there is such a room for indecision, what is the difference between poetry and philosophy?

[350] See *supra* -.

Does the distinction that I have been clinging to between concepts and metaphors, simply collapse? As we will see, for Heidegger the difference depends upon the force of factical history. Here, I will anticipate this indecision by briefly asking whether we can think about an ironic relation to the tradition that in some respect resolves the tension of Heraclitus's paradoxes. This is what I take Kierkegaard to suggest in Heraclitus.

Imagine the source of a stream in early summer, thousands of tiny rivulets trickling down a mountain, run-off from partially glaciated snow. The ground around this sort of source is fairly stable and remains more or less the same. But we must nonetheless agree with Heraclitus that it is impossible for anyone to step into the same river twice. Correlatively, it is impossible for two or three companions to step into the same river at the same time since slight hesitations or slightly different situations make everything slightly different. It is simply a matter of catching one's breath, of stopping to drink from the stream before crossing it, of catching the sunlight refracting on the snow, or simply listening to what someone else says which makes everything different. Of course, we must also acknowledge that these differences are insignificant. (Although no two flakes of snow are identical they are, for most intents and purposes, the same). What is not insignificant are the differences of response and differences of identity (between companions) that allow for insignificant differences to pool in the stream.

When Kierkegaard wants to appeal to the difference between Heraclitus and Parmenides he does so from the point of their acknowledged proximity in the ancient world. In this respect, he partially anticipates Heidegger's own conclusions about the relationship between Heraclitus and Parmenides.[351]

[351] Heidegger's own reasons for reaching this conclusion come largely out of the philological research of Karl Reinhardt. See Brogan 270-272 for a discussion of these affinities.

> "One must go further, one must go further." This urge to go further is an old story in the world. Heraclitus the obscure, who deposited his thoughts in his books and his books in Diana's temple (for his thoughts had been his armor in life, and therefore he hung it in the temple of the goddess), Heraclitus the obscure said: One cannot walk through the same river twice. Heraclitus the obscure had a disciple who did not remain standing there but went further --- and added: One cannot do it even once. Poor Heraclitus, to have a disciple like that! By this improvement, the Heraclitean thesis was amended into an Eleatic thesis that denies motion, and yet that disciple wished only to be a disciple of Heraclitus who went further, not back to what Heraclitus had abandoned.[352]

Given Heidegger's critique that Nietzsche failed to see the closeness of Parmenides and Heraclitus, I suspect that Heidegger would insist that Kierkegaard also fails to grasp the essential sameness of Parmenides and Heraclitus. After all, Heidegger's Parmenides could hardly be suspected to agree with his disciple Zeno and deny the existence of motion. But it seems to me that some slight differences here yield crucial distinctions. By seeing how these differences pool up, we will see a source of resistance for an overly patricidal understanding of the tradition, one which we can take with us to our readings of Heidegger and Celan.

First, Heraclitus deposits his thoughts in the form of a work which lends them a deceptive permanence, like armor. The ghost of the elder Hamlet also appears entirely covered in his armor, so that the armor does not reveal permanence so much as conceal what is impermanent --- the flesh that is no longer there. So Heraclitus, who is himself quite opaque, gives his thoughts to the goddess in the shape of the work of sacrifice. In so doing he abandons them, concealing himself within them. But he also entrusts them to a kind of subsistence that they would not have if he merely abandoned them by growing old, infirm and dying. This subsistence is itself only deceptively stable and, with its paradoxical formulae, says something that undercuts stability. To stand still within this tradition would be impossible because one cannot step in the same river

[352] Kierkegaard, Søren, *Fear and Trembling,* 123.

twice. Nonetheless, Kierkegaard censures the disciple for wanting to go further and not back to what Heraclitus had "abandoned:" the work of thought that was a sacrifice to the goddess.[353] This step beyond whereby the disciple hopes to radicalize what is already quite radical is doomed to failure, because Heraclitus has abandoned what he said, severing it from its own roots. As Plato argues in the *Phaedrus* (and as Derrida has shown with a penetrating depth in our own times), this sort of abandonment lies at the heart of the nature of writing.[354] But as Derrida has shown, writing exhibits this abandonment implicitly by the exposure of the roots of what is written. For Heidegger, the root of what is written in Heraclitus is the self-differentiating unity of logos and *physis* which understands being in terms of flux. Heraclitus exposes this root in the form of a sacrifice, but his disciple misunderstands its nature by taking it to be the starting place of a tradition, the architectural fundaments for the house of Ionian philosophy. Taking up the "child" that Heraclitus has abandoned proves to be the manner in which the disciple kills Heraclitus off. Although Kierkegaard's brief comments are not intended to deal with this question, one wonders how the relationship between Parmenides and his own disciples should be understood. With the "patricide" of Father Parmenides by the Eleatic Stranger, Plato found a ready answer for that question, and Heidegger self-consciously follows in the same tradition. [355]

But is patricide really the whole story of the relationship between teacher and student? Oedipus, that paragon of patricide, received his name because he was abandoned.[356] Laius had

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[353] This confusion between stepping-forward and stepping-back has clear parallels in Heidegger's way of appropriating the Kierkegaardian leap (where he insists that the only way to cross over to the other beginning is through the "step-back" of reticence or reservedness --- cf. *C*, §§115-167), and also, as we shall see below, in Celan's treatment of Lucile and Lenz. (See *infra*).

[354] See in particular Derrida's interpretation of *Phaedrus* in "Plato's Pharmacy."

[355] See *Sophist*, 241d; *Plato's Sophist*, 294-300.

[356] In *Antigone's Claim*, Judith Butler gives a good account of the patriarchal elements of the Oedipus cycle. She also shows that many interpretations have downplayed the centrality of patriarchy. See in particular the section on "Promiscuous Obedience," (Butler, 57-82).

been warned that he would be killed by his son and so he pierced the baby's ankles and left him exposed to the elements to die. In the absence of a given proper name, Oedipus's adoptive parents therefore named him for his swollen feet. Ignorance of this name, the riddle that hides his parentage from him, is the condition for the state of ignorance in which he kills Laius and marries Jocasta. Unraveling the riddle of his name gives him the moment of recognition in *Oedipus the King* and brings him his catastrophic downfall. [357] The condition of Oedipus's patricide turns out to be predicated on Laius's filicide. It is as the survivor of this atrocity that Oedipus comes to understand the monstrosity that he has himself done. Does this mean Laius inadvertently committed suicide, like Jocasta? After all, his ignorance, unlike Oedipus's ignorance, was willful.

I make this digression to suggest a limitation on the story of patricide, a story which is quite common in philosophy. If a story's symbolic value is taken seriously, the story of Oedipus has more than a tangential relationship to the situation of writing. Oedipus's great-grandfather, the founder of the city of Thebes, Cadmus --- a Phoenician --- is credited with introducing the Phoenician alphabet to the Greeks.[358] The figure of patricide, so important for hermeneutical approaches that do not want to see the relationship between past and present as one of pure activity and pure passivity, needs to be reconsidered, even if it is troubling to evoke such a

[357] For this story see Sophocles, *Oedipus The King,* 1015-1183. Jocasta, who knew a little more than Oedipus, unraveled the mystery slightly quicker. But like Laius she preferred ignorance to knowledge. This suggests that the drive to metaphysics is not necessarily a genetic trait, unless it is a mutation (like having three eyes). See Hölderlin, *Poems and Fragments*, 602-605 for the claim that Oedipus is cursed to have an eye too many.
[358] Compare Kirk, G.S., *The Nature of Greek Myths* 158-159. While Kirk disputes that Cadmus was originally of Phoenician origin (he points to the Mycenean Cadmeins in Homer), he allows that this origin was certainly part of the story by Euripedes, whose influence on Plato is considerable. That this shift in origins should be in evidence around the time of Plato is significant for reasons which I discuss at the beginning of my fourth point.

violent seeming form of hermeneutics. But whether this rhetorical violence is really itself at all violent, or is merely a figure which has perhaps served its time, remains to be seen.

Now, my purpose here is merely to contextualize how I see Heidegger's Sophocles (by way of Kierkegaard's Heraclitus *inter alia*) enacting the equilibrium between hyperdecisiveness and indecisiveness. One critical aspect of Heidegger's treatment of the first choral ode from Antigone is his account of the violent struggle between *phusis* and *techne*.[359] One of the reasons for my digression was to set up some of the limits of that interpretation on the basis of the matters being interpreted. But I think that it is equally important to follow this discussion out a little further to glimpse the tradition in which Heidegger's claim that Sophocles is a political thinker stands.

Let me suggest that Kierkegaard's brief treatment of Heraclitus at the end of *Fear and Trembling* presents a thinker whose manner of thinking self-destructs if it is taken up as the foundation of a tradition. The generation of this textual tradition is rhetorically linked both to sexual generation and to death. The son (and in the stories we are dealing with it is always a son and a father) wants to live and to procreate (linked with power), but in order to do so he must kill the father. This proposition has become the thumbnail understanding of Freud that we all carry with us as part of our modern heritage, ingrained in us as deeply the ability to use an ATM machine or to tune out Muzak. But, for whatever reason (perhaps because it goes against our equally superficial thumbnail understanding of Darwin), we tend to forget the correlative claim that the reason why the son must usurp the father in order to procreate is that the father will not

[359] Clare Pearson Geiman provides a good presentation of the relevant scholarship (see Geiman, 310 n.1). While she grants that violence plays a large role in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, she argues that when Heidegger turns to an interpretation of Sophocles more directly oriented towards poetry in his lecture courses on *Der Ister*, he also moves away from the centrality of violence in interpreting the relationship between *techne* and *dike* in the first choral ode (Geiman 172-182).

let any one but himself procreate. The son must kill the father because the father is a tyrant. And the son who becomes the father by killing the father is, from the beginning, guilty. This element was the critical element for Greek piety and for the worship of Zeus, as Plato recognized in the *Euthyphro*.[360] This was the story that was embodied in the Greek theogony and that was presupposed in the symbolic reenactment of this story in the cycle of Theban stories.

When Kierkegaard turns to Heraclitus, it is in the context of the story of Abraham and Isaac, which is, of course, also about the father sacrificing the son. The main argument of the book is that to go further than the story of Abraham would be to do away with the greatest mystery, the end of violence: that Abraham does not lose Isaac. The disciple of Heraclitus does away with Heraclitus by going further. What is interesting here is Kierkegaard's stratagem: "a deception" that serves to show the true value of the highest values.[361] This deception is vague and is layered in a host of stories and images, many of which undercut the violent image of a power struggle between father and son at the same time they are supposed to provide an analogy: the mother who weans the child to set her free, for example, or the lovers who must learn to resign themselves to their separate freedoms.

From this perspective, Heraclitus begins to emerge as the figure who resists the patricidal force of a certain tradition by submitting himself wholeheartedly to the movement of that tradition. Thus, Heraclitus beats his own students to the punch line of advancing beyond him by asserting that everything changes like the flow of a river. Like Hamlet the elder, his armor conceals that there is nothing there anymore to kill. But where Hamlet the elder still stands in the sphere of filicide and wills his son's eventual death as the price for his own vengeance,

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[360] Plato, *Euthyphro*, 5e-6a.

[361] Thus he compares the effect that the argument of *Fear and Trembling* is to have on the value of faith to the practice of dumping goods in the harbor to drive up prices. Compare *Fear and Trembling*, 121.

Heraclitus willingly buries himself in a mound of obscurity. Kierkegaard's decision to employ Heraclitus as the thinker whom one cannot go beyond stalls the patricidal progress of that tradition in the paradox, an expression of a moment of equilibrium between decision and indecision, the eddying of a pool in a river where the water seems to go both forwards and backwards.

From this perspective, many of the biographical stories that were made up about him and chronicled by Diogenes take on a different light. For Kirk and Raven stories such as the one "told by Diogenes that he refused to make laws for the Ephesians but preferred playing with children in the temple of Artemis" show "malicious intent": "Most of these stories are based on well-known sayings of Heraclitus; many were intended to make him look ridiculous, and were invented with malicious intent by Hellenistic pedants who resented his superior tone."[362] While it is scarcely imaginable that stories such as this, or that he died after burying himself in a pile of dung because no one could decipher from his riddles that he needed to be treated for the dropsy, [363] were invented for any reason other than to make fun of him, it is also worth asking how damning they really are. Would someone who held that god was a child playing[364] necessarily be chagrined by stories that said he preferred playing with children to being involved in petty squabbles of the sort he radiated disdain for? Might not someone who thought that most people "vainly purify themselves of blood-guilt by defiling themselves with blood, as though one who had stepped into mud were to wash with mud"[365] be happy to make his own sacrifice in the bloodless form of writing, even if this story this turned out to be a tale? At any rate, Kirk and

[362] Kirk and Raven, 182.
[363] Compare Kirk and Raven, 181.
[364] Fragment 52. Heidegger discusses this fragment at the end of his lecture course on *The Principle of Reason*, which deconstructs Leibniz's principle of reason by referring it to its roots in logos (*Principle of Reason*, 113).
[365] Heraclitus, Fragment 5 in Kirk and Raven, 209.

Raven acknowledge that the story that Heraclitus abdicated the hereditary kingship of Ephesus to his brother might very well be true. But why should it be a "sign of his arrogance" as Antisthenes insists?[366] Seen from this perspective, Heraclitus's text seems to make room for a tradition that is both determined and undetermined. What his disciple does is what Heraclitus expected him to do, because he had no false belief in the peaceful or resigned character of human beings. Seen from this perspective, Heraclitus's life and death appears as the comic counterpoint to the tragic life and death of Empedocles. One is reminded, for example, of the value that Aristophanes' puts on the profitability of peace.[367] By thinking about war in terms of exchange, and exchange in terms of the movement of logos, Heraclitus (like Kierkegaard) ends up thinking about the possibility of peace as the end of violence, which is only possible as a harmony that emerges even from conflict. At least, this seems to be one possibility suggested by a few remarks of Kierkegaard. What is suggested in an oblique way by the textuality of Heraclitus's sacrifice is that somehow this possibility depends upon the nature in which writing exposes the elements of conflict. What is suggested in a symbolic way by the origin of Cadmus is that the conflict writing exposes is the conflict of generation. But this is not adequately developed philosophically until Derrida approaches Plato and Heidegger, and even then the temporal character of writing must be tied into the question of generation. Heidegger could have accomplished this by turning to the significance of genre to his understanding of art and developing a theory of the philosophical significance of poetry as literature, but as we have seen he never adequately did this. I will argue that Celan's understanding of the exigencies and

[366] Confer Kirk and Raven, 183. Antisthenes, like the Megareans, was an early proponent of the theory of Forms whom Plato discusses at *Sophist*, 251a-251c. For a presentation of his ideas and his hostility to Heraclitus, see Aristotle, *Topics*, 104b.
[367] In the *Archanians*, this profitability is monetary, in the *Lysistrata* it is sexual.

resources of modern literature points towards one way of developing such a Heideggerian theory. In order to show this, however, I will first return to Heidegger's relationship to the ancients in order to examine whether our lyrical appropriation of Heidegger provides us with a different classical tradition out of which to imagine our own modern times.

Gathering at the Gates of the City: *Seven Against Thebes*

It may well seem that through this last three examples, I have introduced a number of heterogenous elements into my discourse on lyricism. That is entirely true, and it is intentional. I suspect that my reasons for doing so will not be clear until the end of the book and beg my patient reader's indulgence for a few more pages. Suffice it to say for now that the selection of themes that I have introduced in the previous examples are intended to introduce themes that will be crucial in seeing what concretely will be revealed as the unsaid within Heidegger's philosophy through Celan's poetry. The apparently arbitrary themes abruptly introduced in the previous three examples will turn out to have a double life within the Heideggerean and Celanian *oeuvre.* On the one hand, they will continue to function on the "ontic" register as part of the content proper to what Heidegger and Celan say. On the other hand, they will also exhibit important "ontological" features of the meta-philosophical and poetological content of the "unsaid" of their work. By drawing attention to them, I am trying to draw attention to the figure that ties these ontic and ontological elements together. My contention is that this figure is structured in a way that is fundamentally lyrical (or lyrico-tragic), and that this lyricism offers an alternative to the fundamentally epical (or epico-tragic) way in which so much post-Kantian philosophy has understood itself, history and poetry.

Let us therefore return to the epic. From our lyrical perspective, we are finally in a position to fully distinguish the epic from tragedy and thus to take both seriously in their own right. We can see this by focusing on the relationship between war and peace in the mythopoetic epic of Plato on the one hand and in the tragedy of Aeschylus on the other.

The violence of the relationship between *physis* and *techne* that Heidegger finds in ancient Greek thought has its roots in the divine and human power struggle between fathers and sons. When Plato shunts the mythopoetic from the *polis,* he retains this particular mythopoetic root in the form of the noble lie. There are strong similarities between the mythical, autochthonic origin of the people of Thebes (if not the house of Cadmus) from the earth and the autochthonic "myth of metals" that the guardians tell in the *Republic* to conceal the foreign origin of the people (and to justify the division of people into classes).[368]

Kirk summarizes the myth of the founding of Thebes as it is told by Euripedes, "There was a spring where the cow [Europa, Cadmus's sister] lay down, but it was guarded by a dragon sacred to Ares; Cadmus killed it and sowed its teeth, which produced a crop of armed warriors. By throwing a stone among them he turned them against each other, but the five that stayed alive became ancestors of the chief clans of Thebes."[369] The political significance of this tie between the people of Thebes and the earth upon which their city is built is already recorded well before Plato, by Aeschylus, in *Seven Against Thebes*. The treatment of this theme in *Seven Against Thebes* is instructive for three reasons: first, because it builds on the themes of the previous example by providing a tragic presentation of the peace that emerges from war; second, because it provides us with a good indication of the background understanding in which Sophocles's

[368] *Republic*, 414c-415d.
[369] Kirk, 157.

treatment of the Theban cycle is told; and finally because it sets up the connection between Heidegger's treatment of that story and the claim that the work of the poet is to found what remains in recollection.

When Eteocles, the son of Oedipus, seeks to spur the people of Thebes to the defense of their city from the foreign army led by his brother Polyneices, he makes repeated appeals to this nativity and links it to their language: "This is a town that speaks with a Greek tongue. / City and land of the Cadmeans are free: / do not bind her in slavish yoke; be her protector."[370] The chorus of Theban women echoes this plea in its prayers to the gods:

> You, Ares, protect the city of Cadmus, that bears your name.
> Show your care for it, in manifest presence.
> And Cypris, who are our ancestress
> turn destruction away. We are sprung from your blood
> and we approach you and cry
> with prayers for the ears of the Gods. . . .
> Protectors of our country's forts,
> do not betray this city, spear-won,
> to a foreign-tongued enemy.
> Hear O hear the prayers, hands outstretched,
> of the virgins supplicating in justice.[371]

But curiously Eteocles takes their prayers as a direct challenge to his perspective and involves them in a debate as to whether they will be saved by the gods or their own strength, which Eteocles explicitly links to the question of sexual difference.

> *Eteocles*: Do not call upon the Gods
> and then be guided wrongly.
> Obedience is mother to success,
> and success is parent of rescue ---
> so runs the proverb.
>
> *Chorus*: This is true: but the strength of God is still greater.
> Oftentimes when a man is hopelessly sunk
> in misfortune He raises him, yes from his greatest sorrow

[370] Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes,* 73-75.
[371] Aeschylus, 138-143, 168-172.

while the clouds still hang over him, high above our eyes.

Eteocles: But it is man's part, the sacrifice, the consultation
of the Gods, when the enemy assault us;
it is yours to be silent and stay within doors.[372]

The debate here is not immediately about the priority of fate or freedom but is rather between the relative force of gods and mortals. It also concerns the question of who has the power and right to invoke the gods. Nonetheless, there is a strong sense of the denial of fate here. Eteocles wants to avoid his congenitally appointed doom as part of the house of Cadmus and son of Oedipus. It is not until he realizes that he will decide to fight against his own brother that Eteocles changes his tune, realizing that a great deal which he had thought still up in the air might actually already be determined: "With the God's will, I may indeed speak truth . . . But success --- that is for men the gift of God alone . . . If Gods give ill, no man may shun their giving."[373] As the chorus immediately makes clear, the Gods being referred to in this last line are the Furies, who punish violence within the family. While Eteocles has been invoking the defense of the native country against foreigners the fictionality of this defense reaches its limit in his own person. After all, the army is led by his brother, hardly a stranger. Polyneices is marching against Eteocles because Eteocles has exiled Polyneices in order to make a grab for complete power. This rift between brothers is the curse that Oedipus pronounced on them for casting him out after he had blinded himself.[374] The threat of the foreign army conceals the fear that the city will be engulfed in the atrocities of its own rulers: "Our defense between is but a little thing / no bigger that a wall in width. / I fear that with our princes / our city be subdued."[375]

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[372] Aeschylus, 222-232.
[373] Aeschylus, 563, 625, 719.
[374] These events are the subject of the Choral Ode at 720-791. They are also the one of the main themes of Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*. For the curse, see *Oedipus at Colonus*, 1372-1396.
[375] Aeschylus, 763-765.

The moment of equilibrium between the overdetermined fate of the house of Cadmus and the indeterminacy that would here mark a respite from the meddling of the gods in the affairs of mortals does not come for Eteocles and Polyneices, nor does it come for their sisters Antigone and Ismene. The tragedy ends on a curiously active note with Antigone vowing to bury Polyneices despite the edicts of Thebes and half of the chorus vowing to help her come what may.[376] Nonetheless, there is a moment of some equilibrium. It is called, once again, peace.

Peace gives a perspective on the power of the past: "It has worked to an end, not failed, / the curses called on them by their father of old. / The decisions of Laius, wanting in faith, / have had effect till now."[377] The chorus then asks how we mourn for this house which has brought so much suffering on them but whose death has finally delivered them to peace. They join with Antigone and Ismene in mourning their brothers' deaths, but even Ismene must admit, "one may say over the bodies of this unhappy pair: / much they have done to their fellow citizens, / and much to all the ranks of foreigners / who died in this destructive war."[378] This sympathy for all who have suffered stands in marked contrast to the imprecations that the chorus had previously hurled on the foreigners. This is because the chorus must recognize that the brothers' atrocities have somehow come to an end without forgetting them. "Their enmity is ended, in the earth / blood-drenched their life is mingled. / Very brothers are they now. / Bitter the reconciler of their feud, / stranger from over the sea, / sped hither by the fire / whetted steel. / A bitter and evil divider of possessions, Ares, who made their father's curse / a thing of utter truth."[379] The form of remembrance in which they are mourned is a lyrical dialogue between Antigone and Ismene

[376] Aeschylus, 1064-1072. That Antigone receives active support from the chorus and does not bury Polyneices alone is of course a marked difference from Sophocles' treatment of the story.
[377] Aeschylus, 840-843.
[378] Aeschylus 922-925.
[379] Aeschylus, 938-946.

where their suffering and their wickedness, their love and their hate, their monstrosity and their pitiability form a counter-point.[380]

This is the ending of Aeschylus's Theban trilogy (The other two plays do not, however, survive.) But it is indisputable that it is almost exclusively through Sophocles' presentation of the Theban stories that their significance for Western philosophy and poetry has come, and it is with Sophocles that Heidegger is concerned. I have dwelt on these stories for so long because I am trying to flesh out the backdrop whence Sophocles' concern comes, to the extent that it is available to us, and to point out alternative ways of understanding what Sophocles treats. It needs to be kept in mind that for Heidegger, as for Hölderlin, something historically significant actually happens in Sophocles' plays. We are not accustomed to thinking in this way. It is therefore difficult to see what the power of Sophocles' plays would occlude us from understanding about the background set of assumptions from which his plays proceed. Our treatment of Sophocles should proceed from the assumption that it is a fundamental mistake to read any text merely as a document attesting to the culture, concerns and prejudices (even in the productive Gadamerian sense) from which it emerged. For Heidegger this is true of any great work of art. But this also must be true to some extent of any work of art. It is my contention that this expansion of Heidegger's claim should form one of the core propositions around which we develop a theory of the development of art in its multiplicity, its manifold response to that living tissue wherein we relate to languages that we are not entirely at home in, to a conceptual realm in which we find much more than merely ourselves.

[380] Aeschylus, 961-1004.

Despite the considerable, seemingly monolithic influence of Sophocles, the story of the house of Thebes has trickled into our culture in more ways than just through the story of Sophocles and indeed forms what little remains of an epical, mythopoetic core within Plato's mature philosophy. This core addresses the same set of concerns that Aeschylus relies on, but with an explicit acknowledgment of their fictional character.

> Could we somehow contrive . . . some one noble lie to persuade, in the best case, even the rulers, but if not them, the rest of the city? . . . Nothing new, but a Phoenician thing, which has already happened in many places before, as the poets assert and have caused others to believe, but one that has not happened in our time --- and I don't know if it could --- one that requires a great deal of persuasion. . . I'll attempt to persuade first the rulers and the soldiers, then the rest of the city, that the rearing and education we gave them were like dreams; they only thought they were undergoing all that was happening to them, while, in truth, at that time they were under the earth within, being fashioned and reared themselves, and their arms and other tools being crafted. When the job had been completely finished, then the earth, which is their mother, sent them up. And now, as though the land they are in were a mother and nurse, they must plan for and defend it, if anyone attacks, and they must think of the other citizens as brothers and born of the earth.[381]

This story continues with the myth of metals, where the souls of the various classes in the city are said to come from metals of varying value. Interestingly, Glaucon does not see how the first generation of believers could be persuaded of this story but they both agree that it would not be difficult to persuade "their sons and their successors and the rest of the human beings who come afterwards."[382] And it is this explicitly mythopoetic feature of the "Phoenician" myth that Plato seems most interested in retaining, since in the *Laws* it again serves as the paradigm for the credulity with which people are willing to believe that they have some fantastic origin.[383] Given its appeal to the truth of another level of truth over the material fact and its use in justifying an

[381] *Republic*, 414c-e.
[382] *Republic*, 415d.
[383] Cf. Plato. *Laws,* 663e.

inequitable state of affairs, it is not much of a stretch to call this the first appearance in Western philosophy of ideology as such. And where Aeschylus brings the story to an end in a momentary peace, Plato uses it to set up the permanent internal war that the guardians must wage against injustice. It is certainly clear that the noble lie remains the paradigmatic example of that use of education for the philosophical molding of the state to its own images and idols which many Heideggerian scholars have identified as at the root of Heidegger's decision to ally his rectorship of Freiburg University with the larger National Socialist movement.[384] I have been calling this moment epical, and, in fact, Plato's description of the noble lie would fall under his description of the narrative style of poetry, i.e. the epic.[385]

I have been seeking to contextualize the reading of Sophocles which accompanies the aftermath of Heidegger's decision. What should be clear is that Heidegger is not importing some idiosyncratic element into the story of Oedipus by reading Sophocles's text as addressing the founding of a city. That is what the story of the house of Thebes taken as a whole was always about.[386] What is interesting is that the varied lessons which ancient philosophers and poets drew from it and the varied uses to which they put it coalesce quite explicitly around the set of themes that marks a great deal of the terrain in which these issues are situated in contemporary

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[384] See my discussion of Lacoue-Labarthe, *supra* -. *The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics* brings together a number of essays that address this question. See in particular Kisiel's discussion of Heidegger's relation to the *Republic* in "university Reform" in "Heidegger's Apology," 43-45; and Michael Zimmerman's expansion of Lacoue-Labarthe's designation of Heidegger's philosophy as a National Aestheticism in "Ontological Aestheticism: Heidegger, Jünger and National Socialism." Reiner Schürmann's suggestion that the conjunction of *logos* and law (l*ex*, *nomos*) in the *Contributions* might represent a response to the totalitarian elements of his philosophy is particularly interesting ("Riveted to a Monstrous Site," 322-328). See also Fynsk, Christopher. *Heidegger: Thought and Historicity*, 104-130; 230-249. For an expansion of the "Nazi" element of Heidegger's thought beyond the ideological element with which Lacoue-Labarthe is concerned, see in particular Farias, Victor. *Heidegger et le Nazisme*. A number of philosophers have criticized Farias's conclusions. Here, note in particular Lacoue-Labarthe's response at *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 123-137 and Derrida's in "Heidegger's Hell." Farias responds to these criticisms and others in the preface to the Spanish edition, included in *The Heidegger Case*.

[385] Cf. *Republic*, 329d.

[386] Thus, Kirk classifies the story of Cadmus as "an example of a mythical founder figure" (Kirk, 156).

Continental philosophy: the foreignness or impurity that lies beneath the origin, the consequent fictionality of the idea of an origin, the political effectiveness of the fiction of an origin, birth, death, excess (Dionysus is the grandson of Cadmus --- he is Oedipus's first cousin thrice removed), madness, reason, technology, writing, justice, violence, mourning, trauma, guilt and peace to name a few of those themes that are most important for me. Much more could be said about these themes, and I have already devoted too much space to them here. For now, suffice it to say that this similarity of concerns does not make what ancient interpretations of the Theban cycle said about these issues true anymore than it means we are necessarily right to continue to group these themes together. But it does indicate the contours of a history shared by Western philosophy and poetry. This shared root needs to be taken into account when we think of the variegated development of these ways of thinking, as do many other shared roots. And if the life of the mind which these ways of thinking exemplify ends up having an actual effective force, perhaps we would have to acknowledge that this shared root tells us something about Western history as such. But these possibilities remain tethered to the way of thinking which formulates them and therefore to the question of the meaning of being. All of these assertions remain unfulfilled promises unless it can be shown how this tradition gives us a good picture of the manifold indeterminacy of being wherein the present becomes ambiguous and, by being ambiguous, sets itself in a new relationship to past and future, in a critical relationship to itself. This awaits a description of this tradition in terms of the question of being. Such a description is itself arbitrary unless it is hooked to the question of genre, the locus for asking about the type of being pertaining to written beings. But the question of genre is the question of the historicity of the development of language and logos in the form of the work of art, and this question requires

a conception of the human activity which affects this work. I had promised five examples of the sort of human being who engages in this least immediately human of human activities, but I have only provided three. The final two require a much longer set up because they concern the two examples through which I will take up this larger set of questions.

Heidegger's Sophocles: Violence and *The Introduction to Metaphysics*

4. Heidegger's treatment of the first choral ode from Antigone is intended to further develop how the harmony and division between being and thinking (*phusis* and logos, *noein* and *einai*) in ancient Greek thought gives a concrete, but manifold, understanding of being, concrete because it is determined by internal difference and manifold because it enables all the other divisions internal to being that have been formative for Western thought. Following on the heels of his interpretation of Heraclitus,[387] Heidegger offers an interpretation of Parmenides' saying that "thinking and being are the same."[388] His ultimate conclusion is that "*What Parmenides' saying expresses is a determination of the human essence on the basis of the essence of Being itself*" (*IM*¸153 --- the italics are Heidegger's). But Heidegger goes on to argue that we face an apparently insurmountable difficulty because our own metaphysical determination of the essence of the human being is built upon concepts, the development of whose own meaning is deeply embedded in the evolution of the philosophical tradition. So, "because the thoughtful determination of Being-human that Parmenides accomplishes is difficult to approach directly and strikes us as strange, we will first seek help and instruction by listening to a poetic projection of Being-human among the Greeks" (*IM*, 155f). Is it then easy to understand the determination of the human being in Sophocles? Hardly. In fact, Sophocles is addressing the human being's

[387] *IM*, 133-144. For my interpretation, see *supra* -.
[388] Parmenides, Fragment 3. Compare *IM*, 144-156.

strange character, as the opening words of the ode point out: "manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing / uncannier than man bestirs itself, rising up beyond him."[389] Something that is uncanny (*deinon*) is by necessity difficult to understand. Of course, there is a difference between the difficulty that Heidegger highlights in Parmenides and the difficulty that Sophocles addresses: the first is historically determined (it has become uniquely difficult for us to understand) and the second is determined by the matter under discussion (it treats something that is inherently uniquely difficult to understand). This difference in the sort of difficulty we encounter has to do with the fact that our understanding of the history of the mind is already structured by the difference between genres: here between poetry and philosophy.

It is necessary for Heidegger to turn to poetry at this point. It accords with the logic of his later philosophy. But an essential rule of that logic emerges here. The turn to poetry is necessitated for us by our modern situation in a way without precedence in the ancient world.[390] The goal that Heidegger announces at the end of the "Letter on Humanism" and again in "The Way to Language," to treat both philosophy and poetry as both thoughtful and poetic, the goal that I have been taking as the watchword of this book, is for Heidegger a modern expedient. This is because it seems that it would have been superfluous in the ancient world, at least before Plato, since the categories of human activity that we call philosophy and poetry were not strictly separated. For this reason, Heidegger can think of the thought of Parmenides and Heraclitus as still being poetic and the poetry of Sophocles as still being thoughtful.[391] But the difference in

[389] Qtd.in *IM*, 156. I will be using Fried and Polt's translation of Heidegger's translation of Sophocles. The ode is found in *Antigone*, 332-372

[390] This claim would have to be addressed in terms of Plato's initial formulation of the difference between philosophy and poetry. But there, the difference still has to be determined on the basis of how they comport themselves to things and cannot be taken merely as separate designations for two clearly demarcated regions of thought.

[391] *IM*, 154.

the way that we understand poetry and the way that we understand philosophy shapes how we understand the ancient world as much as it shapes our understanding of the modern world of ideas. So we can see Sophocles in a different light than we see Heraclitus and Parmenides, without stepping outside of our historical prejudices. The differences between genres have to be understood as part and parcel of the unfolding of manifold ways of thinking that have accompanied the development of the question about the meaning of being.

Now, this way of thinking has some very real traps, which are all too easy to fall into. Heidegger comes dangerously close to saying that the pre-Platonic philosophers enjoy an essential privilege because their thinking is poetic. Whether or not this is true for Heidegger is a debatable point and requires addressing some interpretive issues that I think quickly become unproductive. It seems clear (and relatively uncontroversial) to me that Heidegger is right to claim that one of the most distinctive characteristics of philosophy before Plato is that it is much more closely tied to poetry and mythology than the tradition after Plato (with at least the one important exception of the mythopoetic character of the metaphysical state). And I think that only the most dogmatic rationalists and irrationalists would deny that such a link has some real advantages over more conceptual philosophical approaches along with some critical disadvantages. All of this is a trap, but a rather obvious trap.

The more dangerous trap comes from assuming that we can easily reckon with such an obvious trap. There is of course considerable debate about what the advantages and disadvantages of poetry and philosophy are and what their relative merits would be. But it would be pointless to weigh these advantages and disadvantages on a scale. Nonetheless, this is what we do when we seek to apply poetry as a corrective to philosophy or vice-versa. Let me

call this danger the Romantic danger because it is exemplified by the relationship between philosophy and poetry that the Romantics tried to set up through criticism and that we have already explored in some detail.[392] Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy are right to identify this as a species of absolutism and to discern its tentacles embedded deep within twentieth-century thought, even so-called post-modern thought.[393]

In Heidegger scholarship the romantic trap is exemplified in the debate over whether or not Heidegger's own philosophy listened enough to poetry. This question is unfortunately a critical question in Heidegger scholarship.[394] The investigation of this question has made real and important findings concerning the philosophical importance of particular poems and presents striking, persuasive challenges and confirmations to Heidegger's way of thinking. But it is wrong to put these findings to use asking about the extent to which Heidegger was willing to incorporate poetic, non-philosophical insights into his thought. To do so presupposes an answer about what philosophy and poetry are and presupposes that we already know what that answer is.[395] As I have tried to argue in the previous two parts of this book, we simply cannot make these distinctions without further ado, because of the generic and genetic similarities between philosophy and poetry. If listening carefully to specific poems helps to push Heidegger's philosophy to new insights which are not so clearly realized in previous philosophical discourse, it should be seen as expanding, clarifying, or changing the capacities of philosophical discourse.

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[392] See *supra* -.
[393] *The Literary Absolute*, 16.
[394] See my discussion of this literature at *supra* fn. 90.
[395] Derrida highlights this problem in the interview "Is there a Philosophical Language?" (See in particular, 217-218). He uses it to insist that the question of genre cannot be applied to the relationship between literature and philosophy. His reasons for avoiding talking about them as genres is that it seems to impute a stable, non-overlapping identity between them. By treating the question of genre as a question about historical differentiation and the development of what is original in art, my understanding of genre does not involve these problematic assumptions. My discussion of genre as an operation therefore follows more closely on what Derrida calls the law of genre. See *supra* fn.97.

If rereading these poems in a new light or reading poems with a very different sensibility raise challenges to Heidegger's way of thinking, these new readings should be seen as continuing the still vital discipline of philosophy, not as showing that Heidegger had not properly balanced the ledger between the fixed domains of "philosophy" and "poetry." Let me insist, however, that I do not think this means philosophy has no meaning apart from its current determination. But I do not think that its current determination is irrelevant to what it is. This is the point of talking about concept formation and metaphor formation. There is an ideal entity, analogous to an essence, that helps us to explain what is distinctive about a particular genre, but this entity is temporal. Its temporality is, moreover, rooted in the most fundamental registers of the significance of temporality for Dasein. And, finally, its temporality overlaps with the temporality of any other kind of work of art without being reducible to it.

As I have shown in Part One, the first person to fall prey to the danger of romanticizing Heidegger was Heidegger, but he was also the first person to point the way out of this danger. Here, I am more interested in the latter path, but this of course presupposes some involvement with the former. For now, suffice it to say that for Heidegger, and for both the well-wishers and nay-sayers who followed in his footsteps, the Romantic trap was prepared by a third danger, the metaphysical trap. When I say the metaphysical trap, I do not mean merely that the practice of metaphysics is a trap. I also mean that it is a trap to merely dismiss metaphysics as a trap. The metaphysical trap is a particularly insidious trap because it announces itself as a trap. The romantic trap is the trap of the avant-garde, and it constructs the self-denying practice of metaphysics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Maurice Blanchot has made this argument forcefully with regards to literature, which has become obsessed with the idea of the

avant-garde in the last two centuries. Because literature is a self-contesting practice, it is constantly courting the possibility of its own exhaustion. But as long as the illusions of progress and originality are preserved, literature continues.[396] Of course, the fact that Blanchot shows this illusion to be an illusion but continues to write literature (and to write in a style that borrows heavily from the surrealists who were the avant-garde *par excellence*, or, perhaps better, the avant-garde *ad absurdum*) raises the question of what literature looks like when it comes to term with its own illusions. What happens to the genre of metaphysics when its illusory presuppositions are revealed to be illusions? What is clear is that, in this same situation, literature continues. If literature has this paradoxical status because it is a self-contesting discipline, what would we say of philosophy, particularly of the sort of philosophy that takes its self-understanding from its capacity to ask any question? But this is what philosophy is for Heidegger.[397] And metaphysics, from the beginning, has been the discipline of philosophy which is willing to ask the deepest, most difficult, perhaps most self-deprecating questions.[398] Until we recognize that any set of works which defines its cohesion by radical questioning will be inherently fluid and therefore capable of tremendous overlap with other sets of works, we will never be able to grasp the productive, finite meanings of the concerns, themes and presuppositions which define a particular set of works. Until we grasp the fluidity of metaphysics, the variegated critical definitions of metaphysics which we have been constantly

[396] "How is Literature Possible?" See *supra* fn. 170.
[397] See *IM* 1-10. Here and elsewhere the root of philosophy in the questioning attitude is closely linked both to the uselessness of philosophy and to its mode of investigating the meaning of being as the question concerning being. These three features are woven together in a particularly interesting way in Heidegger's interpretation of the mystical poet Angelus Silesius in *The Principle of Reason*. On this section of *The Principle of Reason*, see Caputo, John. *Mystical Elements in Heidegger's Thought*, 97-140.
[398] In addition to the sources in Heidegger listed above, note Aristotle's claim at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* that philosophy and science develop because people wonder and desire by nature to know (*Metaphysics*, 980a-983a).

treated to for the last two centuries will remain worthless, because they will amount to nothing more than a definition of metaphysics as whatever we adjudge wrong with the present situation of philosophy. Perhaps this is an inevitable consequence of the dogmatism of pre-Kantian, eighteenth century metaphysics, or even of scholasticism of all stripes. But we must learn to see that metaphysics and literature, or poetry and philosophy if you prefer, always overlap to the extent that they are sometimes even practically one and the same. Until we do this, it will be hard to grasp their actual differences in anything more than an arbitrary (at best) or prejudicial (at worst) manner.

It is from this perspective that we must evaluate Heidegger's claim that Sophocles's understanding of the human being is more accessible to us moderns than is that of Heraclitus or Parmenides. Sophocles, Heraclitus, and Parmenides all say the same thing insofar as they think poetically or poetize thoughtfully about the essence of human being as the uncanny belonging of humans to beings as a whole. There is a particular determination of logos in all of these thinkers which nonetheless splits them from one another from our perspective. Saying that this split is a matter of history and of the fact that we think of the history of thought through the diffracting lens of genre begins to answer how this split is possible, but this must be further developed.

We are as accustomed to talk about "metaphorical," "conceptual," "philosophical" or "poetical" languages as easily as we think of English, Greek, Swahili, German, Mandarin, Cantonese or Esperanto as languages. We can even talk about body language, which depends upon one's spoken language as well as one's culture but is not reducible to these. But it would be as odd to talk about a "metaphorical" *logos* as opposed to a "conceptual" *logos* as it would be

to talk of different languages as expressing essentially different *logoi*.[399] This is because, as Heraclitus shows, *logos* is essentially a unitary structure (so that even when we talk about *logoi* as words what we mean is multiple instances of an expression which exhibits the unity of meaning) whereas language is a name for a group of related "entities." This was the starting assumption for our discussion of language and logos in Part Two.

To turn to Sophocles's treatment of logos in a way distinctive from Heraclitus and Parmenides is therefore to ask whether "poetic" language, a modern concept, tells us anything about the determination of the human being in terms of logos. It is therefore a question about what Sophocles can tell us about our modern way of comportment. Heidegger thinks of this interpretive structure in terms of violence (*IM*, 173-174). I have already expressed some of my reservations about the appropriateness of thinking about this comportment as violence and even more of understanding this purely as a violence that we, the modern interpreters or appropriators, inflict upon the past. But both of these reservations can be bracketed to an extent here because of the nature of the first choral ode in *Antigone*, which is itself about the violence of human

[399] Of course, one of the reasons for this is that the Greeks imported the categories of the Greek language into their understanding of logos, a fact which has been commented on both by people who therefore criticize the Eurocentrism of logo-centrism and who therefore assert an essential historical privilege of the Greek language. In fact, it is perfectly consistent to hold both positions: to recognize that the categories of the Greek language have provided some of the essential fundaments of a world-view which is increasingly global while questioning the desirability of monolithically extending such a world-view. But the claim that we ought to understand the structures of logos in terms of language could also provide an impetus to think about how we can be fair to the inherent multiplicity of languages while accepting that something like a universal logical structure might prove critical in understanding what we share with one another as human beings. One recent discussion of this problem which is directly relevant to my concern with being is Gregory Fried's defense of Heidegger's etymological justification for his interpretation of the meaning of being in "What's in a Word?: Heidegger's Grammar and Etymology of 'Being.'" Fried follows Charles Kahn in arguing that while "the particular array of concepts brought together in Indo-European forms of 'to be' is simply an accident . . . this was a *serendipitous* accident for philosophy." On this point, see in particular Kahn, Charles "Linguistic Relativism and the Greek Project of Ontology." Fried also recognizes that (particularly for Heidegger) the meaning of being and logos are co-determined. While I would concur with Fried and Kahn to a point, I would insist that this conceptual privilege be localized within specific pragmatic and genealogical endeavors.

beings and consequently suggests the terminology and model for understanding which Heidegger employs here.

When Sophocles describes the "uncanny" character of human beings in the first choral ode from Antigone, it is specifically with regards to this tension in the human being between the staggering array of ways in which people shape and determine their world (and therefore one another) and the enormous inertia that reveals the sheer, sublime vanity of such manic activity. Keeping with the tragic character specific to his treatment of this theme, Sophocles envisions this tension as the human sojourn "between the ordinance of the earth and the gods' sworn dispensation."[400] The specificity of how this is tragic can be emphasized by a contrast to the tragic character of Hölderlin's Empedocles. Whereas Empedocles becomes one with the gods by defying their injunction to silence (or, what in this instance amounts to the same thing, joins himself to nature by violating its tendency to hiddenness) the paradox that the chorus of Antigone ruminates on is the disparity between the human and the divine exhibited in Antigone's attempt to honor the divine law. As Hölderlin himself realized, this makes *Antigone* fundamentally different not only from his own tragedy, but also from *Oedipus the King*.[401] To extend the point beyond Sophocles and Hölderlin and hook it up with Aeschylus and Nietzsche we could further add, minimally, that it distinguishes the tragic character of *Antigone* from that of *Prometheus Bound*. This addition also mitigates against interpreting the tragic structure of *Antigone* as earlier or more original. Rather than insisting on some essential (rather than merely biographical) temporal priority to Antigone (as Hölderlin seems to do), I highlight the specificity of *Antigone* for the sake of contrast with my other examples and to provide a modicum of the

[400] *IM*, 156-158.
[401] *Essays and Letters on Theory*, 102, 109.

context which Heidegger's treatment of the choral ode, or at least his treatment of the ode in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, lacks. But when Heidegger unfolds this basic paradox he is more concerned with the linguistic constellation in which it expresses itself. From there, he is concerned to show what this linguistic constellation tells us about the relationship between being and logos in pre-Platonic, pre-metaphysical thought. In turning to this example of hyper-decisive indecisiveness I am therefore trying to do two things. First, I am situating the movement of poetry, which I claimed ought to be present in Heidegger's treatment of Hölderlinian history, within the gestures he himself makes in that direction. Secondly, I begin to explore the consequences such a shift would have in Heidegger's understanding of the relationship between logos and languages. In this way, I will be restricting the broader strokes that I used in my previous examples and in my digression into tragedy and comedy. But it is for the sake of these broader strokes and to show their rightful place within (rather than, of course, "without" but also rather than "after" or "before," "posterior to" or "anterior to") Heidegger's interrogation of the question of being as it is worked out in the introduction of genre into the artistic presentation of the truth or meaning of being. Here, I will confine my exposition of Heidegger's Sophocles to the third phase of his treatment of the ode, where he attempts "to attain a stance in the midst of the whole, in order to assess who the human being is according to this poetic saying" (*IM*, 158). This phase leads to the three claims by which Heidegger ties Sophocles' understanding of the treatment of the human being into Parmenides' (And therefore also into Heraclitus') treatment of the differential unity of logos and *phusis*:

1. Apprehension is not a mere process but a decision.
2. Apprehension stands in an inner essential community with logos. Logos is an urgency.

3. Logos grounds the essence of language. As such, logos is a struggle and it is the grounding ground of historical human Dasein in the midst of beings as a whole. (*IM*, 179).

The first two phases of Heidegger's interpretation seek to establish the paradox that the ode deals with in Sophocles' own language. The first phase highlights the series of paradoxical characterizations of the human being which reveal that the human being is *deinotata*, "the uncanniest" or most terrible, that the human being is *pantoporos aporatos*, "everywhere trying out, underway; untried, with no way out" (line 360) and *hypsipolis apolis*, "rising high over the site, losing the site," that is both above and without the *polis* (line 370). The human being is terrible because she constantly goes astray and consequently goes nowhere, because she is hyper-political, completely and thoroughly attuned to "the site of history" (*IM*, 162) to such an extent that she is also a-political, bereft of a secure site in which to dwell (*IM*, 161-163.) In the second phase, Heidegger roots these paradoxes in the tension between *techne* (art as the distinctive form of human comportment in which the work of art --- or the technological product --- is formed) and *dike* (justice, the comportment of the divine in its lawfulness), both terrible (*denai)* powers that shatter one another (cf. particularly *IM* 170-171). "The reciprocal relation between them is the happening of uncanniness" and is another way of naming the reciprocal relationship between logos and *phusis* (*IM,* 176). In this way, it is clear how Heidegger roots Sophocles' description of the futility of our manic activity in the language of paradox and how he sees this paradox as expressing the barest relationship of human beings to nature. It is therefore not surprising that he will see it as describing the critical moment when human beings decide their place among beings as a whole.

The first two phases therefore describe how Heidegger establishes the tension that I have been describing as the tension between hyper-decisiveness and indecisiveness and also establishes what is most characteristic of this tension for Heidegger: a dual violence undertaken between human action (*techne*) and divine law (*dike*). But, despite this clear closeness of concerns, where within this attempt to characterize the essence of decision is there anything like what I have been calling the moment of pure indecision? To the extent that such a moment is visible, it is in the third phase, where the place of the human being within the whole of beings is assessed. In many ways, Heidegger acknowledges that this assessment is merely a summation of what he has already found (and what is fairly straightforwardly the case in Sophocles) so that imagining any movement towards pure indecision in this assessment would be absurd. And yet, Heidegger insists, to read the text in the terms which it calls for, to determine what it says about the human being in a human way, oriented by the way of comporting oneself named in Sophocles as *techne*, that is, to make interpretation and art, requires submitting the text to a hermeneutical violence. "The authentic interpretation must show what does not stand there in the words but which is nevertheless said. For this the interpretation must necessarily use violence" (*IM*, 178).

With the idea of an unsaid gathering of what is said, we return to that crucial, but deeply troubling element of Heidegger's thought which he shares with Hegel.[402] Without endorsing or rejecting this theory of the unsaid, we should be aware of its central role in determining how Heidegger understands Sophocles and how he wants this understanding to reflect the relevance

[402] See my discussion of Derrida, *supra* -. On the capacity of the unsaid to invert or undo what was previously said, see Hegel's account of the unsaid in "Sense Certainty" (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, ¶110).

of Sophocles for us. Heidegger claims that what this relevance is is revealed in the modern German word *Verderb*, which Fried and Polt translate as "perdition."

Heidegger describes the state in which the human being is *deinotaton*, most uncanny, as *Verderb*: "The *deinotaton* of the *deinon*, the uncanniest of the uncanny, lives in the oppositional relation of *dike* and *techne*. The uncanniest is not the augmentation of the uncanny to the highest degree" (*IM*, 173). This is because the uncanniness of human beings is that they set themselves apart from all other (uncanny) beings and that by doing so they show all beings, but particularly the beings that they themselves are, to be uncanny. In *techne*, the form of knowing appropriate to art, the order of the world, *dike*, is revealed as uncanny. Within, but against, this order, *techne* is revealed as being uniquely uncanny. Thus, "It [the uncanniest] is what is one of a kind, according to its kind, within the uncanny. In the opposition between beings as a whole [*dike*] and the human being as violence-doing Dasein [*techne*], the possibility arises of plunging into what has no way out and no site: perdition" (*Ibid*). Perdition, then is distinctively allied with one side of the paradox that Sophocles is chewing on, the one side that I am calling indecision, that which is *aporos* and *apolis*. But this form of indecision is itself the equilibrium of indecision and hyper-decision because it is the danger that lurks within hyper-decisiveness. "Neither perdition nor its possibility first occur at the end, when the violence-doer does not succeed in a particular act of violence and mishandles it; instead, this perdition holds sway and lies in wait fundamentally in the opposition between the overwhelming and doing violence" (*Ibid*). *Verderb*, which Fried and Polt correctly translate as "perdition," could also be translated --- more freely, less accurately, but certainly keeping in line with Heidegger's usage as the "disburdening of oneself of one's heritage [*Erbe*]," where this is still understood with all the

negative connotations "perdition" has in English. It is a disburdening, accordingly an un-determination, of that which must be supposed to actually be determining us. This is not, for Heidegger, the end of history but rather the way in which history, at least the history of the work of art, happens. "In the shattering of the wrought work, in knowing that the work is un-fit [*Unfug*, unjust --- AA] and *sarma* (dung heap), the violence-doer leaves the overwhelming to its fittingness (*Fug*, justice --- AA]. [But this] occurs solely in the manner of setting-into-work itself. The overwhelming, Being, confirms itself in work *as history*" (*IM*, 174).

Here we see an interpretation of the setting-into-work of the work of art in the context of a fundamentally unfaithful form of preservation.[403] This enacts Heidegger's appropriation of the idea of patricide within the hermeneutical tradition and his incorporation of Sophocles (and thereby Heidegger himself) within that tradition. The distinctive form that this appropriation takes might be well described in the second and third stanzas of Celan's early poem "*Lob Der Ferne*" (Praise of Distance).[404] "*Hier werf ich / ein Herz, das geweilt unter Menschen*, / *die Kleider von mir und den Glanz eines Schwures: // Schwärzer im Schwarz, bin ich nackter. Abtrünnig erst bin ich true. / Ich bin du, wenn ich ich bin.*" (GW, 1:33). "Here, as a heart / that abode among humans, / I throw off my clothes and the glare of an oath: // Blacker in black, am I more naked. Apostate only am I true. I am you, when I am I" (*SPP*, 25). I, who am a heart, spending my time in the place of human beings, di-vest myself of the light that swears me (to what?) Here. Where? "*Im Quell deiner Augen*" (GW, 1:33) "In the springs of your eyes" (*SPP*, 25). There, where according to the tradition your soul is visible, at the very source of your soul,

[403] This would resemble a form of preservation that is more concerned with preserving the work of art by creating a new work. See *supra*

[404] Hamacher claims that in this poem, "Celan weaves an entire mesh of antinomic formulations whose intention is not simply the presentation of unity but, dialectically, the presentation of the unity of unity and division" (Hamacher 228f.). As becomes clear in the rest of this essay, this inversion is only apparently dialectical.

I, a heart, what is soul in me --- this is where I live, foresworn to what I am not: I, a heart among humans. Here, says Celan, "*Im Quell deiner Augen / halt das Meer sein Versprechen*" (GW, 1:33). "In the springs of your eyes / the sea keeps its promise" (*SPP,* 25). Where I throw off my own oath, there is where the sea, however, fulfills its promise. What sea? "*Die Irrsee,*" the sea that is in error or that is mad (Felstiner translates this as "Madsea" following Celan's correction of the French translation of Denise Nevelle as "la Mer Démente." Compare *SPP* 25, xxix). And what is this sea of madness or error, of what is translated in Fried and Polt as "errancy"[405] and is related by Heidegger to perdition, *Verderb*, the disburdening of the tradition? What is its promise? I might answer: it is the terminus of your soul and all souls, their confluence, where the sources are lost and no "abode" is possible, but where they remain by whiling away the time that might be. I might answer, that it is the region of an improper being-towards death, what Blanchot calls the impossibility of dying.[406] I might answer, it is the place where what has been decided is disowned, the place where promises promise to be broken. I might answer thus, but I would then be importing my conceptual framework onto the poem.

Without doing so, we can nonetheless see Celan giving voice to the concern we found in Kierkegaard and Heidegger. How can one be faithful to an attempt to think about errancy or madness? How does one properly interpret an attempt to think about paradox? From the perspective of *Being and Time*, to interpret something properly is to identify the conceptual

[405] See Fried and Polt's German-English Glossary at *IM*, 234.

[406] See Blanchot, Maurice. "Literature and the Right to Death," particularly 377. Fynsk emphasizes the sense in which "the right to death," involves an "abandonment" similar to my disburdening: "For Blanchot as for Heidegger, *il y a / es gibt* names the opening of essence; but the *pas* of this opening in Blanchot … also paralyzes the setting under way and turns the way into an endless detour. The *il y a* is a name for what might be called the 'underside' of the hermeneutic circle, the abyssal opening from which Heidegger consistently turns away even as he remarks its presence" (*Language and Relation*, 233). I depart somewhat from Fynsk's location of this in the materiality of language, insofar as I have tried to displace the difference between ideality and materiality into the structure of temporality.

underpinnings that make it intelligible in its own terms.[407] How is this possible with regards to paradox? In Heidegger, the question has to do with violence, indecision, and perdition, but also with decisions, history, art, and (what may or may not be the same thing) poetry. Without endorsing Heidegger's interpretation of Sophocles, we can nonetheless see its sources in the conceptual framework in place in the section of the *Introduction to Metaphysics* dealing with the history of the division between being and thinking. And here we can see how the equilibrium that Heidegger finds in Sophocles answers to a distinctively Heideggerian problematic.

Sophocles, like Heraclitus and Parmenides, articulates an understanding of the relationship between being and thinking where they are seen as united but where the seeds for their later complete disjunction are already planted. They are united insofar as they are both *deinon* and insofar as they are both what they are only in their reciprocal relationship. But they are able to be disjoined insofar as *techne*, and thus the human being, is set apart, distinct and unique from *dike*, from beings as a whole. But when we consider this stance as a stance determined by a "poetic" as opposed to a "thoughtful" saying, we gain an insight which is obscured for us by our historical relation to the philosophical tradition that we are discussing. This history has made it more difficult for us to see this point in Heraclitus, and even more so in Parmenides. But when we see it in Sophocles, using a modern apparatus, we can then also see it in Parmenides and Heraclitus. We can see what our historical prejudices have obscured from us. We are divested of our heritage. Divesting ourselves of our history through an interrogation of what that history has made possible and foreclosed: this is, for Heidegger, what Sophocles makes possible. It is what I describe as the equilibrium of indecision and hyper-decisiveness. It

[407] *BT*, H148-153.

is made possible for Heidegger by considering "Sophocles" as a work. The preservation of this work is perhaps what enables Heidegger's own works. On the basis of my discussion at the end of Part Two, I would suggest, against the primarily epical thrust of Heidegger's argument, that this is better described as a condition of un-founding rather than of founding.[408] But it is clear that here, at least, Heidegger agrees. Perdition, even if it names the essence of being-human, is a homelessness more than a homeland (*IM*, 173-174). What is at issue is whether this homelessness ends up enabling something like a home, and to the extent that it might, the relationship between the form of comportment proper to this way of being human as distinguished from other ways of being human.

Celan's Lucile: Indecision and Freedom

By interrogating Heidegger's conception of history with an eye to the role that generic difference plays in understanding the production of history, we have found articulated a picture of the human being who, like Hölderlin's mariners, is far away from home. On Heidegger's reading of Sophocles, the relationship of such people to their homeland (and ultimately therefore to nature) is exemplary of what it means to be human, but it also reveals a terrifying possibility that the community wants to shut out from itself. This gives us a picture of the human being which would best be categorized as classical and lyrical: classical because it still relates to history inceptively,[409] and lyrical because it articulates an inherently multiple, internally divided subject. What happens if we place that subject within modernity as the time proper to our understanding of lyricism and as the time proper to that division between philosophy and poetry

[408] See *supra* -

[409] This is most clear in Hegel's decision to employ *Antigone* as the model for the struggle between ethical substance and ethical action, whose resolution necessitates the development of civil society and legality. (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, ¶¶444-477).

which colored Heidegger's interpretation of Sophocles? We might ask what the activity of such a person within the community that is already formed might look like and what the reaction of the community would be to someone who does not share its founding myths and indeed, by being homeless, is, in fact, hostile to them. If we now turn to Celan's portrayal of Büchner's character Lucile in "*Der Meridian*," we find that the sort of freedom which Lucile exhibits answers to the absurd situation that the poetic and/or philosophical presentation of the caesura occupies in modernity.

When we turn to Celan's Lucile, we find an experience of the equilibrium between indecision and hyper-decisiveness that, by expressing a more equivocal thought about the powers-that-be, thinks more unequivocally the decision turned against itself whereby in the middle of the political (*In der Mitte des Marktes*, as Celan says in "*Schibboleth*," whose themes are close to those of "*Der Meridian*" --- cf. *GW*, 1:131),[410] one unburdens oneself of one's political state: violently, but like Heraclitus's violence, with a violence that amounts to an admission of vulnerability and an acceptance of that vulnerability. In short, we find a founding act of indecision which confounds the state and relieves it of its decision making power. We find, crystallized, a decision in favor of indecision.

[410] Derrida's essay, "Shibboleth," investigates the closeness of "*Schibboleth*" and of the related poem, "*In Eins*" (*GW*, 1:270) to the theme of the date in "The Meridian Address." Note that his French transcription of the title incorporates his own language into the text in a different way than the differences in pronouncing the word "schibboleth" would in the original story (See "Shibboleth," 26-33). Here it involves an avowal of closeness, of a singular relationship, rather than indicating (betraying) a national or ethnic difference. It is interesting that in a related essay, "Aphorism Countertime," Derrida links the date in the death scene of *Romeo and Juliet* to an experience of time similar to that found in his treatment of *Hamlet*, but in the context of *Romeo and Juliet's* tragic lyricism, names it explicitly as "counter-time,' [*contretemps*]. "Romeo and Juliet, the heroes of contretemps in our mythology, the positive heroes. They missed each other, how they missed each other! Did they miss each other? But they also survived, *both of them*, survived *one another*, in their name, through a studied effect of contretemps: an unfortunate crossing, by chance, of temporal and aphoristic series" ("Aphorism Countertime," 417).

Let me reiterate what we have already said of Celan's Lucile.[411] She is the person who utters the "counter-word," "Long Live the King." Her word, which sounds like an invocation of the old regime, in fact, testifies "to human presence" in the form of the majestic absurd. And, by testifying of the absurd, Lucile's counter-word is "an act of freedom" (*SPP*, 402-403). We should now consider that freedom in more detail. Lucile's "act of freedom" amounts to snapping the "wire" by which the mannequin (the human being considered as a thoroughly determined product of human art interacting with natural forces) is controlled.[412] Of course, this control is a constraint, but it is also the condition for the mannequin's potential to move. The mannequin's movement can only happen if that movement is constrained; so freeing the mannequin amounts to making activity impossible for it, removing the mannequin's power of movement, killing the mannequin. Lucile's apparent avowal of the king also kills her. It renders her movement indeterminate, makes all future decisions impossible.

But here, on Celan's reading, the analogy breaks down because Lucile's action is wholly her own decision. Lucile decides decisively, once and for all, hyper-decisively and therefore authentically (since, as Heidegger interprets it, authenticity is the dimension proper to decisions proper, that is to resoluteness.)[413] Lucile achieves the equilibrium between decision and indecision in the phrase, "Long Live the King." From this equilibrium, her counter-word is able to divest itself of its apparent reference to a "preservable Yesterday" (*SPP*, 403). This means that it sets something truly new, introduces a new causal chain, produces a force apparently *sui generis*. In so doing, it "testifies to human presence" (*SPP,* 403). This absurd sort of freedom

[411] See *supra* -.
[412] In "Majesties," Derrida offers a reading of the theme of sovereignty and the mannequin in the "Meridian," which is particularly valuable in its treatment of the uncanny and its relation to poetry. In *Sovereignties in Question*, (108-134).
[413] *Being and Time*, H267-300.

testifies to the force of a presence different from the now-point, related differently to the past (and therefore to the future also), the force of a presence whose privilege Heidegger announced in *Being and Time* and re-affirmed in "Time and Being" as the fourth-dimension of time (therefore more radically split from the "common" form of presence --- but still nonetheless called "presence"). This presence is here rooted in human activity undertaken for the sake of the human being and explicitly linked to the thematic of Heideggerian authenticity, to "words only understandable through [one's own] death" (*SPP*, 402).[414]

In this form of presence we encounter the conception of the human being which is required by the structure of difference and indifference that girds up Heidegger's understanding of the concept and the metaphor. The form of activity which is proper to this sort of human being has to be understood as truly and radically free (she produces a new chain of causes and effects from an act which has no real roots in the past) but also as only ironically free (her freedom amounts to the end of freedom; it makes her future impossible). Her freedom, then, is precisely the form of freedom that is rejected by the philosophical project of ontotypology, which produces the subject as the subject of a pedagogy.[415] The importance of this point should not be obscured, nor should its centrality for Celan be underestimated, since it ties together the concerns of his two principle addressees in "The Meridian:" Büchner, the critic of Romanticism who nonetheless ends up adopting many of Romanticism's concerns, and Heidegger, the critic of

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[414] What I am glossing as "one's own" reads "his" (*seinem*) in Celan's text and refers to Danton. I think that it is justifiable to make this gloss and thereby generalize the point. What would be true of Danton, that there is something about himself which becomes comprehensible only through his own death, is also true for Lucile. More importantly, Celan's discourse in the "Meridian" Address increasingly links self-identity and self-propriety in reflexivity, so that he responds to Büchner's description of Lenz as an artist --- "he had quite forgotten himself" (qtd. at *SPP, 405)* --- by saying, "I think of Lucile when I read that. I read: *He*, he himself" (*SPP*, 405). He then applies this description to his own encounters in his poetry: "It was myself I encountered" (*SPP*, 412). However, as I will discuss below, the character of this reflexivity is different for Lucile or for Celan than it is for Lenz.

[415] See the discussion of Lacoue-Labarthe in Part One (*supra* -) and of Plato and Heidegger in this part (*supra* fn.59).

Idealism who ends up continuing the Idealistic project. We have already seen that for Heidegger the concern with pedagogy and the production of a certain kind of free human being marks the most epical element of his thought. Against this, but on the basis of other elements of Heidegger's thought, Celan describes Lucile. It is also how he describes Lenz, but I am more concerned with Lucile here, since I take her refractory language to constitute the language of the lyrical subject par excellence, the subject who displaces the modern self without taking the truth of that self up into a concept of the human being and from there into a concept of the concept or absolute knowing. I feel justified in making this qualification by virtue of the play between language, poetry, and art that Celan sees enacted in Büchner's presentation of Lucile. It is also in this play that our concerns come full circle. Furthermore, we see that over and beyond being one more figure of the equilibrium of indecision, Lucile marks the ontological significance of that equilibrium for the continued attempt to conceive of a productive relationship between the concept and the metaphor as a continual spur for the production of internally divided linguistic arts: poetry, as Celan shows, but also, I insist, philosophy.

Lucile's language is refractory to the concept by virtue of its relationship to what Heidegger would call ontic beings and what would for Hegel approximate the thing considered in itself rather than for the self of Spirit. Hegel, following Fichte, understands spirit (the I) and nature (the not-I) to be taken up into spirit for the first time through the work of the concept in reason, which recognizes the subjectivity and ideality of the categories in which the objective characteristics of the natural world are understood.[416] And the work of the concept is itself

[416] For Hegel, see in particular the determination of nature and objectivity at the moment of spirit's nascence from (self-)consciousness in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, "Observing Reason," ¶¶240-346. For Fichte, see his account of the dialectic between the I and the not-I in the second introduction to the *Science of Knowledge*. (Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. *Science of Knowledge*, 34-38.)

prefigured in the work of poetry.[417] While the form of knowledge which is proper to spirit (absolute knowing) comes to see this for the first time in the categories of reason, the work of the concept is itself prefigured in the work of poetry, although there this subjectivity is obscured by its emphasis on the materiality of language. Lyrical poetry's musical language represented the paradigmatic case of this misunderstanding because it achieves its poetic effect through the sonorous characteristic of language (whereas epic relies more on the temporality of language).[418] On Celan's reading Lucile's understanding of language disrupts this pre-figuration because "when the talk concerns art, there's always someone who is present . . . and not really listening . . . who hears and listens and looks . . . and who doesn't know what the talk was about . . . this someone is Lucile" (*SPP*, 402). We have already seen an example of this disruption in the relationship between thoughts (concepts) and materialized words in two poems from the first cycle of *Die Niemandsrose*.[419] The axis of the difference there made the distinction between materiality and ideality irrelevant insofar as it instead focused on the temporal relationship between words and thoughts. I suggested that the interpretation of presence articulated by this temporality was best understood as belonging to the Hölderlinian-Heideggerian tradition of the caesura, understood as the operation of the metaphor. This is suggested again by Celan's

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[417] For the relationship to "Observing Reason" see Hegel's discussion of "The Beauty of Nature" (*Aesthetics*, 116-152); compare particularly how the various elements of the concept achieve implicit independence in the "Idea of Life," (*Aesthetics,* 116-123).

[418] *Aesthetics,* 1136-1137. Of course, like any speculative proposition, this claim must also be reversed: insofar as epic relies on the temporality of the spoken word (rhythm) it is still more objectified than lyricism (since rhyme and other poetic tropes require a certain degree of internal reflection). But the principle emphasis here is on the character of the language of the philosophical concept, which is more compatible with the pre-prosaic character of epic poetry than the anti-prosaic character of lyrical poetry. That is to say, the temporality of the exteriorized word (the language of epic poetry considered in itself) reveals the temporality of language understood spiritually (when we consider the meaning of epic poetry for us) whereas lyrical poetry's self-conscious internalizations of language are refractory to a properly conceptual form of internalizations because they retain a material form after the moment of internalization..

[419] *Supra* -, - . "The Meridian" was delivered in 1961 between the publications of the collections *Sprachgitter* (1959) and *Die Niemandsrose* (1963).

description of how Lucile manages to "mis-understand" what is going on in art. It is on the basis of this description that the character of Lucile comes to be the figure of the poet who strives for freedom in a hyper-determined world by taking a step back to a place of indecision.

Lucile does not know what the discourse is about when it is about art. As it is formulated here, this amounts to the barest expression of the Romantic and Idealistic devaluation of women. On this account, art, and "perhaps" poetry also, lie in the same direction as artifice and technique:[420] art is conceived of as *techne* and opposed to *dike*. Of course, for Celan, this says more about a problem with art than it does about Lucile. As Fóti, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Christopher Fynsk have shown, this point is the crucial point of engagement between Celan and Heidegger in "The Meridian."[421] One way of reading Celan's defense of Lucile's non-artistic use of language is as moving our understanding of language away from a philosophical/ontological understanding of poetry revealed in the non-human towards a more ethical, human understanding of poetry. Fóti's interpretation of Celan's Lucile is exemplary of this kind of approach. After clarifying the importance for Celan of "the self-presentation of art, its inter-involvement with *techne* and politics, and finally, the relationship between poetry (*Dichtung*) and art," she goes on to specify the mimetic, technical shape that art takes in politics and in philosophy, in short in "cultured conversation."[422]

> Someone may, nevertheless, listen to and participate in this sustained conversation without seeming to understand --- someone who is "artblind" because s/he insists on hearing the poetic word as "breath, which means direction and destiny" (PC III, 188). Destiny is not thought here --- as for Heidegger --- through the recreation of history on the stage of myth; nor does it assign to the poetic word a foundational (or any other) role in constituting the political as a total work of art (*Gesamtkunstwerk*) --- a conception that Lacoue-Labarthe has perceptively identified as the political model of National Socialism (HAP, 64). This destinal

[420] *SPP* 406-408.
[421] See *Heidegger and the Poets*, 99-110; *Poetry as Experience*¸ 41-70; *Language and Relation*, 135-158.
[422] *Heidegger and the Poets*, 100f.

> orientation tends, rather, toward a space of freedom that is the gap of the *caesura* --- a space where no tradition consummates itself but which is opened up by a word that renders homage to "the majesty of the absurd which attests to the presence of the human" (PC, III, 190). With reference to Büchner's play, *Danton's Death*, Celan points to the figure of Lucile, who, standing by the guillotine through which her revolutionary husband, Camille Desmoulins, died his death "theatrically," even "iambically," shouts suddenly and incongruously: "Long live the King!" Such a "counter-word," Celan observes, "has no name which is permanently fixed; but I believe it is --- poetry" (PC III, 190). Celan, first of all disagrees here sharply with Heidegger's conception of language as speaking out of itself and saying the enigma of manifestation; Lucile speaks the counter-word because, as one who is "artblind," she perceives language under the aspect of the human.[423]

For Fóti, Celan defends the human side of language against Heidegger's monological, phenomenological and aletheiological understanding of language by appealing to the gap of the caesura as it is uttered in Lucile's counter-word. Consequently, destiny understood as the caesura runs counter to Heidegger's mythological founding of the history of a people in the poetic word. I have followed Fóti in understanding the counter-word on the model of the caesura and I agree with her that Heidegger's mythologization of history stands as one of the possibilities of his thought, indeed as the dominant possibility. Moreover, I agree with her that Celan's poetry gives us the opportunity for a broader concern with the human being than we find in Heidegger. However, I cannot follow her (1) in her opposition of Heidegger's conception of history to Hölderlin's caesura, (2) in her claim that the freedom exhibited in the gap of the caesura has any destinal orientation at all, (3) in her claim that Heidegger simply ignores the question of the human being and (4) in her conscious assimilation of the question of the human being in Celan's poetry to the model of the Levinasian other.

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[423] *Heidegger and the Poets*, 101. The references to PC are to Celan's *Gesammelte Werke* (her own translation) and HAP to Lacoue-Labarthe's *Heidegger, Art and Politics*.

By identifying the essence of art as poetry and by identifying the nature of both art and poetry as the uncanny (*Unheimliche*), Heidegger has drawn a line that connects him to the idealistic and romantic traditions from which he was trying to break. I have shown that Heidegger himself "straddles" that line: he sometimes finds himself within the assumptions of Idealism and sometimes finds himself beyond them. But as Heidegger himself has shown, to straddle a line presupposes the ability to conceive both sides of it together, and this requires a place of conceptualization outside of the line itself.[424] It was Hölderlin's archi-conceptual or archi-metaphorical schematization of history which promised to provide Heidegger with an immanent site from which this understanding could irrupt. But, as Alleman has shown, Heidegger is really concerned primarily with just one segment of Hölderlin's schematic lines: the turn in art from pathos, "nature," to clarity of representation, "culture."[425] For the ancients, the turn from nature to culture (*dike* to *techne*) was the beginning of the story: it shattered their naturalized, collectivized understanding with the birth of a distinctive culture of art and science. For the moderns, however, it is the story of a return: the so-called *Vaterlandische Umkehr*, the return to the homeland or the fatherland. By calling attention to the elements of Heidegger's thought which lead away from this most determinate gesture of Hölderlin's thought and begin to develop a Heideggerian interpretation of other motifs in Hölderlin's thought, particularly the pre- (and post-) national condition of wandering, I have been attempting to expand the scope of the kind of art and poetry that Heidegger is able to deal with. Rather than opposing Hölderlin's understanding of the caesura to Heidegger's mythological poetics of founding, it would be more

[424] Heidegger, Martin. "On the Question of Being." See in particular 297-299 where Heidegger uses the figure of the line to introduce his discussion of *Gestalt* in Ernst Jünger and Nietzsche. I will discuss Celan's use of *Gestalt* in "The Meridian" presently. I am grateful to Dennis Schmidt for the suggestion that Celan is responding specifically to "On the Question of Being" in his choice of the metaphor of the meridian.
[425] Alleman provides a helpful schematic representation of this at Alleman, 31.

proper to say that Heidegger is restricting the possibilities that such a model of history can deal with to a narrow subset of those possibilities.[426]

Thinking about the relationship between Heidegger and Hölderlin in this fashion indicates another critical point. The caesura is not properly the movement of art where the sacred fire pathos is clearly represented; it is also not the opposite movement. If we expand ourselves beyond these two possibilities to include a more multiple understanding of historical shifts, we would still have to insist: the caesura is not a movement at all. The advantage of the caesura is that it "names" the nameless and represents the unrepresentable. What is unrepresentable is the movement of the whole arc of history, since we do not occupy a place beyond the time-line of history. The moment of the caesura or, to employ Celan's language, the counter-word or the breath-turn (*Atemwende*), simply denotes a shifting or a pause in speech before it denotes any determinate direction that follows such a gap. This point is clear in the initial meaning of caesura as a way of scanning a poetic line. When I am done saying one set of words and I am going to say something else, I pause. Instead of exhaling, I breathe in. But when I breathe in, I am not saying anything at all. I am simply preparing the way to say something else. This is not a mystical process.[427] It is simply a matter of participating in the directionless movement of life as it precedes and enables all thought and speech. Even when we turn to the rarefied, highly conceptualized and metaphorized uses of caesura, *Atemwende* and the whole logic of sigetics as Hölderlin, Heidegger and Celan all play with it, this basic trait remains: it

[426] To fully work this claim out, it would be necessary to compare my understanding of Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin with that of Fóti. Cf. *Heidegger and the Poets*, 44-77. However, because my concern in this book is to focus on a Hölderlinian element within Heidegger's thought while also indicating the ways that Celan re-engages Hölderlin after Heidegger, I will be unable to go into this systematically here.

[427] See, however, Calasso, 145-166 for the claim that "meters are the cattle of the gods," that is to say that the vocalization of a poetic line gives the gods their presence in the *Rig Veda*.

unfolds a space of play between the human being and the air, and this play is a basic feature of being alive or of being mortal.

Let me make this point more concretely by returning to the relationship between directionality, the representation of directionality, and the counter-word in Celan's Lucile. We have already seen that from the perspective of Romanticism and Idealism, Lucile misunderstands the discourse about art. In light of our discussion of these themes we can further clarify this criticism: Lucile seems to misunderstand the character of both language and logos, particularly in their sameness (the shape of their partition as it is determined in the linguistic arts). By using language as if it were something "personal and perceptible," when it is in fact a matter of ideal universals, by betraying the revolution for something like love, for putting something clearly political to an apolitical use, Lucile distorts language: she naturalizes it, perhaps even womanizes it. We might be tempted to assimilate this criticism of Lucile's "blindness to art" to Creon's criticism of Antigone's blindness to politics. Although Antigone's actions do not seem motivated by anything recognizable to a modern as love for her brother, she is willing to resist the current regime for the sake of her duty to care for her brother's body. By being oriented towards her divine duties she is, for both Hegel and Hölderlin (although in importantly different ways), representative of the un-artistic or un-spiritual.[428] For both of them, she stands in the way of the movement of history.

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[428] For Hegel, see *Phenomenology of Spirit*, ¶¶456-462. For Hölderlin, see his "Remarks on 'Antigone,'" *Essays and Letter on Theory*, 109-116. The point of his references to Greek vs. Hesperian forms of tragic presentation have to do with the reversal of time between *pathos* --- the holy (Greek) and *representation* --- the cultured and artistic (Hesperian). *Antigone* is more Greek because it inclines to the beginning rather than the ending (*Essays and Letters on Theory*, 109). This is why to the extent that *Antigone* is a play about rebellion (*Essays and Letters on Theory*, 114-116) it is a rebellion against the march of history. Antigone, more than Haemon, is the subject of that rebellion. For Hölderlin as for Hegel, Haemon indicates the republican alternative. Of course it would be interesting to compare Haemon's death for the sake of romantic love to Lucile's death for the sake of romantic love. Such a comparison would undercut the highly gendered presentation of these themes as we find it in Hegel and, to a lesser extent, in Hölderlin.

But Lucile is not Antigone. She does not die in the name of a logic of her own, for the sake of some other universal than the universal of the current regime. Whereas Lucille does not say "Long Live the King!" out of allegiance to the *ancien regime* but out of love for her husband, Antigone's defiance is less out of love for her brother than out of allegiance to the most ancient of regimes, the religion of the earth. For this reason, for Hölderlin, Antigone represents another direction of the arc of history than is represented by her proto-philosophical father. She represents a determinate set of human values, different than that of Creon and the polis, but no less "logical." We might say that Antigone really does what Fóti takes Lucile to be doing, namely representing a direction of poetry that Heidegger fails to take account of.[429] What Lucile does, however, is absurd. And there is not any explicit re-orientation within her counter-word, at least not immediately.

Lucile does not understand art as art (*techne*), nor does she oppose art, nor does she necessarily understand art differently. She mis-understands art, because her hearing is not attuned to the question of art (human activity). This needs to be understood as an impossible form of understanding, a mis-understanding oriented towards errancy and thus not oriented at all. But because she does not understand art, she is able to perceive "Breath, that is direction and destiny" (*SPP,* 402) "*Atem, das heisst Richtung und Shicksaal*" (*GW*, 3:188). Breathing out involves a certain direction, a sending-off one way or the other. So does breathing inward. But in between them, in the impossibly small instant (the present that does not exist), there might be a turning of breath which goes neither way. If the counter-word really is a child of the caesura,

[429] This despite the fact that Heidegger's understanding of tragedy is primarily oriented towards the first choral ode of the *Antigone*. But saying that this helps Heidegger understand Antigone begs the question of how well the chorus, which tries to stay out of the fight between Creon and Antigone, or at the very least to get Creon to relent (without taking Antigone's side), really understands Antigone.

this would mean that Lucile's real accomplishment is to present an impossible equilibrium, standing at the height of a tension, rather than going off in some direction of her own. And this equilibrium, this perception of direction and destiny, is perhaps nothing other than poetry. It is clearly an act of freedom, but it is a paradoxical act. It is an act that entails a certain form of perception, the perception of "language as form and direction and breath" (*SPP*, 406). It is an act of perception, a matter of representation or understanding that, by expressing a certain understanding, has a political force. But, it must be emphasized, the political force is a function of this perception, and not as Marxists would have it, vice-versa.

The insistence on "form" or "figure" (*Gestalt*) here is significant, because it again emphasizes the formal quality of what Lucile does and because it emphasizes the "form" as the dimension of the human being which Celan is seeking in recollection. We should recall the final stanza of "*Mit Allen Gedanken*," as a description of the *Atemwende*. When the lap or womb of the poem's feminine addressee opens up, a breath (*Hauch*) climbs into the aether, but *Still*, quietly and motionlessly (to adopt the description of a later cycle of poems, the breath arises as an *Atemkristall*, a breath-crystal --- something that can only exist ephemerally). This *Hauch*, when it is born, creates a cloud, and the cloud that comes to be (*was sich wölkte*) is a form or figure (*Gestalt*), as good as a name, but of our creation (*von uns*). The crystallized, ephemeral commingling of air and water is the form of something which is not human, but is of the human, like the human, and the creation of human beings. As such, it is *die Niemandsrose*, the rose of no-one as opposed to the flower of God's creation. It is also our vocalization, what we say to one another but that then goes up in thin air.

Lucile is supposed to accomplish this poetic achievement by virtue of the fact that she "hears the speaker, 'sees him speak'" (*SPP,* 402) even when she isn't really listening to what the discourse is about. This involves then an orientation towards the human being, and this is what Fóti sees lacking in Heidegger's poetic practice. It needs to be kept in mind that Heidegger has a conception of the human being, indeed, a highly determinate and not altogether bad conception of the human being --- one which takes its heritage from some of the noblest expressions of human nature to be found in the enlightenment and modernity: the human being as free, as intelligent, and as fundamentally creative. Of course, this is the same heritage that has been employed in twentieth century totalitarianisms from Nazism to Stalinism to reveal a human being that is infinitely plastic, and thus moldable, conformable and capable of being recreated. This is why Derrida is right to insist that we cannot divorce Heidegger's involvement with Nationalism Socialism from the remainders of humanism in his philosophy.[430] And in fact, while Fóti does at times talk as though Heidegger does not have a picture of the human being at all and simply ignores the question of the human being, what I take to be her actual position is more careful: it is not that Heidegger ignores the question of the human being, but rather that he ignores certain dimensions of the human being, such as an orientation towards goodness revealed in Platonic *eros* or an orientation towards the other revealed in Levinasian alterity, in order to focus on the way in which the human being understands the question of the meaning of beings as a whole.[431] While this criticism is much more defensible, it no longer supports the claim that Celan's thinking departs from Heidegger's by addressing the place of the human being in language. It would be more proper to say that he seeks to open up the question about the human

[430] See Derrida's précis of the argument of *Of Spirit* in "Heidegger, the Philosophers' Hell," 183-187, where he focuses on this thread of *Of Spirit*.
[431] Cf. *Heidegger and the Poets*, xx-xxi, 110.

being to a broader range of questions, questions which are not necessarily any more (or less) compatible with Levinas or Plato than they are with Heidegger.

This leads me to my last point of contention with Fóti, which will also introduce the set of questions (with which I will end this book) about Celan's own poetic practice and what it figures. As I suggested above, it seems to me that the poem "*Mit Allen Gedanken"* provides a good entree to the question of how Lucile's "poetic practice" relates to Celan's own poetic practice. And I think that the conception of the human being which it gives us is no more oriented towards a Levinasian ethics than it is to a Heideggerian metaphysics. Or rather, before we could say that any one particular discourse provided a particularly privileged point of access to the question of the being of the human being, we would first have to deal with the history of how that point of access is constituted. This is why I have been concerned to raise the question of genre with regards to their historical formations as distinctively meaningful beings. In asking how Celan conceives of poetry in "The Meridian," we should not pass too quickly over his description of the sort of human being who practices this activity of poetry. And here, I insist, it is Lucile more than anyone else, more even than Lenz, who provides us with the model.

Why Lucile rather than Lenz? After all, Celan will admit "Lenz --- that is, *Büchner* --- has gone one step further than Lucile" (*SPP*, 407). Lenz's practice is much less ambiguous than Lucile's. Unlike Lucile who says the absurd, and thereby says something in a way that does not say anything at all, Lenz says nothing and simply walks on his head. Lenz is absurd, or if you prefer, performs absurdity. Lenz does this in order to call art into question. "Whoever keeps art before his eyes and in his mind --- here I'm thinking of *Lenz* --- has forgotten himself. Art creates I-distantness. Art in a certain direction demands a certain distance, a certain path" (*SPP*,

406). To describe Lenz in this language, and Celan is clear at several different points that this is *Büchner's Lenz*, is to sketch out the anti-Romantic, anti-Idealistic, and also anti-Heideggerian understanding of art that seeks to embrace artifice (Celan thus calls Büchner "the poet of the creature" --- *SPP*, 405). The paradox is that this understanding amounts to another way of thinking about the uncanniness of art. It seems, then, for a moment that there are "two kinds of strangeness" but that they are "in one and the same direction --- chockablock." Romanticism and anti-Romanticism, Heideggereianism and anti-Heideggereianism all orient themselves towards a discourse about art which cannot help but get tangled up in strangeness. Whether it proceeds from the self or seeks to rescind from questions about the self and be naturalistic, art has to produce a certain "I-distantness" within the self that causes uncanniness to emerge.[432]

By refusing to speak, Lenz has gone a step further than Lucille. But this does not mean that he has stepped even one step further towards the place of the counter-word, the place that Celan describes as a Utopia. Going a step further than Lucille means moving one step away from the place of freedom that she achieved. To borrow from Blanchot, one step beyond freedom is not a step of freedom. Thus, when Celan remembers that Lenz has forgotten himself he says, "I think of Lucile when I read that. I read: *He*, he himself" (*SPP*, 405) "*Ich denke an Lucile, indem ich das lese: ich lese,* Er, *er selbst*" (*GW* 3: 193). Celan italicizes the "*er*:" "he." The point is that it is Lenz who forgets himself when he goes about thinking about art whilst

[432] By revealing the structure of these directions and by setting them into relationship with one another, this "I-distantness" is also the experience of the lawfulness of the caesura. For Lyotard, this lawfulness is fundamentally inexplicable as Greco-Hölderlinian. (Lyotard, 87-94). Lyotard thus disputes Lacoue-Labarthe's claim that "the ultimate paradox is that [the "thinking of the Extermination" as a caesura] is preserved, as memorial, in a poem by a Jewish poet" (*Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 117). For Lyotard, it is not a paradox, but a simply necessity since the Law is "Judaic-Kantian" (Lyotard, 86). For Lyotard, Celan, as a Jewish poet, speaks about the trauma of the law apart from identity, community, or nationality. Such an experience is required of Heidegger's thought, but it is absent even from the unsaid of Heidegger's thought. "'Celan' is neither the beginning nor the end of Heidegger; it is his lack: what is missing in him, what he misses, and whose lack he is lacking" (Lyotard, 94). See *supra* fn.130 for Lyotard's understanding of the way in which the Law is revealed in the caesura.

standing on his head. Thinking about Lucile suggests that we apply the experience to her, as I discussed above, but, by still saying "he," Celan also suggests that the experience does not apply to *her*, that *she* relates to art in some other way. And, indeed, we find that Celan's interest in Lenz might be that he, *Celan*, wants to be Lucile to Büchner's Lenz: "I shall leave the self-forgotten man, concerned with art, the artist [i.e. Lenz/Büchner --- AA]. I believe I have encountered poetry in Lucile, and Lucile perceives language as form and direction and breath ----: I'm seeking the same thing here in this work of Büchner's, I seek Lenz himself, seek him --- as a person, I seek his form: for the sake of poetry's place, for the setting free, for the step" (*SPP*, 406). Celan's interest in Lenz is different than his interest in Lucile. Lucile *is* the poet who teaches us how to perceive language and form. Lenz is not a poet. (The irony of course is that, factually speaking, Lenz is a poet, and Lucile is not.) But, in Lenz's step, we see the appearance of a certain historically determined form of art: ancient, but also pressingly modern. "Probably these [uncanny apparitions of art] are among the oldest forms of the uncanny. That I dwell on them so stubbornly today has likely to do with the air --- the air that we have to breath" (*SPP*, 405). In Lenz's steps, there is something like our own. We, like Lenz, might live in an inverted world with an abyss in the place of heaven. But this does not make Lenz's step beyond Lucile the step of the modern poet. If we live in a topsy-turvy world that has gone one step too far, taking a step forward might be the same as taking a step back. Lucile's act of freedom, the equilibrium she describes, is such a stepping-back. This is why it appears to affirm the past, even though it does not. To seek to locate the lyrical subject in the modern world (even though this is the world proper to the lyrical subject) might require us to take a step back.

It is from the perspective of this step back that I believe we need to evaluate the sort of human being that emerges as the poet of "The Meridian." Such a poet is one who is mindful of dates, attuned to an encounter with others, and thus oriented towards a utopia (and therefore dis-oriented).[433] These themes, which have been amply shown to mix together Heidegger, Buber, Benjamin, Malebranche, Büchner, and Mandelstamm, to name only a few, cannot be reduced to a Levinasian critique of Heidegger. It must rather be thought of as an attempt to read the force of history into Heidegger, even when he does not want to acknowledge the force of history. I have argued that we need to open up Heidegger to a lyrical interpretation of poetry, history and thought. In the end, however, this is not enough: this lyric of being is supposed to be open to multiple ontical voices, tunes, or modes. It is supposed to provide us with a way of maintaining that openness without losing the conceptual and linguistic rigor that Heideggerian ontology promises. But beyond merely acknowledging this openness, we must ask ourselves what has come to be true: what determinate forms of human life do we need to take stock of at the end of the twentieth century? The power of Celan's poetry is that he was able to grasp how deeply difficult to do this would be while maintaining the openness of being in a rigorous way. This is not true merely because of the uniqueness of the horrors that the twentieth century has had to deal with, as Lacoue-Labarthe has argued.[434] While the Holocaust, totalitarianism, countless genocides, oppressions and environmental despoliations are all uniquely horrible, their conceptual roots are buried deep within what it has meant to be human for a long time now. Lacoue-Labarthe is right to recognize the uniqueness of these horrors, but he is equally right to

[433] Fynsk sees this dis-orientation into the *Gegen-* of *Gegenwort* as linguistically enacting this dis-topian response to art (and culture), *Language and Relation*, 141-152. See Meinecke for the situation of the un-said (*Ungesagten*), un-sayable (*Unsagbaren*) and non-linguistic (*Sprachlos*) elements of a poem within this theme of the utopia (Meinecke, 231-234).
[434] *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 47-52.

show that they belong to the logic of our traditional ways of thinking.[435] They stand alongside one another as different, but related, ways of being human. The way to understand this difference, he argues, is to realize that we stand in a world that has been "caesuraed."[436] I find a similar notion expressed in Celan's treatment of Lenz: we live beyond a world of sense in a world of inverted values: but this was already the world of Hölderlin and Nietzsche, and even of Hegel. We do not know precisely "when" the caesura happened, because it did not "happen" on the present of a time line. While Celan would surely agree with Lacoue-Labarthe's reading of Heidegger (Lacoue-Labarthe's reading of Celan himself for that matter) that we live in a world marked by a disastrous caesura, his appeal to Lucile shows that poetry and thought seek to register the shock of this disaster by stepping back *into* the caesura. The caesura is not itself the unrepresentable, traumatic event, but is rather the presentation of that trauma. It is the task of the poet to uncover the time of the caesura, which does not even exist unless a human being can stammer her way into it. It is also the task of the thinker.[437] This is the ultimate answer that we find when we use a lyrical tone of voice to ask the question that Heidegger borrowed from Hölderlin, "What are poets for in a destitute time?" Heidegger asked this question looking back to the past (to paraphrase Heidegger talking about Hölderlin and Hegel). Because we live in an inverted world, he thought he was looking to the future, but he was wrong. His famous "step back" therefore ended up going a step too far (much like the very non-Heideggerian Büchner). In contrast, Celan, who dwells poetically on the past, might end up stepping forward into a freedom, even if it is only the absurd freedom of a puppet falling, stringless, to the ground.

[435] *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 77-86.
[436] *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 45-46.
[437] As Lacoue-Labarthe argues in his appropriation of this element of Heidegger's oeuvre. See *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, 108-117,

This is why I find the sigetics of Celan's poetry to be oriented in a fundamentally different direction than Lenz's walking on his head. A poem might be absurd, but it is not ridiculous. A poem is not ridiculous, but it might give us an insight into the ridiculous, or the horrible, or the uncanny by virtue of its absurd act of freedom:

> Perhaps, since strangeness [*die Fremd*] --- the abyss *and* the Medusa's head, the abyss *and* the robots --- seem to lie in a single direction, perhaps poetry here succeeds in telling strangeness from strangeness, perhaps right here the Medusa's head shrinks, perhaps right here the robots break down --- for this unique brief moment? Perhaps here, with the I --- the estranged I set free *here* and *in such wise* --- here perhaps yet some Other becomes free (*SPP*, 408).

If there is such a step, then the step back away from any one determinate way of being human and from any determinate form of homeliness or strangeness would be a step of freedom that is like Lucile's freedom.[438] Thus, when Celan speaks of what the poem is like today, of what he wants to say about the situation of the poem at today's date, what he says is "like Lucile." This saying, which is like Lucile, speaks about language and the temporality of dates in the context of a today. Let me end my discussion here by quoting in full this rigorously thoughtful description of the present situation of poetry, one which we cannot help but join Fóti, Lacoue-Labarthe and Celan himself in maintaining that Heidegger himself should have written himself. We must also join them in insisting that Heidegger could never have written this description:

> Certainly the poem, the poem today shows --- and this I think has only indirectly to do with not-to-be underestimated difficulties of word choice, with the sharper fall of syntaxes or heightened sense of ellipsis --- the poem unmistakably shows a strong bent toward falling silent.
>
> It holds on --- after so many extreme formulations, allow me this one too --- the poem holds on at the edge of itself; so as to exist [*um bestehen zu können*], it ceaselessly calls and hauls itself from its Now-no-more back into its Ever-yet.

[438] For the roots of this idea in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, see *supra* fn.28.

> But this Ever-yet could be only an act of speaking [*Dieses Immer-noch kann doch wohl nur ein Sprechen sein*.] Not simply language [*Sprache*] and probably not just verbal "correspondence" either [*nicht erst vom Wort her "Entsprechung"*]. But actualized language, set free under the sign of a radical individuation, which at the same time stays mindful of the limits drawn by language, the possibilities opened by language.
> This Ever-yet of poems can only be found in a poem by someone who does not forget that he speaks from the angle of inclination of his very being [*Dasein*], his creatureliness.
> Then a poem would be --- even more clearly than before --- the language-become-form of a single person and, following its inmost nature, presentness and presence. [*Dann ware das Gedicht --- deutlicher noch als bisher --- gestalt gewordene Sprache eines Einzelnen, --- und seinem innersten Wesen nach Gegenwart und Präsenz*.]
> The poem is lonely. It is lonely and underway. Whoever writes one stays mated with it.
> But in just this way doesn't the poem stand, right here, in an encounter --- *in the mystery of an encounter*? (*SPP*, 409, *GW* 3:197f.)

In the language of Heidegger's "The Way to Language," Celan describes the loneliness of the poem as the making towards another (which can be a thing or a human being --- cf. *GW* 3:198). It makes its way in an act of language which is mindful of 'the limits drawn by language," by being mindful of dates. With a way of speaking that pays attention to the presence of dates, the form of presence that a date has, and particularly the date "today," with its zig-zagging between what is gone and what remains, the modern poem will perhaps be a form of speech like Lucile's counter-word, but only if the poet pays attention to the Utopian a-topian place where she is, or to which she is underway.

At the end of Parts One and Two, we have seen Heidegger's discourse in "The Way to Language" articulate a way of thinking that could be attuned to both an epical and a lyrical mode of saying. In both cases, we saw that Heidegger's understanding of modern poetry was determined by the flight of the gods. In contrast, Calasso proposed a theory of literature in which the gods have already returned. With his ambivalent invocation of a "Wholly Other"

(GW*, 3:196)*, Celan forces us to ask this question again. Celan's re-casting of the language of "The Way to Language" and "On the Question of Being" in his search in "The Meridian" for a meridian of encounter forces us to ask this question again of the modern poem and, more sharply, of Celan's own poetic practice as a response to the world in which the modern poem is situated. I will end this book by providing a brief sketch of how Celan works this reconfiguration into the poetological elements of his own poetry in the poems "*Todnauberg*," "*Ein Blatt*," and "*Schliere*." By reading these poems, we will see how this reconfiguration ties the ontic and ontological elements of poetry and philosophy together in the way that Heidegger's philosophy called for even when it did not actually enact it.

After All, What Are Poets For?

In order to give a more concrete picture of the workly character of philosophy and poetry when viewed from the perspective of the understanding of the meaning of being afforded by lyricism, I sketched out five pictures of the lyric subject. In following out Nietzsche's interpretation of Hamlet, we see that the ontological form of indifference must nonetheless be situated in ordinary, differentiable language. It must be a determinate form of indetermination just as the Dionysian "drive" both is and is not a drive. From Hölderlin's presentation of Empedocles, we saw the time of this difference as being expressed in a sort of writing that belongs to a distinctive point of indifference, between the sea and the river, as it were. Hölderlin's Empedocles is not uninterested in questions of history, identity and politics, but he speaks from a place where no answer is given or even immediately made possible. Our turn to Kierkegaard showed the distinctively ironic logic which such a writing employs to maintain this indecision in the movement between originality and a founded tradition. These three examples

afforded us a view of the role that Heidegger's own modernity plays in informing his interpretation of Sophocles. It allowed us to develop a historically differentiated account of the relationship between poetry and philosophy which provides a glimpse into the uncanniness of such a form of indecision from within a determinate tradition. Such an experience seeks to disclose an anarchic form of s*ophia*. I have sought to suggest the outline of a way of comporting oneself toward the world in linguistic works of art. This way resembles the ancient Greek practice of *sophia*, but it is distinctively modern. But the distinctively modern logic that such a paradoxical gesture requires moved us away from Heidegger's own understanding of the dialogue between thinkers and poetry and towards Celan's critical appropriation of this dialogue. We saw Celan seek a practice of poetic freedom within the ambiguities of a caesuraed modernity. Lucile's absurd act of freedom provided us with a model which Celan suggested was his own. Let me conclude my discussion of Celan by showing how his own poetry develops this act in a way which again raises the questions of being and presence with which our consideration of the relation between Heidegger and Celan began.

The possibility of understanding being in a truly multiple philosophico-poetical way that I sketched out in Part Two depended upon opening up the play between the concepts of language and logos. This possibility is seen in the presuppositions about modern poetry and philosophy found in Heidegger's use of Sophocles to elucidate Heraclitus and Parmenides. This way of reading Heidegger's philosophy does avoid some of the problems of a more epical interpretation of his understanding of philosophy and poetry. For example, it does not overemphasize the univocity of the world (and consequently the meaning of being), nor does it turn a blind eye to artworks which are not strictly speaking originary of a people's world. But although it avoids

some problems, Heidegger's focus on the development of *techne* in the interpretation of modernity that emerges from *Introduction to Metaphysics* and even more from later texts does not explicitly raise the specific situation of the modern world with an eye to how his own fundamental Hölderlinian presuppositions need to be recast. We saw Celan broach this problem in "The Meridian." Through the figure of Lucile, we saw him suggest the shape that this takes in his poetic treatment of language as breath, form, direction and destiny.

In the poem, "*Todnauberg*," Celan describes his visit to Heidegger's mountain retreat.[439] The longest stanza centers around the guest book,

> *Die in das Buch*
> *--- wessen Namen nahms auf*
> *vor dem meinen? ---*
> *die in dies Buch geschriebene Zeile von*
> *einer Hoffnung, heute,*
> *auf eines Denkenden*
> *kommendes*
> *Wort im Herzen*. (*GW*, 2:255).

> What in the book
> --- whose names did it take up
> before my name? ---
> what is written in this book, the line about
> a hope today,
> for the coming of a thinker's
> word in the heart.

This stanza describes an event that happens seven years after "The Meridian" address, near the end of both Celan's and Heidegger's lives, well after all of the texts by Heidegger that we have discussed, and after most of the Celan poems that we have discussed or will discuss. It juxtaposes Celan's continued hope for Heidegger to thoughtfully address the situation of modernity with his accusation of Heidegger's complicity with Nazism, his willingness to take

[439]For the most comprehensive reconstruction of this encounter, and how Celan worked it into his poem, see Lyon 159-191.

suspect names into his text. This accusation takes the form of a question that interrupts the entry in the guest book that Celan himself presumably writes. But it is important to note that one of the "lines" of Heidegger's thinking involved attending to the signs of a coming poet who would open up the heavenly dimension from which the last god(s) could come.[440] Celan's interruption seems to suggest that the heart-felt word of the thinker must go back to the site of this interruption if it is to truly think about the present. Celan's lines force a different scansion of the caesura, a different "collocution" than the one that Heidegger called for. But there is no simple rejection of the notion of collocution. On the one hand, Celan produces a reversal. The "poet" sets up the task of the "thinker." But, more to the point, Celan deconstructs this collocution. He renders the relationship between thinker and poet ambiguous by destabilizing the identities that Heidegger ascribes to them. He sets them to work at the site of an interruption. This site resembles what Celan called utopia in "The Meridian." But we find it situated in discourses that have to deal with the most bitter and difficult political and historical realities of today. In this sense, Lacoue-Labarthe's use of the word "catastrophe" to describe Celan's treatment of history is apt.[441] Celan certainly treats history as a catastrophe, as we have seen in his invocation of a God who grows whole from the bodies of those who have died like a tree grows from the compost of grass clippings, or in his identification of Lenz's situation as the emblem for our own, or in his recollection of Heidegger's disastrous past. But more to the point his poetical treatment

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[440] Celan shows the difficulties such a poet would face in one of his poems about Hölderlin, "*Tübingen, Jänner*." This poem is found in the same cycle of Die Niemandsrose as "*Dein Hinübersein*," "*Mit Allen Gedanken*" and "*Psalm*" (and also "*Zurich, Zum Störchen*, which I shall address shortly). In it, Celan visits Hölderlin's tower with the words, "*käme ein Mensch zur Welt, heute, mit / dem Lichtbart der / Patriarchen: er dürfte,/ spräch er von dieser Zeit, er / dürfte / nur lallen und lallen, immer-,immer-/zuzu*" (*GW*, 1:226) "should a man come into the world, today, with / the shining beard of the / patriarchs: he could, / if he spoke of this / time, he / could / only babble and babble / over, over / againagain" (*PPC*, 155)..

[441] *Poetry as Experience*, 49.

of history is cata-strophic: it turns downward and inward in order to reckon with the impact that history has on the very way we speak.

Celan's point is not that all our speech should itself be attuned to the most awful, troubling and difficult moments of history, as he makes clear in his response to Berthold Brecht. Brecht voiced the position of many intellectuals and artists that the traditional subjects of art such as nature and beauty could not be represented any more and had indeed become impossibly vulgar when he asks, "What kind of times are these when / a conversation about trees is almost a crime / because it omits so many horrors?"[442] Celan responds with a conversation that he identifies as a treeless leaf.[443]

> *Ein Blatt, baumlos*
> *für Berthold Brecht:*
>
> *Was sind das für Zeiten*
> *wo ein Gespräch*
> *beinah ein Verbrechen ist*
> *weil es so viel Gesagtes*
> *mit Einschliesst*? (*GW* 2,385)
>
> A LEAF, treeless,
> for Berthold Brecht,
>
> What sort of times are these
> where a conversation
> is nearly a crime because
> it contains so much of
> what's been said?

To begin with, there is a playful element of verbal pastiche going on here, a sort of *argumentum ab absurdum* against the whole-sale rejection of the traditional values of art, beauty, and nature

[442] Quoted in SPP, 419.
[443] There is probably also an inverted reference to Hölderlin's description of the mariners who are willing to endure years beneath the leafless, shadeless tree of the mast in their search for both the foreign and the homeland. See *Poems and Fragments*, 490.

implied by Brecht's comment (even if not actually practiced by Brecht himself). We can extend this point beyond the "ordinary language" of a conversation to the poetic. Celan himself certainly did not give up on the idea of beauty, nor does he shy away from writing poems that are primarily about love, sex, nature, or birth.

In addition to this playful element, there is also a rejection of an overly-loud form of thought or poetry in favor of a turn to silence. When too much is simply said, our conversations threaten to break off, and not really to be conversations at all. In contrast, many years earlier Celan had described his own conversation with the poet Nelly Sachs as navigating between saying too much and saying too little. "*Vom Zuviel war die Rede / Vom Zuwenig*" (*GW*, 1:214). "Of too much was our talk, / of too little" (*PPC*, 135). By navigating between these two extreme possibilities, Celan and Sachs manage to sustain an intermittent dialogue that lasts over their whole lifetime and touches to the core of their understanding of both poetry and Judaism.[444] In announcing his proclivity for shared silence rather than a deluge of words, what Celan is saying is not that different from Heidegger's critique of idle chatter (*Gerede*) in *Being and Time*.[445] Indeed, it attests to the conviction they both shared that silence is a fundamental part of language.

But we should note that what Celan says in general terms would certainly apply to what he says about his conversation with Heidegger. They talk about flowers "*Arnika, Augentrost . . . Orchis und Orchis*" ("Arnica, Eyebright . . . Orchid and Orchid"), they drink from a well with a star die on top of it, they walk through the "forest meadows" along "*die halb-/ beschritten Knüppel- / pfade im Hochmoor*," (*GW*, 2:256), "the half trodden log - / paths on the high moor" amid much wetness, but they do not really talk about what Celan wants to ask, or about what he

[444] See Wiedemann, Barbara, ed. *Paul Celan / Nelly Sachs: Correspondence*. See in particular Felstiner's introduction to that volume and his discussion of their meeting at Felstiner, 155-163.
[445] *BT*, H167-170.

has been asking about, perhaps in a round-about way in the visit he describes, but unmistakably in "The Meridian," in a number of his earlier poems, and through their mutual friend Otto Pöggeler. Celan certainly fel that Heidegger did not hear him ask the question, even when Celan actually asked him the question. The earliest published bibliophile edition of "*Todnauberg*" says that Celan hoped for "*eines Denkenden / (ungesäumt kommendes*) */ Wort im Herzen*" "a thinking / (undelayed coming) / word in the heart." But Celan deleted *ungesaümt* (undelayed) from the version of "*Todnauberg*" published in the more widely released collection *Lichtzwang*. Felstiner suggests that this was because Heidegger responded to the poem with polite, effusive thanks rather than by addressing it thoughtfully.[446] It seems that right at the end of his life, Celan came to believe that despite his severe critique of Heidegger, he had still overestimated him. The dialogue that Heidegger had failed to take up despite numerous solicitations, but that Celan hoped would nonetheless be spurred by the lines of a poem he had addressed directly to Heidegger, still did not reach its destination. The anticipated dialogue of thinker and poet at the site of a catastrophe would have to wait, or more likely never would happen at all. It would break off before it began. This really is a crime.[447]

What sort of a time is it when this crime is committed but is also commemorated? The question we have been asking of Heidegger thickens the critical interrogation of presence in the name of presence, or at least of the present time, as we saw Celan enacting it in the first cycle of

[446] Felstiner, 247.

[447] Lyon's recent reconstruction of the visit between Heidegger and Celan at Todnauberg as well as Celan's composition of the poem "Todnauberg" suggests that the relation between these two versions of the poem might be somewhat more complicated. Although it is impossible to know exactly what the two men said to one another on that visit, Lyons uses the evidence that we do have to show that Heidegger may very well have apologized to Celan for his National Socialism and addressed his concerns to his satisfaction. Lyon thinks that the "undelayed word" is meant at first to be a reminder of a promise that Heidegger made to offer his explanation publicly in order to help combat the anti-Semitism that was resurging in Germany in the late 60s. When this public explanation never came, and as his mental health became more precarious, Celan came to doubt whether an apology had ever really been given, and with the deletion of one word hardened the poem into its final form. See Lyon, 164-167.

Die Niemandsrose. There, we saw the possibility that Heidegger's philosophy could articulate an understanding of the meaning of being in modernity, rooted in lyrical poetry. We also saw that such an understanding would describe the conception of time, history, and meaning that informs these sorts of poetical practices. Now, we find that this possibility is never actualized as far as Celan is concerned. Perhaps it could have been. Perhaps things could have been different, [448] but we have to contend with the fact that they are not. The account of modern poetry that Heidegger puts forth is inadequate to deal with the catastrophic history of the twentieth century because it remains overly attuned to a modern philosophical-poetic response to the unfolding of *techne* as technology. When Heidegger is at his best, most attuned to the positive qualities of modern poetry and thought, he succeeds in proposing a multiple response to this situation, but he does not seriously question the univocity of this situation.[449] I will have to lay aside an adequate exploration of the dimensions of this situation and response in Heidegger's essays on technology. For our purposes, the essential point which these essays make is that the modern world's essential meaning is rooted in how it has dissociated *techne* from its historical connections to *dike*, an argument derived from Hölderlin and dealt with in my discussion of the *Introduction to Metaphysics*.[450] What he fails to grasp adequately is the fundamental ambiguity that pervades the essence of modernity in the multiplicity of worlds of modernity. While I agree with critics of Heidegger such as Caputo, Nancy. and Rorty that Heidegger employs an overly univocal

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[448] A hope that Celan gives voice to in a different context in "*Es ist alles anderes*" ("It's all different"), one of the last poems in *Die Niemandsrose* (*GW*, 1:284-286).

[449] This is most clear in his focus on the nihilism of modernity in "The Age of the World Picture," "On the Question of Being," "The Question Concerning Technology," and "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead."

[450] See *supra* -. For a discussion of how these themes are developed in the later writings on technology see Zimmerman, Michael. *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics and Art*. Lacoue-Labarthe's discussion of *Gestalt* in Heidegger's determination of Nietzsche's Zarathustra and in its relation to *Ge-stell* is also particularly useful (*Typography*, 43-63).

understanding of the meaning of modernity, I differ from them in that I continue to employ the language of essences. My reasons for doing so are that I think I (1) have provided an account of presence as ambiguous, (2) have provided an account of the temporal underpinnings of concept formation, and (3) have situated the meaning of "propriety" --- *eigentlichkeit* ----within the domain of theoretical discourse from which one can claim to have a certain privileged position without claiming to be the only one with such a position.

In this way, I have relied on the hope for and belief in the viability of a set of "sophic" practices which resemble traditional theoretical practices in their range and in the (archic) form of the concepts or metaphors they use to define themselves, but differ in their attunement to the genetic (non-eternal) character of these *archai*. Such practices, then, are attuned to contingency, rupture, and shift, not at the expense of or in place of traditional theoretical discourse, but within, at the place of, such a discourse. Such an account, if it were possible, would amount to one way of appropriating Heidegger's insight into the non-oppositional character of the relationship between being and becoming,[451] within an explicitly differential, ontically attuned ontological framework. Although I differ from him strongly in my belief in the possibility for considering such a practice to be philosophy and perhaps even metaphysics (that is to say, practices originating in large part from the domain of theoretical knowledge), by attempting to develop such a strategy, I am following in the path of Lacoue-Labarthe, whom Derrida credits for providing a thoroughly ontical formulation of Heideggerian ontology.[452] Like Lacoue-Labarthe, I have sought to measure my understanding of this philosophical tradition in the light of or

[451] *IM*, 100-103.
[452] "Desistance," 28-29.

against, or, to borrow a phrase from Celan,[453] in the counter-light or backlight of the poetry of Hölderlin and Celan. Such a light renders foreground concerns dark and thus transforms them sharply into pure forms or figures. Such a transformational practice is, of course, highly theoretical, but it is not divorced from a consideration of factical human life.

Let me end my treatment of this poetic figuration here by starting to draw its contours with a slightly more finely shaded brush. I will do this by reading a poem from the 1959 collection *Sprachgitter*. As we have already discussed, and as Lacoue-Labarthe recognized, Celan's poetic practice casts a critical light on the meaning of Heidegger for the present and for us "moderns." The first way in which Celan casts his shadow upon the meaning of Heidegger is by doing exactly what Heidegger called for: rendering the difference between a certain kind of poetical language and a certain kind of philosophical language undecidable. As we have seen, Celan shows this indifference in his assessment of Lucile's "poetical" accomplishment in "the Meridian." The contours of this same way of situating "poet" and "thinker" are recalled in his poetical description of his visit to Heidegger's retreat. They are also embedded in the poetology he calls upon in his own poems at least as early as the poem "Schliere," (Streak) collected in the first cycle of his volume *Sprachgitter*. As Pöggeler attests, Celan had considered sending these lines to Heidegger as a description of poetry, a response, as it were, to the question, "What Are Poets For?"[454] As far as I know, he did not actually send these lines to Heidegger (except as part of the collection *Sprachgitter* --- Celan sent all his collections to Heidegger), nor did he explicitly mark him as the addressee to this or any of a number of other poetic lines that have been shown or could be shown to have Heidegger at least partially in mind. "The line in the

[453] Celan gives the title "*Gegenlicht*" to the third cycle of "*Mohn und Gedächtnis*" (*GW,* 1:43-61) and an early set of prose fragments (*GW ,* 3: 163-165).
[454] *The Paths of Heidegger's Life and Thought*, 242. Pögeller dates this to 1957.

book" that Celan refers to in "*Todnauberg*" thus also stands in for all these other lines that Celan had delayed from posting explicitly to Heidegger. But in "*Schliere*," ten years before "*Todnauberg*," we already read of the sort of ontico-ontological twinning of language on both sides of the metaphysical divide that is marked by the ontological-difference and that keeps language from devolving into idle chatter.

Pöggeler's reading of "*Schliere*" and related poems across Celan's oeuvre focuses on the importance of the theme of the trace, *Spur*, as the trope which takes Heidegger's poetology in new directions.[455] Heidegger had followed Hölderlin in assigning the poet the task of searching the heavens for the tracks of the gods who have vanished and also of attending to the traces that herald the coming gods. The poets (and thinkers) are in search of the subtle traces and shades on the horizon which connect the present world(s) to those of the past and future. The trace which Celan identifies in the third stanza of "*Schliere*" as the path of "*Seelenbeschrittene Fäden*" (*GW*, 159) "Soul-trodden threads" is a particularly difficult trace to see, because it is transparent, a

> *Glasspur,*
> *rückwärtsgerollt*
> *und nun*
> *vom Augen-Du auf dem steten*
> *Stern über dir*
> *weiss überschleiert.*(*GW*, 1:159).

> Soul-trodden threads,
> glass trace,
> rolled backwards
> and now
> from You-Eye to the constant
> star above you
> o'erstreaked with whiteness.

[455] *The Paths of Heidegger's Life and Thought*, 239-245. Note in particular Pöggeler's question, "Might a lyricism like that of Paul Celan, which endures the destiny of time, not indicate a poetic of the trace or comprise the trace" (*The Paths of Heidegger's Life and Thought*, 239).

Celan's glass trace would be invisible, except that it has rolled backwards and thus is now stained white with a streak, the streak that Celan identifies in the first stanza,

> *Schliere im Aug:*
> *von den Blichen auf halbem*
> *Weg erschautes Verloren.*
> *Wirklichgesponnenes Niemals,*
> *wiedergekehrt* (*GW*, 1:159).

> Streak in the eye:
> lostness come to sight
> through the glances on the half path.
> neverness spun of what's real,
> turned back around.

The streak goes from what the eye looks at to something lost that it can only see partially. Such a streak turns inward a non-existent time which is nonetheless woven of the real. The path of this half-way seeing is the way of Celan's language; it is the longest and most difficult task towards which we are underway, as the second stanza makes clear. "*Wege, halb --- und die längsten*" (*GW* 1:159) "Ways, half --- and the longest." The way is the streak in its path from the "you-eye" to the constant star. "*Augen-Du*" suggests your eye, of course, but it also suggests you as eye, as the visibility of the soul, as the possibility for you being able to see, as the mourner, whose tear is a streak in the eye.[456] This is all mirrored colorlessly in the figure of the star above you, where it is also stabilized.

For whose sake does all this happen? Why seek out an invisible trace leading from you and I up to the night sky? The final stanza suggests a tentative answer.

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[456] See, for example, the figure of the tear in *"Ein Auge, Offen*" ("An Eye, Open"), also from *Sprachgitter* (*GW*, 1:187). In the opening poem of *Sprachgitter*, "*Stimmen*" ("Voices" --- *GW*, 1:147-149), a poem which invokes the water as tomb in the same way that the closing poem *Engführung* (*GW:* 1:195-204) invokes the earth as tomb, Celan speaks of dwelling in the tear, "*Tränen im Bruderaug./ Eine blieb hängen, wuchs. / Wir wohnen darin*" (*GW*: 1:148) ("Tears in the brother eye. / One remains hanging, grows. / We dwell within." What is interesting here is that it is breath which dislodges this dwelling place: "*Atme, dass* / *sie sich lose*" (*Ibid*) ("Breathe, that / it be let loose.")

Schliere im Aug:
dass bewahrt sei
ein durchs Dunkel getragenes Zeichen,
vom Sand (oder Eis?) einer fremden
Zeit für ein fremderes Immer
belebt und als stumm
vibrierender Mitlaut gestimmt (*GW* 1:159).

Streak in the eye:
That may hold true
a sign dragged through the dark,
Quickened from the sand (or the ice?) of a foreign
Time for a more foreign Ever
and tuned to
a dumb vibrating consonance.

This streak in the eye, though white, preserves a sign that has been carried through darkness. This is the situation of modern language, according to Celan's Bremen Address.[457] This strange time, where the sign has been dragged through "a thousand darknesses of deathbringing speech" (*SPP*, 395) searches in the heavens for the trace of glass, which could be made of sand or ice. Despite the strikingly different formulations, Celan speaks in a similar way as in "*Todnauberg*." There, he juxtaposed the lines which interrupted his own with the line that hopes for a future word addressed to this interruption. Here, he contrasts the sign that has been blackened with the trace of white-stained glass that figures the sign (and with it, the eye that sees the sign, endures the darkness and does all this to look at what is lost) into a light shining in the darkness. Such a streak would quicken, enliven, this strange (present) time for the sake of an even more strange eternity. It would be determined, given voice, as a silent sound, a sound which hums, which sounds along with (what? The sign dragged through darkness, perhaps?) and produces a sort of half heard consonance alongside the half-glimpsed lostness. Would such a consonance give

[457] *GW* 3:185-186.

voice to lostness? Would it provide a sign for what can only be half seen by the lark light of a star? Could such an enlivening resuscitate a language grown moribund through its traffic with death-bringing darkness? Perhaps, half-way.

What this quickening does do is describe the "space" between two closely linked strangenesses, the strange time that we live in and the strangeness of the "eternity" to which the ideality of language refers it. I began my treatment of Celan by suggesting that Celan's use of language places him in this space in a critical fashion. We then saw him adopt Lucile's capacity for poetically distinguishing between two strangenesses. We now find the temporal account of this distance already rooted in his earlier description of his understanding of the task of the modern poet. Such a task does not replace or contradict what Heidegger read as Hölderlin's call. Rather, it takes it and radicalizes it by showing it the ambiguities which are inherent in it and also by distinguishing multiple registers even within that ambiguity --- in the half-way of the lostness, in the murkiness of the sign, in the strangeness of a star's constancy, in the equally strange consonance of a mute vibration produced between the two.

On the philosophical register that we are pursuing here, the resistances produced by this ambiguity, that is to say, the importance of impurities, streaks and strange sounds being made manifest upon the glass-like purity of the heavens amounts to a blurring of the distinction between the ontic and the ontological, but a blurring that does not erase their distinctiveness. Again, this keeps with Heidegger's basic intentions. The ontico-ontological distinction is inherently impure because we have to employ an onto-typological model to understand any historically given meaning of being. Indeed, there would be no ontology without the impurity, because the meaning of being would be factically inexplicable. Heidegger would have to grant

that the "streak" which Celan speaks of is productive. It is because art speaks between the imagination and the understanding in this way that Kant says art can "quicken" (*beleben*) our cognitive capacities.[458] Heidegger relies on this fact when he flips the Kantian schematism in order to develop an understanding of the imagination that is productive of the schemata.[459] Celan relies on this flip when he invokes the ontic realm, and all in it that is timely, inscribed within the public-world time, dated in order to direct language to the heavens, to the structure of temporality, "being," the space of the holy even if the holy has vanished as such. But Celan is clearer than Heidegger that this turn to the ontological is motivated by the ontic. Such a turn attempts to and might even succeed in allowing us to envision an impossible present, one divested of its heritage. In contrast to the alternative envisioned by Fóti between a Levinasian ethics of alterity and a Heideggerian metaphysics of freedom, Celan's poetry speaks to an impossible encounter between the living and the dead, what has been borne and the unbearable, between Trakl's unborn and the orphan. Such an encounter could only be envisioned by an imaginary act of freedom.

Hegel declared that art was dead, because all of its possibilities had been appropriated by speculative philosophy. Heidegger, acutely aware of the failures of speculative idealism, and philosophy generally, sought to restore art to its pre-speculative, pre-Platonic place of preeminence. We have seen that his attempt to do so remained riddled with a latent Hegelianism and classicism that forced Heidegger to push the opening of a poetic world onto the horizon of a presently impossible future. Nonetheless, his philosophy of language provides a delimitation of the present in the name of a different sort of presence. This delimitation opens up a different sort

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[458] Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Judgment*, 60-64.
[459] Heidegger, Martin. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant's* Critique of Pure Reason, 291f. For Kant, see *Critique of Pure Reason*, A137-147 / B176-187.

of present, one which has to be understood as being presented in a distinctively modern way. Juxtaposing Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin's Böhlendorff letter with that of Calasso, we arrived at a conception of this time as one in which the gods have already come. This means that we have arrived at a time whose history is indissociable from the poetical roots it opens up. These roots, moreover, are the multiple, irreducible roots of a lyricism that plays across nations, naturalities and borders, rather than founding them. We saw the sort of presence which this relies on exemplified in the poetry of Celan. Celan theorized the situation of poetry within the world more clearly than Heidegger did by presenting it in its ambiguity: gathering the ambiguities, differences and indifferences of the modern "world" without dissolving them, sketching out the decisions which face us and before which we might shiver, paralyzed by indecision. The reconfiguration of the meaning of modernity that Celan introduces into Heidegger's pain-staking description of the dialogue between thinker and poet re-orients the meaning of the question concerning the meaning of being. It thus enables the sort of adequate response to Hegel that Heidegger had first sought to find in the situation of contemporary art.

The ambiguity which Heidegger had seen in the meaning of being was, for him, foreclosed by the modern world in both modern philosophy and modern metaphysical poetry since both focused on the being of beings, itself rooted solely in the meaning of "is." While Heidegger's own attempt to articulate this foreclosure was indelibly marked by his decisions about what the human being ought to look like, Celan figures the ambiguity of modernity into a newly articulated lyrical subject, one whose internal multiplicity is inherently open to a host of forms of multiplicity and alterity, one which cannot be mistaken for the monad of the traditional modern subject, whether it be in the philosophy of Descartes or the poetology of Schlegel. In

addition to dramatizing Heidegger's claim that what "is" means is fundamentally ambiguous, Celan's poetry shows that the being of beings, what is essential or pertinent about something, plays across the whole ontico-ontological register. It is not necessary for a poet to come and rename the holy *in toto*, because poets do so all the time, even in dark times. It is not necessary for a thinker to come and pave the way for this poet by clearing aside the detritus of the past, because the way is paved in things themselves, whose ambiguity we reflect on everyday, in a number of ways. Heidegger's Herculean formulation of his tasks overstates his case. Consequently, it missed what Celan thinks poets and thinkers are desperately needed for. We certainly do live in dark times, and there is indeed much to think through. These tasks are difficult enough. Celan says with an obsessive succinctness in "Tübingen, Jänner," a poem about Hölderlin,

> *Käme,*
> *käme ein Mensch,*
> *käme ein Mensch zur Welt, heute, mit*
> *dem Lichtbart der*
> *Patriarchen: er dürfte,*
> *spräch er von dieser*
> *Zeit, er*
> *dürfte*
> *nur lallen und lallen,*
> *immer-, immer-*
> *zuzu*. (*GW, 1:226).*
>
> Came, if there
> came a man,
> came a man to the world, today, with
> the patriarchs'
> light-beard: he could,
> if he spoke of this time,
> he could
> only babble and babble,
> ever- ever-
> moremore. (*SPP*, 159).

Someone who speaks thoughtfully and poetically about these times is threatened by silence, not merely because of what is foreclosed in these times, but even more because of the content of what these times actually contain. Of course, the contents are inseparable from what is foreclosed. What is said is critical to what is un-said, because it is only in what is said that the unsaid is said at all. Babbling itself is not, however, entirely unpoetic. Hölderlin wrote "In Lovely Blueness" in his madness. Such babbling even creates a new word that deals with the ambiguities of this time: *pallaksch*, a word that Hölderlin used in his madness to signify both "yes" and "no."[460] But it is also meaningless babble. Philosophy and poetry must both develop their own systems, perhaps seemingly divorced from one another, but both embedded within ordinary language. Embedded in ordinary language, each must be capable in its own way of simultaneously affirming, denying and dissolving what ordinary language says. As our discussion of poetic dwelling has shown, such a task for philosophy and poetry has little to do with elaborating a secure foundation for human discourse, and more to do with exposing the roots of those discourses, showing how they shift, and perhaps even sometimes influencing the direction of that shift. This impossibly impractical activity is what I follow a certain apparition of Heidegger in calling the task of modern poetry and philosophy, modern literature, and art. Perhaps, as Celan suggests, it is also the only way to free ourselves from our own barbarity. But

[460] See *SPP*, 416. By saying both "yes" and "no," Hölderlin paradoxically achieves the sort of language that Celan identifies as the task of poetic language in one of his earliest poems oriented explicitly to the task of poetry. In "*Sprich Auch Du*," Celan exhorts the one who speaks as the last one to give the shadow of what is said by not splitting yes and no. "*Sprich --- / doch scheide dem Nein nicht vom Ja. / Gib deinem Spruch auch den Sinn: Gib ihm den Schatten. / Gib ihm Schatten genug, / gib ihm so viel, / als du um dich verteilt weisst zwischen / Mittnacht und Mittag und Mittnacht*" (*GW,* 1: 135). (Speak --- / But don't split off No from Yes, / Give your say this meaning too: / give it the shadow. / Give it shadow enough, / give it as much / as you see spread round you from / midnight to midday and midnight" (*SPP*, 77). Here, Celan again refers the problem of poetic speech to time. The meaning of what the "last one" says must participate (*verteilen*) in the whole of the day. The image of participation in the day, coupled with the image of being enveloped in shadows or a sail, is one of the central images that Parmenides uses to criticize the young Socrates' theory of Forms in the *Parmenides*. Plato, *Parmenides*, 131b-c.

perhaps, as both Celan and Heidegger found, it is also a way we have barred ourselves from, with our ceaseless upturning of the earth, with our appetite for destruction, with bulldozers and with bombs, with our erection of buildings and graves, with all that we have interned therein. Perhaps the way to language has been barred. Perhaps. Much of Celan's poetry is a plea to nonetheless seek the way. In poems such as "*Todesfüge*," "*Stimmen*," "*Engführung*" and "*Es War Erde in Ihnen*"[461] Celan's cry of despair approaches the beauty of song. Perhaps, as Adorno said, "To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric."[462] Perhaps all art is trash and perhaps beauty itself is vulgar. Perhaps, to echo Heraclitus, there is another form of beauty to be found even within this trash.[463] If we do not try to dig through the rubble, we will never know.

[461] GW 1:41-43; 147-149;197-204, 211. Any number of Celan's poems could be mentioned as an example of extremely lyrical expressions of despair, mourning, and hope. I highlight these four, here at the end, first because their masterful expression of these themes is widely acknowledged, and secondly because I think that they represent the starting point of a way of figuring mourning and trauma specifically into the elemental figuration of poetry and philosophy as we have been investigating it in Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Celan.
[462] Adorno, Theodor. "Cultural Criticism and Society," 34.
[463] Heraclitus, Fragment 124 reads: "*all hosper sarma eike kechumenon ho kallistos kosmos*," which Heidegger translates as "The most beautiful world is like a dungheap, cast down in shambles" (*IM*, 142).

Conclusion: Reconciliation

For Friedrich Hölderlin, words were capable of being "deadly factual."[464] His poetry, his philosophical writings, and his investigations of Greek tragedy all testify to how profoundly he felt the weight of language, the force behind the imprint our linguistic practices leave upon the world. He shared this outlook with his contemporary G.W.F. Hegel, whose philosophy traces the force of the mind onto the most minute operations of the world. All this perceived weight notwithstanding, Karl Marx had little trouble managing to turn the word on its head and show that it was the world that weighed down on words. Milan Kundera designates this topsy turvy vertigo as "the unbearable lightness of being." This lightness is first and foremost the light-headedness of not being able to decide whether "being" was light or heavy, whether or not the weight of the world, and of words, was all in our heads.

I do not think that Martin Heidegger provides us with an answer to the question of the weight of words, or even of the modern value of the life of the mind, although he assumes both. What interests me in Heidegger is that his stubborn insistence on asking the anachronistic question concerning the meaning of being elucidates the question of the weight of words in interesting, unexpected, untimely ways. More to the point, I think that his style of asking the question dramatizes the experience of the vertigo of wondering about how our intellectual lives effect the way we live in the world. This is evident in his ambivalent stance towards modernity, in his obsession with the strange Greeks that he discovers in Hölderlin and in his whole-hearted embrace of the holy coupled with a skeptical attitude towards "God." In these ways, we find a

[464] *Essays and Letters on Theory*, 113.

way of thinking traumatized by the precarious position of the intellect, even if he never succeeded in recognizing the traumatic character of the deadly-factual world.

For me the most important results of this experience are the tentative steps toward a theory of modern art, emancipated from its politicized position, strung between the equally politicized alternatives of being ideological and regressive and being progressive and avant-garde. Such a theory is hinted at in the poetic determination of the essence of art, and in the submission of the question concerning being to the experience of art (and vice-versa). My goal in reading Heidegger has been to dissociate this theory from the dangerously regressive and nationalistic tendencies to which it is tied by Heidegger's pedagogical placement of the human being.

This way of reading has forced me into the somewhat counter-intuitive position of having to tentatively disown the exclusive primacy of the investigation of the being of the human being, Dasein. I have sought to tell a story about the development of the lyrical poem in which the human being is manifest only metonymically as the subject of the poem and as such is subordinated to the constellation of meanings that coalesce in the poem as a whole. Such a theory of the poem seeks to develop a robust theory of multiplicity where the alternative between the ideal and the material content of the poem is rendered moot along with its ideological and revolutionary functions. The activities of both ideology and revolution seem to me to be too implicated in the violence of daily political life to clarify the role that the life of the mind might play in healing the wounds it has inflicted and that have been inflicted upon it. The theory of ambiguity and indecision that I have attempted to articulate in place of the lyrical subject or of Dasein is intended to sweep these concerns to a strange place where they can be tentatively

reconfigured in the name of a utopic peace. While I do not know if this idea is ultimately compatible with Heidegger's hope for a new, saving word borne of the return of the gods, I believe that his ontological investigation of language in light of this hope can be put into the service of this lyrical configuration of deconstruction.

What lay behind the keen interest of both Hölderlin and Hegel in probing the "deadly-factual" word was the desire for a word which would reconcile and heal. I have followed Paul Celan in thinking of this word as a counter-factual word and have turned to his poetry with the hope of discovering the trace of such a word, as I think he himself did. I believe that he wrote out of the hope of such a word. I believe that his interest in Heidegger's philosophy, despite all the failings of "Heidegger's philosophy" and despite the even grosser failings of its author, lay in Celan's recognition that Heidegger's philosophy perhaps contained such a hope.

I have treated Celan's poetry as a search for the trace of the counter-factual word. Such a word, if it were to exist, would actually heal us in the same way that the deadly-factual word "truly kills."[465] If such a word does not exist, and in a world so marked by injustice we have every reason to expect that it does not, perhaps there is something to be gained by nonetheless commemorating its traces. The counter-word is more than hope: it is oriented more to the present than the future. The counter-word is more than mourning: in its figures, what is past lives on. In mourning, the counter-word is supremely hopeful. I have attempted to describe Celan's poetical figuration of the counter-word as the confluence of the past and the future in a

[465] *Ibid*.

present which looks at and judges the untenable situation of the present instead of getting hopelessly tangled up in it.

I have attempted to show how Celan envisions this critical function of poetry in his prose and also how he articulates it in the self-reflexive character of his poetry. I have stopped short, however, of asking to what extent Celan's poetry succeeds in accomplishing such a reconciliation. Let me briefly suggest some ways in which this could be further investigated.

As we have seen, Celan is thoroughly attuned to that thread of Heidegger's thought which seeks to adapt Hölderlin's fourfold (earth, heaven, mortals, and gods) to the work of ontology. In his own appropriation of these themes, Celan reminds Heidegger that the fourfold also brings the stain of the ontic into the ontological. It seems to me that a more rigorous development of the ontological import of Celan's poetical dialogue with Heidegger could investigate this stain in three potentially productive ways:

1. **The Elemental Power of Words**. Celan's most famous poem, "*Todesfuge*" ("Death-Fugue") speaks of the "ashes" of the hair of the victims of the Shoah, ashes which rise to heaven and stain it black (*GW*, 1:41-42). But it also sings the song in which they might be sheltered and buried. The poem immediately became a document in the cultural wars of reconciliation and guilt, denial, forgiveness and blame. Celan came to regret its way of phrasing his experience of suffering, and he attempted to "rewrite" it in his longest poem, "*Engführung*" ("Narrowing") which closes the collection *Sprachgitter* (*GW*, 1:197-204). But this rewriting does not undo "Death Fugue." Rather it multiplies the elements in which violence, suffering, memory and poetry are encoded by setting these blackened heavens in relation to the mass-grave of the earth. This rewriting is itself strung along towards the beginning of *Sprachgitter* where

another uncharacteristically long poem, "*Stimmen*" ("Voices") describes the water as the burial place for a whole antediluvian race (*GW*, 1:147-149). Between these three important poems, Celan begins the work of writing the world into the words of his poetry. And this work continues in many of his other poems. I have already stated why I think this poetic activity contains the hope of reawakening the power of words in a distinctively modern way, but the extent to which this work is accomplished in his poetry still needs to be investigated.

2. **The death of God, The Return of God/The Gods, The Growth of God out of Death**. I believe that I have investigated this dimension of Celan's reconfiguration of the fourfold in my own exposition of Celan. Throughout the collection *Die Niemandsrose*, the presence of God is invoked in the absence of God. Nonetheless, something like God remains. What are these remains like? This question attunes the question of the poetic determination of the sky and of the heavens. For Roberto Calasso, the reinvigoration of words that I have been tracing has already happened through the return of the gods. If we grant that this describes a real phenomenon in the cultural life of Europe and its colonies, we must nonetheless follow Celan in insisting on raising two questions. First, have the gods survived our barbarity, or have they died along with all of the victims of "the West?" In essence, this is another way of phrasing the question of the power of words and of intellectual and literary life. But secondly, what are we to make of the presence of a God or gods who seem so willing to trade on death? Do we want to invite such presences into our lives? In this respect, I think that Celan remains fundamentally tragic. His invocation of God continually asks whether the divine has come to save us or to lead us to our doom. But the stakes of this question, as well as the difference between a tragic polytheism and Celan's fundamentally monotheistic treatment of God, remain to be examined.

3. **The Song of the Animal Beyond Humankind.** My treatment of Celan has focused primarily, but not exclusively, on Celan's early and middle poetry. But one of the most interesting features of Celan's late poetry, one which has not been particularly well investigated, is the turn to animality, technological imagery, and an almost mechanistic biology in his later poetry, particularly in the collection *Fadensonnen* ("Thread-suns"). The title is taken from a poem in *Atemwende*, which ends: "*Es sind noch Lieder zu Singen jenseits der Menschen*" ("There remain songs to sing beyond humankind" *GW*, 2:26). Both of my previous questions turn on the activity of poetry, both as song and as literature. Now, these become the song of something beyond humankind. Such a claim is extremely Nietzschean. To turn to the song of the animal in Celan's later poetry would be to turn towards the lyricism of Nietzsche, which I have had to pass over in order to adequately deal with Heidegger's (very non-lyrical) Nietzsche.[466] While I think this was necessary in order to discover the operation of thought and poetry beyond the individual poem, I think that the thought of Nietzsche (and Celan's appropriation of Nietzsche) remains critical to developing the individual style of such a thoughtful lyricism. However, for Nietzsche, lyricism is inseparable from musicality, and Celan's poetry is uncharacteristically musical for a high modernist. Ultimately, asking about the song of the animal might force us to leave the dialogue of thinker and poet, which cannot help but downplay the beauty of the artwork, in favor of a different way of investigating the world of sounds, light, and colors. This might be the most extreme result of a lyrical interpretation of Heidegger because it would push the displacement of the human being to its logical conclusion, situating her in the world of animals who do not share with her the capacity for *logos*. Perhaps it would

[466] For an example of a treatment of these themes which does not pass over the lyrical Nietzsche see *Words in Blood, Like Flowers*. There, Babette Babich attends explicitly to the musicality inherent in Nietzsche's theory of lyricism to open onto a reading of Heidegger and Hölderlin. See particularly 3-18, 37-54.

force us to reconsider meaning, thought, and history in the light of nature, to which they belong. It remains to be seen what impact such a naturalization of genre would have on the meaning of art or art's capacity for generation and on the capacity of art to represent or otherwise deal with natural generation. Does there remain an art that deals with desire and birth, sexuality and beauty, beyond the dead-ends we humans have worked ourselves into?

These three paths seem to me to be ways to follow Celan's pursuit of the trace of the reconciling word. Such paths exist between hope and memory as an alternative form of presence. While such paths need to be followed, for the sake of reconciliation, Heidegger's example is instructive in one more way. We must keep in mind that the path to the deadly-factual world might seem similar to the path to the reconciling counter-factual world. Celan's recognition of the intrusion of the deadly-factual world on the path of reconciliation should serve as a cautionary tale for anyone who wants to take seriously a philosophy as implicated in violence and totalitarianism as Heidegger's. In an unpublished poem which tried to deal with the pain of writing about trauma, Celan confesses to his mother, whose murder he has just invoked:

> *Gestern*
> *kam einer von ihnen und*
> *tötete dich*
> *zum andern Mal in*
> *meinem Gedicht. (GW*, 7:46).
>
> Yesterday
> one of them came and
> killed you
> once more in
> my poem (*PPC*, 443).

If the poem seeks to find the way to peace, the dangers that it risks in its invocation of such fearsome ghosts must be kept in mind. But we must hope that if the poem can once again kill, perhaps it can also sometimes write its way free.

Appendix: Poems of Paul Celan

Dein Hinübersein heute Nacht. Mit Worten holt ich dich wieder, da bist du, alles ist wahr und ein Warten auf Wahres. Es klettert die Bohne vor unserm Fenster: denk wer neben uns aufwächst und ihr zusieht Gott, das lasen wir, ist ein Teil und ein zweiter, zerstreuter: im Tod all der Gemähten wächst er sich zu. Dorthin führt uns der Blick, mit dieser Hälfte haben wir Umgang. (GW 1, 218).	Your Being far out there on this night. With words I brought you back, there you are, All is true and awaiting the truth. There's a beanstalk climbing in front Of our window: think who grows up by us and watches it. God, so we we've gathered, is one part and a second, scattered: in the death of all that's mowed down he grows into himself. That's where the look leads us, with this half we have our relations.

WITH ALL THAT IS THOUGHT I went
Far out from the world: There you were,
You my soft one, you my open one, and –
You received us.

Who
says, that it all went dead,
when our eyes failed?
All awakened, all taken up.

Giant, a sun came swimming, bright
stood soul opposite soul, clear,
domineering they silenced it
upon its path.

With ease
your womb opened up, silently
a breath rose up in the aether,
and what formed a cloud, was it not,
was it not figure and of our own stuff,
was it not
as good as a name?

MIT ALLEN GEDANKEN ging ich
hinaus aus der Welt: das warst du,
du meine Leise, du meine Offne, und -
du empfingst uns.

Wer
sagt, daß uns alles erstarb,
da uns das Auge brach?
Alles erwachte, alles hob an.

Groß kam eine Sonne geschwommen, hell
standen ihre Seele und Seele entgegen, klar,
gebieterisch schwiegen sie ihr
ihre Bahn vor.

Leicht
tat sich dein Schoß auf, still
stieg ein Hauch in den Äther,
und was sich wölkte, wars nicht,
wars nicht Gestalt und von uns her,
wars nicht
so gut wie ein Name?

(GW 1, 221)

Schliere	Streak
Schliere im Aug: von den Blicken auf halbem Weg erschautes Verloren. Wirklichgesponnenes Niemals, wiedergekehrt Wege, halb – und die längsten Seelenbeschrittene Fäden, Glasspur, rückwärtsgerollt und non vom Augen-Du auf dem steten Stern über dir weiβ überschleiert. Schliere im Aug: daβ bewahrt sei ein durchs Dunkel getragenes Zeichen, vom Sand (oder Eis?) einer fremden Zeit für ein fremderes Immer Belebt und als stumm Vibrierender Mitlaut gestimmt. (GW 1, 159)	Streak in the eye: lostness come to sight through the glances on the half path. neverness spun of what's real, turned back around. Ways, half --- and the longest. Soul-trodden threads, glass trace, rolled backwards and now from You-Eye to the constant star above you o'erstreaked with whiteness. Streak in the eye: That may hold true a sign dragged through the dark, Quickened from the sand (or the ice?) of a foreign Time for a more foreign Ever and tuned to a dumb vibrating consonance.

Ein Blatt, baumlos für Berthold Brecht: Was sind das für Zeiten wo ein Gespräch beinah ein Verbrechen ist weil es so viel Gesagtes mit Einschliesst? (GW 2,385)	A LEAF, treeless, for Berthold Brecht, What sort of times are these where a conversation is nearly a crime because it contains so much that's been said?

TODTNAUBERG	TODTNAUBERG
Arnika, Augentrost, der Trunk aus dem Brunnen mit dem Sternwürfel drauf, in der Hütte, die in das Buch --- wessen Namen nahms auf vor dem meinem? ---, die in dies Buch geschriebene Zeile von einer Hoffnung, heute, auf eines Denkenden kommendes Wort im Herzsen, Waldwasen, uneingeebnet, Orchis und Orchis, einzeln, Krudes, spatter, im Fahren, deutlich, de runs fährt, der Mensch, der’s mit anhört, die halb- beschrittened Knüppel- pfade in Hochmoore, Feuchtes, viel. (GW 2, 255-256).	Arnica, eye-bright, the drink from the well with the star-die on top. in the hut, there in the book --- whose names did it take up before mine? ---, in this book the line written of a hope, today, for a thinking word to come in the heart, Forest meadows, left uneven, orchid and orchid, singly, Raw, later, while driving clear, Who drives us, the man, who hears it also, The half- trodden log- paths on the high moor, Wetness, lots.

ICH TRINK WEIN aus zwei Gläsern *und zackere an* *der Königzäsur* *wie Jener am Pindar,* *Gott gibt die Stimmgabel ab* *als einer der kleinen* *Gerechten,* *Aus der Lostrommel fällt* *unser Deut* (GW 3, 108).	I DRINK WINE from two glasses and plow away at the royal caesura As One did at Pindar God gives his tuning fork up as one of the little just ones. From fate's drum falls our insignificant lot

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